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FOREWORD
As Kosovo demonstrates, the United States is and will
continue to be deeply engaged in the security of the
Mediterranean Basin. Moreover, we will participate in shaping
benevolent outcomes there with our allies and partners. Indeed,
the United States cannot do otherwise since the multiple
challenges to regional security in that area are so diverse and
numerous. For these reasons, we must engage our allies and
partners in an ongoing dialogue over the nature of security
challenges, their perceptions of them, and the most effective ways
to address them.
The papers included in this volume represent just such an
effort to lay a firmer foundation for this continuing dialogue and
to bring together different points of view. In October 1998, the
Strategic Studies Institute, assisted by Pepperdine University,
assembled a distinguished group of analysts from the United
States, Europe, and the Middle East, in Florence, Italy. At a
conference titled “Mediterranean Security into the Coming
Millennium,” the task of the participants was to address current
regional security issues in the Balkans, Middle East, and the
Aegean, as well as the perceptions of the individual states, the
relevant security organizations, NATO and the European Union,
and the players and major external actors like the United States
and Russia. These papers cover the many areas discussed at the
conference and should advance the debate on Mediterranean
security both in the United States and abroad.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this
compendium as a contribution to the international dialogue on
these issues.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Stephen J. Blank

At present, U.S. air, naval, and ground forces stand
guard across the Mediterranean and perform multiple
missions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Kosovo
operation is only the largest and most prominent of these
combat or combat-related missions. However, the scope of
American civil and military engagement in the
Mediterranean basin is enormous and growing. And as the
Kosovo operation increasingly appears to encompass a
wholesale restructuring of the Balkan sub-regional security
system, that scope will only expand further. Therefore,
across the Mediterranean the number of troops on active
deployment and their missions will probably increase.
This growth in U.S. engagement clearly pertains to our
NATO allies as well, and not just in Kosovo. Even before
that operation, they had forces in Bosnia due to the Dayton
treaty. Both NATO and the European Union (EU) had
begun systematic programs of security dialogues with other
Mediterranean states in North Africa and the Middle East
because of multiple challenges to the security of those
organizations’ member states. While those challenges are
not strictly or even primarily military ones, many member
states regard them as the fundamental blocks to regional
security. If a lasting structure of peace is to evolve in the
Mediterranean basin as a whole, Europe must engage those
governments across a wide-ranging agenda of economic,
social, political, military, and ecological issues. For these
reasons, Mediterranean missions play an enormous role in
current U.S. defense and foreign policies and will continue
to be essential for our armed forces for some time.

1

However, even after the Kosovo operation began, the
range and extent of the issues that we and our allies and
partners must grapple with remain poorly understood and
little known. Second, it is clear that so extensive a security
agenda requires multilateral efforts and therefore
continuing dialogue among all the players if cooperative and
mutually beneficial solutions are to emerge. Most, if not all,
security problems there, as Brigadier General John Batiste
(USA) of AFSOUTH’s Policy and Plans Division observed,
1
are not military ones but economic and political. Civilian
and military professionals must also share their insights
and experience through such dialogues to clarify and
publicize the issues and the interrelationships among them.
Apart from “trans-Mediterranean” issues, e.g., economic
relations among Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa,
we find many instances of intra-state security where states
are at risk, and far too many cases of sub-regional and
transnational challenges to security. For example, the
regional agenda goes from Algeria’s civil strife or Turkey’s
Kurdish insurgency to include Lebanon, the peace process,
Israel’s overall relations with its Arab neighbors, the whole
Balkan cauldron, pervasive economic backwardness
throughout most of the former Ottoman empire, the use of
the Middle East and Balkans as an area of growing
transnational crime including narcotics trafficking,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and, of course,
the activities of the great powers in areas of long-standing
rivalry and intervention.
For these reasons, the Strategic Studies Institute and
Pepperdine University sponsored an international
conference, “Mediterranean Security into the Coming
Millennium,” attended by civilians and military
professionals from the United States, Europe, and the
Middle East and held in Florence, Italy, on October 26-27,
1998. Even before international violence erupted in and
over Kosovo (i.e., the civil war between the Serbian
government and the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA] was
already in progress), it was clear that dialogue was urgently

2

needed. Therefore the conference brought participants
together to discuss many of these challenges to security. The
papers that follow are some of those that were presented,
but the conference agenda was even broader. Besides the
papers that follow and a separate monograph on
transnational threats such as drugs, terrorism, and
proliferation, by Anthony Cordesman, the participants
discussed the Arab side of the Israel-Arab relationship; the
then recent Wye River Agreement between Israel and the
2
Palestinian National Authority (PNA); and arms control.
The discussions were lively, spirited, and probing. Those
discussions and the papers provide a basis for further
international dialogue and engagement across continents
and among civilians and military professionals. A second
purpose of the conference was to engage the U.S. Army with
regional institutions and experts in an ongoing dialogue on
these issues; without such a dialogue the Army’s and the
West’s ability to forge appropriate responses to future
challenges will be undermined. That outcome would have a
strongly negative impact upon Western security since
NATO and the other organizations that provide security in
and around Europe are already heavily engaged in the area.
As General Klaus Naumann, Chairman of NATO’s Military
Committee, has written,
It is in NATO and Europe’s interest to keep conflicts at a
distance and to cope with new risks which may no longer be the
military risks we are accustomed to. It is for this very reason
that NATO focuses its attention on the security in the
Mediterranean and its periphery together with the Southern
3
Region, which is today NATO’s most endangered region.

The need for such dialogues will grow as the engagement
of the United States, either alone or with its allies and
partners, grows. Without a better insight into the needs,
interests, and views of our interlocutors, we are apt to
stumble into a morass based on excessive unilateralism and
triumphalism. And once so trapped, as in Kosovo, there may
be no way out other than through a forceful military
operation. This is not merely academic speculation.
3

Indeed, there are those, like Ambassador Matthew
Nimetz, who argue that a U.S.-led Pax NATO is about to
descend on the entire region. As Nimetz wrote, a clear U.S.
commitment to remaining a military power here will
markedly enhance regional security. This is also true for the
major NATO powers: France, Germany, Italy, Great
4
Britain, Spain, Greece, and Turkey. To maintain regional
security, NATO must not only integrate the entire region
into the Western economy and foster the development of
“pluralistic institutions,” NATO must also grasp the
military nettle.
The Pax NATO is the only logical regime to maintain security in
the traditional sense. As NATO maintains its dominant role in
the Mediterranean, it must recognize a need for the expansion of
its stabilizing influence in adjacent areas, particularly in
Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea region (in concert, of
course, with the regional powers, primarily Russia, Ukraine,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) and in the Arabian/Persian
Gulf. The United States must continue to play the major role in
this security system. The Sixth Fleet will be the vehicle to
implement this commitment for years to come, although this is
5
something that might be reviewed some time down the road.

However, upon closer examination, the problems of
Mediterranean security do not appear to point to so
clear-cut a resolution of future issues. And, as Kosovo shows
us, NATO was unready to assume this responsibility or
shoulder the burden of adequately supervising a regional
peace so that war would not again break out. Indeed,
challenges to the West as a whole and to the United States
in particular may rise in the future beyond our ability to
deal with them comprehensively. Kosovo shows the many
problems that we now face in trying to execute Nimetz’s
mandate. And the fact that our engagement in Bosnia will
not end anytime soon also will undoubtedly test NATO’s
staying power.

4

Mediterranean Security: The Issues.
To discuss Mediterranean security is to enter a
conceptual minefield. Nor are these merely academic
disputes. Definitional issues are deeply relevant to policy
because any definition of the terms “Mediterranean” and
“security” shapes the nature of our cognitive and policy
responses to local challenges. Nor do these definitional
issues pertain solely to U.S. forces. Precisely because the
Mediterranean overlaps Asia, Africa, and Europe, our
commitments there are often multilateral ones that involve
NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), or bilateral partners like Morocco, Egypt,
and Israel.
Thus our Mediterranean policies and domestic
discussions about them take place in a context of
multilateral and international debates and contending
approaches to the problems of Mediterranean security.
Without a shared understanding of the scope and nature of
the issues we are facing, we will find ourselves unable to act
alone or in concert with our allies and partners. If the
United States or its armed forces disengages from regular
concerted dialogues with its prospective regional partners,
it will lose much of its standing and ability to shape
responses to local security challenges. In that case,
dissension rather than consensus will be the order of the day
among our allies and partners, not to mention other
interested parties. Instead of unity, challengers to local
security will find Western disunity and arguments.
Quarrels, not common undertakings, will reflect the nature
of NATO, OSCE, and EU policy, as in the fiasco of Europe’s
and Washington’s Bosnia policies until 1995 and the Dayton
Peace Process or, more recently, Kosovo.
The visible discord among our NATO allies in the Kosovo
crisis even after the operation began is very much due to the
fact that their concepts of what must be done and what kind
of outcomes are desirable diverge sharply from ours. This
divergence is one of the primary causes of the difficulties we
5
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have faced regarding the Kosovo crisis in 1998-99. A more
informed and continuing dialogue among NATO members
on Balkan issues in general and this one in particular might
have averted this sorry spectacle. Sadly, Kosovo is only the
latest in a long list of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern
crises where inter-allied discord has hamstrung U.S.
7
policy.
Clearly this lesson must be constantly in our mind
because it all too often is not one that sufficiently commands
our elite’s attention. Europe resents American
unilateralism, and the United States is quick to cite
8
Europe’s seeming paralysis. But Europe’s “paralysis”
stems as much from a growing perceptual gap between our
allies and ourselves over the nature of security and
challenges to it, as from diverging responses to those
challenges. Therefore dialogue and discussion, not an
arrogant know-it-all posture or self-righteous universalism
and excessive faith in the use of long-distance, intense, but
short-term military power, is the preferred answer to
challenges to international security.
At the conference it rapidly became clear that the very
terms “Mediterranean” and “security” are problematic and
contentious in nature. When we say the word
“Mediterranean,” do we imply a strict geographical
construction to include only those countries whose shores
comprise the Mediterranean Sea’s coastlines from Portugal
and Morocco to Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt?
Or do we include whole regions attached to those coastlines,
the entire Balkan peninsula, the entire Middle East to the
Gulf, and beyond that the Black Sea littoral? After all, as
Ambassador Luigi Ferraris observed in his keynote speech,
the latter was colonized to some degree by the Greeks, the
Romans, and later the Venetians. None of these colonizing
9
peoples’ Mediterranean affiliations are open to question.
By this standard, and it seems to be materializing before our
eyes, Black Sea security issues must already play an
important role in any consideration of the Mediterranean’s
security agenda. Thus definitions of the Mediterranean as a
6

“security space” or “spaces” are subject to political definition
as well as historical evolution. And even if we can
satisfactorily provide a regional geographical definition so
that all security providers agree on the territorial scope of
their responsibility to provide security (whatever that
means), can we also agree then that there is some
overarching generic “Mediterranean” quality to the region?
That is, can we conceptually and thus practically
organize our efforts and those of our alliances to create a
single regional security system or structure? Or is it rather
the case that the diversity of challenges to security across
the entire space we have previously defined is so great that
any unifying or uniform regional approach is foredoomed to
failure and is inherently an absurd undertaking? For
instance, Mario Zucconi argues that the Mediterranean
space is not a unitary geopolitical realm and that in the
absence of the galvanizing Soviet threat, allied
interventions throughout the area must now be rationalized
10
on a case-by-case basis. Accordingly, a sub-regional
approach that sharply differentiates between the
challenges to security in the Balkans and the Arab-Israeli
peace process must be the order of the day. Thus the search
for a unifying and uniform strategic principle behind our
operations in the Mediterranean is as elusive there as it is
elsewhere.
And if the heterogeneity of threats to security is what
distinguishes the region, can we deal with them through
some form of sub-regional organizations? What form would
those organizations take and what issues would they
address? Furthermore, by what principle would we define
the sub-regions and those states who can contribute to the
region or sub-region’s greater security? Is there a basis for
lumping together Israel and Mauritania in the EU’s and
NATO’s ongoing Mediterranean dialogue? Does the limping
NATO-Mediterranean dialogue proceed on the same basis
and should it do so? Does geography or some other attribute
qualify for membership in such debates and fora? And is this
a satisfactory way of organizing the Mediterranean littoral
7

for any kind of security challenge? Evidence suggests that
Israel, for example, finds such a structuring of the security
11
process to be deeply problematical. And it probably is not
alone in doing so although other states will have their own
reasons for such dissatisfaction with the Western approach.
And these questions are hardly the only such issues of
conceptualization and practical organization to bedevil
efforts to enhance security. Whether one looks at the EU’s
Barcelona Initiative directed to the states upon the
southern coast of the Mediterranean, or to NATO’s
Mediterranean dialogue, one finds little progress but
continuing mutual suspicion and mistrust between North
and South. Observers also discern within these processes
mutual mistrust among the southern states, most
strikingly, but not exclusively, in fora where Israel and Arab
states would logically participate together on an equal
12
basis.
At the same time the Greco-Turkish controversy is
heating up, with each side’s senior statesmen denouncing
13
the other in highly inflammatory terms as “outlaw states.”
Professor Duygu Sezer’s paper stresses that Turkish
policymakers and elites feel surrounded by threats, not just
Europe’s rejection of Turkey’s claim to membership in the
14
EU and thus to an identity as a fully European state. Yet
other analysts write about Turkish policy in terms of
Turkish high-handedness and confidence in striking
15
truculent poses. Who is right, and how do we square this
circle? This too is not an academic point. Getting Turkey
right is crucial to consolidating security in many troubled
areas of the post-Cold War world. For example, 10 years
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the barriers separating
north from south remain deeply entrenched, and the
identity of what constitutes Europe remains a matter of
intense contention and dispute. Turkey’s attempt to enter
the EU is a powerful emblem of those barriers and the
salience of disputes over Europe’s identity.
As Zucconi and many others have observed, NATO may
be adapting its military structures, but its governments still
8

cannot reach consensus on how, where, and when to
intervene abroad. European governments are not ready to
spend money for the proliferating new contingencies in the
area that make up the bulk of current U.S. operations. Thus
even before Kosovo it was obvious that resources were
dwindling while operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and the
16
number of contingencies were increasing. Kosovo’s results
to date only confirmed many of the problems that will
instantly arise due to the underfinancing of an
overstretched NATO and U.S. military. Nor are these the
only challenges to allied cohesion and comprehension of
what must be done in the region. As Zucconi writes,
And possibly, the main problem is not so much the dwindling
budget and reduced force structure, as much as the lack of
overall, articulated strategies and of clear determination to be
engaged in upholding stability in this area. In fact, there is
much improvisation and, in large measure, inability to come
into the crisis before the issue becomes an intractable one. In
interviews with this author in Brussels in June, 1998, about
what to do and when to act in regard to Kosovo, several senior
officials and military officers started by warning that the
arrival of Christiane Amanpour, the CNN reporter, in
Pristina, meant that NATO “had to do something”—needless
to say, an indication of [the] lack of overall policies, of strategic
17
planning, and even of well-defined mandates.

And beyond the issues involved in defining and
conceptualizing the Mediterranean, we encounter
arguments over what security should mean and its
definition. And again this is not an academic issue since the
definition of security will furnish statesmen with their
intellectual guide to policymaking for achieving that
condition. Indeed, today the very notion of security itself is
deeply contested, and the divisions over its meaning both
cause and reflect the Alliance’s inner confusion and discord.
For NATO as an organization, as U.S. General Batiste made
clear, the main sources of challenges and threats to security
18
reside in economic-political structures and their defects.
Classical studies on security interpreted security strictly in
terms of the defense of the integrity, independence, and
9

sovereignty of a territory and state. The word security
applied almost exclusively to military security. That is no
longer the case. Security as a concept and as the goal of
day-to-day policy is becoming ever more civilianized as are
its practitioners. And NATO evidently accepts this trend as
legitimate and as an accurate reflection of reality. Security
also is increasingly used as a comprehensive term denoting
policies across a broad range of governmental and
inter-governmental activity that can fairly be described as
19
being of unprecedented scope. In Europe those responsible
for security policy and those who contribute to the public
discourse on it are increasingly disinclined to see the utility
of military force as an answer to problems short of invasion
or to fund it as we think they should. The term security now
applies to economics, environmental security, societal
security (or social but not our old age program) and so
20
forth. But in this context of an expanding definition of
security that encompasses virtually all aspects of organized
social life, what becomes NATO’s role? After all, these kinds
of issues are not those for which NATO is most equipped to
deal with. But if NATO cannot effectively provide security
in these domains and must wait for an explosion before
acting, who then can and will provide security in any sense
of the term? And can we find mechanisms by which to avert
explosions or to anticipate crises? Here Zucconi and Roberto
Aliboni seconded General Batiste by highlighting the need
for the effective deployment of economic power as a sine qua
non of any effective Western response to Mediterranean
21
security challenges. Yet at the same time, the EU’s rather
inhibited dialogues with the Mediterranean countries
betrays hesitation, mutual incomprehension, and mutual
suspicion as both Aliboni and especially Professor
22
Mohammad El-Selim cogently argued.
Egypt is hardly the only country that has a grievance
against the EU. Israel is certainly dissatisfied with the
progress of the EU’s Barcelona dialogue, and Turkey’s
anger at its exclusion from the EU has been extensively
23
displayed publicly. Worse yet, as Sezer, Theodore

10

Couloumbis, and R. Craig Nation all indicated, Turkey’s
entry into the EU is formally tied to progress on its
relationship with Greece and the resolution of the Cyprus
24
issue. Thus the EU’s effectiveness as a vehicle for
integrating Turkey, and beyond that the Middle East, is
severely limited from the start. As Couloumbis stated,
Greece now openly declares its willingness to lift its objections
(given its veto power in the EU) to the building of a close
relationship between the EU and Turkey, provided the latter
abandons its threats of going to war over the Aegean question
and contributes substantively toward a functional and
mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus question
permitting the reunification of Cyprus as a federal, bizonal,
and bicommunal state that is also a member of the European
25
Union and NATO.

Since even this quite moderate presentation of Greece’s
position puts or appears to put the onus of action wholly
upon Turkey, it is unlikely to provide a satisfactory basis for
resolving the issue. Thus the EU’s failures and the linkage
of Turkish entry to the bilateral political conflict will
weaken NATO’s cohesion and open the way to mischief
makers of all sorts in the area. As R. Craig Nation pointed
out, the Cyprus issue is thus tied to other, larger issues of
both bilateral and regional security in the Eastern
26
Mediterranean. Already, as Stephen Blank observed,
Russia’s efforts to sell arms to both Greece and Cyprus are
clearly motivated, at least in part, by a desire to fan the
27
conflict’s flames and weaken NATO by splitting it.
Thus it would seem from these papers, and from the
unhappy Bosnian and Kosovo experiences, that Europe still
has not addressed with sufficient seriousness what it itself
considers to be the root challenges of security through the
EU, the organization most suited to deal with economic
security issues. Kosovo may change that as the EU now
appears to be moving to create a more comprehensive
program of socio-economic reconstruction for the Balkan
regional economy which has been devastated by almost 8
years of constant warfare in and around the former
11

28

Yugoslavia. And if the EU is somehow remiss in meeting
its responsibilities, how can NATO make up the security
deficit in places like the Balkans? Or should it even try?
At the same time, the emphasis in Europe on threats
stemming from underdeveloped Mediterranean economies’
failure to modernize clashes with the U.S. tendency to see
threats in more purely military terms and unilateralist
approaches. And as we have seen in Bosnia and Kosovo,
these differing or clashing perspectives inhibit rapid and
unified allied or European response. Those disputes strain
our relations with our allies and possibilities for effective
coalition building and maintenance. Recently Italian Prime
Minister Massimo D’Alema wrote that Italy, by virtue of the
threats it faced from uncontrolled migration, drug running,
29
and so on, was a front-line state. While the humanitarian
disaster in the wake of the Kosovo operation may increase
our understanding of this perspective, his remarks remain
jarring or dissonant to American ears since the term
“front-line state” clearly denotes a state that is actively
threatened in its vital interests by an opposing military
force, not migrants fleeing for their lives. And if his analysis
is true, NATO cannot do much to prevent these challenges
to Italian security.
Until now the EU has been unwilling to act on its own to
sponsor the rapid economic integration of Eastern Europe,
Southeastern Europe, or the Middle East with Western
Europe. As Stephen Calleya warned, there is the danger
that European dialogues with the South may come to be
seen as an exercise in boundary maintenance—fencing off
30
the South from the North—not integration.
By all
accounts, the EU’s Barcelona process and the EU’s
Mediterranean Dialogue appear to be marking time. And
NATO’s parallel dialogue with Mediterranean states does
not appear to be flourishing either. As Alberto Bin of
NATO’s Political Affairs Division and Secretary-General
Javier Solana have both stated, the success of this initiative
depends on developments in two other fora which are deeply
troubled or just marking time, the peace process between
12

Israel and the Arabs, and the EU’s Barcelona Process or
31
Euro-Mediterranean Program.
Meanwhile, the two most acute crisis areas seem to be
the Middle East and the Balkans. The Florence conference
took place immediately after the Wye River Agreement in
Maryland between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in
October 1998. Just to get this agreement on paper required
a stupendous exertion of American diplomatic activity and
appeals from the dying King Hussein of Jordan. Yet, as
Robert Freedman and Gerald Steinberg both pointed out, it
was not likely that this accord would constitute the decisive
impetus to bring the two sides closer to peace. Domestic
factors in Israel and the PNA, as well as the intense legacy
of suspicion built up over the years, would probably obstruct
much more progress. And the subsequent fall of the Israeli
government of Prime Minister Netanyahu and the
suspension of progress until elections in May 1999 validated
32
their insights. Failure to advance the peace process will
likely diminish the U.S. standing in the area, for such a
stalemate as well as the depth of the U.S. involvement in the
Israeli political process could lead Israel or other states to
look for alternatives to the stifling U.S. presence. Not
surprisingly, a quite recent rapprochement between
Jerusalem and Moscow seems to be emerging, in part for
33
this reason.
Neither do the difficulties of establishing peace in the
Middle East end here. Sami Hajjar’s discussion of the
Lebanon triangle illustrates that fact. As long as the
Lebanon issue remains unresolved with Israeli and Syrian
forces both exercising an occupation or hegemony over part
or all of the country and its government, terrorist attacks by
Hizballah against Israeli armed forces in the south with
Syrian and Iranian support will continue. But since Syria
has no incentive to negotiate Israel’s way out of this and
accommodate Israel that is taking heavy losses but cannot
find any satisfactory way to retreat without endangering its
own territory, the conflict will go on. Under those
circumstances, it cannot be ruled out that the conflict in
13

Lebanon could trigger a wider war as almost happened in
1975-76, 1982, and 1996. As Hajjar observed, Israel is now
bogged down and trapped in one of the many low intensity or
unconventional conflicts now taking place throughout the
world. If its leadership cannot find an alternative solution,
it may have to withdraw unilaterally, but that may not
34
produce more security for itself or Lebanon either. Thus it
is entirely possible that war will go on here for a long time
and poison the security environment for all concerned,
including the United States. After all, our own recent
memories of Lebanon are not happy ones, and it is unlikely
we will intervene with force. But is it in American interests
or within our capacity to remain aloof or disengaged from
this process? On the other hand, if we cannot disengage
from the peace process without serious losses to our
interests and regional standing, how far should we be
engaged? The experience of Israel’s 1977 and 1996 elections
show that if the United States is perceived as too obviously
supporting one Israeli leader or coalition against another,
then the U.S.-backed faction is likely to lose.
Obviously the Lebanon war will not come to an end
without progress in some fashion between Israel and
Lebanon and Syria. Washington’s participation is also
obviously indispensable. But as no such vista is in sight, the
Eastern Mediterranean may not know peace for quite some
time. And under such circumstances, as Stephen Blank
warned, outside parties with rather different agendas, like
Russia, could be tempted to intervene in the area. And
indeed Moscow has fished in the turbid Lebanese waters
already in 1996 and again at present as its relations with
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Syria and Israel now illustrate.
The United States and its allies in the Eastern
Mediterranean, e.g., Turkey and Israel, face threats beyond
these unconventional ones of the Kurds and Lebanon or a
renewed Intifada. In the United States the threat of a
revived Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program
or Iran’s developing one has become one of the most vital of
contemporary defense issues. As missile defense against
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proliferation takes center stage in the United States, we
must also recognize that this is becoming the most
dangerous, if not vital, threat perceived by Israel and
36
perhaps by Turkey as well. As Steinberg and Sezer both
observed, these missile and WMD threats are also major
threats to Israeli and Turkish security and are forcing these
governments to contemplate and undertake fundamental
changes in thinking about defense strategy, force planning,
and overall security policy. In Israel’s case, this becomes
even more urgent since it is no longer certain that it can
achieve conventional superiority and deterrence over its
37
Arab enemies.
The Middle East in general has long since become a place
of increased tendencies to long-distance missile warfare.
This threat did not begin with Saddam Hussein. Egypt
under Nasser had numerous German scientists working on
rockets against Israel and Israel’s atomic program began in
the 1950s. Nor is WMD use a new threat or one that began
with Iraq in its war with Iran in 1980-88. Nasser’s Egyptian
forces in Yemen, in the 1962-67 civil war, used chemical
warfare against their Yemeni and Saudi-backed opponents.
But what is most dangerous is that Saddam Hussein used
chemical war as a strategic operation in the war against
Iraq over a decade ago and paid no price for it then or since.
The price he has paid is for attacking Kuwait in 1990 and his
subsequent defiance of the United Nations Southern
Command (UNSCOM) and the United States. Thus, his
example is not likely to be the last one, for it succeeded both
38
operationally and politically. For the United States,
Israel, and Turkey, proliferation and terrorism, two types of
unconventional warfare that are simultaneously arrayed or
deployed against them, are real and major threats. For
example, Israeli Brigadier General (res.) Aharon Levran, a
senior intelligence officer, recently told an interviewer that,
You don’t need heavy weapons to win. When you consider what
has happened to us, the Palestinians have succeeded in
beating us with the lightest of weapons. Clausewitz defines
war as gaining one’s goals. And when you consider what the
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Palestinians have done—the territory which they have
gained— they truly have demonstrated that terror is not only
simply a nuisance—it is in and of itself a strategic threat.
We have already seen how short range light weapons, when
used to carry out a campaign of terror, can be just as effective in
achieving the Arabs’ goals as heavy weapons. After all, terror
has achieved something which, traditionally, one side only loses
39
after a crushing defeat—territory. (emphasis author)

However, this is not the case in Europe. Or at least
Europe and our major NATO allies do not uniformly see it as
40
41
such a threat. D’Alema omitted proliferation as a threat.
States that do not feel menaced by the same threats will find
it difficult to cooperate on the reply to those threats. This is
only one source of the difficulties the United States had with
devising a new strategic concept for NATO. U.S. allies
remain extremely skeptical of our argument that NATO
should have the explicit capability and intention to strike at
threats that may originate outside of Europe like
42
proliferation. Therefore there is little European urgency
about devising effective and unified counterproliferation
policies or about arms control regimes in the Middle East.
For instance, a recent article by Francois Gere of the
Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique argued that a
proliferation threat to Europe is highly doubtful as a threat
requiring amendment of NATO’s new strategic concept,
that military ripostes to threats emanating from places like
North Korea are taking over NATO’s political process, and
that there is no reason to believe that NATO would lose its
effective deterrent capability vis-à-vis Russia if it dissents
43
from Washington’s stance on proliferation. Like many
European elites, he opposes globalizing the Alliance along
lines suggested by the United States and stresses that we
are overrating the military threat. Instead, for the Alliance
to move forward there must be a strategic convergence of
interests between Washington and Europe, and it must be
confined to European issues, e.g., the Balkans and the
Mediterranean. Therefore Europe must resist the effort to
44
foist a global anti-proliferation posture upon it.
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Whether or not his arguments make sense for Europe, it
is clear that they are irrelevant at best and dangerous at
worst for the Middle East, including Turkey. Sezer has
pointed out that Turkey feels surrounded, not least by
45
proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD. And since
such weapons have already been used with impunity in the
Middle East, it is unlikely that further instances will not
occur. Nor can pro-Western Middle Eastern states
necessarily rely on allies and the promises of collective
security for,
In true collective security it should make no difference who
commits aggression and who the victim is. But the principles
of collective security were ignored even during the Gulf War.
[Henry] Kissinger, among others, observed that in its finest
hour, the Security Council closed its eyes to that principle
when Israel was attacked. . . Tactically the Council’s silence
made eminent sense, but the implications of this omission are
sobering, for they confirm yet again that the Council is
governed less by the commitment to respond to unprovoked
46
aggression than by the politics of the situation.

Thus, for these states and for the United States,
proliferation is seen as a growing menace. As Stephen
Blank pointed out, Russia seems increasingly willing to
supply Iran, Iraq, and even Syria with capabilities that can
only enhance both their conventional and WMD
47
capabilities. Therefore the threat posed by proliferation of
missiles with these capabilities and of conventional ballistic
missiles to U.S. allies in the Middle East is rising. Nor do we
have effective counters to it. While Russia’s interest in
obstructing U.S. initiatives is growing and adding another
page to the history of the Middle East and Eastern
Mediterranean as an area that is constantly and thoroughly
penetrated by the great powers’ more general rivalries, as
Robert Freedman demonstrates, U.S. policy is
48
floundering.
As Freedman shows, the United States has proven to be
inconstant in the peace process and unable to forge an Iraqi
policy that commands international support. Worse yet,
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U.S. attempts to forge a rapprochement with Iran have not
yet borne appreciable fruit, and we can expect little progress
here as a presidential election draws near. The United
States has not succeeded in persuading our allies to
invigorate their counterproliferation policies or to join us
against Tehran and Baghdad. Instead, we have managed
only to draw ourselves into a long-term, low-level war of
attrition with Iraq and to commit ourselves to the overthrow
of its government, policies and goals that is very unprom49
ising. Despite NATO’s rhetorical and organizational
commitment to a counterproliferation policy, it is clear that
the allies’ misgivings about U.S. policy on this issue will
frustrate efforts to realize a meaningful strategic
commitment.
But this means that the Middle East will remain, not
just an arena of ethnic and religious conflict largely
populated by authoritarian governments facing
increasingly dire socio-economic challenges, but also an
50
area of strategic dissension among our allies. As before in
European history, the inability of the powers to agree on the
“Eastern Question” has allowed enterprising revisionist
powers, today, most notably Russia, to attempt to unhinge
the entire status quo using this area’s inherent instability
as a political crowbar. And we can see similar efforts
underway in the Balkans. Russia seeks tactical alliance
with powers like France who resent American prominence
so that they can both enhance their position at the expense
of the United States in Europe as well as in the Middle
51
East. This trend will only further complicate efforts to
forge a strategic and operational consensus for NATO’s new
strategic concept when it comes time to implement it in
practice. Therefore in the Middle East, on top of the
structural failings in economics and politics that are the
main sources of local challenges to internal and external
security, we face the abiding tendency of the great powers to
use the area as a battleground for their larger global
political rivalries.
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And the same holds true for the Balkans, Europe’s own
tinderbox where consensus among the great powers is no
less elusive today than in the past. In the Balkans, as in the
Middle East, local intrastate conflicts and ethnic rivalries
easily spread across borders, threaten existing state
borders, and then often, as in the past, generate major
international crises. Frequently these crises are intensified
because the great European powers approach them from the
vantage point of their own interactions. Thus the United
States did not intervene decisively in Bosnia until NATO’s
own cohesion was at stake. So, too, in 1991-92 the AngloFranco-German responses to the crackup of Yugoslavia
were as much driven by their considerations of their own
bilateral and trilateral interactions as they were by efforts
52
to respond to local events and trends.
NATO’s new Kosovo operation only confirms and
extends this depressing trend. NATO and the EU are now
committed to a fundamental and long-term reorganization
of the regional status quo and by so doing have decisively
worsened relations with Russia. Russian ties to NATO will
probably not improve when this war is over, and it already is
talking ominously of revising its military doctrine to meet
NATO’s challenge to its sense of itself as a great power and
53
to its regional security interests. And if NATO fails to
achieve its goals, Russia’s interest in undermining allied
cohesion and capability for doing so will dramatically grow.
While the Balkans may well produce too much history
for its own good, that history is inextricable from the larger
issues of European security. While nobody writing about the
Balkans can just glide over the multiple challenges to
security in maladapted political and economic structures,
the siren song of exclusivist nationalism, contested borders,
and so on, Europe’s responses to these problems has been
tepid or too little, too late, too often.
As Colonel Valeri Ratchev of Bulgaria makes clear,
Romania and Bulgaria are anxiously looking to the West for
54
support and finding encouragement to be in short supply.
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Nor is Ratchev’s an isolated opinion that calls for a deeper
European engagement. Romania’s ambassador to the
United States recently complained that allied prevarication
on the “open door” to NATO is inhibiting foreign investment
55
in her country. That produces a vicious cycle which only
impedes Romania’s efforts to catch up to NATO and EU
membership requirements. The destruction of a substantial
part of the regional economy in the wake of the Kosovo
operation only adds to this structural problem. Bulgaria
may not have made effective use of the first 7 years of
post-socialist rule, but it is now striving manfully to make
the needed reforms and likewise fears that the doors to
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Europe will be shut in its face. Perhaps skepticism about
the depth of Sofia’s or Bucharest’s commitments to reform is
not unmerited, but we should remember that these are the
most pro-Western governments that we can expect in these
states. If they fail, what prospect is there for their
successors to launch the kind of reforms that will make
them more eligible for integration according to Western
standards and more secure?
However, the regional picture is not just one of either a
total lack of reform or of complaints about the West. In
February 1999, Bulgaria and Macedonia signed a treaty to
put an end to the “artificial problems between our two
countries,” namely whether they speak a separate language
or not. The two governments renounced national and
territorial claims upon each other and refused support to
groups who sought to use their territory for purposes hostile
the other. Both sides also claimed that they had “found a
way to speak in the language of a united Europe.” And in
March 1999, Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria announced
plans for a free trade zone to begin in 2002. A Balkan peace
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force made up of local forces is also coming into being.
While all these actions are not disinterested ones, they can
and do contribute visibly to the possibility for building
durable sub-regional or regional security structures in the
Balkans that can help move that troubled area to a new and
more tranquil place in world politics. These are most
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welcome developments and should remind us that not all is
darkness in the Balkans. But too much still is darkness as
Serbian policy daily shows us. The United States and
NATO’s militaries now realize that the only effective basis
for enduring long-term stability in the region is through
governments’ provision and management of long-term
prosperity. As Supreme Allied Commander Europe
(SACEUR) General Wesley Clark observed, military force
does not bring long-term stability, but prosperity does foster
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stability. If we are to avoid more Kosovos and Bosnias, this
lesson and its implications must forcefully be imprinted
upon the official minds of governments who have the
capability to help and interests that would otherwise be
negatively affected by new conflicts. Therefore as NATO
confronts the challenge of restoring a lasting and legitimate
order in Kosovo and Bosnia, its challenges are as much
political and economic ones as they are military, perhaps
more so. And indeed, in 1998, NATO began to rise to the task
as Secretary General Javier Solana launched a Balkan
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economic initiative. Now diplomats, expert analysts, and
generals must strive to grasp what policies best promote
attaining those goals in Kosovo, Bosnia, and across the
Balkans.
Steven Burg provided a detailed and comparative
typology of the kinds of solutions that have been tried
elsewhere in Europe in analogous conflicts as well as a
penetrating analysis of the actual operative facts on the
ground in these countries. His conclusions pointed strongly
to the need to foster democracy in these areas and for
outside democratic players to heavily engage themselves for
the long-term in bringing about such a solution. Like
Ratchev, Burg insisted that European attention to Balkan
trouble spots cannot be intermittent and after the fact.
Europe must make its presence and interests felt
throughout the political process and not come in at the end
with a heavy-handed force for lack of a better alternative or
for want of more insight when the conflict could have been
60
prevented or arrested. While preventive diplomacy or
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conflict resolution, the stuff of many articles and editorials,
is not likely, Burg’s approach offers us a chance to learn
from our past errors or sins of both omission and
commission and prevent the deployment of trained soldiers
for long periods of time in roles that are ultimately
uncongenial to them.
As Burg observed, NATO soldiers cannot be deployed to
defend a status quo but rather must be instruments of
progress towards a better peace. Examination of other
precedents, like the Basque one in Catalonia, suggest ways
to overcome the conflict in Kosovo and find creative ways to
address bitterly contested issues of sovereignty. An
indispensable element of any viable solution, as Stefano
Bianchini argued, is that the combatants have to get beyond
the political culture of nationalism which inflames local
passions and get to a new concept of the state which is not
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coterminous with that of ethnic groups. To the extent that
new conceptions of sovereignty and of the state can be
implemented in practice and agreed to thereafter, we might
be able to overcome the multiple crises, especially in the
former Yugoslavia. Bianchini argues that all these crises
are intertwined and require an overall solution that builds
with neighbors and not against them as nationalism
demands. Thus he argues that if NATO alone occupies
Kosovo and its autonomy or independence comes about
exclusively through the efforts of a military alliance, rather
than an international organization like the UN, it will
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always be seen as an illegitimate outcome. If that is the
case, NATO will be trapped there in an increasingly
inhospitable and untenable situation. The Balkans, to be
secure, must be integrated into the world current of
interdependence where alternatives to classical sovereignty
have been tried and succeeded.
This consideration returns us to NATO for it is an
embodiment of that trend towards the creation of a
pluralistic security community where war is unthinkable
and where aspects of traditional sovereignty, such as
command over national armed forces, have been traded for a
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broader democratic form of governance. NATO presents
this internal harmony of interests among its members
because it has formed a true security community, where war
among the members and purely unilateral national security
63
policies are inconceivable.
NATO’s integrated
military-political structure subjects current and future
members to a rigorous international system of civilian
democratic control over the use of armed forces at home and
64
abroad. NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement buttressed
this democratic form of control by demanding it as a
precondition of membership, and the OSCE’s 1994 code of
conduct also outlined a politically binding European agenda
for such control. NATO staked its claim here to democratize
and internationalize controls over governments’ defense
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and security policies.
Everyone undergoes
democratization and mutual restraint, and becomes more
secure.
NATO justified its enlargement simply by requiring
democratic civilian control over the armed forces and
subjecting all its members to mutual discipline or restraint,
as well as internal constitutional restraints that go far in
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preventing renationalized security policies.
This
generalized discipline makes NATO a uniquely
self-restraining alliance whose inner constitution reassures
Europe of peace. Even when Europeans complain about
Washington’s dictation, they acknowledge that it occurs
because Europe cannot overcome its divisions of advocating
collective European defense policies, while refusing to
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spend the money or take the necessary action. NATO
works only when it acts in unison, when everyone acts
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unilaterally, or tries to, the result is failure. When there is
European unity, they all say, Washington then does indeed
listen to its allies and moderates its position in the interests
69
of allied unity. Even at the height of the Cold War,
Washington could not simply dictate to its allies, and it
remained exquisitely attentive to their interests and
concerns, often being forced to amend its policies to meet
70
those concerns.
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NATO thus bridles U.S., French, German, and Russian
temptations to unilateralism in Europe. Those who wish to
use NATO assets for global crusades and worldwide
intervention in the name of collective security or democracy
may find this condition irksome. But it is the necessary price
we pay for leading this kind of multilateral alliance. We are
now learning this lesson again the hard way in Kosovo. But
it is essential that NATO again find its way to consensus
because it remains the most effective and legitimate
security provider in Europe.
As Stephen Calleya pointed out, if NATO fosters the
kinds of consensus needed to respond to threats running
from economics, through ethnic conflicts, to proliferation, it
can achieve a great deal of cohesion and rapprochement
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among the various conflict zones in the area. The NATO
model of an authentic European community holds great
potential appeal for non-European and non-member states,
and, if successfully developed, it can increase its appeal
through successful performance and meeting new
challenges to it. The converse is also true so NATO’s
disarray could unravel some, if not all, of the progress made
since 1989. This does not mean NATO should substitute for
the OSCE or EU in the Mediterranean, but it should do
what it can, if for no other reason than because its
abdication or failure will encourage those organizations to
evade their responsibilities as well. For this kind of pattern
to succeed in promoting peace in the area, NATO and other
key states must avoid the perception of or temptation to act
according to a scheme which looks like traditional
hegemonic power plays. Overcoming security challenges to
the area must encompass attention to sub-regional
72
dynamics.
For instance, in the Greco-Turkish rivalry, the issues of
EU membership for Cyprus and Turkey, disputed
territories in the Aegean, military buildups, etc., must be
addressed together as Nation suggests. Nor should Turkey
continue to act in a high-handed and threatening manner
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and make veiled and not so veiled threats against Greece for
73
harboring Kurdish rebels or other sins.
Moreover, to the extent that NATO neglects regional or
sub-regional concerns and issues, it will come to be seen as
an intrusive interloper that must be resisted or as a power
whose true intention is to maintain the boundary between
the East and the South. While the West would be a kingdom
of integration in this scheme, the East would be the realm of
fragmentation and crisis. If states that endeavor to climb up
to European levels feel discriminated against or left out of
the status quo, they will oppose it. And if NATO is not
united, it will not be able to reach for solutions like those
called for by Burg in the former Yugoslavia or the kinds of
long-term engagement Ratchev and Bianchini urged. Then
more unilateralist forces, whether in Greece, Turkey,
Russia, or the Middle East, will have their day as
cooperative multilateralism will have been tried and found
wanting.
While there are no easy answers, there are some signs of
a rethinking of past postures. Italy’s new military policy will
devote more attention to rapid reaction forces and to defense
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against proliferation threats. There are also signs that
Germany understands that to safeguard security and its
European role, it must move as well towards a broader
southern engagement. The St. Malo Agreement between
Britain and France in December 1998 gave a new, more
vigorous impetus to a European Security and Defense
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Identity. The aftermath of the Kosovo campaign may also
lead to more creative responses to the challenges now on the
overall European security agenda. On the other hand,
NATO’s fractured process over Kosovo in 1998-99 and
Russia’s determination to frustrate U.S. efforts in Europe
and the Middle East, and its occasional success in finding a
European partner are very disheartening signs. So is the
fact that substantial economic pressures are building up in
the United States to reduce its foreign military exposure at
the same time as its economic presence in the
Mediterranean as a whole is dropping relative to other
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areas. If there is little discernible profit or return on large
investments there as compared to other more clearly
strategic areas, the U.S. interest and military commitment
76
in the Mediterranean may well decline over time.
Thus the current Mediterranean situation contains both
frustrating and hopeful signs; it is neither sky-blue nor
black, but rather something in between, perhaps a more
typical, if not wholly satisfactory complexion. But since it is
governments that have the power to change the region’s
weather, they must first try to grasp in what direction all
the region’s winds are blowing, even if they are seemingly
blowing in contradictory directions all at the same time.
This may frustrate many, for complexity is not always easily
accepted as today’s or tomorrow’s status quo.
Readers may therefore feel somewhat shortchanged that
we did not lay out here a blueprint of solutions or a menu
from which to choose. However, the more one comes to terms
with the entire range of security challenges in the
Mediterranean, the more one comes to understand the
enormous diversity of those challenges and of perspectives
upon them. Hopefully this understanding should serve to
help us and governments clarify their thinking and serve as
a guide to action. Such clarification through dialogue and
mutual engagement is essential. For, as many of the papers
that follow imply or even state explicitly, if NATO and the
United States fail to understand the dynamics of the
challenges to which they are responding, they will fail to
extinguish them as sources of conflict. In that case, not only
will the forces committed to existing crises and conflicts
remain in place, but new forces for new crises will have to be
found, and that is a most unappealing prospect.
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CHAPTER 2
TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Alessandro Politi

Executive Summary.
The objectives of this paper are to define the boundaries
of the Mediterranean Region, to provide a definition of
transnational security challenges, to offer a description of
the major risks and their effects on European security, and
to describe some policies to cope more effectively with them.
A transnational security challenge is a phenomenon that
threatens different areas irrespective of borders or
distances. In this paper, we will consider as transnational
security challenges mainly three phenomena: transnational
organized crime, illegal drug trafficking, and international
terrorism. The exclusion of other possible security concerns
stems from the observation that either they cannot be faced
with forceful means or because they are not necessarily
transnational.
In describing a geopolitical map of these challenges, the
paper focuses on:

•

three centers of gravity, concerning major
transnational organized criminal organizations,
namely Italy, Russia, and Turkey;

•

21 regional gravitating support areas: Albania,
Croatia, Bulgaria, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, France,
FRY, FYROM, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, Rumania, Slovenia, Somalia,
Spain, Syria, Tunisia;

35

•

two states at risk of failing (Algeria and Russia), and
ten having experienced various degrees of failure
(Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Eritrea, FRY,
FYROM, Georgia, Lebanon, Slovenia, Somalia);

•

four islands which have relevant grey zones and
different degrees of organized crime control/
connection (Corsica, Cyprus, Sardinia, and Sicily);

•

two major (Morocco and Russia) and two minor drug
producers (Lebanon and former Yugoslavia);

•

three major drug trafficking routes: Atlantic Route,
Balkan Corridor, and Russia;

•

three major drug trafficking entry points: Russia,
Spain, and Turkey;

•

three major people-smuggling sea-routes
(Morocco-Spain, Tunisia-Italy, and Albania-Italy)
and four land-routes (Sarajevo-Croatia-SloveniaItaly/Austria; Istanbul-Ukraine- Poland-Germany or
Istanbul-Romania-Hungary- Slovakia-Czech
Republic; Istanbul-Greece- FYROM-Italy/Austria,
Russia-Finland);

•

three regional financial offshore centers, i.e., Cyprus,
Malta, Monaco;

•

the presence of Chinese, Colombian, and Japanese
organized criminal groups and the relative absence of
North American and Mexican ones;

•

the prevalence of drugs such as cannabis, heroin, and
ATS, with cocaine increasing;

•

20 countries with internal/endemic/civil war
terrorism, inspired by nationalist/ethnic motivations
(Spain, Israel, Greece, FRY, FYROM, Turkey, Iran,
Iraq, Russia) or by political/religious motivations
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(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Iran,
Iraq, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain);

•

three countries affected by international terrorism
(France, Saudi Arabia, Yemen);

•

five countries designated as terrorism supporting
states (Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran);

•

nine countries seriously violating human rights at
various degrees in their counterterrorist actions
(Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Iraq, Bahrain, Turkey, FRY).

With regard to the possible policies to be adopted, the
paper argues that, at an institutional level, the EU is the
leading institution in the region. The possible four priorities
should be to:
1) continue the gradual integration of the common law
enforcement and judicial spaces;
2) prepare to enlarge through policies that enhance
formally and informally the cooperation among actors
interested in stability and economic development;
3) continue support to Russia; and,
4) devise appropriate policies for the assistance to law
enforcement agencies of third countries.
The Boundaries of the Mediterranean Region.
The general use of the word “Mediterranean” may imply
that it includes on one hand the countries of the old North
l
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Southern Flank and
on the other the dialogue partners of the Western European
2
Union (WEU) and of NAT0. Indeed, for traditional security
purposes, this definition would be a reasonable one;
although for strategic and political reasons, it should be
regarded as a minimalist one.
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Personally, I prefer a wider definition, where the
European Union (EU)-sponsored Barcelona Process
represents a large component (since it represents 27
countries), although not an all-inclusive one, for two main
reasons: methodological and political.
Firstly, transnational risks do not conform to
international political constellations or mind sets trying
somehow to slice a geopolitical area into nice subdivisions.
For analytical purposes, one has to see an area as whole,
using afterwards the existing political settings or devising
new arrangements to implement an appropriate policy.
Secondly, these risks are considered too often in a logic of
“us versus them” (i.e., thinking that they come from the
external perimeter of our Western “civilised” world),
whereas they are as transnational as financial markets
with transactions and raids occurring in London,
Barcelona, Istanbul, Berlin, Rome, or New York.
It should also be borne in mind that the widespread idea
that the Mediterranean is nothing more than a geographic
expression, because it is impossible to reconcile very
different realities, may reveal three distinct and somewhat
politically unhelpful mind sets.
The first one pretends that a region must be somehow
homogeneous in order to be considered as a whole. It is very
similar to those favouring “unity and purity” within a set
geopolitical area.
The second conception, much cherished by simplistic
and pragmatic-by-default people, tries to exclude as much
as possible every complexity, believing that outside a
politically correct area the rest is an incoherent, fragmented
chaos.
The third mind set derives from the rich, yet limited
experience of the last two centuries (19th and 20th
centuries), whereby it is nearly impossible to understand
realities lacking the relative coherence of nation-states or of
great alliances. The problem is that most events challenge
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political decisionmakers through their diversity,
complexity, and more or less substantial disorder.
Now, what will be called in this paper the
Mediterranean Region can be subdivided into different
subregions, but it is impossible to cut apart if one does not
want to pay heavy economic, social, political, and strategic
prices. Seas create inevitably strong links and to try to use
them as bulwarks is an illusion, as two world wars and
several migratory waves have demonstrated. The
Mediterranean Region is a geopolitical reality connecting
willy-nilly the destinies of different countries.
According to these premises, we will consider as the
Mediterranean Region the area included by the Straits of
Gibraltar, Bosphorus, Kerch, Bab el Mandab, Hormuz, and
by the Suez Canal. This means that the Black Sea will be
considered as an extension of the Mediterranean, while the
Red Sea and the Persian Gulf are not only physically, but
also historically and politically linked to the Mediterranean. This area can evidently be subdivided into four
smaller subregions: West Europe, Balkan/Black Sea,
3
Middle East/Red Sea, and Maghreb.
During each great historical period, the Mediterranean
Region had to face as a whole the great security questions,
even if these were considered from different angles in each
subregion.
During the Cold War, the subregions of West Europe and
of the Balkan/Black Sea were characterised by heavily
armed peace, tinged with strong political tensions. The
Maghreb, instead, after post-colonial convulsion, was a
secondary theatre of confrontation between the two blocks,
while in the Middle East/Red Sea subregion war raged.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the great Arab-Israeli
wars have been superseded by an extremely fragile peace,
more marked by internal conflicts (opposing terrorisms,
urban guerrillas, social inequalities) than by the great
armoured and air battles. Iraq is the only exception, and
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despite U.N. interventions in the Horn of Africa, the
problems of this part of the subregion remain the fights
between armed bands and all types of illicit trafficking.
Similar plagues affect some Maghreb countries in a more
visible (Algeria) or less evident way (Libya).
In several countries of the Balkan/Black Sea subregion,
the armed peace has changed into a long civil war, featuring
in most cases guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations,
conducted by more or less heavily equipped troops. The wars
of Yugoslav dissolution, ended in Slovenia, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, are now continuing in the FRY,
Albania, and Macedonia. Yet all the countries in the
subregion are affected by the new transnational security
challenges (namely drug trafficking, organized crime, and
terrorism). In fact, most countries of the Mediterranean
Region do not confront a single, classic military threat, but
are going back to a multidimensional security.
Defining Transnational Security Challenges.
There have been within the post-1989 Euro-American
strategic literature a number of studies trying to redefine in
various ways the nature and the scope of changes
4
concerning traditional security. Surely a first bone of
contention can be the definition of traditional security itself.
If, by traditional security, we understand that political
concern and that politically oriented activity that Europe
was accustomed to seeing as relevant for the past three
centuries in the case of earlier centralised states and for
some 150 years for younger states, then we risk missing a
wider and much more complex picture. This is particularly
true if Western strategic thinking may be still under the
unconscious influence of the Cold War.
The fact is that all the security concerns that we pretend
are new are stone-age old in other continents and remained
pretty much unchanged in other parts of the Mediterranean
Region. A cursory glance at history books shows that civil
strife and violence, population imbalances and migrations,
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resource scarcity, environmental degradation,
international terrorism, and transnational organized crime
are in most cases common during the some four millennia
that preceded our age (international terrorism becoming
much more frequent in the 19th century due to the evolution
5
of political movements and of technology). This is equally
true for many areas that were not directly under the spell of
Cold War stabilization, the Middle East being one evident
example and the tragic events in Lebanon being almost a
paradigm.
Thus, it would be more appropriate and simple to state
that we, in the Northern hemisphere, once dominated by the
Cold War, are rediscovering traditional security, a security
by nature multidimensional, whose concerns might have
changed in object and scope when compared to the past.
This return, although justifiable with Vico’s theory of the
6
corsi e ricorsi (occurrences and recurrences of history), is
better explainable with the link that exists between policy
and grand strategy. If we take into account major
definitions of grand strategy, we shall see that in this realm
the old Cold War division between security proper (i.e.,
external and military interstate security) and internal
7
security or other newer concerns never applied.
An immediate political objection to a wider concept of
security is the danger of putting very different things into
the same category of security, with the consequence that the
policy approach will be less focused on political and social
solutions and more in favour of indiscriminately repressive,
quasi-military actions. In other words, if potentially
everything concerns security, policy responses could be
implicitly more and more “militarised.” On a more
intellectual level, this objection is coupled with the risk of
“concept inflation,” whereby the progressive widening of
security endangers its coherence.
The reply in favour of the return of a of concept of
multidimensional security will combine different
arguments.
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•

First, the idea that a broader concept of security
should imply a more narrowly focused response is not
warranted by itself. On the contrary, a broader
concept should allow a flexible, tailored policy where
force is only one of the different means employed.

•

Secondly, as already shown, the concept of security
became singularly “deflated” during the 1948-1989
period in a significant, but not all-encompassing zone
of the globe. Conversely, it risks not being inflated
when security reacquires its original complexity.

•

Thirdly, security has become more visibly
multidimensional because attacks on the sovereignty
of nation-states can now be carried out more
effectively by richer and more powerful non-state
actors, and because the complexity of modern
societies offers multiple vulnerabilities. Governmental resources, moreover, seem insufficient to
control key autonomous components of sovereignty
(territorial integrity, strategic control of key areas or
resources, financial flows, internal security).

•

Finally, security is, and remains, a politically defined
concept. One can discuss if the widening of security
might be a good or a bad political choice, but security
is not intrinsically a self-contained concept, nor can it
be related to military affairs only. If the political
priorities change, the nature and the means of
multidimensional security will inevitably follow and
adapt to the different sectors of the political action. 8

How the political decision on including other concerns
within the perimeter of security will respect basic and
democratic freedoms does not depend on the concept of
security itself, but on the state of actual laws and practices
of a given government.
Once one agrees that multidimensional security is a
matter of fact, politically and operationally acceptable, it
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remains still to be seen if all nontraditional risks may be
really considered security challenges or not.
In principle, as stated above, once a political leader
decides that a specific issue is relevant for security, this
should be more than enough, yet this arbitrary element is
compounded by some less subjective factors, both practical
and conceptual. From a practical point of view, there are
some nontraditional concerns that clearly involve the use of
violence, allowing easier links to traditional security, such
as civil violence and insurrection, international terrorism,
transnational organized crime, and illegal drug trafficking.
Environmental degradation, resource scarcity,
population growth and migration, all can affect national
and international security, but in general they tend to be
managed more within higher policy and grand strategy.
With regard to these problems, the use of means other than
force (economic, political, diplomatic, social, cultural ones)
appears to be, in first instance, more cost-effective, even if
force may remain the last recourse, as always in politics. In
a certain sense, whereas the first four nontraditional
security risks are, notwithstanding the causes, manifestations of violence, the remaining ones may be, instead of
violence, considered more likely to be stakes for an armed
confrontation.
From a more conceptual point of view, grand strategy
does work as a bridge between politics and traditional
security in both senses. On one hand, as we have seen, it
favours the enlargement of the old concept of security, but,
on the other, it helps to shift some of the newer security
challenges to a domain that is more politically than
security-minded.
At this point one can define what a transnational
security challenge should be. A security challenge is a
phenomenon that threatens the security of a given area, be
it defined by geographic, geopolitical, statehood, national,
sub-national, or supranational criteria. A transnational
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security challenge is one that threatens different areas
9
irrespective of borders or distances.
In this paper, we will consider as transnational security
challenges mainly three phenomena: transnational
organized crime, illegal drug trafficking, and international
terrorism. The exclusion of other mentioned security
concerns stems from the fact that either they can be
considered more the resort in first place of means other than
force, as already argued, or because, as such, they are not
necessarily transnational. Civil violence and insurrection,
for what these somewhat vague terms mean, are
characterised in the first place by their localised action and
immediate effects, although they sometimes may have
transnational aspects either in terms of logistics
(sanctuaries) or in terms of terrorist actions. If one takes
Algeria as an example, civil violence and insurrection are
fairly localised, whereas terrorist actions and political10
logistic networks may be transnational.
The delimitation of the analysed transnational security
challenges does not exempt us from the equally complicated
definition of the three risks themselves. Academics, jurists,
and police forces continue to disagree on the definition of
11
transnational organized crime. There are, however, four
elements defining organized crime on which a large
majority of authors agree: the existence of an organized and
stable hierarchy; the acquisition of profits through crime;
the use of force and intimidation; and recourse to corruption
in order to maintain impunity.
This paper will use the definition adopted in 1993 by the
EU’s Ad Hoc Group on Organized Crime, then presented to
the EU Council:
Organized crime is present whenever two or more persons are
involved in a common criminal project, for a prolonged or
unspecified period of time, in order to obtain power and profits
and where to the single associates are assigned tasks to carry
out within the organization: (1) through business or connected
business activities; (2) using violence or intimidation; (3)
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influencing politics, media, economy, government or the
judiciary, through the control of a determined territory, if
necessary, in order to commit the planned crimes that, from a
collective or individual point of view, must be considered
12
serious crimes.

Appended to this definition, which is not a common EU
definition but represents an important step, was a table of
eleven characteristics for use during the preparation of EU
reports on organized crime and in pinpointing more easily
this phenomenon at international level. They are: (1)
collaboration among more than two people; (2) among whom
there is a distribution of tasks; (3) who operate for a long or
unspecified time; (4) operate under a certain discipline and
control; (5) are suspected of serious crimes; (6) operate at
international level; (7) use violence and other means of
intimidation; (8) use commercial or pseudocommercial
structures; (9) launder money; (10) exercise their influence
on politics, media, public administration or in the economic
field; and (11) seek profit and power. If a criminal group
displays at least six of these characteristics, among which are
necessarily (1), (5) and (11), it can be considered to be
13
involved in organized crime.
Concerning illegal drug trafficking, for the purposes of the
paper it will be called simply drug trafficking. It will not dwell
upon the debate on what should be illegal drugs or not or
what should be the best strategy to combat this problem. It
will consider illegal those drugs considered as such by the
majority of EU governments, knowing that some notable
exceptions in legal practice or in actual law enforcement
priorities in some countries might create political problems
and difficulties in implementation, as the Dutch case
14
shows.
International terrorism is no less controversial than the
previous two phenomena regarding definitions, despite a
15
marked increase in cooperation during the last 5 years.
Probably the best known definitions are those employed
16
by the U.S. Department of State:
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- The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,
17
usually intended to influence an audience.
- The term “international terrorism” means terrorism
involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.
- The term “terrorist group” means any group practicing,
or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.
The definition adopted will be that proposed L. R. Beres,
which uses the twin criteria of just cause and just means to
distinguish between rightful recourse to insurgent force and
18
unlawful terrorism. As has happened also for the Ocalan
extradition case from Italy to Germany, the just cause of
19
political violence can always be argued, but the just means
are quite clearly defined by international law both for
regular and irregular forces. Terrorism is unlawful because
the means used fail to satisfy the criterion of just means
(i.e., whenever the use of force is indiscriminate,
disproportionate, and/or beyond the codified boundaries of
military necessity). The group that violates these norms
would be guilty of war crimes and possibly even of crimes
20
against humanity.
Further clarification is needed for the term international
terrorism. In the wider debate, it is often a fairly imprecise
expression that covers actions, differing in degrees of
political and moral unacceptability. This paper puts
forward seven types of terrorist or terrorist-like situations:

•

domestic terrorism, endemic terrorism and civil war; 2l

•

international implications of domestic/endemic
terrorism and civil war; 22

•

international spillovers of domestic/endemic
terrorism/civil war; 23
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•

international support to domestic/endemic terrorism/
civil war; 24

•

international state-sponsoring of domestic, endemic
terrorism or civil war; 25

•

international terrorism proper. In this case citizens of
one country are conducting attacks in countries other
than the theatre of civil confrontation and/or against
citizens who are neither within the mentioned theatre
nor in countries adjacent to it; 26

•

covert operations. Under this denomination are
included state-sponsored assassinations of selected
individuals whose political or military research
activities are considered dangerous or because they
are retaliatory targets. 27

In the international political debate, there is also
another category called ”state terrorism” and defined as the
situation in which a state lends its legitimacy to terrorism or
lends its own organs to indulge in acts of terrorism. It
appears that this concept, although repeatedly employed, is
not particularly helpful in pinpointing the nature of
international terrorism. In the case of legitimization of
terrorism per se, it may be a condemnable political position,
but it is not a terrorist act. In the case of using state organs
for terrorist operations, it falls mostly either in the category
of state-sponsoring or in that of covert operations. It seems
that only in the context of a situation of endemic terrorism
can one envisage state terrorism as the method by which a
government (or a part of it) sets up clandestine groups,
whose selected or indiscriminate killings are officially
disavowed. In all cases, state terrorism either weakens the
rule of law within a given country, or creates in the medium
term heavy friction with the rest of the international
28
community.

47

A Strategic Perspective of New Challenges in the
Mediterranean Region.
Transnational organized crime and drug trafficking.
The paper will analyse what it considers the two major
threats among the transnational security challenges:
transnational organized crime and drug trafficking. Both
have to be considered together since the drug production
and smuggling chain requires criminal organizations.
While organized crime can exist without drug trafficking,
the reverse is not true. But drugs can be considered a force
and a crime multiplier not only for criminal groups, but also
for guerrilla and terrorist groups.
Transnational organized crime, and especially its
association to drug trafficking, is an outright threat for the
governments and societies in the Mediterranean region for
the following reasons:
1) The lives killed or maimed by drugs or during criminal
confrontations are not only casualties, but represent
directly or indirectly an economic gain for dangerous actors,
that challenge across the border the authority of the state
and of law. Few governments or publics would accept
similar levels of casualties in peacekeeping, external attack,
and terrorism (at least 16 dead per day in 1996 in Schengen
29
countries, apparently one of the best protected areas). But
politicians and citizens at large still entertain the ruinous
belief that it is an internal matter, to be fatalistically
accepted as car accidents are. The human costs of this
dangerous combination are, of course, not the same for the
countries in the region, but experience shows that transit
countries become in most cases also consumer countries,
with all the attendant consequences.
2) The economic resources generated by organized crime
and drug trafficking are directly and deliberately used for
destabilising the society, the political system, the
administration and the economy of the country. Its financial
muscle, facilitating the accession to political influence and
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power, is far from being understated. Organized crime is a
multibillion transnational business: drug trafficking alone,
according to the UNDCP World Drug Report, yields a $400
billion per year turnover, equal to 8 percent of total global
30
exports. The corresponding effects are: ”pax mafiosa,"
destruction of democratic/liberal values, corruption, money
laundering, and business infiltration. Even if in a number of
countries the political regimes are not democratic, the
undermining effects of parallel power structures should not
be underestimated. The case of the Soviet Union shows that
organized criminal structures were never fully integrated in
the system and that, even then, they produced marked
inefficiencies, injustices, and illegal power struggles even
31
within the laws and the logic of the regime.
These
circumstances could have potentially dangerous effects in
the transitions that some regimes in the Balkans, the
Middle East, and some states adrift in the Horn of Africa
will face at the end of this century.
3) The transnational networks, created and sustained by
this combination, attack the territorial integrity both at the
borders and within a given country. Whenever organized
crime controls an area, transnational organized crime has
free access, and law enforcement finds a no-go area or is
anyhow ineffective. These areas, also called grey zones, are
practically out of state sovereignty. Grey zones are
unfortunately also present in many countries of the
32
Mediterranean Region.
4) In addition to the problems experienced by West
European countries, many countries in the remainder of the
Region risk becoming less reliable international partners
because organized crime and drug trafficking undermine
them, even if they consider themselves only drug transit
countries. In this context, the stability of Russia and
Ukraine may be put significantly into question, with
evident repercussions at the political and economic level,
not the least in the G8 forum, where important political
33
coordination takes place against these risks.
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5) The evolution of these phenomena is by no means
finished, and it could imply much bigger dangers. Some U.S.
analysts believe already that the latest evolution of both
phenomena are going towards organized systemic crime
(OSC), characterised by increasing alliances between
Russian, Chinese, Italian, Japanese, and U.S. criminal
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organizations, and a fully-fledged narco-industry.
Between 1991 and 1993 a number of criminal ”summits”
have taken place, involving also Cosa Nostra and Russian
criminal organizations.
It may be easily overlooked that the Mediterranean
region is home to five major transnational organized
criminal constellations:
- Italian Camorra, Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta, and
Nuova Sacra Corona Unita (SCU);
- Russian and Georgian organized criminal groups;
- Turkish and Kurdish maffia clans.
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Moreover, minor, but not less dangerous and virulent
organized criminal groups are very active in Albania,
Bulgaria, France, Israel, Lebanon, Spain, and former
Yugoslavia. To these countries, one should naturally add
Malta, Monaco, and Cyprus as centers providing offshore
banking facilities and fiscal incentives, a natural magnet for
money laundering schemes.
This listing of countries is just an indicator, and one
should not concentrate attention only on those geographic
areas, because one would miss the formidable interconnections between those groups and the whole of the
Mediterranean region, Europe, and the world.
As a first proof that the phenomenon of organized crime
must be viewed at a strategic scale, one should take the
projected forgery and money laundering operations during
36
the switch to the Euro currency. Naturally, this will not be
some Spectre-like secret operation; much worse, it will be
the sum of flexible agreements between some sophisticated
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components of major and minor organized criminal groups,
opportunistically exploiting with regional/global
capabilities, this great occasion.
The potential damage of gigantic fraud on the public’s
and market’s confidence could be very considerable. One
could just imagine if some powerful Russian organized
criminal group would have converging interests with
aggressive neo-nationalist Russian groups in order to
undermine the confidence in future European integration of
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). NATO
integration would be lamed, proven substantially useless,
while politics, societies, and economies would be more
infiltrated by diverse criminal organizations. To this risk
one could add risks of distortion of the gold trade, because
all major criminal organizations are starting to use gold as
traceless money laundering means.
The geography of criminal groups is bound of modifying
inevitably current geopolitical maps, because in some cases
transnational organized crime is capable of modifing the
nature of the governmnent. According to the Observatoire
Geopolitique des Drogues (OGD), in the Mediterranean
Region, Russia, the FSU republics (Georgia, Moldova,
Ukraine, in our case), and Turkey are the countries where
the dangers of connivance between state organs and
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criminal groups are greatest.
With the proviso that it is not our intention to substitute
the old Soviet enemy with a new Russian one, since Western
mafias are absolutely cooperative with Russian mafiosniky
whenever they settle their power and money feuds, we will
point out some relevant strategic implications of Russian
and Georgian organized crime before passing to other cases.
We will leave the Turkish-Kurdish until the end, when we
will treat the mixture of organized crime, drug trafficking,
and terrorism.
The end of the Soviet regime marked the mutation of a
type of organized crime from the “totalitarian” version
towards a “free market” one. While during the Soviet regime
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organized crime was less visible (and much less relevant) in
the Western world, it was nonetheless so present that it
undermined significant portions of the Soviet state. Not
surprisingly, “mafya” problems already existed in
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in the
1960s-1980s, prompting the Muscovite leadership to
replace corrupted and criminal top local party members,
who, in turn, complained (not without some reason) that the
Moscow bosses led an unfair competition.
With the liberalization of the regime and its ultimate
fall, organized crime also became liberalized. The jump in
quality of the first generation of former Soviet transnational
organized crime is due to these factors:
- strong cohesiveness within the different levels of
organized crime and the ethnic groups;
- a higher level of instruction (higher secondary school
and university degrees for many bosses);
- the hard training that the first post- perestroyka
criminal generation received during the Soviet regime;
- the arrival in criminal organizations of well-trained
senior military and intelligence officers;
- the long-standing collusions with corrupted sectors of
the ruling elite;
- the ongoing collapse of the old police and judicial
system;
- the legal and criminal globalization of economy;
- the widespread poverty, hitting also relatively higher
classes;
- the slow reconstruction of alternative moral and social
values after the vanishing of the old ideology;
- the persistent lack of a transparent and efficient tax
collecting, banking and customs system;
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- the Western political interest in aiding the development of the Russian economy without questioning too much
the destination of funds and the arrival of Russian
38
investments for many years.
This state of affairs has brought important consequences
for the stability of the Mediterranean Region and Europe:
the existence of criminal regimes in Crimea, Transdnestria,
and in other areas affected by civil strife and with high
illegal emigration rates (Georgia in our case); the rise of
criminal terrorism in Russia and Ukraine; drug production
and trafficking in North Caucasus, Black Sea ports,
Ukraine, Moscow, St. Petersburg; major smuggling
operations in North Caucasus and Ukraine; massive bank
frauds and money laundering in the major Russian cities;
and substantial economic penetration in the CEEC
countries and sizeable investments in the legal economy of
39
West European countries.
Main illegal businesses of these groups are racketeering,
smuggling of Western wares and East European
antiquities, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, prostitution,
and gambling.
A recent disquieting dimension is the export of key
proliferating technologies by criminal business and
quasi-government entities, which may be outside the direct
control of the government, towards sensitive countries like
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India, Iran, and Syria. This phenomenon is actually much
more credible than the dreaded possibility that Russian
organized criminal groups might export nuclear weapons or
components to proliferating countries. Although the
situation does not leave room for complacency, the
proliferating pattern by these entities shows that they
prefer to do some illegal and lucrative business, instead of
risking a dangerous sale with unforeseeable consequences.
The diffusion of these groups is truly on a global scale,
since the countries most targeted are France, Germany,
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Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. That
said, all CEEC countries are affected at different levels and
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with them also countries like Austria, Greece, Israel, Italy,
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Spain, and Turkey. Connections with other major
worldwide organized criminal groups have since long taken
place.
In this context, Israel is interesting as a country that,
besides local criminal organizations that were active in drug
trafficking since the 1980s, has particularly experienced the
effects of criminal diasporas. The massive immigration of
Jewish people from former Soviet Union evidently could not
avoid the arrival of elements of the Soviet organized crime.
The activities of these groups is suspected of having rapidly
influenced the internal political game in the country.
Italy has long been a country synonymous with
organized crime, but the evolution in the last decade is fairly
different from that of FSU. Also, here the Cold War favoured
collusions within a political system that could not enjoy, for
strategic reasons, normal competition between governing
parties and opposition. Corruption had penetrated a
significant number of governmental institutions both at
local and at central level, and in several regions organized
crime enjoyed substantial impunity.
The end of that period, both in political and judicial
terms (generally called Mani Pulite—Clean Hands), has
opened different scenarios from the previous constant
advance of organized crime in southern Italian regions,
supported by drug trafficking and white collar crime in the
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center and north of the peninsula.
In this sense,
notwithstanding the judicial result, the trial of the former
Premier Giulio Andreotti has an enormous political and
psychological importance because it is the Nuremberg trial
of an era of political-Mafioso liaisons.
Italy, after having experienced an internationalization
by the export and the international connections of its Cosa
Nostra and Camorra, is now experiencing the globalization
in the criminal domain. The most visible event is the
eruption of Albanian, Kosovar, former Yugoslav, Turkish,
and Russian organized criminal groups in the Italian
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criminal market. The stream of illegal immigrants and
prostitutes from Albania, CEEC, Kurdish areas, North
Africa, Nigeria, Philippines, and Turkey, and their social
effects have in the first 2 months of 1999 lead to heated
political controversy. In the last 8 years the criminal
geography of a big city like Milan changed from the
coexistence of the old Apulian, Calabrian, Neapolitan, and
Sicilian organized criminal groups to the forced entry of six
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main gangs—five Kosovars and one Croat.
The fight against national organized crime and its
evolution continues. On one hand, Cosa Nostra has been
severely affected by aggressive investigation techniques,
but on the other, if the importance of the Corleonesi “cosca”
has been reduced, other families also have reduced their
profile in order to continue their business. Especially for
what concerns racketeering, the hold of Cosa Nostra
appears to be undiminished, and money laundering
provides further relevant profits. The relative weakening of
Cosa Nostra does favour a certain criminal anarchy which,
in turn, creates further problems for law enforcement.
Between the cracks of Cosa Nostra’s power, organized
groups like the Stidda (Star) or smaller “angry young men”
gangs have tried to establish with ruthless violence their
own influence.
A similar phenomenon of relative disintegration can be
observed within the Camorra, which for the first time saw
the use of car bombs and antitank rockets in internecine
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wars.
Much less penetrable is the Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta,
whose control on the region is particularly strong and whose
influence in the shady world of professional kidnapping is
remarkable. Only a string of arrests by mid-February in
connection with the Sgarella kidnapping has opened a chink
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in its criminal power.
Finally the Nuova SCU (New SCU) has lost the bosses of
the first generation, but has received further impulse by the
connections across the Adriatic with Albanian and Kosovar
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organized criminal groups. It must be taken into account
that this group is not alone in the region of Apulia; on the
contrary less known, but even more dangerous “Mafias”
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prosper in the Northern part of the region.
The problem of the deep infiltration of local organized
crime within the government and the economy of Turkey is
not new (in the 1960s the U.S. Government had pressured
Ankara to destroy opium poppy cultivations), but it has
acquired a newer international dimension with the fall of
the government guided by the premier Mesut Yilmaz and
with the Ocalan case.
The fall of that political coalition has highlighted the
danger that organized crime poses to the stability of
important allies. The warning signals go back to the
November 1996 when a car accident in the village of
Susurluk revealed to the public that a Mafia boss (working
for the Turkish intelligence service), a Kurdish politician,
and high official of the police were travelling together in a
car full of arms and drugs. A further investigation ordered
by the then new premier, Mesut Yilmaz, concluded that
organized criminal groups, trafficking in drugs and
connected with certain sectors of the government, were
responsible for some 2,000 killings.
Revelations that the sale of a major state-owned Turkish
bank and of two dailies were tainted by organized crime
infiltration, and that both the premier and the minister for
economy were aware of the circumstances and that they
nevertheless encouraged the deal were the direct cause of
the government’s fall last November.
This discomforting state of affairs was confirmed a
month later by the explosive declarations of a successful top
anti-drug police official that detailed how the chief of the
Istanbul police, his deputy, and the chief of the Turkish
police had been corrupted. In addition to the traditional
arms smuggling and drug trafficking businesses, TurkishKurdish groups are very active in human trafficking.
Ironically, Albanian-Kosovar organized criminal groups
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might have replaced the Turkish ones in substantial shares
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of the drug trafficking market.
The Ocalan case adds a further dimension to the
international importance of transnational organized crime,
but it will be considered further when the paper examines
the transformation of terrorism and its links with drug
trafficking.
To recapitulate the strategic picture drawn until now in
terms of major organized criminal constellations, the
Mediterranean Region is characterised by three centers of
gravity located in Italy, Russia, and Turkey.
The fact that some of them are NATO members is fairly
irrelevant for the effects that this may have on the quality of
governance and the prevention/repression of organized
crime. This point should be kept in mind, especially now
that NATO will enlarge and celebrate its 50th-year
anniversary: the argument made by CEEC politicians in
favour of NATO membership as a means to ”Westernise”
their countries is purely political and is not valid beyond
that realm. EU enlargement might provide much more help
against these plagues, but, precisely because it has higher
requirements and standards, it does not have for the time
being the needed political push.
All three centers of gravity have remarkable
transnational reach: Cosa Nostra for 70 years at least,
Turkish-Kurdish groups at least for 30. The RussianGeorgian groups are younger on the international scene,
but displayed Blitzkrieg quality in their diffusion, thanks to
the active cooperation of other local organized criminal
groups or gangs. The patterns of drug trafficking will show
the complexity of the web of opportunistic alliances and
collaborations.
In the meantime, it is useful to recall briefly some of the
international connections among major transnational
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organized criminal groups.
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The Colombian cartels are using Europe as an important
money laundering area, especially in the tourist,
entertaininent, and gambling industries. Spain is used as a
main transit point towards Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Russia. CEEC are used as transit
countries towards Western Europe. All Italian major
organized criminal groups have relationships with the
cartels.
The Russian-organized criminal groups have targeted,
in Southern Europe, countries like France, Italy, and Israel
(in addition to Austria, Northern Ireland, Finland,
Germany, Switzerland, and the UK).
The Chinese Triads, after having selected the
Netherlands as their first bridgehead, have expanded
towards Italy and France in the area (and for the rest of
Europe, they are present in Belgium, Germany, and UK).
Looking from the side of Italian criminal organizations,
we can find that groups from Brazil, Egypt, Tunisia, and
former Yugoslavia are in contact with Cosa Nostra,
Camorra, and ‘Ndrangheta. Cosa Nostra, in turn, has
specialized contacts with Argentinean, Chilean, Israeli,
Jordanian, Moroccan, Polish, and Syrian organizations.
Camorra has links with Argentinean, Colombian,
Jordanian, Somalian, and Uruguayan groups, while the
‘Ndrangheta finds support from allies in Chile, Czech
Republic, Dominican Republic, Israel, Poland, Rumania,
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Slovakia, and Turkey.
The end of the Cold War worked differently on these
three centers of gravity. In Italy, it helped to break old
connivances and to weaken significantly older dominant
groups and families. In Turkey, apparently it did not modify
preexistent situations, although the increase in publicity
and in pressure from allied countries might help in time to
change things. In Russia and Georgia, it gave more or less
free rein.
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While these three centers concentrate a significant
amount of criminal power, one should avoid jumping to the
conclusion that the Eastern and Central Mediterranean
basins are Mafia-ridden, while the rest is relatively clean.
Whenever there are drug trafficking and money laundering,
one can be assured that organized crime is at work and that
its social and political nefarious effects are present.
A quick look to other relatively minor situations can be
instructive. A first indicator are states that failed at
different degrees within the past decade: Lebanon, Somalia,
former Yugoslavia, and Albania. All these countries have
experienced or continue to experience governments that can
be corrupted, and their law enforcement is questionable at
best.
Lebanon was one of the first cases where drug trafficking
became a standard financial resource for several militias,
while others preferred large-scale trafficking and
kidnapping. This has had a corrupting influence over Syria,
whose military and intelligence forces were heavily
involved in the war and in the further pacification. Although
drug production and trafficking have undergone significant
changes, they still remain an important factor in the local
and Syrian political life. Poppy cultivations have
disappeared, to be replaced by cannabis and heroin
refineries. Beirut retains a very marginal role, but the ports
of Jieh, Damour, and Tripoli retain their role, while new
ports are developing near the Israeli border (Byblos,
Batroun, and Enn Naqoura). Lebanon is an important
regional hub for deliveries towards Tel Aviv, Damascus
(further on to Cyprus and Greece), Al Riyadh (via Amman)
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and Istanbul.
Somalia, after the failure of the Western coalition
policies governing U.N. missions, has become a major drug
trafficking transit point. Allegedly most of the drug
trafficking is controlled by the warlord Osman Atto, former
second in command of Aideed. Moreover, after a drop of
activity due to the death of the warlord Mohammed Farrah
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Aideed, piracy continues to infest Somalia’s waters through
attacks where even mortar rounds and rocket-propelled
antitank grenades are used to stop ships.
The whole war in former Yugoslavia cannot be
understood if one does not consider the level of deep
corruption of most regimes in place, no matter if some of
them are supported by Western countries. In many cases,
their most bloody militias had been recruited directly from
the underworld of organized crime, often disguised as
football clubs or hooligan groups. The Neretva Valley was
and remains a place where cannabis is grown, and the whole
region is known to law enforcement agencies as the Balkan
Corridor or Route (by 1995, 80 percent of all heroin seized in
West Europe had passed through that corridor). Due to the
war in former Yugoslavia, the tracing of this corridor has
changed, but not its importance. The general rehearsal of
the projected Euro mass forgery was the widespread forgery
of the Deutschmark, the reference currency in the area, in
order to finance the costs of the wars of Yugoslavia’s
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dissolution.
It should be absolutely clear that the presence of the
SFOR has only blocked open war and has forced some
militias take a relatively lower profile, but its presence has
been negligible in severing the criminal liaisons among
political elites, armed militias and organized crime. Some
U.N. and EU initiatives have started to tackle very
prudently the problem, but they are severely hampered by
the diplomatic constraints placed upon them and by a
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general lack of cooperation among different entities.
Albania since 1997, when the Italians, leading a
European coalition of “able and willing," intervened to help
the local government restore law and order with the
operation Alba, is the classic example of how transnational
organized crime is a real security threat. First, through the
bankruptcy of the “financial pyramids,” it has generated the
nightmare of a criminal republic just across the Adriatic
Sea. Second, it has continued to exploit the despair of
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clandestine emigrants, using many of them in female and
juvenile prostitution rings. Third, it has created and
maintained in the north and in the south of the country grey
zones which are respectively responsible for nourishing the
war in Kosovo and for keeping up a stream of drugs, slaves,
war weapons (50 percent of all Italian confiscations are in
Apulia, the region facing Albania) and cigarettes across the
Adriatic. The drugs, once imported, are starting to be
produced locally. Mostly it is cannabis, whose quality and
lower prices are beginning to replace Lebanese hashish,
but, under the supervision of members of Cosa Nostra and of
the Colombian cartels, experimental coca cultivations have
been started on the local, rugged mountains. Moreover,
there are several indications that the local groups have
started operating morphine refineries. The same country,
together with Montenegro, is the starting point for money
laundering operations carried out by the NSCU, with
ramifications towards Russia and Rumania.
A much less discussed, but no less important grey zone is
the island of Corsica, infested by a sort of Mafia almost
forgotten by international analysts. The story of Corsica as
a base for transnational organized crime begins with the
gradual transformation, through a series of secessions, of a
terrorist nationalistic movement into a collection of
organized criminal groups, as French President Jacques
54
Chirac defined them. He was the first French president to
admit the problem openly, until then mostly considered an
internal affair, mostly buried under the silences of
successive governments of different political affiliations.
As it happens often with insular regions, Corsica was for
decades one among the most economically depressed and
socially backward regions of the centralized French state.
After the end of World War II, national movements sprung
up, advocating more resources for the island and the
secession from France, following traditions displayed
during the upheaval of the French Revolution, where many
peripheral regions tried to oppose the dominance of the
capital. The situation was worsened when the former
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French colonists of Algeria (the so-called pied noirs—the
black-footed ones) were relocated after the end of the war of
decolonization of that country. But by the end of the 1960s,
the revolutionary fervour had given way to a diffused and
organized racketeering system, thinly disguising itself with
the old ideals. The French political elite thought it more
expedient to buy out the secessionist movement with tax
cuts, privileges, contributions to its development, and by
tolerating the creation of a parallel power structure. The
tacit pact was that France enjoyed a more or less nominal
sovereignty on the island, and that, in exchange, Corsicans
supported in various ways the party in power, promoting at
the same time their own lobbies.
Until the end of 1996, intimidating bomb attacks were
still conducted so as to minimize casualties, but by the end
of 1997 some still unidentified “nationalist groups” (local
parlance for organized crime groups) assassinated the
prefect Jean-Claude Erignac, evidently throwing the
gauntlet to the French state.
As with every country facing forms of organized crime
capable of controlling the territory, France has its own
understandable difficulties restoring law and order on the
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island. It must be clear, however, that Corsican organized
crime is not something that can be considered as
circumscribed to the island alone. Corsican groups have
infiltrated various levels of the French law enforcement
agencies, they have connections with the local and
transnational organized crime groups present in Southern
France, and, as other groups in other countries, they are
responsible for serious frauds against European
Community structural aid and agricultural support funds.
Spain is also another interesting and not so often
mentioned base for transnational organized crime. Its local
organizations, although lacking the strong image of others,
are very active in drug trafficking, systematic cigarette
smuggling, liaisons with trasnational prostitution rings,
and software piracy. Part of the problem comes from the
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grey zones that straddle the Spanish-French border and
that were created by the terrorist and racketeering
activities of ETA. Their liaisons include Brazilian,
Bulgarian, French, Italian, Moroccan, Polish, Portuguese,
56
and Russian organizations.
Drug production in the Mediterranean region occurs,
according to the type of drug, among the following
57
geographic areas:

•

Cannabis: Morocco and Russia (major producers),
Lebanon and former Yugoslavia (minor).

•

ATS: Western Europe (group of the ecstasy drugs)
and CIS (methamphethamine and ephedrone).

Drug trafficking, instead, reveals the following patterns:

•

Heroin: Afghanistan 58 has replaced the Golden
Triangle as major producer, 40 percent of global
heroin seizures were made in Europe (Western and
Eastern alike). The drug followed three possible
routes: 1. Central Asia, Russia; 2. Central Asia,
Caucasus, Turkey Balkan Corridor; and 3. Iran,
Turkey (much less used due to harsh Iranian
anti-drug policies). Some 10-20 percent could come via
Pakistan, Somalia, Nigeria, Netherlands, or Spain.
Russia helped significantly to make the global
connection between two producing areas that were
before much more separated: Golden Crescent and
Golden Triangle. 59

•

Cocaine, largely produced by Colombia (Bolivia and
Peru have a lesser role), and Europe (Eastern and
Western) is a market with an upwards trend (actually
10 percent of all world seizures happen here). While
the Netherlands and Spain are the main European
entry points, the air and sea trafficking routes connect
the producing countries either directly or via the
Brazil-West Africa or Southern Africa route. Another
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possible route, according to Interpol, would be directly
to Russia in order to reach European markets.

•

Cannabis, produced by the mentioned countries,
plus Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan
(Colombia, Cambodia, and Thailand are minor but
increasing in importance). Congo, Ghana, Kenya,
Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania (taken
together) are important transit points and producing
countries for European markets.

Summarizing at the end of this paragraph, we can say
that the organized criminal and drug trafficking geography
of the Mediterranean Region is marked by:

•

three centers of gravity, concerning major
transnational criminal organizations, namely Italy,
Russia, and Turkey;

•

21 regional gravitating support areas: Albania,
Croatia, Bulgaria, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, France,
FRY, FYROM, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, Rumania, Slovenia, Somalia,
Spain, Syria, and Tunisia;

•

two states risking to become failed (Algeria and
Russia), 10 having experienced at various degrees
such a failure (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Eritrea, FRY, FYROM, Georgia, Lebanon, Slovenia,
and Somalia);

•

four islands which have relevant grey zones and
different degrees of organized crime control/
connection (Corsica, Cyprus, Sardinia, and Sicily);

•

two major (Morocco and Russia) and two minor drug
producers (Lebanon and former Yugoslavia);

•

three major drug trafficking routes: Atlantic Route,
Balkan Corridor, Russia;
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•

three major drug trafficking entry points: Russia,
Spain and Turkey;

•

three major people-smuggling sea-routes
(Morocco-Spain, Tunisia/Albania-Italy), and four
land-routes (Sarajevo-Croatia-Slovenia-Italy/
Austria, Istanbul-Ukraine-Poland-Germany or
Istanbul-Romania-Hungary-Slovakia-Czech
Republic, Istanbul-Greece-FYROM-Italy/Austria,
Russia-Finland); 60

•

three regional financial offshore centers: Cyprus,
Malta, Monaco;

•

the presence of Chinese, Colombian, and Japanese
organized criminal groups and the relative absence of
North American and Mexican ones;

•

dominant drugs are cannabis, heroin, and ATS, with
cocaine on the increase. 61

Transforming Terrorism . The end of governmental
control and manipulation of guerrilla movements during
the Cold War has produced, as in other areas of politics and
economy, deregulation and delocalization, only that here we
see a deregulation of guerrillas and a delocalization of their
logistics. The deregulation of terrorism includes its
privatization, its links to criminal organizations, and,
mainly at the local level, its extension as a practice of
criminal organizations. The delocalization is synonymous
with globalization. These three relatively new
characteristics pose a direct problem to the states in terms
of diffusion of power. The privatization of terrorism is easily
epitomized by the figure of the millionaire Osama bin
Laden.
Instead of ideologies and political struggle, war
economics are increasingly a mainspring of these civil
conflicts, leading to a “degeneration” of armed movements,
more and more entangling them in the vicious circle of
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criminalizing resources. Beyond possible tactical alliances
with criminal organizations, the most worrying feature is
that armed movements acquire more and more ”Mafia”
characteristics precisely because they engage themselves in
drug trafficking. The drawback for these movements is that,
in the long run, their legitimacy will be increasingly eroded
in the eyes of dominated populations.
The dynamics of this involvement in crime are
illustrated through three levels;
- local tax on illicit cultivations,
- involvement in commercial networks, and
- development of international networks.
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Through the first system, it is possible to set up fairly
large private militias (brigade strength). The second level
follows the first, through a tax on drug trafficking. The final
level has been developed by the Lebanese Christian militias
during the civil war, the TTLE (since the mid 1980s), the
Kosovo Albanian organizations, and the Kurdish militants
of the PKK.
The case of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan (the
Avenger, nicknamed by his followers Apo—Uncle) is a
striking illustration of the transformation of terrorism. In
1978 he founded the PKK on a Marxist-Leninist ideological
basis and begun eliminating competing nationalist Kurdish
formations (KUK). In 1980 the coup of the Turkish generals
unleashed a systematic persecution of all pro-Kurdish
groups, moderate and extremist alike. Fleeing from Turkey,
he started training his fighters in 1982 in the midst of the
Lebanese civil war. By 1984 he started an outright guerrilla
campaign in South Eastern Turkey that cost until now
31,000 dead (17,878 rebels, 4,660 civilians, 3,835 soldiers,
247 policemen, and 1,218 rural self-defense militiamen).
Sanctuaries and help were provided by regional
neighbours (Iran, Iraq, Syria) interested in creating
problems for Turkey, by the USSR for political and
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geopolitical reasons, and in many ways by Greece, until
recently locked in the long running feud with Ankara. This
resulted in a very structured organization, 10,000-15,000
hard core militants (among which some German RAF
terrorists) capable of controlling actively non-negligible
portions of the Kurdish diaspora in the world and
influencing several cultural associations, one islamist
branch movement, a Kurdish parliament-in-exile, some
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dailies, one TV chain, and one political wing (HADEP).
While at the start the costs had been borne by foreign
assistance, in time systematic racketeering and drug
trafficking began increasingly to fill PKK’s war chests.
Ocalan not only resorted to all usual, bloody terrorist tactics
and suppressed even political dissenters ruthlessly at home
and abroad (the crime for which German judges wanted
him), but, unlike Arafat, Mandela, or the IRA, he used his
position on the Turkish border to promote the passage of
drugs towards Western European markets.
The war waged in Southeast Turkey would not be
logistically understandable if one would not take into
account the drug trafficking dimension and the extensive
complicities in that trade on both sides. This aspect
constitutes also the hidden political dimension on which the
future of hard liners in both camps is at stake. The
beginning of the end, prepared by terrible counterguerrilla
Turkish campaigns, started with the end of Syrian
protection, an ambiguous sign of the remaining influence
that state sponsoring has on terrorism.
At a political level, only the imminent trial of Ocalan will
tell if there has been a backstage agreement between Apo
and the Turkish generals towards some vaguely federalist
political solution. Apparently one of the goals of the Kurdish
terrorist leader was to continue the political overtures of
1993 in the direction of a cease-fire and the search for some
political solution, yet it remains to be seen if all the
commanders of the PKK will exercise restraint or if some
64
parts of the PKK run amok.
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Another interesting and much discussed case is Osama
bin Laden. In the past bin Laden had actively collaborated
with the CIA in Afghanistan, but he changed his mind after
the arrival in Saudi Arabia of American troops, felt by him
as sacrilegious. His $300 million fortune has created several
terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen,
and Somalia, with a network of 3-5,000 affiliates under the
name of Al Qaeda (the Base). He is suspected of being the
mastermind of the killing of 18 U.S. Rangers in Mogadishu,
the Dahran bomb attack (June 25-26, 1996), and of being
involved in the twin attacks in Nairobi and Dar Es-Salaam
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(August 7, 1998).
A less spectacular, but no less important aspect of the
transformation of terrorism is the network of private or
religious charities that are capable of supporting low-cost
terrorist networks, who, in turn, may accept state support,
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but do not depend on it.
This independence from
governments is real, but it should not be exaggerated.
Private initiative, despite having succeeded in putting
together most of the means necessary for an international
terrorist campaign, appears not to be capable of effectively
mounting one like in the 1960s and 1970s. One could argue
that only the systematic support capability provided by
states allowed such campaigns during the Cold War.
Several intelligence evaluations in 1998 indicated that the
French terrorist Kelkal group was induced to use
rudimentary means not only to avoid investigative
detection, but also because it was very difficult to get
sophisticated materiel. The same appears to happen even in
Algeria, where GIA groups are forced to rudimentary
production instead of relying on effective logistic networks
abroad. By the way, the case of the GIA also shows how
endemic terrorism can ”degenerate” into clanic gangs. The
name itself does not stand for a rigidly organized group, it is
just a label, covering a terrorist nebula, whose kataeb
(companies) are controlling each their own territory,
managing their own racketeering and trafficking and
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fighting as fiercely among themselves as against the
government forces.
The geography of terrorism in the Mediterranean
Region can be summarized as follows:

•

20 countries with internal/endemic/civil war
terrorism, inspired by nationalist/ethnic motivations
(Spain, Israel, Greece, FRY, FYROM, Turkey, Iran,
Iraq, Russia) or by political/religious motivations
(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Iran,
Iraq, Djibouti; Saudi Arabia, Bahrain);

•

3 countries affected by international terrorism
(France, Saudi Arabia, Yemen);

•

5 countries designated as terrorism supporting states
(Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran);

•

9 countries seriously violating human rights at
various degrees in their counterterrorist actions
(Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Iraq, Bahrain, Turkey, FRY).

Regarding international terrorism as defined above, the
Mediterranean Region is characterized by the apparently
contradictory presence of a vast movement of islamist
extremism, of a majority of U.S.-designated terrorism
supporting states, of some of the most important terrorists
and yet a very low number of casualties, compared to the
potential targets in the whole area and in the Western
European riverine countries.
The most striking contradiction is the recurring news of
a great Iraqi terrorist offensive, possibly with the help of
Abu Nidal or Osama bin Laden. It should be remembered
that before the Gulf War, the alarm was launched about
Saddam’s supposed terrorist armada, but nothing
happened. Surely quiet preventive measures are having
their effect, but probably other factors also are playing their
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role.
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The first is the weakening of extremist islamist currents,
exploiting the Islamic religious renaissance and
particularly its integralist variants. Saudi Arabia had
promoted since at least 1980 its own wahabbite variant of
fundamentalism, exporting it not only to Afghanistan, but
also to Algeria, Tunisia, and other countries where it
succeeded in exercising influence. The presence of Western
infidel soldiers on the holy land of Saudi Arabia, whose
monarchy is legitimized precisely from its role as protector
of the holy Muslim places, weakened severely Saudis’
prestige. This circumstance was in some cases coupled with
a cut of funds towards extremist groups that had supported
the Iraqi cause in 1991. Moreover, the conservative islamist
movement failed because it did not address revolutionary
needs of the societies. Land reform was, for instance,
conspicuously absent from their agenda, while they
believed that a Middle East “Marshall Plan” could have
furthered their goals.
On the other hand, secular forces started in a number of
countries to break their ambiguous relationships with
integralist islamist groups. In fact, these groups had been
supported in order to fight against other political opponents
(in some states they were leftwing forces, in other
Palestinian groups). At the same time, the impetuous rising
of religious streams in the political debate had forced more
secular parties on the defensive. Some analysts noticed
that, at a certain moment, two Middle Eastern leaders
started vigorously drawing the attention of the
international community on the danger of islamist
extremism, particularly the attention of the United States.
Creating this new enemy, Hosni Mubarak and lzthak Rabin
succeeded in getting international support or neutrality,
regaining in importance vis-à-vis and liquidating without
too much international criticism their own armed
opponents (al Jamaa al Islamiyya, Muslim Brotherhood,
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Hamas, al Jihad).
The second factor, already mentioned, is the lessened
support of certain states to terrorism, compared to the days
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of the Cold War. The effect of this reduced support and the
fear of the propagation of islamist extremism also brought
several Arab states to underwrite same basic political
principles of the anti-terrorism fight, which, in turn, have
lead to a better cross border cooperation among Mediter69
ranean region countries.
Finally, one should not forget that terrorism is not a
winning option in several significant countries in the area.
Through democratic or despotic means, the battle against
terrorism is being won slowly but assuredly in Spain, Egypt,
and Turkey, and, in the supposedly much more fragile
petromonarchies, it appears to be a somewhat limited
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risk.
Another aspect of international terrorism is represented
by the future of its evolution, particularly regarding the use
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of information
warfare. The debate on the possibility of the use by terrorist
groups of biological or chemical weapons has gained more
profile through President Clinton’s declarations on that
risk.
Surely the chemical attack in Tokyo carried out by the
Auni Shinrikyo sect has left a deep impression in the minds
of decisionmakers and law enforcement agencies, and one
should not be complacent about the failure of the same sect
to procure biological weapons. Nuclear terrorism, especially
its variant featuring crude radiological dispersion devices
(RDD), remains still a distinct possibility; therefore all
preventive measures aimed at reducing the risks to civil
populations are something that should be considered by the
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European governments, too.
That said, one should acknowledge that most terrorist
groups do not need to face the risks and the possible severe
backlash inherent to the use of WMDs because much cruder
methods are enough to attain their goals. Moreover, only a
limited number of groups may present a profile of global
purification and isolationist mentalities, which, in turn,
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might resort to extreme means regardless of any political
consideration.
The so-called cyberterrorism is already a reality with
which open information societies must learn to live, albeit
until now no spectacular incident has reached the effect of
traditional killings and bomb attacks.
On a less exotic note, a much more probable risk is given
by the links between terrorism and criminal groups. In itself
this feature in not new, but the way these bonds are
presently fostered is different, as the French case
demonstrates. Since 1994 the frontier between islamist
militants and criminals has become hazy, due to an
increasing interpenetration of both environments. The
French anti-terrorist experts point out that the new groups
emerging are bound by a more ”intellectual” member or a
veteran from Afghan or Bosnia; already socially excluded,
they tend to create a sort of internationalist counterculture
using islamism as an existing ideological anti-system tool
offered by certain mosques, cultural associations, and
within prisons; and, finally, their social opposition
connecting internal and international terrorism is expected
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to increase.
The diffusion of terrorist methods to organized criminal
groups is particularly well-known in Colombia, where the
Cali and Medellin drug cartels have employed car bombs
frequently in indiscriminate attacks. In Europe the
phenomenon is still relatively limited: three Cosa Nostra
attacks in Italy (1994) and one Russian organized crime
attack in Moscow (November 11, 1996). In the case of
Corsica, we have instead the gradual transformation of a
terrorist nationalistic movement into a collection of
organized criminal groups, as already mentioned.
An ominous sign of the lethal potential that the
manipulation of organized crime and terrorist techniques
can develop in spillovers of endemic terrorism comes from
India. The March 12, 1993, multiple bomb attacks using
explosive cars, motorcycles, and suitcases left 320 dead and
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more than 1,200 injured in the business district of Bombay.
The perpetrators were not terrorists, but local criminals
following the directives of an Indian ”godfather” living in
Dubai, apparently recruited by the Pakistani intelligence to
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retaliate for the Indian killings of Muslims in Kashmir.
A possible variant of this deadly synergy is the criminal
multiservice agency, making money through criminal
activities organized in ”mafia”-like fashion and obtaining
money and political protection through customized terrorist
attacks. Although rare, there is the important precedent of
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the Magliana gang (1983-93).
Concluding the analysis of the new risks in the area, one
should draw attention to the case of Aum Shinrikyo, which
has also highlighted the possibility that some sects may
represent a risk for democratic governments either by
violent actions (including mass suicides) or, worse, by secret
political and economic infiltration, leading to the
destabilization of the very foundations of democracy.
The problems are not only the undemocratic ideals and
the methods advocated by these groups, but also their
specific crimes against the human person (brainwashing,
battering, rape, and extreme physical and psychological
pressure) and at the economic level (extortion, tax fraud,
money laundering, and corruption). Ironically, while
Southern Mediterranean countries have more problems
with religious extremism, Northern Mediterranean and
more affluent countries have more specific troubles with
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sects.
Policies.
If one might believe that coordinated and coherent
policies regarding these new risks are more easily found in
the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) domain than in the
defence one, reality will delude him quickly. Already in the
relatively homogeneous area of EU countries, this issue has
taken several years to come to maturity, and it will take
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some more time to produce fully satisfactory operational
results. The Mediterranean Region is an even more
complicated environment, where few frameworks have
some chances to succeed, particularly when they affect
sovereignty aspects which are terribly sensitive to many
governments outside the EU zone.
Institutions are surely not the panacea, but they help in
better organizing common efforts. Apart from more or less
universal groupings like the U.N., Interpol, the OECD, or
the G-7/G-8 or from specific multilateral initiatives (Sharm
El Sheikh summit, multilateral meetings among Interior
ministers or intelligence chiefs), the only institution that
can do something here is the EU.
Despite the sometimes dismissive remarks of some
commentators on its CFSP, the EU has altogether the
consensus, relative will, and the concrete means to act in
this respect. This fact was authoritatively confirmed by the
policy adopted by NATO itself. EU is the leading
organization, while NATO can only be seen as a facilitator.
What are the comparative advantages of the EU?

•

Its successful experience concerning the JHA (also
denominated the third pillar), because it succeeded
first in securing consensus of sovereign countries over
an intrusive agreement like the Schengen treaty and
then in extending this acquis to the rest of European
partners.

•

Its multiple dimensions, political, economic, and
security, embodied in the Barcelona process. These
will help gradually in developing that mutual
understanding that is the precondition to any
scenario of partnership and democratization in the
area.

•

The availability of the WEU as a vehicle for concrete
security initiatives, including out-of-area law
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enforcement missions that will be carried out on the
basis of an implicit or explicit EU mandate.

•

Its political profile that is, rightly or wrongly,
perceived as less imposing, unilaterally acting and
biased than the U.S. one.

Much of what will be mentioned is already being done,
but it is useful to stress it again. What can be done by the
EU?

•

Continue in the gradual integration of her law
enforcement and judicial space. EU countries are
among the most lucrative markets for transnational
organized crime and a traditional target for extremist
political groups. Therefore, preventing and combating
effectively these phenomena will create a zone of law
and order with direct and indirect positive effects on
neighbouring countries.

•

Prepare her enlargement through policies that
enhance formally and informally the cooperation
among actors interested in stability and economic
development. Few people realize that a good reform of
the much decried Common Agricultural Policy will
help ease the tensions created by clandestine
immigration and its attendant criminality through a
further opening of Mediterranean agricultural
imports.

•

Continue support to Russia in order to contribute as
much as possible in avoiding the foundering of the
state and of the economy and to prevent further
inroads by transnational organized crime.

•

Devise appropriate policies for the assistance to law
enforcement agencies in the accomplishment of
objectives of common interest among the
Mediterranean partners. Europol could be developed
gradually into a regional focal point for assistance and
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information exchange with law enforcement agencies
of third countries.
Beyond the established institutional and economic aid
contexts, another policy could be considered at purely
intergovernmental level.
Cooperation among law enforcement agencies also has
made significant strides on both sides of the Atlantic, as
shown by the successful working relationship between the
director of the FBI, Mr. Louis Freeh, and the general
prosecutor of Palermo, Mr. Giovanni Falcone. What is
lacking is a better cooperation among foreign intelligence
services in the new fields of transnational organized crime,
money laundering, and drug trafficking.
Here again, European governments should take the lead
because their intelligence agencies suffer from excessive
duplication, fragmentation, and relatively low budgets. The
new strategic environment already puts an enormous strain
on their limited resources concerning their traditional
tasks. It would be interesting to develop a common
framework and understanding in order to repeat and
improve the successes achieved in the fields of international
terrorism and counterproliferation.
This framework, that could be called a European
intelligence policy, means that a new informal alternative
collaboration culture should be shaped among the different
intelligence services, shaping in turn their collective
behaviour.
Concerning the specific new risks issue, a common
discussion among intelligence directors could be started on
basic requirements (a first one could be to include financial
and organized crime within the broader analysis of foreign
governments), leading gradually to joint assessments and
eventually to the joint training of analysts in this area.
Another subject that could be broached in this context is the
division of labour between internal security and external
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intelligence services at a European level.
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2
1. That is, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.
2. That is, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan,
and Israel. Libya is still out due to the freezing of diplomatic ties after
the Lockerbie incident, but might in the medium term be involved again
in principle. The partners of dialogue do not fully coincide between the
two security organizations.
3. The Western European subregion includes Portugal, Spain,
France, and Italy. The Balkan/Black Sea subregion comprises
Slovenia, Croatia, FRY, Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM,
Albania, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia,
Georgia, and Turkey (Hungary being a bridge towards Central Europe).
The Middle East/Red Sea subregion includes Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran,
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman,
Yemen, Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, Israel, Palestinian
Territories, and Lebanon. The Maghreb subregion is represented by the
classic quartet of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, where
Mauritania has been politically added.
4. For a succinct review of the different theories and a good
bibliography, see Paul B. Stares, ed., The New Security Agenda, A
Global Survey, Tokyo-New York: JCIE, 1998. Besides the chapter on
North America (Florini-Simmons), for the concerned area, see also the
chapters on FSU (Medvedev), Western Europe (Politi), and Middle East
(Shehadi).
5. Just to name some examples for each mentioned category of risk,
the repeated civil wars in the republican and imperial Rome, the
Cossack revolt (18th century), the “brigandage” in Italy (19th); Arab,
Norman, Mongol, Turkish migrations throughout the Middle Age; white
settlers’ migrations in the Sioux and other Amerindian tribes’
territories (19th); the availability of water and fertile land before
modern agricultural techniques; the availability of timber for navies
before the spreading of iron hulls; religious terrorism in the Mashreq
(the sect of Assassins) and in India’s different kingdoms (Thug sect); and
piracy in different centuries.
6. Giovarnbattista Vico, Principi della scienza nuova, 3rd ed., 1774.
7. See International Military and Defense Encyclopedia,Trevor N.
Dupuy, et al., eds., Washington-New York: Brassey’s, 1993; Edward N.
Luttwak, Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace, Cambridge MA:
Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 180. For the scope of
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the paper, the definitions of Henry H. Kissinger (strategy as the manner
by which a society secures its future); of Basil H. Liddell Hart (grand
strategy as guide and coordination of all the resources of a nation or an
alliance to attain the political objectives established); of Edward
Luttwak (“grand strategy is the highest level of interaction between any
parties capable to use unregulated force against one another”); and of
Helmuth Schmidt (grand strategy as the harmonization of national
economic and security policies among Western countries, since no one
individually can achieve security) are used.
8. See also Barry Buzan, “Rethinking Security After the Cold War,”
Cooperation and Conflict, Sage Publications, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 5-28, for
an analytical point of view.
9. It is important to keep in mind that in this context the word
“challenge” is synonymous with “risk” rather than with the concept of
outright threat. This is also necessary in order to qualify the seriousness
of different challenges.
10. This applies also to Abkhazia, Albania, Chechenya, Cyprus,
Iraq, Israel, Kosovo, Ossetia, Palestinian Authority Territories, Spain,
Trasnistria, Turkey, or Yemen. Lebanon and Bosnia were cases, as was
Vietnam, where a quasi-conventional war, a conventional war, or an
international low intensity conflict were merged with an insurrection.
11. For an overview of a sample the different definitions proposed,
see W. Hagan, “Organized Crime Continuum: A Further Specification of
a New Conceptual Model” in Criminal Justice Review, 1983, p. 8, in
which he lists 13 different conditions for organized crime, defined by 15
different authors, and finds 11 elements that could be included in the
concept of organized crime; Didier Bigo, “Pertinence et limites de la
notion de crime organisé,” in Relations internationales et stratigiques,
20, Hiver 1995, pp. 134-8; Peter Kopp, “Analyse Economique des
Organizations Criminelles,” pp. 139-43; Marcelle Padovani, “Le modele
Cosa Nostra," pp. 113-15; Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman, eds.,
The Economics of Organized Crime, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995, pp. 1-30; Pierre Tremblay et Maurice Cusson, “Marchés
criminels transnationaux et analyse strategique,” in Marcel Leclerc,
ed., La Criminalite Organisee, La Documentation Frangaise, 1996,
Paris, pp. 19-42; Ernesto U. Savona, “La regulation du marché
criminel,” pp. 263-264. In general, the paper will try to avoid the terms
“mafia” or “mafiosi.”
12. Ad Hoc Group on Organized Crime, Report on the Situation of
Organized Crime in EU, 1993. This definition could gradually replace
the older definition adopted by the OIPC-Interpol since 1988.
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13. For a more thorough discussion on the definitions of
transnational security risks, see also Alessandro Politi, Nouveau
risques et sécurité europeenne, Cahier de Chaillot nr. 29, IES-UEO,
Octobre 1997, Paris, pp. 4-11.
14. According to Dutch Justice minister Winnie Sordrager,
however, 50 percent of the hashish seized in the Netherlands arrives
from France and Belgium, while 80 percent of the seized heroin from
Germany and Balkan countries. See Associated Press, Rotterdam, April
22, 1997.
15. For an essential survey of definitions of terrorism, see Louis
Rene Beres, “The Meaning of Terrorism for the Military Commander,”
Comparative Strategy, Vol. 14, No. 3, July-September 1995,
Basingstoke: Taylor & Francis, 1995, pp. 287-99; Paul Wilkinson,
“Terrorist Targets and Tactics: New Risks to World Order,” in Alison
Jamieson, ed., Terrorism and Drug Trafficking in the 1990s, Aldershot:
Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1994, p. 179; Alain Joxe, “Un concept
fourre-tout: le terrorisme,” in Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1996, pp.
6-7; Vittorfranco S. Pisano, “Contemporary Terrorism and the West,” in
Occidente, October 4, 1994, p. 28-29.
16. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995,
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, April 1996
(Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., Coordinator for Counterterrorism).
The definition itself is drawn from the Title 22 of the United States
Code, Section 2656f(d) and has been used for statistical and analytical
purposes since 1983.
17. The U.S. Department of State specifies that the term
”noncombatant” is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians,
military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or
not on duty. Also considered acts of terrorism are the attacks on military
installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military
hostilities does not exist at the site.
18. See L. R. Beres. The principle of just cause maintains that an
insurgency may exercise law-enforcing measures under international
law. This argument is deducible from the existence of an authoritative
human rights regime in international law and from the corollary
absence of a central enforcement mechanism for this regime. It is
codified inter alia at the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
International Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 29th sess., supp. no. 28, at 1, U.N.
Doc. A/9028 (1973); see also Article 7 of the U.N. General Assembly’s
1974 Definition of Aggression. Article 7 refers to the October 24, 1970,
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
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Relations and Cooperation Among States. The standard of just means
has been brought to bear on non-state actors in world politics by Article
3, common to the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and by
the two protocols to these conventions. Protocol I applies humanitarian
international law to conflicts fought for self-determination. A product of
all armed conflicts that are not covered by Protocol I and that took place
since the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts that
ended on June 10, 1977, the protocol brings irregular forces within the
full scope of law. Protocol II, also additional to the Geneva Conventions,
concerns protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts. This
protocol thus applies within the territory of a state between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces.
19. Although it remained difficult to understand in the development
of the case until the end of January 1999, how some German and Italian
politicians continued to ignore that the PKK leader was seriously
involved in drug trafficking, and whose political/freedom fight rationale
begs some questions.
20. A precursor case was the attempted investigation by the U.N. of
massacres allegedly committed by the new ruler of the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Laurent Desire Kabila. It would have been difficult
to distinguish between his responsibilities as guerrilla chief and as
president of the new republic, and in both cases he remained legally
accountable.
21. That is, where indigenous attackers constantly target people
within the same country—the denominations express increasing
degrees of violence. Examples of endemic terrorism might be found in
Northern Ireland or Spain, while civil war is ongoing as of January 1999
in Algeria.
22. Citizens of another country are attacked in an area plagued by
local, usually endemic terrorism, e.g., if a European dies in a bomb
attack against a bus in Tel Aviv.
23. Citizens of another country are attacked in an area adjacent to
that plagued by endemic terrorism, e.g., Tunisian border guards are
attacked by Algerian terrorists.
24. Support in different kinds by non-state actors—or by
governments on an occasional basis—to armed/terrorist groups or to
their front political organizations, acting in the theatre where endemic
terrorism or civil war is ongoing, e.g., the Islamic charities’ networks or
the pro-IRA fund raising actions in the United States.
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25. Continuous and/or decisive support by governments to
armed/terrorist groups, acting in the theater where the confrontation is
happening, as, for instance, the support of Syria and Iran to the
Hezb’allah in Lebanon. This category includes all manipulations of
armed/terrorist groups made by intelligence agencies. If a group is
based in a particular country, this amounts to sponsoring by that
country, not to a support role.
26. It can receive international support or state sponsorship, again
including all intelligence manipulations in the preceding note. This
terrorism can be perpetrated in support of an endemic terrorist
confrontation (e.g., attacks by the PKK in Western Europe); in support
of a wider political confrontation at political, ideological, or religious
level (e.g., the bomb detonated on December 23, 1995, at the office of the
Peruvian Honorary Consulate, claimed later by the Anti-Imperialist
Cells—AIZ, the successor organization to the RAF); and as a proxy for
indirect confrontation between governments.
27. Covert operation has here a narrower meaning, since much of
the intelligence manipulations in categories 5 and 6 normally fall into
this bracket. Covert operations can be the French retaliations after the
bomb attack in Beirut in 1986, or the Iranian-sponsored killings of
dissidents in Germany, proved in April 1997.
28. Such may allegedly be the case of several “death squadrons” in
Latin America during the Cold War, of a spate of bomb attacks in Italy in
the late 1960s or mid-1970s, or of the GAL (Group of Anti-terrorist
Liberation) in Spain. It should be noted that even within a
nondemocratic country, the creation of clandestine terrorist groups
muddles the existing chains of command and political power
constellations, as in Algeria for instance.
29. In the year 1991, heroin overdose casualties amounted to 4,843,
only among the eight countries of the Schengen space. The medium
annual increase is, allowing for statistical fluctuations, around 600-700
dead. See Marie-Christine Dupuis, Stupifiants, prix, profits, PUF,
Paris, 1996, p. 139. Concerning the United States, in 1995, overdose
casualties amounted to 8,400 people against 530,000 drug-related
hospital emergencies. See Strategic Assessment 1994, H. Binnendijk
and P. Clawson, eds., Washington: Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University, 1997, pp. 202-203; see also note
59.
30 Stephen Fidler and Jimmy Bums, “Illicit Drugs Trade is put at
$400bn,” Financial Times, June 26, 1997, p. 4. According to the World
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Bank Atlas 1994, The World Bank 1994, this estimate must be related to
a yearly money laundering turnover of at least $1 trillion.
31. See Alessandro Politi, “Russian organized crime and European
security,” in European Commission, Reinhardt Rummel and Sabine
Weyand, eds., Illicit trade and organized crime - New threats to economic
security?, European Union External Relations (DG-1) - SWP,
Luxembourg, 1998, pp. 39-46.
32. See Bertrand Gallet, “La grande criminalité organisée, facteur
de déstabilisation mondiale?,” in Relations Internationales et
stratégiques, Grande criminalité organisée: dessous et enjeux, nr. 20,
Hiver 1995, pp. 95-98. The rapporteur of the Loi de programmation
militaire 1991-93 at the French Assemblee Nationale spoke of “zone
grises” defined as ”regions devenues inaccessibles et hostiles à toute
pénétration, où aucun gouvernement n’est en mesure de faire appliquer
les regles minimales du droit” (Regions that have become inaccessible
and hostile to any penetration, where no government is capable to
enforce the minimal rules of law). Generally these grey zones are places
where a civil war is ongoing (Afghanistan, the border regions of Burma
and Thailand), where political confrontation and infringements of the
law are a normal means for controlling any type of trafficking (the
Beqa’a Valley, the Andine Cordillera, the Chinese region of Xinjang,
some parts of Northern and Southern Albania). But they can also be
areas where the nation-state has disappeared (e.g., former Yugoslavia
during the war, Somalia); where guerrillas, militias, and drug
traffickers hold sway (e.g., jungles and other rough territory); lawless
suburbs in major third world cities and in a fair number of cities in the
industrialised countries. See Xavier Raufer, “The New post-Cold War
Terrorist Threats,” in Democracy & Security, Issue 7, May 1996,
GIRIS/IGRIS. Although there are some ideas that the cyberspace of
Internet could be considered a grey zone for some criminal
undertakings, it simply cannot be considered neither inaccessible nor
hostile to any penetration. A further classification sees the distinction
between grey zones, chaotic territories, and concrete jungles. Chaotic
territories are those at the border of different old empires and at the
crossing of different cultures, left to their own devices and to their
chronic instability (Central Asia, Caucasus, former-Yugoslavia).
Concrete jungles are found in each megalopolis and its own slums or
bidonvilles (Cairo, Istanbul, Karachi, Lagos Lima, Los Angeles, Rio de
Janeiro). See VV AA, CHEAr, GRR nr. 12, Défense et sécurité à l’horizon
2000, Nouveaux défis, nouveaux moyens, Paris, September 1995, pp.
35-27.
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33. See also VV AA, “Transnational Crime: A New Security
Threat?,” in Strategic Survey 1994/95, London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, Oxford Press, 1995, pp. 25-33.
34. James Holden-Rhodes, intervention at the seminar ”New Risks
and European Security," WEU-ISS, November 28-29, 1997, Paris.
35. According to recent estimates, the Camorra is made up by 132
“families,” Cosa Nostra by some 130-186 cosche, the ‘Ndrangheta by 150
‘ndrine, the Nuova SCU by 51 families, the Russian groups should be
some 12,000, 300 among which have an international dimension
(including Georgian ones), while the Turkish-Kurdish clans should be
12-10. See F. Rizzi, “L’oro, ultima frontiera del crimine,” Il Messaggero,
September 24, 1998. According to other sources in Russia, more than
6,000 criminal groups and more than 150 criminal societies are active,
while in Ukraine some 400 criminal groups are present. See Paul B.
Stares, Sergei Medvedev, Former Soviet Union, p. 89.
36. See “BKA sieht mit Unbehagen der Einfiffirung des Euro
entgegen,” in Frankfurter Allgemeine (further FAZ), November 20,
1998; “700 Fltichtlinge kommen iiber die Adria nach Italien,” FAZ,
December 28, 1998; John Mason, “Organized Crime Licks Its Lips Over
Forgeries,” Financial Times, January 9, 1999; John Mason, “Criminals
Will Profit from Euro,” Financial Times, January 20, 1999; “Mafia
Prints Millions of Counterfeit Euros,” The Telegraph, January 31, 1999,
www.telegraph.co.uk:80/et (January 31, 1999); “Mafia stava
falsificando euro,” RAI TV, February 26, 1999. The last news report
refers to the first confiscation of a fully equipped printing shop in
Palermo by the police forces, following a lead of the SISDE, the internal
intelligence service.
37. See “Mafias y Estados son complices, segun el Observatorio de la
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFP

Agence France Presse (France, French Press
Wire Service)

AP

Associated Press

ATS

Amphetamine-Type Stimulants

BKA

Bundeskriminalamt (Germany, Federal
Criminal Office)

CEEC

Eastern European Countries

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIS

Confederation of Independent States

ETA

Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (Spain, Basque
language, Basque Land and Freedom)

FAZ

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

FT

Financial Times

FSU

Former Soviet Union

GIA

Groupe Islamique Anne (Algeria, Armed Islamic
Group)

HADEP Popular-Democratic Party (Kurdish party,
political wing of PKK)
IRA

Irish Republican Army

JHA

Justice and Home Affairs

KUK

Liberators of Kurdistan

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development

OGD

Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues (France,
Geopolitical Drugs Observatory)

PKK

Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Turkey, Kurdish
Workers’ Party)
90

RAF

Rote Armee Fraktion (Germany, Red Army
Fraction)

RDD

Radiological Dispersion Devices

SCU

Sacra Corona Unita (Italy, Sacred United
Crown)

SFOR

Stabilization Force

SISDE

Servizio Informazioni e Sicurezza Democratica
(Italy, Democratic Intelligence and Security
Service)

SISMI

Servizio Informazioni e Sicurezza Militare
(Italy, Military Intelligence and Security
Service)

U.N.

United Nations

UNDCP U.N. Drug Control Project
USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction
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CHAPTER 3
REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Stephen Calleya

This paper examines the role the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) are
playing in the Mediterranean area and discusses the impact
such international organizations can have on managing the
security challenges of proliferation of weapons and arms
control. An attempt is also made to conceptualize a security
model that can assist in improving cooperative relations
between Europe and the Arab world. A specific security
proposal put forth is that of establishing a EuroMediterranean Maritime Coastguard that would be
mandated to carry out stop and search exercises in a
number of areas, including those of weapons proliferation.
This analysis concludes with an assessment of regional
relations to 2010. Unless international organizations
address more effectively the political differences and
economic disparities that continue to separate the countries
along the northern and southern shores of the
Mediterranean, the issues of managing the proliferation of
weapons and arms control will remain more of an aspiration
than an achievable goal.
A Security Model to Manage Proliferation and Arms
Control: What Role for NATO?
The post-Cold War period is proving to be a
revolutionary era due to the fact that dividing lines of the
past have faded or disappeared completely. Yet no clear
pattern of international relations has emerged in their
place. This period of rapid flux presents NATO with an
identity crisis that is exacerbated when seen through the
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lens of such a diverse area as the Mediterranean. But it also
presents the Alliance with an opportunity to forge new links
with Mediterranean nonmembers. Although the costs of
developing an active alliance network across this waterway
will be high, the costs of failing to establish such a system
could be higher in the long-term, should instability from the
Mediterranean spread northwards.
NATO’s successful Cold War track record makes it one of
the most prominent security institutions functioning today.
One way to preserve this position is by leading cooperative
efforts with other institutional associations that also have
an interest in ensuring stability in areas like the
Mediterranean. By forming coalitions and relationships
with other international organizations in the basin, NATO
could play a direct role in helping to prevent the emergence
of conflictual patterns of relations between the Western
European and Middle Eastern international regions. Such
relations could easily evolve if political and military
misperceptions and the increase in the proliferation of
weapons is not checked in the short term. Containment of
the erratic pattern of relations between the rival NATO
members of Greece and Turkey is indicative of the
confidence-building role the Atlantic Alliance can play at a
subregional level across the Mediterranean. Participation
in NATO activities will also assist in removing some of the
negative perceptions nonmember Mediterranean countries
harbour about the Alliance. For example, permitting
countries in the Maghreb and the Levant to attend certain
NATO sessions will assist in nurturing the fact that NATO
is a common defense grouping and not an aggressive
military alliance. In the longer term, it has also been
suggested that those Southern Mediterranean nations
which are emerging as democracies should be afforded
1
observer status in NATO. The inclusion of nonmember
Mediterranean countries in NATO’s consultative framework would help remove existing misperceptions on both
sides of the Mediterranean basin and could help generate
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cooperative intergovernmental interaction in the sensitive
area of military issues.
As the most active military international organization in
the Mediterranean basin, NATO has the capacity to
influence the patterns of relations across and around the
basin. In the end, it will come down to the Alliance’s ability
to read the indigenous patterns of relations and act
according to these trends. Like other international
organizations operating in the Mediterranean, NATO is
finding it difficult to implement a comprehensive and
coherent security program in this area. Rather than solely
blame the Alliance for this outcome, it seems more accurate
to indicate that NATO’s apathy in the South is more the
combination of the Mediterranean’s incoherent and diverse
regional dynamics and NATO’s inability to act.
The emergence of a more multipolar international
system in the last 7 years has seen an increase in
multilateral intrusive behavior around the world. Great
powers are eager to at least appear to be acting
multilaterally in their foreign policy endeavors. The U.S.
emphasis on obtaining a U.N. mandate before it acts outside
its borders as it did in the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91,
Somalia in 1992-93, and Haiti in 1994 illustrates this trend.
This review of NATO’s role in the Mediterranean is
indicative of the impact international organizations have on
regional dynamics. The end of the Cold War, the process of
EU, and the winds of peace blowing from the Middle East
have changed the parameters of Mediterranean regional
politics. One significant shift is that Mediterranean littoral
states are much more keen to develop active relations with
the rest of the world. Although they are still apprehensive
about the implications of an enhanced American or
European role in the area, they actively seek relations with
the West now that competition for foreign direct investment
has increased.
A U.S. security presence in the vicinity as a balance
against the revival of old or new hegemonic threats, or new
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terrorist threats under the guise of Islamic fundamentalism, is also still favored among the majority of
countries in the basin. Appeals to establish a nuclear free
weapons zone or to establish a multilateral security forum
may find their place in the future, but so far both remain
2
symbolic aspirations.
Post-Cold War considerations have led outside powers
and international organizations such as NATO to
reevaluate their policies towards the Mediterranean.
Conversely, regional leaders have had to explore new
external alignments in light of the sea-change in the
international system since 1989. Two recent changes in the
dynamics of the Mediterranean regional politics may affect
the nature of intrusive influence in the Mediterranean.
First is the Arab-Israeli reconciliation process. The peace
treaties signed between Israel and the PLO and Israel and
Jordan may become preliminary steps towards eventually
establishing a cooperative pattern of intergovernmental
relations in the Levant. Rapprochement between Israel and
the Arab countries has the additional benefit of removing
one of the stumbling blocks that has prevented closer
relations between the Levant and other Middle Eastern
subregions such as the Maghreb and the Gulf. The series of
Middle East international financial meetings held in
Casablanca, Amman, Cairo, and Doha in 1994, 1995, 1996,
and 1997, respectively, highlights the potential that
3
peaceful relations can bring to this international region. If
stability persists, and this is no foregone conclusion,
attracting foreign direct investment to the area may become
a more feasible enterprise. Such a development would fit in
with the hypothesis that extra-regional actors are most
influential in international regional relations when they
complement the basic pattern of regional alignment and
conflict.
The second shift in Mediterranean politics is both
internally and externally motivated. After years of being
accused of marginalizing and isolating its southern flank,
NATO has imitated actions taken by other security
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organizations such as the EU and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) by proposing to
establish closer relations with a selection of nonmember
countries in the Mediterranean area, incorporating the
Levant and the Maghreb.
At first, it might appear that NATO could attempt to
establish some kind of outer zone of suzerainty in the
Mediterranean. In reality, it must be stressed that NATO
has yet to formulate a coherent vision of long-term goals that
could justify such possibilities. In addition, NATO’s
enlargement agenda towards the East, and the plethora of
security issues it will have to contend with vis-à-vis Russia,
will leave very little diplomatic resources to begin tackling
the multitude of security challenges which exist across the
Mediterranean. At most, NATO’s most recent outreach
program towards a selection of nonmember Mediterranean
countries can promote political interaction among states in
the area. It is unlikely that NATO’s exchange plans will
elevate cross-cultural, environmental, or military relations.
If successful in the long term, this extra-Mediterranean
led effort to enhance politico-military cooperation between
Europe and the Middle East could indirectly benefit
trans-Mediterranean initiatives. The evolution of a more
integrated and interdependent Mediterranean security
community would make it more difficult for actors in the
basin to upset the balance of power due to the numerous
consequences they would have to confront as a result.
The fact that Western Europe has developed a
multi-level international society, in which international
organizations such as the EU, the OSCE, and NATO can
interact with states and subnational institutions, puts this
comprehensive international region in a strong position to
approach security issues in the Mediterranean in a
multi-institutional and multi-functional manner. Given the
lack of unity in the perceptions of the countries in the
Mediterranean and those powers with an interest in the
area, it is unrealistic to assume that a single international
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organization can contend with the security challenges
across the Mediterranean. A more realistic alternative is
one in which a single international organization, for
example NATO, complements the actions taken by others in
the area. As the international organization with a large
proportion of Mediterranean member-states and the most
active military actor in the Mediterranean, NATO is well
positioned to complement the EU’s socio-economic and
political endeavors in the south. But NATO should not
attempt to lead European multilateral initiatives as it is not
perceived as positively as either the EU or the OSCE, for
that matter, by the majority of countries located in the
Mediterranean. For example, NATO’s Cold War military
record makes it an unattractive partner to several countries
in the Middle East. An enlarged NATO presence in the
Mediterranean could even increase accusations of
“neo-imperialist” designs by Arabists and Islamists and
thus fuel support for the already very active Islamic
fundamentalist groupings operating in various subregions
of the Middle East. American leadership in NATO also
makes this organization appear more like a vehicle of great
power interests than one concerned with advancing
Mediterranean causes.
Absent the creation of a trans-Mediterranean
international forum, which would certainly be perceived as
much more representative of Mediterranean regional
interests and not some self-referenced or great power
interests, the EU currently appears the most acceptable
international organization across the Mediterranean that
can intensify cooperative patterns of relations throughout
this area.
Post-Cold War international relations show that
multilateralism has failed to address effectively the
increase in domestic regional hostilities. Over the last 5
years, most regions of the world have been touched by a
resurgence of such intolerance based on traits that include
ethnicity, language, and religion. The Mediterranean space
is no exception. The ad hoc and often ineffective
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international response to many of these crises has cast a
question mark on the relevance of the multilateral
mechanisms designed to contend with different types of
problems, i.e., of an international nature. Civil conflict and
regional tensions are not the only security issues that need
to be addressed in the Mediterranean. Yet, international
organizations must adapt their modus operandi if they are
to play a pivotal role in diffusing such contentious issues as
environmental degradation, economic disparities, migra4
tion, weapons proliferation, and narcotics trafficking.
The United Nations remains the principal international
organization for achieving such multilateral endeavors. The
U.N. is, however, already suffering from overstretch and
cannot be expected to focus on such an extensive list of
challenges on its own. Other institutions and agencies in the
area such as NATO, the EU, the Western European Union
(WEU), the OSCE, the Arab League, and the Arab Maghreb
Union will also have to play a supportive role to the U.N. if
an effective multilateral Mediterranean mechanism is to
emerge. In a world without a political, ideological, or
geographical strait-jacket, each institution or agency can
play on its comparative advantages to ensure maximum
effectiveness.
Multilateral agencies must however be cautioned
against expecting rewards from their efforts in the short-tomedium term. In an area as diverse as the Mediterranean,
regional coordination and cooperation is probably the most
that can be initially achieved. For example, a more active
OSCE in the Mediterranean can lead to an increase in
political, social, and environmental exchanges. Nonmember
OSCE states in the Mediterranean have already shown a
keen interest in cooperating in this forum, and there has
also been a call to extend associate membership to this
5
area. Such multilateral governmental action could lay the
groundwork for similar exchanges at a transnational level.
If supplemented by nongovernmental organizations which
are already active in the area, existing disparities between
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the Western European and Middle Eastern international
regions can be gradually bridged.
Several countries bordering the Mediterranean have
sought external support to help create a single institutional
framework in which discourse and dialogue on
Mediterranean issues can take place. On the other hand,
states such as Libya and Syria remain reluctant to actively
engage themselves in such endeavors for a number of
reasons: sometimes because of animosities dating back to
former colonial days, and also due to mutual rivalry among
themselves for spheres of influence. The proliferation of
weapons in North Africa and the Levant continues to be
fuelled by systemic, regional, and internal motives. Key
regional actors, including Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and
Iran, are engaged in an active search for geopolitical
6
“weight” and national prestige in the post-Cold War world.
The political and economic fault-lines that exist along a
north-south and south-south axis also provide motives for
proliferation.
The superpower track record in the Mediterranean
offers two cautionary notes in this respect. First, external
actors can only influence and not dictate regional
7
dynamics. International organizations such as NATO must
therefore read and decode the mixed signals originating in
the Mediterranean if they do not want their effort to
consolidate a sphere of influence across this waterway to
8
result in a conflict-based international region. If
cross-border political and military measures are introduced
in consultation and agreement with the Mediterranean
states, NATO’s outreach scheme towards the south could
act as a catalyst toward regional collaboration in other
areas.
If nonregional actions are perceived as attempts to
dominate intra-Mediterranean patterns of interaction, the
latter could retaliate by uniting and becoming less
cooperative in their dealings with external actors who have
substantial political and economic interests in the area.
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This would certainly be the case if such a transMediterranean backlash included the key oil and gas
producers.
In the post-Cold War period, domestic politics play a
major role in foreign policy considerations. This trend is
likely to continue as internal interest groups become more
assertive. This is especially the case in countries across the
Maghreb, particularly Algeria, where Islamic movements
are already constraining government policies. If current
Arab regimes are not pressured by external actors at both a
bilateral and multilateral level to establish working
relationships with other political activists within their
boundaries, the aspiration of nurturing more intense
cooperative patterns of trans-Mediterranean relations will
9
surely recede.
Failure to identify and complement regional patterns of
relations functioning around the Mediterranean area will
also ultimately result in increasing discord among NATO
member-states. In recent years distinct subregional
dynamics have on several occasions shed light on such
chords of disunity which exist within the Alliance.
Greek-Turkish rivalry almost resulted in the outbreak of
hostilities in early 1996 over the contested Aegean Islands,
and procurement of armaments by these two countries
10
remains among the highest in the western world. Disunity
among NATO member-states, particularly the United
States and France, is also apparent in the unilateral Middle
East policies which they have been put forward.
Transatlantic differences of opinion towards the
Mediterranean surfaced again in late 1996 when France,
with the support of Germany, Spain and Italy,
unsuccessfully called for NATO’s Southern Command
headquarters in Naples to be taken over by a European
admiral as part of a general effort to enhance Europe’s
11
contribution to the Alliance. It could also be argued that,
whereas enlargement towards central and eastern Europe
has assisted in boosting NATO cohesiveness, the
Mediterranean is serving as a strategic backdrop which is
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fueling transatlantic differences. This thesis perhaps helps
to explain NATO’s reluctance to attempt introducing a more
comprehensive strategic framework towards the south,
opting instead for a more ad hoc/selective engagement
approach.
It is a truism that the end of the Cold War has released
the superpower grip on the Mediterranean. But the
indicators discussed above suggest that one type of
intrusive dominant system (bipolar superpower model) has
been swept aside, only to make room for a different type of
intrusive dominant system (multipolar great power model).
This more multipolar design is reflected in the increase of
activity registered by international organizations in
regional relations. The more non-Mediterranean
multilateral organizations, such as NATO, come to
dominate patterns of relations in the Mediterranean area,
the more they are likely to stifle a resurgence of
intra-Mediterranean patterns of relations. As a result,
contemporary European international organization
involvement in the Mediterranean is best seen as a
boundary management exercise, which aims at
safeguarding the regional dynamics of integration in
Western Europe from those of fragmentation which are
active in the Middle East.
A Euro-Mediterranean Response.
At the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference which took
place in Barcelona in November 1995, the 27-partner
countries established three principal areas of cooperation: a
political and security partnership with the aim of
establishing a common area of peace and stability; an
economic and financial partnership with the aim of creating
an area of shared prosperity; and a partnership in social,
cultural, and human affairs in an effort to promote
understanding between cultures and exchanges between
civil societies.
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The main task at the Euro-Mediterranean ministerial
meeting in Malta in April 1997 and the informal ministerial
meeting in Palermo in June 1998 was for the member-states
to elaborate more specifically on implementation of the
partnership program and to set up short-term action plans
so that tangible cooperative ventures could commence.
At the top of the agenda was the endorsement, or at least
elaboration, of a security charter that will lay the
foundations for the peaceful resolution of crisis situations
and conflicts throughout the Euro-Mediterranean area.
Such a charter would enable the partners to identify the
factors of friction and tension in the Euro-Mediterranean
area and to carry out an assessment of how such
destablizing focal points can be managed.
In actual fact the Malta Declaration indicated that very
little headway has been registered in implementing such an
aspiration:
The Participants take note of the work of Senior Officials on a
Charter for peace and stability in the Euro-Mediterranean
region, and instruct them to continue the preparatory work,
taking due account of the exchanged documents, in order to
submit an agreed text at a future Ministerial Meeting when
12
political circumstances allow.

The vagueness of the above phrase is a clear indication of
the lack of progress that has been achieved in
conceptualizing a framework for setting up a pan-EuroMediterranean security arrangement. The partner
countries failed to commit themselves to an incremental
work program that would at least seek to create the
necessary cooperative relations that would allow for the
introduction of such a charter.
They have also avoided hammering out a specific
timetable within which such a framework of analysis can be
carried out. As a result, it now seems more logical if the
Euro-Mediterranean process (EMP) countries start to
dedicate their diplomatic resources to defining a package of
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confidence-building measures that would create the
necessary atmosphere within which a more elaborate
mechanism, such as a charter, can be fleshed out.
When it comes to the direct tangible endeavors that the
EMP should seek to realize, these can primarily be
classified into time-oriented categories. In the short term,
the 27-partner countries must introduce a basic type of
confidence-building measure network that will contribute
to removing the curtain of prejudice and misperceptions
that continues to divide the Mediterranean along a
North-South axis.
Such a network should eventually also assist in
managing and containing the large number of security
challenges that risk upsetting stability across the
Euro-Mediterranean area. The long list of security issues
that could derail the EMP includes the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, maritime safety, environmental pollution, narcotics trafficking, and the flow of
illegal migration.
At the moment there are no elaborate mechanisms to
contend with such security crises or even an incident such as
an accidental collision at sea between transport tankers
crossing through the Straits of Sicily, or the alarming rate of
degradation which is currently taking place in the
environmental sector. One must also mention the
proliferation of drug consignments which are reaching ever
deeper into the civil societies of the Mediterranean, and the
accentuation of illegal migratory flows from south to north
which risks destablizing the legal structures of the state.
A confidence-building initiative that can be introduced
as part of the political and security charter of the EMP is
that of establishing a flexible security framework that is
already addressing security issues as those outlined earlier.
It will set the stage for tackling more sensitive security
challenges which include intolerant fundamentalism,
demographic expansion, and outright conflict.
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At this point in the partnership process, a concerted
effort should be made to investigate the feasibility of setting
up a Euro-Mediterranean Maritime Coastguard (EMMC).
The EMMC would be mandated to carry out stop and search
exercises in a number of areas: maritime safety, maritime
pollution, narcotics trafficking, the transport of illegal
migrants, and the proliferation of weapons. Such an early
warning and crisis prevention mechanism should be
introduced in accordance with the principal of consent and
open to any of the Euro-Mediterranean partner-states that
wish to participate in such a flexible soft security
arrangement. In order to ensure that such a security model
can become operational in the shortest period possible, the
EMMC should consist of sectoral types of soft security
cooperation.
For example, any two or more EMP members can
formulate cooperative alliances in specific sectors, such as
that pertaining to narcotics trafficking, without having to
wait until all partners are in a position to introduce such
measures. Such a plan will enable the EMMC to evolve
along subregional security fault-lines in the first instance
until it becomes feasible to establish a fully fledged
Euro-Mediterranean Coastguard at a later date.
In addition to strengthening political and security
channels of communication, the establishment of such a
Euro-Mediterranean early warning and conflict prevention
network will assist in cultivating more intense crisis
management mechanisms in an area where these are
lacking. In order to ensure that such a flexible security
arrangement moves beyond the conceptual stage in the
shortest time-frame possible, its primary mandate may be
limited to the following codes of conduct: fact-finding and
consultation missions, inspection, and monitoring
delegations. Such traditional rules of engagement may also
be supplemented by operations that include the facilitation
of humanitarian relief, particularly in times of natural
disasters. At a later stage, situation centers may be set up
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around the Mediterranean to monitor activities under this
mandate.
Only after such a threshold has been reached, should a
concerted effort be made to spell out the parameters of a
security charter which will include both confidence-building
and crisis prevention measures that seek to further advance
regional disarmament. The introduction of a EuroMediterranean security charter will also assist in creating a
climate where the partner countries can develop command
and control mechanisms to intervene as early as possible in
crisis situations. Acting only after an aggressor has
acquired territory or access to natural resources is to force
the unwelcome choice between a massive military response
and a major strategic debacle. The later the international
community and security organizations intervene, the larger
the cost and the less chance to restore stability.
Prospects for the Future: A Regional Assessment
to 2010.
A number of indicators extant today can be used to
project the strategic environment in the Mediterranean to
2010. Unless these indicators change significantly, the
environment for the first 10 years of the next century will be
set by the year 2000. The speed with which the events in
Europe and the Middle East are moving makes it likely that
the shape this part of the world will take by 2010 will be
clearly discernible by the end of this century. The United
States and Europe will continue to depend on the Persian
Gulf and North Africa for much of their energy supplies.
They will however be joined by the likes of China and India
that will need to satisfy their growing energy demands and
therefore access to these areas will remain a high foreign
policy priority.
In the first half of the 1990s the Mediterranean showed
signs of becoming a cooperative dominant area. But in the
past 2 years there has been an increase in conflictual
relations throughout the Mediterranean and a resultant
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shift to an indifferent type of region. Fault-lines along a
north-south and south-south axis have become more
apparent, with no sign of a process of regional transformation taking place.
As relations stand, two scenarios are possible: the first is
one in which a number of Mediterranean countries manage
to integrate at both a regional and international level, while
the rest collapse completely. The second is one in which the
majority of countries in the Mediterranean fail to integrate
and are marginalized from the international political
economy.
As patterns of relations across the Euro-Mediterranean
area stand, the majority of littoral countries in the
Mediterranean are unlikely to integrate into the global
political economy that is emerging. Transnational ventures
will remain limited, with states in the area more concerned
with intra-state issues than with inter-state types of
cooperation.
What is thus required is an urgent concerted effort by
the Mediterranean states themselves to create a
transnational network upon which cross-border types of
economic and financial interaction can take place. If the
Mediterranean is to compete and prosper in the global
village of tomorrow, it must nurture an environment where
people, products, ideas, and services are allowed to flow
freely. At the moment there are too many bottlenecks in the
system.
In contrast to the cooperative South-East Asian and
Latin American developing regions, the Mediterranean
currently consists of a number of subregional constellations,
i.e., Southern Europe, the Maghreb, the Mashreq, the
Balkans, that are evolving along separate and distinct
paths. Perhaps the label that best describes the pattern of
relations in the area is “fragmegration” which denotes the
integration efforts being pursued by the EU Southern
European countries and the fragmentation type of relations
that continue to dominate the southern and eastern shores
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of the basin. In fact, the lack of cohesion and unity achieved
to date somewhat mirrors regional dynamics manifesting
13
themselves across central Africa.
During the first 10 years of the new millennium, the
United States will shift its foreign policy concerns in the
region further east, focusing on the management of
relations in the Mashreq and the Persian Gulf. The rest of
the Mediterranean will become a EU sphere of influence
once a common foreign and security policy is introduced. In
the interim, the EU will continue to contain instability that
may emerge along its southern periphery through NATO.
The Mediterranean has shifted from an imperial British
lake in the 19th century to a superpower sea in the 20th. On
the eve of the 21st century, the Mediterranean is more akin
to a fault-line between the prosperous North (the haves),
and an impoverished South, (the have-nots). The key
development to watch in the Mediterranean in the next
decade will be whether the phase of cooperative competition
that has dominated post-Cold War relations to date is
eventually superseded by an era of conflictual competition.
This is sure to happen if states on the lower levels of the
development curve come to the conclusion that they are not
going to be able to move up the ladder anytime soon. If this
age of indifference scenario does take hold, disorder will
dominate Mediterranean relations and, as resources are
depleted, the region will become an economic wasteland.
In the post-Cold War world that has emerged, the
patterns of relations in the Mediterranean have already
moved away from a cooperative security dominant
framework to a more competitive security based model. If
trends continue as they have been, the Mediterranean is
destined to become a geo-strategic cross-cultural zone of
indifference. Security risks will multiply, demographic
growth will exacerbate economic problems, and the
developed world will adopt a selective engagement
approach towards the area.
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The only way this scenario can be avoided is if NATO and
the EU adopt a policy of strategic optimism towards the
Mediterranean. Based on the theory of realism, the doctrine
of strategic optimism is one in which international
organizations seek change in a positive direction by
identifying those areas where such progress can be made.
When drawing up security policies to contain the
proliferation of weapons, European security organizations
must ensure that their efforts to contain such risks do not
result in them becoming part of the problem.
A more transparent and engaging NATO policy that
complements a overhauled EU Euro-Med Partnership
process is thus necessary if an effective collective security
framework is to be established in the area. This should be
supplemented by a more proactive approach by international economic institutions such as the World Bank and the
IMF in their dealings with the region, an approach that
assists the Mediterranean countries to adopt more of a
self-help mentality. Only then will efforts to contain the
proliferation of weapons have a serious chance of being
effective in the Mediterranean.
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CHAPTER 4
NATO IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Mario Zucconi

After the end of the Cold War, the greatest part of
NATO’s energies, operational activities, financial
resources, and policy disputes have been spent on,
addressed to, and originated from troubles in the
Mediterranean region. From the drawn-out Balkan
experience, the Alliance derived the stimuli and pressures
to adapt to new missions, create flexible capabilities to
respond to non-Article 5 security, and offer itself as the
organizing element of larger, international stabilization
forces. In the Balkans—if only from 1995 on—the Alliance
established the credibility of its capabilities and of its
members’ collective will. It solidified its authoritativeness
as main instrument of international stability.
After the end of the Cold War, for a while it looked like
the United States was drastically cutting down on its
presence and interest in this area. However, the Bosnian
crisis compelled it back to a strong conmitment toward
stability there. Overall, and for some time in the future, the
United States is bound to remain an essential and most
influential actor with regard to the Mediterranean theater.
But due to the character of many of the sources of instability
here, it is most important that the main Western European
countries and European institutions take more
responsibility, develop mechanisms and strategies for
collective action, and invest much more than they are
presently doing in creating stability around the Mediterranean.
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The Mediterranean: Not a Unitary Geopolitical
Concept.
In recent years, Western policymakers and NATO
officials have increasingly expressed concern about the
Mediterranean as an area of instability. They have also
referred to it as to an area of allied interest. The
Mediterranean is the small lake in which the powerful U.S.
Sixth Fleet is stationed. And in Naples resides a
double-hatted U.S. admiral—both commander of that Sixth
Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of NATO Southern
Command (AFSOUTH or Allied Forces South.)
However, the Mediterranean is not a geopolitically
defined area—as it could be considered with regard to the
time of Rome and Carthage, or Sparta and Athens. It is not
an area with distinctive and unitary political characters.
And, in fact, it may encompass today a number of different
major geopolitical areas, of different and most important
international problems. Moreover, the view of where the
main issues lie in the Mediterranean changes considerably
in Washington and in the Western European capitals. Not
even the limits of this area are precisely defined. The
Commander of the Sixth Fleet oversees operations from
Gibraltar to the Black Sea and from the Baltic to South
Africa. The Mediterranean is also the main base from which
power was projected in the Persian Gulf since the Kuwait
crisis of 1990-91.
And the fact that the Mediterranean is not a unitary
political problem is not irrelevant. The polarization of
international power during the Cold War carried the
possibility, by pressing and negotiating with Moscow, of
dealing with issues as diverse as Syria’s attempt to
destabilize Jordan in September 1970, or the military
uprisings in the Shaba region of Zaire, or the guerrillas’
attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan government in the
1980s, or the worrisome presence of Cuban troops and
military instructors in several parts of Africa for almost two
decades. And if, in fact, Moscow was unable to deliver much
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of what was expected of it, the important point is that the
Soviet international influence helped justify intervening in
a range of disparate cases. In contrast, the separate,
discrete crises of the post-Cold War world—and of the
Mediterranean area in particular—require difficult,
individual explanation and a case-by-case rationale for
intervention.
An Area of “Growing Instability”?
It has become commonplace among political analysts to
relate recent sources of instability to the end of the Cold
War. On the contrary, most of the issues we had to deal with
in recent times in this vast area are old ones. No doubt, a
crisis brewing for a long time in Yugoslavia reached the
boiling point when systemic pressures on that state
diminished in the early 1990s. But the root causes of that
crisis are economic and political, and began to emerge and
steadily grow at the beginning of the 1980s. The issues that
sour Turkish-Greek relations—disputed territory in the
Aegean, Cyprus, Greek alleged support for Kurdish
separatism in Turkey—have been there for a long time. A
half-century of Arab-Israeli dispute, political and religious
issues, and oil make the whole Middle Eastern area one of
great political pressures and instability.
On the shores of the Black Sea, the end of the Soviet state
freed political pressures, ethnic rivalries, and competition
among ruling elites that are today a source of instability (in
an area again, of great interest for production and
movement of oil and gas). But the civil war between the
Turkish army and Kurdish guerrillas in Eastern Anatolia is
an older problem, going back to the early 1960s. And that
between the Iraqi Kurds and Baghdad goes back to the
middle 1970s.
While their aspiration is not a unified Kurdistan for the
different Kurdish communities in different states, the
Kurds are at the source of a number of important political
problems in the area. In October 1998 Ankara threatened to
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attack Syria militarily because of the hospitality that state
was known to be offering leaders of the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK). But then, if Turkey has recently established
an important military cooperation with Israel, its problem
with Syria (caused, first of all, by control over water
resources) is beginning to grow into a larger problem of
regional alignments—with Syria finding support in Greece
and Iran.
West of Suez, the main source of instability—different
militant brands of Islamic fundamentalism—is, once more,
older than the end of the Cold War. It is a relatively recent
problem in Algeria, but a much older one in Egypt. Libya, of
course, is a problem of its own. And, finally, if there is a
common, unifying character of the instability of the
southern shore of the Mediterranean (with the exception of
Israel, of course), it is the general conditions of economic and
political backwardness of the area.
Strategic Importance of the Mediterranean.
Needless to say, the states and issues mentioned above
are of primary importance for the well-being of the
industrialized world and for overall international stability.
Italy imports more than 50 percent of its gas solely from
Algeria. And to Spain, Algeria makes up 70 percent of its
supply. To France, Algeria means not solely gas but also a
large community of foreign-born residents and still
important political ties.
Washington may be less directly concerned by the
Algerian civil war, but for half a century has been a most
influential actor in the Middle East. Its ability to influence
the flow and price of oil—related in turn to its ability to deal
with Arab-Israeli issues and with other ones in the
region—long has been the main reason for its lasting,
hegemonic position among the industrialized countries.
Turkey may be the case the importance of which the
Western allies—but especially the Western Europeans—
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continue to underestimate. It is a country that, we can say,
lies at the intersection of different main political and
cultural areas and currents. It is the industrial state
bordering the raw material-producing south of the former
Soviet Union. Had Turkey, its power, and infrastructures
not been available and Ankara unwilling to pay the serious
costs paid for it, the conduct of the operators in the Gulf in
1990-91 would have been much more complex and costly.
In Washington, there is today growing awareness of the
strategic importance of a country such as Turkey. However,
doubts, ambivalence, and great reluctance continue to be
present in the debate about the U.S. commitment to the
1
stabilization of the Balkans. Are the Balkans, among the
different security issues in the Mediterranean, less
important or marginal?
“We don’t have a dog in this fight,” Secretary of State
James Baker said in 1991 to qualify the U.S. interest in that
2
crisis. Still, if most Western countries looked at the
Yugoslav crisis at its outset with a simplistic “vital interest”
approach, all came out of it in 1995 realizing that the West
can ill-afford large-scale conflicts in adjacent regions, even
if the countries involved are economically irrelevant. Flows
of refugees and terrible abuse of human rights carried into
everybody’s living room by CNN-type TV broadcasting have
become issues as vital politically as the unimpeded flow of
oil through the Persian Gulf. And as long as the Western
European allies are unable to take care of that or similar
problems, the domestic and international pressures
deriving from them are as important for far-away
Washington as they are for closer-by Paris, Bonn, or Rome.
The importance of the Mediterranean in security terms
derives not from the fact that six NATO member-countries
are on its shores, as many analysts pointed out until
recently, but rather from the fact that it is an area of great
interest, adjacent to the European continent and an area
which, unfortunately, is also characterized in the overall by
great instability. Many analysts agree that if NATO is going
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to have to fight again in the near future, it will be in the
Mediterranean region. And even more, if there is any
possibility of activation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty (that is, collective territorial defense), that
possibility today concerns the states bordering the
Mediterranean and, first of all, Greece and Turkey.
Militarily a Profound Restructuring of the Alliance.
Not that there is lack of awareness, particularly among
officials and the military in Western countries, of the
relevance and complexity of Mediterranean security issues.
NATO senior officers are especially aware of the conditions
and pressures that are profoundly reshaping the Alliance.
In Mons, Belgium, the atomic bunker built to shelter the
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in case of
attack will probably be visited by growing numbers of
schoolchildren and their teachers in the coming years. In
Naples, in contrast, both the Sixth Fleet Command and
AFSOUTH compound are being rebuilt in view of the
possibility of missile attacks from somewhere in the Middle
Eastern region.
Moreover, even while much attention was being given to
the enlargement of NATO in Central Eastern Europe, the
largest part of allied planning, operations, and allocation of
resources had to do with the problems the Allies
encountered in the Mediterranean region—Bosnia above
all, in the last 7 years. More precisely, while NATO
enlargement is mostly a political-diplomatic exercise and in
the end may shrink down to an operation of consensus
buttressing for the Alliance (especially in the U.S.
Congress), the Mediterranean is where NATO wears its
camouflage and flak jackets and moves around in armored
personnel carriers and tanks; where it uses its fighterbombers and naval units. It is in the Mediterranean that
NATO, as a collective body and structure, went into combat
for the first time in its history. It is there that the Western
countries need today to exert effectively their military

116

power. Finally, it is the pressure produced by instability in
the Mediterranean that was the motor of the profound
reshaping and adaptation of the Alliance that has taken
place since the early 1990s.
The Gulf war and immediately after that the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia were the two most important
experiences that caused the Alliance to refocus its interests
and adapt to new missions. An issue always present in allied
relations, that of the “out-of-area” tasks, became again a
central one after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
However, Washington’s pressures at the time managed only
to have put explicitly on record the unwillingness of
Western European countries to assume a role in non-Article
5 situations. In the Gulf, most Western allies intervened,
but especially the French remained rigidly opposed to
labeling the allied participation as a NATO operation.
That stand became impossible to maintain when the
political pressures deriving from the Yugoslav conflict
combined in 1991-92 with the uncertain post-Cold War
legitimacy of the Alliance. Thus the first decision to
participate in international missions outside the Treaty
area came in June 1992 at the Oslo North Atlantic Council.
That was 2 months after the outset of the Bosnian conflict,
and it was the beginning of an adaptation that from 1995 on
would turn NATO into the main institutional actor in
maintaining stability in the Balkans.
In the same context of political necessity deriving from
the Bosnian conflict, other important developments took
place. After much agonizing over the issue, Germany
decided in favor of participation in allied operations outside
the Treaty area. And because France wanted to have a part
in the decisions that now counted, it announced in 1995 its
willingness to come back after almost 30 years to the
military structures of the Alliance (even though later, in a
context of diminished pressure, it tied that participation to
other conditions). Similarly, Spain began to broaden its
NATO participation with the same military structures.
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The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program became a
useful framework in the post-Dayton Allied intervention in
Bosnia. That experience, in turn, gave substance and a
better focus to the PfP program. It is, once more, in that
context of real operation that the idea, first advanced in
January 1994, of flexible Combined Joint Task Forces
(CTTF) began to shape up.
Two final points should be made with regard to Bosnia
and the Balkans as a motivator of evolution of the Alliance.
The Bosnia experience—years of suffering for the main
Western capitals, followed by the proved effectiveness of the
U.S.-NATO commitment in September 1995—brought a
great clarification with regard to power structures and
institutions which can effectively deal with important
sources of instability. In most Western European capitals,
the post-Cold War urge to establish a European security
identity (ESDI) and related structures quickly receded as
NATO proved effective, especially because of its essential
U.S. component. At the Berlin summit of June 1996, the
French accepted the idea that any ESDI would be sought
within and not outside NATO.
And, finally, because of the pressure deriving from
Serbian repression in Kosovo, we may be today at a defining
moment with regard to NATO non-Article 5 operations. In
October 1998, Richard Holbrooke coerced President of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic into
accepting Western conditions under threat of a NATO
attack. The protracted NATO air campaign of
August-September 1995 gave credibility to the threat of the
bombings. What was new this time, concerning the Gulf
with respect to December 1990, to August-September 1995,
and to the very policy established by the North Atlantic
Council in December 1992, is that the Western military
instrument was used in the negotiations with the explicit
opposition of Russia, a permanent member of the Security
Council. One may agree or disagree with the decision then
taken to Western capitals, but the point is that it will
probably remain as an important development in the life of
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the Alliance, and that such a development came about, once
more, because of instability in the Mediterranean.
Politically Serious Disagreement Over Mandate.
The growing importance of the Mediterranean theater
for the future of Western security does not immediately
translate into a corresponding, broad consensus among the
Allies, into well-thought-out general plans and corresponding resources. In fact, the Allies continue to fail to
make adequate investments and adapt rapidly enough to
the changing security environment. NATO (and Western
security arrangements) seem to be pulled in two different
directions: fast adapting its military structures to new
problems and missions, and having its potential
effectiveness limited by the political differences among the
Allies about where, when, and how to intervene.
To start with, contingencies increase and resources
dwindle. Awareness of the problem is kept mute, and the
mandates to deal with those issues remain precarious—
when not controversial. American officials point out that 80
percent of military contingencies involving the United
States since the disappearance of the Soviet Union
(December 1991) have occurred within the Sixth Fleet’s
3
zone of responsibility. And Admiral T. Joseph Lopez,
former Commander-in-Chief of AFSOUTH, in a lecture
given 1 year ago, was reminding his audience how the 15
countries of concern to NATO’s Southern Region in the
1980s have now become more than 40—and often, one may
add, with new and individual problems.
And possibly, the main problem is not so much the
dwindling budget and reduced force structure, as much as
the lack of overall, articulated strategies and of clear
determination to be engaged in upholding stability in this
area. In fact, there is much improvisation and, in large
measure, inability to come to grips with the crisis before the
issue becomes an intractable one. In interviews with this
author at NATO in Brussels in June 1998 about what to do
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and when to act with regard to Kosovo, several senior
officials and military officers started by warning that the
arrival of Christiane Amanpour, the CNN reporter, in
Pristina meant that NATO “had to do something”—
needless to say, an indication of lack of overall policies, of
strategic planning and even of well-defined mandates.
Since 1993, all ministerial North Atlantic Councils
(NAC) and summits have mentioned the Mediterranean. In
1994 a Mediterranean Dialogue was started with five, then
six, countries in the proximity of the Southern shore (Egypt,
4
Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan.) NATO
officials point to the carrying out in early 1998 of a
CJTF-type exercise in the Southern Region, with eight
countries participating and the first one to develop concrete
operational procedures. People implementing Western
policies in the Mediterranean stress the importance of a
visible presence of Western power as a deterrent. Admiral
Lopez repeatedly spoke about “forward engagement.”
However, the dialogue initiative or the recent exercises are
more a sign of the recognition of a need than the beginning of
an adequate response to existing problems.
Of course, it is not easy to move Western security policies
toward a new focus. The NATO Southern Command during
the Cold War not only had to guard a smaller number of
countries, but was doing that with a clear focus and a
well-defined threat. Indeed, the Western alliance developed
mostly around the problem posed by the presence of Soviet
power in Europe. It is easy to enlarge NATO to Central
Eastern European countries, for no one doubts that those
countries belong today to the expanded European zone of
peace. Enlargement is a no-risk initiative and with
immediate political dividends. Its financial costs remain
undetermined and can always be delayed to future fiscal
years. A U.S. administration can always blame the
Europeans for being irresponsible in that respect. The
Europeans can always say Washington should pay for what
at the Madrid summit came out as an American version of
enlargement.
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In contrast, Bosnia alone has meant the disbursement of
7 billion dollars a year since 1995. And those are financial
resources that need be found, year after year, in different
parts of the budget of the countries participating in it. The
same applies to the Gulf war—many tens of billion of dollars
in the end found through a fund-raising campaign in the
United States and in other Western countries.
A Broader Approach to Western Security.
But even a better understanding among Allies on
NATO’s new competencies and more sufficient resources
are only a small part of the remedy to adequately deal with
the different sources of instability in the Mediterranean
region. Except for a few issues, the response to which is
solely military (such as Saddam Hussein’s policies), most
other issues require a complex array of instruments to be
dealt with—beginning with economic power. Were the
Western European countries able to unify and effectively
exert their potential influence, they would be decisive in
different critical issues in the Mediterranean area.
The Western European countries created mechanisms
for producing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP,
with the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties). If the
European Union (then Community) failed to control the
crisis in Yugoslavia in 1991, officials and analysts often
explain that that was before it created the new mechanisms.
One analyst found that the Yugoslav crisis “was
premature,” for Europe was then in the process of redefining
5
itself. But 3 more years of war, the successive stabilization
period, and then the new Kosovo crisis proved the European
CFSP mechanisms unable to produce policies any more
unified and effective than those of the pre-Maastricht
Community. In 1998, a small, manageable but also highly
visible operation in Albania to stabilize politically the
situation there was left to the Italians and French to carry
out. They refused any European institutional support and
labeling.
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Decades of specialization in the international roles
played, with the United States as the single power dealing
with most non-European crises and sources of instability,
are difficult to substitute with a culture of shared
responsibility. Moreover, with the regional issues left to
themselves and no longer fed by the global U.S.-Soviet
rivalry and linked to the compellance of strategic weapons,
those issues became tempting occasions for raising the
political profile of different countries or for testing one’s new
influence. The result is a diminished ability to steadily act
collectively for most influential Western European capitals,
foreign policies more dependent on domestic politics, and, at
times, even frivolous policies. In the former Yugoslavia,
even more important than for the additional firepower it
brought with it, the United States has been essential as the
unifying element of Western will and power.
The result is a vacuum of jurisdiction among the
Western countries over different issues or even different
regions. (Whose responsibility was dealing with
Yugoslavia? Where were the Europeans?) The collective
intervention then takes place only when the situation
creates too many direct, unbearable pressures—but also
when an issue, largely manageable early on, has become an
intractable one, as in the former Yugoslavia. And at that
point, the outside intervention ends up being necessarily
massive, only military, costly, risky, and requiring a
long-term commitment. In the former Yugoslavia, the
United States and NATO intervened after other collective
instruments failed in the early phases of the crisis.
However, that does not necessarily mean that NATO was
the sole right instrument—the lack of a real institutional
“common” European policy and the inability to intervene
early in the crisis are other explanations for the failure of
the Western countries to deal with an issue before it
becomes totally militarized in character.
The regions around the Mediterranean are where the
West will have to make the largest investment for stability
and for defending its interests in the near future. Except for
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a few ones of military nature, most issues need be dealt with
through an early commitment, a broad array of instruments
and, above all, economic ones. NATO’s capabilities can
contribute significantly and need be present and visible—
but not be the substitute for other forms of influence.
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CHAPTER 5
EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY PERCEPTIONS
AND POLICIES TOWARDS
THE MEDITERRANEAN
Roberto Aliboni

This paper takes into consideration, first, the security
challenges the European Union (EU) member states
perceive with respect to the Mediterranean area, and,
second, the policy responses of the EU states to such
challenges and perceptions. Mediterranean security
perceptions comprise an uneven set of military and
nonmilitary challenges, with an emphasis on the latter. The
paper begins by examining military challenges and moves
then to nonmilitary ones. Finally, it considers the European
overall Mediterranean security doctrine which links the two
clusters of challenges.
This Mediterranean security doctrine explains policy as
well as institutional responses actually undertaken by the
EU states in the 1990s. Such responses are considered in
the last section of the paper. A brief conclusion provides an
assessment of the EU Mediterranean policy effectiveness.
Military Challenges: Proliferation.
No state in the Mediterranean areas of the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) would be capable of conducting a
full military attack on European countries and, in fact, no
such threat is minimally perceived or even taken into
consideration in the Northern part of the region (maybe
with the exception of Turkey with respect to Syria). Military
challenges and related risk perceptions in the North
concern proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and their delivery means.
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According to many analysts, WMD and related missiles
proliferation is less a threat than a risk for the European
countries and the West. Its effects are likely to be less of
military than diplomatic and political character. This is due
to a number of factors, like:

•

The pulling force towards proliferation, irrespective of
its actual military effectiveness, is the political
necessity to earn some strategic “weight” and status
from the possession of WMD and missiles. As noted by
Lesser and Tellis, these states want to be “taken
seriously” by the West (as well as by neighbors). 1
During the Cold War, these states could obtain
strategic weight internationally by aligning or not
aligning themselves in the framework of the global
East-West confrontation. In a sense, WMD and
missiles are a substitute for alignment in the
post-Cold War world. By the same token, possessing
WMD is regarded, particularly by Arab states, as a
proof of their technological capacity, allegedly
improving their political and strategic status.

•

On the other hand, there is no doubt that many
MENA states feel insecure with respect to both
regional enemies and the West. In this sense, WMD
must be regarded as a form of gross military and
political deterrence or as an instrument of interdiction and coercive diplomacy.

•

Many analysts point out that MENA countries’ WMD
and missiles are essentially targeted on their
Southern neighbors. As a matter of fact, it is in the
South-South context that MENA states face real
military threats and more often than not have proven
to be willing or able to resort to military instruments
to solve their disputes, by diplomatic coercion as well
as other forms of conflict. The North is not a primary
target of Southern WMD and missiles, at least from a
narrower military point of view.
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•

Finally, whichever their use and motives, because of
MENA’s poor industrial and technological background, the military effectiveness of their WMD and
related projection capacities are challenged by many
analysts.

Despite the importance of nonmilitary motives, their
poor effectiveness, the lack of an adequate industrial
background, their uneven development and their mostly
South-South orientation, there is no doubt that southern
proliferation of WMD and related delivery means affects
regional stability in a very general sense. From a narrower
military angle, it makes the European Union and its
principal allies (the U.S. forces deployed in Southern
Europe and Turkey) more vulnerable. Southern Europe is
already encompassed by a number of delivery vehicles.
Even if such exposure remained a minor military threat to
the EU and EU allies’ security, still it would bring about a
degree of political and military interdiction. Dealing with a
growing instability with less freedom of maneuver might
prove very difficult and risky.
The EU states belonging to NATO have recognized the
risks put forward by proliferation in the NATO Istanbul
Declaration of 1994. In the November 1995 Barcelona
2
Declaration, signed by the EU states and 12 non-EU
Mediterranean partners, there is a joint commitment
against proliferation beside other commitments to contain
or diminish the level of armaments, as well as their
offensive or inhumane nature.
Nonmilitary Security Challenges: Migration,
Terrorism And Criminality.
Although recognizing proliferation as a major risk, EU
states’ concerns are focusing on nonmilitary security
challenges. First, the basic European feeling is that much of
the Mediterranean armed conflict is linked to global rather
than regional factors and trends. Proliferation, just to quote
an example, is not precisely a regional, Mediterranean
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trend. Containing such military trends and solving
outstanding armed conflicts in the area require an
international management to which the EU can contribute
but cannot tackle in isolation.
Second, the EU aims at working out the conditions for
stability in the Mediterranean area, by acting principally on
political, social, economic and cultural factors. In the
European vision, instability in the Mediterranean stems
essentially from these nonmilitary factors. Economic and
social underdevelopment coupled with the rule of
authoritarian regimes brings about instability
domestically. Such domestic instability turns regionally
into spill-over effects which intrude in Europe and affect
European security. What is at stake is not national security
in a conventional sense, but the security of European
democratic polities and the welfare and civic order of the
latter as they have developed after the end of the Second
World War.
The most important spill-over effects concerning the EU
are related to immigration, terrorism and internationally
organized criminality. These issues are contemplated by the
third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration. As a matter of
fact, rightly or wrongly, they are more and more important
and visible in the daily political and social life of the
European members of the Union.
Immigration is not a threat to employment, although
unemployment is currently raging in Western Europe. With
a European demographic growth approaching zero
(particularly in Southern Europe) and a very poor
propensity by young Europeans to accept menial jobs and
mobility, immigrants are in fact almost badly needed
economically. Western Europe, however, is not prepared to
accept immigration (or more immigration) for political and,
most of all, cultural reasons.
As a matter of fact, situations are varying from country
to country because of very different legal, historical,
political and cultural legacies regarding immigration and
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citizenship. While in Great Britain and in some Northern
European countries there is an articulated relationship
between communities and the state which allows for the
presence of even numerous immigrant groups and a
relatively high degree of cultural-political autonomy of the
latter, in Southern Europe and in Germany this same
relationship is definitely less flexible. This lack of flexibility
makes relations with culturally assertive communities, like
Muslim ones, very difficult, for these communities either do
not accept assimilation (a mainly French solution) or just
feel discriminated and marginalized (like in Germany,
Spain and Italy) because, as well as they may be treated (but
this is not always the case), they do not get the recognition
they wish.
As a result of difficulties in accommodating a growing
migration from the Mediterranean and other numerous
areas (among which the Balkans play a political role
definitely more important than that played by
Mediterranean peoples), in Europe xenophobia and racism
are increasing and giving way to organized political
movements. Besides exacerbating tensions stemming from
migration anyway, these developments put strains on the
democratic character of the European polities. This is a first
important risk perceived today in Europe by concerned
democratic people and leaderships. At the beginning of the
1990s, the EU Commission had explicitly warned about
such risk and consequently advocated the necessity of a
more articulated and important European Mediterranean
policy.
A second risk comes from political links between
immigrated groups, notably Muslims, and respective
sending countries. European inability and unwillingness to
integrate immigrated people, increasingly turning into
xenophobic and racist criminal attacks on individuals and
groups or mistreatment, is resented by Muslim and Arab
public opinion in sending countries as an evidence of a wider
and fundamental European-Christian hostility towards
Islam and Arabs. In this respect it is linked to early
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European hesitation to intervene in Bosnia to defend
Muslims. This alleged European hostility stirs in Muslim
communities a sense of danger and reinforces their
spontaneous identitarian assertiveness. Islamist activism
is diffuse in Europe as a form of defense and identifying
assertiveness backed by substantive relations with
religious-political organizations at home. In this way,
migration brings the Islamist movements’ anti-Western
hostility inside Europe and tends to exacerbate difficulties
in international relations.
To a large extent, immigration is a source of conflict and
instability just because the European states are unable to
agree on common policies. Joint policies to control
immigration are now operated within the Schengen
agreement (which provides for free movements of European
citizens among a number of EU member states).
Cooperation within the Schengen agreement remains weak,
however, because it is not yet predicated on more
articulated joint policies with respect to migrants staying
and working in the EU states. This risk to European
security is largely due to European inertia.
To some extent, the link between migration and Islamist
anti-Western attitude we have just talked about explains
also European involvement with terrorism. Immigration, in
fact, brings about an environment in which terrorists are
able to move with relative ease. While MENA terrorism is a
new development in the United States, Europe is not new to
terrorism originating from these regions. Sometimes
Europe is no more than a logistic base or a battlefield, like in
the “Mikonos” affair. In other cases, Europe is more or less
directly involved for its past colonial links (as in the case of
France with current Algerian terrorism) or because it is
regarded as a more or less direct player with respect to
Islamists’ domestic and international interests.
Finally, immigration and terrorism link up with
international criminality. Though an evil in itself, illegal
immigration is more and more becoming a business
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managed by international criminality, functionally or
operationally associated with other kinds of traffics, like
drugs and armaments. Illegal traffic organized by
international criminal gangs is another effect of instability.
Intra-state and inter-state conflict as well as terrorism start
the vicious circles of drugs and displaced persons trafficking
in order to finance arms transfers. The unfinished cycle of
conflict in the Balkans and in Northern Iraq-Southeastern
Anatolia has shown the strict and formidable intermingling
of criminality, conflicts and migrations.
Structural Causes.
These challenges are regarded by European analysts
and governments as proximate causes of instability and
insecurity in the Mediterranean. These proximate causes
trace back to structural causes, however, i.e. the roots of
instability and insecurity. In the Mediterranean area two
main clusters of structural causes can be identified: (a) the
weakness of Arab regimes and governments on the grounds
of political legitimacy; (b) the lack of good governance and
political freedom bringing about political and social
disruptions and economic underdevelopment. As the latter
is not a secondary source of political radicalism and
systemic opposition, the two clusters intermingle.
Figure 1 is an attempt at mapping out the EU vision of
the hierarchy of structural causes of instability in the
3
Mediterranean and their linkages . The figure is also a
guide to EU policy responses intended to correct such causes
or contain their effects. To be sure, the links established in
the figure are not necessarily valid from a scientific point of
view: on policy grounds, however, they are helpful as they
point out the political values and expectations which direct
EU action. While this section describes the networking of
structural causes of instability, as interpreted by the EU,
next one will provide an overview of the policies worked out
by the EU to attain stability in the Mediterranean.
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The Barcelona Declaration principles and aims are
largely inspired by the model of cooperation and integration
of the EU itself. In a 1993 document of the EU Commission
related to the “Future Relations and Co-operation between
the Community and the Middle East,” it was stated that:
The Community’s own experience demonstrates that war
between previously hostile parties can be made unthinkable
through economic integration. While this model cannot easily
be transposed to the Middle East, it does suggest that the
development of regional economic co-operation can be a
powerful tool in reducing the level of conflict, making peace
irreversible and encouraging the people of the region to learn
4
to leave in peace.

Strongly influenced by EU’s experience in dealing with
post-Communist Central-Eastern Europe, the Barcelona
Declaration puts forward a systemic interplay among
democracy, integration, and peace as the basic ingredients
to affect root causes of instability.
Consequently, the agenda suggested by the Declaration
starts from the necessity to use the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership (EMP) to introduce democracy and pluralism
as well as strengthen political legitimacy and its underlying
civil society. The emergence of such factors would allow, in
turn, the achievement of inter-state relations based on
peaceful resolution of disputes and the respect of the
fundamental principles of international law (recalled in
detail by the Declaration, in the same way as the Helsinki
Declaration).
According to the model shown in Figure 1, the
consolidation of peaceful relations between states would
bring about stability in international as well as in
intra-state relations. The existence of peaceful relations,
especially in the Middle East, would open the way to a
substantive disarmament and to the possibility of achieving
some degree of regional economic integration.
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Democratization is understood as a factor that changes
and reduces the role of the state in the economy, making it
possible to liberalize the latter and proceed to privatization.
This development would help regional economic integration
and cooperation. At the same time, the overall domestic and
regional stabilization coupled with the strengthening of the
market economy would allow for capital abroad to return
home (an extremely significant amount in the MENA
region) and for foreign capital to enter in the form of direct
investments and new technologies.
Economic growth made possible by political stability
attained in intra-state as well as inter-state relations would
allow for reducing unemployment, particularly in relation
to young generations, and lowering poverty. These would be
key factors in discouraging political radicalization as well as
emigration.
By indicating the introduction of democracy as the first
mover of the virtuous circles described above, the EU with
the Barcelona Declaration has pointed out the structural
causes of instability in the Mediterranean and the character
and primary sources of insecurity in the area, at least from
its point of view. The Declaration is not an explicit analysis
of such causes but alludes to them indirectly by setting an
agenda directed at eliminating and containing such causes
of instability. This is the topic of next section.
The Euro-Mediterranean Security Agenda.
In the Euro-Mediterranean security agenda, as outlined
by the Barcelona Declaration, there are two policy layers: a
broader one directed at shaping the structural factors which
would allow for stability and, thus, security in the
Mediterranean; a narrower one constituted by specific
policies to be implemented jointly and cooperatively by the
members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
All in all, the Barcelona process resembles the
CSCE/OSCE experience. It is a cooperative security
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scheme, in which the players are expected to gradually
attain security and escape security dilemmas by the use of
cooperative instruments (instead of being guided by policies
of balance of power and deterrence). The cooperative
security scheme envisaged by the Barcelona Declaration is
strongly predicated on a concept of comprehensive security,
in which both military and nonmilitary factors are included
and integrated. This is reflected (and is the outcome) of the
EU analysis of Mediterranean instability on which, as
argued in the above, the security scheme is predicated.
It must be added that from the point of view of the EU,
the emphasis on nonmilitary factors does not come from
objective analysis only, but also from the very “civilian”
nature of the European Union. The Treaty of Amsterdam,
having failed once again to provide an operational and well
integrated Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to
the Union, remains more a civilian-economic power than a
politico-military one. Having said that, however, it would be
wrong to think that the EU is not pursuing military or
military-related cooperation in the Mediterranean.
Although to a minor extent and with poor effectiveness,
military cooperation is tried nonetheless .
On this backdrop, the broader and structural layer of
EMP cooperative security scheme is tasked to provide a
common code of conduct, which includes a set of basic
principles for international cooperation and peaceful
relations. The aim is similar to the Helsinki Act: the
Barcelona Declaration commits its members to
democratization, pluralism, the implementation of the state
of law, respect for human rights and minorities, good
neighborly relations, etc. as the frame which would make
cooperative security work. Like the CSCE, the EMP is
politically binding only. Its pivotal mechanism is the
political dialogue, which is conducted in its institutions: the
biennial Conference of Foreign Ministers, the EuroMediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process
(Euro-Med Committee), and the High Officials Committee.
The political dialogue is aimed, first, to create cooperation
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needed to make the cooperative security scheme emerge
and, secondly, to manage jointly what cooperation is
actually worked out.
The narrower layer makes reference to the three
chapters of the Declaration. The first and third chapters
envisage a set of specific policies related to security, in
practice to the military and nonmilitary factors that have
been pointed out in the two previous sections: WMD and
missiles proliferation coupled with other military trends,
and migration, terrorism and organized international
criminality. The second chapter envisages strong support to
economic development and the integration of the Southern
Mediterranean economies in the international setting by
the creation at 2010 of a free trade area.
As for nonmilitary factors, it is important to note that the
Barcelona Declaration emphasizes the necessity of
promoting the cultural dialogue between the different parts
of the Mediterranean as a tool working across the board, i.e.,
in relation to the varying social and human dimensions that
are involved in the broad notion of Mediterranean security
and peaceful relations. The Declaration gives special
emphasis to the role of civil society in reinforcing cultural
understanding and, most of all, promoting political and
economic liberalization and cohesiveness in their respective
societies.
Beside the aforementioned diplomatic and political
instruments that can be used within the political dialogue,
incentives to democratization are provided by a small fund
devoted to support of nongovernmental initiatives to
reinforce and spread democracy (Meda-Democracy). On the
other hand, the fund designated for developmental aid is
considerable (a little bit more than 4 billion ECU for
concessional aid and as much from the European
Investment Bank). The incentives to promote democracy,
and to respect human rights and law, are supported by a
strict scheme of “conditionality” that is related to the
disbursement of aid.
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As for the military factor, the Barcelona Declaration
points out the prominent necessity to stop or contain
proliferation. At the same time, it stresses other targets of
arms control, arms limitation and disarmament, as well as
the necessity to promote confidence-building measures and
introduce conflict prevention capacities into the scheme.
The relevant key passage of the Declaration points out that
the Parties will:
consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons;
refrain from developing military capacity beyond their
legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming
their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and
mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and
weaponry and adherence to CCW;
promote conditions likely to develop good security, prosperity
and regional and subregional cooperation;
consider any confidence- and security-building measures that
could be taken between the Parties with a view to the creation
of an “area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean”
including the long-term possibility of establishing a
Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.

This set of measures is named by the Declaration the
“area of peace and stability.” To establish the “area,” Senior
Officials have begun setting out two main agendas: the
Action Plan and, later on, the Euro-Mediterranean Charter
for Peace and Stability. While the Action Plan would be a
list of measures and policies that the Partners would pick up
and negotiate over time according to priorities and modes
they would remain free to gradually agree upon, the
Charter would be an institutional framework with a
normative ambition and a stronger mechanism of political
dialogue. In a sense, the Charter would be the
“Euro-Mediterranean Pact” mentioned at the end of the
just-quoted passage and its substance would resemble the
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Stability Pact in Europe established by the EU within the
CSCE/OSCE.
The Barcelona Declaration is not exhausting the
military instruments available to the EU for achieving
security in the Mediterranean. Beside the principles and
policies the EU shares with its Mediterranean partners in
the framework of the EMP, instruments available to the
Union in the framework of the WEU and multinational
forces set up by members of the Union, like Eurofor and
Euromarfor, must also be taken into consideration
(although they are not directed specifically to the
Mediterranean). These instruments are part of the defense
forces of the Union, its members and its allies, and tasked
primarily to their national security. There is no doubt,
however, that their use is intended f or cooperative
purposes. These purposes are listed by the 1992 Petersberg
Declaration, in which the WEU members have pointed out
that military forces answerable to the WEU are to be used
eventually for the management of crises as well as for
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Eurofor and
Euromarfor, made answerable to the WEU (as well as
NATO and other regional security organizations) by the
governments of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, are
endowed with a special maritime mobility and for this
reason have a natural destination to act in the
Mediterranean (although not necessarily there).
Since 1993 the WEU has conducted a Mediterranean
Dialogue with Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and
Egypt (since 1995). In the first semester of 1998, the WEU
Council decided to enlarge its dialogue to Jordan as well.
The dialogue amounts to biannual meetings with
representatives of these countries to exchange information.
Recently, the non-WEU Mediterranean partners have been
invited to visit, first, the WEU Torrejón Satellite Center
(Spain) and, secondly, the WEU Planning Cell in Brussels.
Principally because of the EU members reluctance to make
the WEU work effectively, this organization’s
Mediterranean agenda (not unlike other agendas) proved
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weak. The Mediterranean Dialogue operates as a very
broad confidence-building measure directed to enhance
transparency. The establishment of Eurofor and
Euromarfor, on the other hand, was not welcome by the
Mediterranean partners (and countries at large) for these
forces are not included in an explicit cooperative framework
and would thus operate unilaterally.
Conclusions.
EU security perceptions with respect to the
Mediterranean are predicated essentially on nonmilitary
structural causes. Proximate causes of instability may well
be of military nature, like proliferation. Still, nonmilitary
proximate causes, such as migration or terrorism, are seen
as most important. Accordingly, EU instruments to deal
with security in the Mediterranean are less military than
political, economic, and cultural in their character.
It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the EU is
overlooking military and military-related instruments and
issues. The cooperative security scheme envisaged by what
the Barcelona Declaration defines as the “area of peace and
stability” is very important not only because the EU is
aware of the fact that in the middle-longer term the level
and quality of armaments in the region will be decisive for
its overall stability (and will be no less important than
nonmilitary factors), but also because acquiring a capability
to manage military and military-related relations is an
important element for EU’s ongoing political and defense
integration. In fact, from the point of view of the EU, while
Barcelona policies directed at improving economic
development, containing illegal immigration, and
countering terrorism as well as international criminality
are of the utmost importance for European security, the
implementation of the “area of peace and stability”
corresponds to a no less important investment from both the
point of view of security in the area and EU’s political
identity. In the light of these purposes, what is the balance

139

sheet of the Mediterranean policies set out by the EU in the
1990s?
In its 3-year life, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
has duly progressed in implementing its agenda of economic
cooperation, but less so in shaping the varying aspects of
security cooperation envisaged by the first and third
chapter of the Barcelona Declaration. In fact, the balance
sheet, after the second ministerial meeting in Malta (April
15-16, 1997) and the ad hoc ministerial meeting held in
Palermo on June 4-5, 1998, is somehow disappointing in
this respect. It must be added that it is maybe disappointing
more in relation to migration, terrorism and criminality
than the “area of peace and stability."
While the standstill in the Middle East peace process has
been a serious stumbling block on the road to build up the
“area of peace and stability,” the EU and EMP inertia with
respect to illegal immigration, terrorism and criminality is
explained by the modest level of integration in the Union in
relation to such matters, particularly immigration. In more
general terms, the weakness of the CFSP is an important
factor in slowing down the EU Mediterranean security
agenda. It must be also noted, however, that despite some
rhetoric, especially in Southern Europe, EU security
concerns concentrate elsewhere than in the Mediterranean,
i.e., in the Balkans and in Russia.
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CHAPTER 6
ARAB PERCEPTIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PROJECTS
Mohammad El-Sayed Selim

Introduction.
In October 1994 the European Union (EU) announced a
proposal to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(EMP). According to this proposal, the EMP was directed
towards “support for establishing a zone of stability and
security and creating conditions for lasting and sustainable
rapid economic development in the Mediterranean
countries.” The proposal reiterated two main dimensions of
the Partnership, namely, establishing a EuroMediterranean Zone of Political Stability and Security, and
establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area. The
objective was to establish a free trade area in all
manufactured products between the EU and the
Mediterranean countries, preferential and reciprocal access
for agricultural products, and a free trade area among
Mediterranean countries themselves. “The EuroMediterranean free trade zone would constitute the biggest
free trade area in the world covering 600-800 million people
in some 30-40 countries.” The EU Proposal also promised
financial support of Ecu 5.5bn for the period 1995-99 to help
Mediterranean nonmember states to realize these
objectives. It also called for a Euro-Mediterranean
conference.
The projected Euro-Mediterranean ministerial
conference was held on November 27-28, 1995, in
Barcelona, Spain. The conference attendees witnessed
heated debates between the EU and nonmember
Mediterranean countries’ representatives on the elements
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of the partnership. However, the final declaration issued by
the conference, the Barcelona Declaration, reflected to a
large extent the European viewpoint, as far as the nature of
peace and stability and the free trade area that will be
established by the year 2010.
The EU drafted a model “association agreement” with
the southern Mediterranean countries as the starting point
of the partnership negotiations. Negotiations have been
conducted separately between the EU and would-be
Mediterranean partners. So far, they have resulted in
partnership agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan,
and Israel. Negotiations are under way between the EU and
Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.
Each of the Mediterranean partners was handed a model
draft agreement, and negotiations evolved around this
draft. The final agreements were more or less modifications
of the draft agreements. The draft agreements and the final
agreements contained seven main items, namely:
Political Dialogue. The establishment of a regular
political dialogue, between Egypt and the EU, that would
cover all issues of common interest, and would be held at
regular intervals and whenever necessary at ministerial
and senior official levels and through all diplomatic
channels.
Free Movement of Goods. The establishment of a free
trade area over a transitional period lasting a maximum of
12 years starting from the date of entry into force of the
agreement. Custom duties on industrial products exported
by the EU to Mediterranean countries would be
progressively abolished, but industrial products originating
in these countries would be imported into the EU free of
customs duties and charges as soon as the agreement was
finalized without quantitative restrictions or measures.
Agricultural and fishery exports of each party would be
allowed access to the other party’s markets free of customs
duties within a pre-set quota and in specific seasons.

144

Rights of Establishment and Services . The exchange of
the right of establishment of one party’s firms on the
territory of the other and the liberalization of the provision
of services by one party’s firms to consumers of service of the
other.
Competition and Other Economic Provisions. The
elimination of all agreements and practices that restrict or
distort competition. However, certain concessions were
given to Mediterranean countries for a limited time period,
such as the right to continue state aid to their firms, but
such aid would be limited to what was necessary in order to
maintain and restore the viability of firms. Further, the
parties shall provide suitable and effective protection of
intellectual and commercial property rights in line with the
highest international standards. The parties would
promote the use by Mediterranean countries of the EU’s
technical rules and European standards for industrial and
agricultural products and certification procedures, and
would also conclude agreements for the mutual recognition
of certifications. The EU would also assist in areas of
activity suffering the effects of internal constraints and
difficulties or affected by the process of liberalizing its
economy and foreign trade.
Cooperation in the Areas of Education and Training,
Science and Technology, and Environment . Special
emphasis was put on industrial cooperation with a view of
modernizing and restructuring the industrial sector,
including the agri-food industry in Mediterranean
countries. The draft agreements and final agreements also
referred to the promotion and protection of investment,
cooperation in standardization and conformity assessment,
financial services, agriculture and fisheries, transport,
telecommunications and information technology, energy,
tourism and cooperation in customs matters, statistics,
combating money laundering, and drug use and trafficking.
Cooperation in Social and Cultural Matters. These
included reciprocal treatment of the workers of each party
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in the territory of the others. The EU and the
Mediterranean countries will also enter a dialogue on any
social matters that are of interest to them such as migration
and the conditions of migrant workers, the promotion of the
role of woman, family planning, the promotion of human
rights, and cooperation in the area of strengthening mutual
understanding.
Financial Cooperation. This would include financial
support by the EU to facilitate reforms aimed at
modernizing the economy, updating economic infrastructure, promoting private investment and job creation
activities, and alleviating the effects on the Mediterranean
economies of the progressive introduction of the free trade
1
area.
Arab countries reacted differently to the EU proposal.
Within each country there were also different reactions of
various political and economic groups. Such reactions will
have long-term implications for the viability of the projected
EMP. The objective of this essay is to review the perceptions
of Arab countries to the projected EMP; and to assess the
policy implications of these perceptions to projected
partnership.
Perceptions of the Need to Establish the EMP.
Arab governments acknowledged the need to respond
positively to the European proposal. Egypt’s official
response to the projected partnership was positive. This
response was clearly articulated in the public debate that
was initiated after the Barcelona conference and in other
statements and documents of the Egyptian Foreign
Ministry. A concept paper circulated by the foreign ministry
endorsing the EMP argued that the European proposal
must strive to create a Euro-Mediterranean economic area
that would enhance the position of the partners in this area
within the international economic system, achieve peace,
stability, and security in the Mediterranean, and promote a
dialogue among Mediterranean civilizations. It added that
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the EMP should be based on the consensus of the partners,
thereby reflecting the diverse interests of the
Mediterranean countries. It should not conflict with other
commitments of the partners.
Egypt’s Foreign and Industry Ministries were the most
outspoken advocates of the Egyptian-European
Partnership (EEP). They defended the agreement mainly
on grounds of market expansion, job creation, and increased
foreign investment. Egyptian manufactured products
would get free access to the huge European market. This
would lead to industry expansion and the generation of job
opportunities. Foreign investors would also be tempted to
manufacture in Egypt in order to benefit from the customs
duty-free European market. According to Egypt’s chief
negotiator with the EU,
the EEP conformed with the goal of Egyptian economic
development. It would generate more job opportunities, and
open a huge market of U.S. $800 million to Egyptian exports.
Through the EEP, Egypt would be granted U.S. $2 billion and
loaned another U.S. $2 billion to develop industry, education,
training, and scientific research within the next 3 years. The
EEP provides Egypt with privileges such as the progressive
2
reduction of customs duties over 12 years.

Ibrahim Fawzy, Minister of Industry in 1995, was
almost deterministic in presenting the case of EEP to the
Egyptian business community. He contended that the
post-Cold War era was the era of grand economic blocs.
Egypt was a small country, and, as a result, it had to join a
large bloc or it would risk marginalization. Consequently,
the EEP was “a compulsory option.” The EU was not out to
control the Egyptian Market because Egypt’s import
potential was limited. The EU’s goal, according to Dr.
Fawzy, was to “develop Egypt” and to “create an economic
bloc to confront the American bloc and the East Asian bloc.”
Egypt would also gain access to the huge European market,
and that would generate 1.4 million job opportunities
annually. That the projected agreement did not include the
freedom of labor movement into its provisions was not a
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disadvantage. This would serve to stop the “brain drain”
from Egypt to Europe. The choice for Egypt, he added, was
not the United States or East Asia, it was the European
3
Union.
The projected EMP was also viewed as complementing
the Mediterranean Forum (MF) that Egypt had lobbied
heavily to establish in 1994. The Egyptians argued that the
MF, which is a purely Mediterranean framework, could
serve to regulate cooperation between the Mediterranean
countries that are members in the EMP. Both institutions
could mutually reinforce each other.
The Tunisian government perceived the EMP as
urgently needed to ensure better utilization of resources,
achieving co-development in the Mediterranean, and
securing the process of democratic transformation.
Ben-Yehia, Tunisia’s Foreign Minister, argued in his
address at the Forum of the Constitutional Democratic
Party in November 1995 that the EMP “provided the
Mediterranean with a historic opportunity that could
enable the area to formulate a comprehensive strategy for
development.”
Despite their serious misgivings about the EMP, the
Syrians joined the EMP negotiations in 1997, arguing that
it could bring about certain gains. The Libyans, too, have
4
clearly expressed their desire to join the EMP.
How do we account for the Arab endorsement of the basic
idea of the EMP despite their major reservations (which will
be outlined at a later section)? Arab desire to join the EMP is
an outcome of Arab tremendous economic linkages with the
EU. The EU is the major trade partner for all Arab
Mediterranean countries. It is also a major donor of
economic aid and technology. The Arabs fear that these
interests will be jeopardized if they do not join. Further, the
Arabs perceive the EMP as a mechanism to counterbalance
American economic hegemony in the Middle East. They
would like to see a more active European role in the Middle
East as Europe is perceived to be less biased towards Israel
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than the United States is. Finally, the Arabs hope that
through negotiations they will be able to persuade the EU to
give them more concessions than have been already offered
in the draft association agreements.
Arab Perceptions of the Scope of the EMP and Its
Impact on Arab Regional Cooperation.
In 1992, European countries suspended all forms of
multilateral cooperation in which Libya was involved. The
rationale for the decision was that such cooperation would
only be resumed after Libya hands over two Libyans
suspected of being involved in the downing of an American
airliner. In this context, the 5+5 formula was suspended,
and Libya was not invited to participate in the negotiations
to build an EMP. Although Arab countries began
negotiations without Libya, most of them contended that
Libya should be brought into the Euro-Med process,
including the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the Moroccan
5
Prime Minister. However, they did not specify whether this
should occur immediately or after the resolution of the
Libyan-Western crisis. Arab interest in bringing Libya into
the EMP stems from a major concern over its potential
negative impact on inter-Arab regional cooperation.
There is also a concern that the EMP will establish a
system of vertical cooperation between each Arab country
and Europe, thereby jeopardizing horizontal Arab
cooperation, especially the prospects of establishing an
Arab free trade area. In response to this concern, the eight
Arab governments participating in the EMP, in addition to
Libya and Mauritania, launched a system of regular
consultations to benefit from the experience of the EMP in
promoting inter-Arab economic cooperation. The last
meeting of this group was held in Cairo, Egypt, in July 1998.
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Arab Perceptions of the Economic Aspects
of the EMP.
Of all the dimensions of the EMP, the economic ones
were the most severely and widely criticized by the Arabs.
This is understandable, given the expected strong impact of
the EMP on Arab economic security.
The issue of the Arab agricultural exports to the EU was
the major stumbling block in the ongoing negotiations. In
the case of Egypt, whereas the draft agreement exempted
European industrial exports to Egypt from all Egyptian
tariff and nontariff barriers, it put restrictions on Egypt’s
agricultural exports to the EU. The EU offered limited
increases in the quotas of Egyptian agricultural exports,
extensions of the importation seasons, and granted more
agricultural products entry to the EU market. The
Egyptians rejected this offer. They argued that the
association agreement must maintain a balance between
the liberalization of industrial trade and agricultural trade.
Each party was entitled to benefit from the areas in which it
enjoyed a relative advantage. The liberalization of Egypt’s
agricultural trade with the EU would not hurt European
agriculture as such trade represented a small fraction of the
EU’s total agricultural production and importation.
Further, Egypt was a net importer of European agricultural
goods. The EU’s agricultural exports to Egypt were almost
five times Egypt’s agricultural exports to the EU. According
to the 1995 statistics, Egypt’s agricultural exports to the EU
were U.S. $154 million, and its total exports from the EU
were U.S. $840 million. The association agreement had to
address this trade imbalance if the philosophy of the
association were to be based upon the economic
development of Egypt and reciprocal commitments. The
strategy of the 1977 Egyptian-European protocol that
restricted Egyptian agricultural exports to the EU was no
longer a viable one, not only because of the new association
philosophy, but also because of Egypt’s growing exportation
potential and the centrality of the agricultural sector to its
economy. Almost 56 percent of the Egyptians depended
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upon this sector. Among the southern Mediterranean
economies, the Egyptian economy is the most dependent
upon agriculture; that called for a different strategy than
the one applied to Tunisia, Morocco, or Israel, countries
which had already signed association agreements with the
6
EU.
During the negotiations, Egypt offered the EU four
alternatives: (1) full liberalization of agricultural and
industrial trade; (2) de facto liberalization of Egyptian
agricultural exports by exempting more agricultural
exports from customs duties and increasing the quotas and
exportation seasons, so the value of Egypt’s agricultural
exports would reach U.S. $1.5 billion; (3) the full
liberalization of the exportation of certain Egyptian
agricultural exports without quotas; and, (4) any other EU
alternative that would create a balance in Egypt-EU
7
agricultural trade. The Egyptians also demanded the
removal of unjustified nontariff barriers such as the
designation of specific ports for the entry of Egyptian
agricultural products and the exaggerated sample
quantities required for laboratory testing.
The term “Four Ghosts” referred to four items in the
projected association agreement that had generated a
public controversy within the Egyptian business
community concerning their potential impact on the
country’s economy. These items were related to Standards
and Specifications, Rules of Origin, Intellectual Property
Rights, and Competition Policy. Egyptian businessmen
argued that these items would act as nontariff barriers,
hindering the flow of Egypt’s exports to the EU. Egypt’s
chief negotiator for the agreement, Ambassador Gamal
Bayoumi, introduced the term, “the Four Ghosts” of the
agreement, to describe these items. In his judgment,
business apprehensions about these items were not totally
justified. According to him, these items were like ghosts.
Once subjected to the light of day, they would disappear.

151

With regard to Standards and Specifications, the EU
proposed to approximate the European rules governing
them and to achieve mutual recognition of certificates
within this field. Egyptian exporters would have to conform
to the EU norms and specifications that were tailored to the
needs and tastes of European consumers. Egyptian exports
would find it difficult to adapt to these rules in 12 years.
According to Farid Khamis, the head of the Egyptian
Industries Union, it took Europe 200 years to reach these
standards, and it was not fair to force Egypt to conform to
them in 12 years.
The second item is the Rules of Origin. The EU proposed
a Unified Protocol on this item to all its Mediterranean
partners, to be annexed to each agreement. The critics of the
proposed agreement argued that the Unified Protocol would
impose a ceiling on the value of the nonoriginating
materials as a percentage of the total cost of the final
product. This was in contradiction with the Uruguay Round
Agreements that required a minimum local added value.
According to the EU proposed formula, as the total cost of
the final product diminishes, the value of the
nonoriginating materials should also diminish. As Egypt
had a relative advantage in the area of the cost of labor,
which means lower final cost, Egypt can only use a limited
amount of nonoriginating materials. Khamis argued that
this was a nontariff barrier imposed by the EU and would
result in the destruction of Egyptian industries. However,
Bayoumi pointed out the principle of multilateral and
bilateral cumulation in the agreement as a major advantage
to Egyptian economy. Such principle would promote
regional cooperation.
In the field of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), the
EU asked Egypt to accede to seven international treaties
relating to IPRs. Egypt was already a member of three of
these treaties. IPRs would be applied 3 years after the
finalization of the agreement. Under the Uruguay Round
agreements, Egypt enjoyed a 5-year grace period, extended
to 10 years in the case of the pharmaceutical industry.
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Whereas some Egyptian academics argued that IPRs would
have a positive effect on the flow of foreign direct
investments to Egypt, others contended they would
constrain Egypt’s ability to use modern technology and
would negatively influence the pharmaceutical industry
and the availability of medicine at reasonable prices.
The fourth “ghost” was the rules governing competition.
The EU proposed that its rules of competition should be
used as a reference point, arguing that the harmonization of
competition legislation was vital for the smooth functioning
of economic relations between both sides. This approach
would require Egyptian businessmen, in the case of any
future trade dispute concerning rules of competition, to
resort to European and international law firms within the
territories of the EU, which would entail high costs.
The EMP was subjected to severe criticisms by Arab
professional and businessmen associations. Perhaps the
most crucial of these criticisms were the following:

•

The flawed philosophy of the EMP. The EMP evolved
around the notion of trade liberalization. Historical
experience testifies that such a notion did not
necessarily result in economic development. The
experience of the East Asian tigers pointed out that
they achieved development not because they opened
their markets to imported industrial products, but
because they had not pursued that strategy.

•

No new concessions were given. The EMP did not give
Arab nations any more major concessions than those
provided under the present Euro-Arab Protocols, such
as the 1977 Euro-Egyptian and Euro-Syrian protocols
and those under the 1994 Uruguay Round
agreements.

•

Erosion of Arab industries. Critics of the agreement
contended that providing European industrial
products with full access to the Arab market would

153

result in the destruction of indigenous industrial
production. Arab industries would not be able to
compete with European ones, even after the
transitional period that was viewed as insufficient to
restructure Egyptian industries. 8 Nabil Al-Gaja, the
representative of the Syrian private sector in the
Euro-Syrian negotiations, argued that Syrian
industries will be destroyed, and that the Syrian
treasury will lose U.S. $220 million annually as a
result of the loss of customs duties. 9

•

Social instability. The critics argued that the
destruction of Arab industries resulting from the
EMP would lead to the loss of job opportunities. The
integration into the European economy would also
result in rising social expectations without real
economic development. All of this would lead to
various forms of social instabilities and dislocations.

•

Insufficient European aid. Although the amount of
economic aid promised to the Mediterranean
countries was the largest in the history of EUMediterranean relations, the critics contended that
such aid, if compared with what has been promised to
Eastern Europe, was insufficient. EU promised
Eastern European countries, whose total population
was 96 million, aid of U.S. $8.8 billion. But it offered
the Mediterranean countries, whose total population
was 203 million, only U.S. $6 billion. If one recalls that
the Mediterranean countries are less developed than
their Eastern European counterparts, one would
comprehend the limited aid promised under the
EMP.10

Arab Perceptions of the Politico-Security Aspects
of the EMP.
Although Arab countries accepted the major principles
of the political dialogue suggested by the EU, they criticized
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these principles as lacking a clear reference to the peace
process in the Middle East. They argued that the EMP
would entail a Mediterranean economic regional
cooperation that would include Israel. Such cooperation was
not likely to materialize without an agreement on the basic
political elements of the future relationships between the
11
Arabs and the Israelis. They contended that, without the
Madrid peace process, the Barcelona agreements would
have never materialized. Consequently, no progress on the
Barcelona formula would be possible without a
corresponding progress on the Madrid formula. Barcelona
was organically linked with Madrid. As it became clear that
the Netanyahu Israeli government was determined to
destroy the Madrid process, the Arabs expressed deep
misgivings in the second ministerial meeting of the EMP,
held in Malta in 1997, on the future of the EMP. The
participants failed to agree on the basic principles of a
politico-security charter because the Europeans were
reluctant to deal with Arab concerns over the Israeli
occupation of Arab territories.
Further, the Arabs resented the reluctance of the EU to
discuss the issue of the presence of nuclear weapons in the
Middle East. Although the Barcelona Declaration referred
to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
from the Middle East, it tended to focus on chemical and
biological weapons, leaving the Israeli nuclear arsenal
untouched.
In fact, there is a strong feeling among the Arabs that the
EU is giving Israel preferential political and economic
treatment that it is not willing to extend to the Arabs. This
was clearly spelled out by Egypt’s Foreign Minister Amr
Moussa in his address at the Euro-Egyptian Cooperation
Council in October 1996.
Finally, the establishment by four EU countries of the
European Force (EUROFOR) and European Maritime
Force (EUROMARFOR) added to Arab apprehensions
about Europe’s real objectives. The European countries did
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not consult the Arabs. They suspect that Europe has not
ruled out the use of force if it is necessary to achieve
European goals.
Conclusion.
Although Arab countries have accepted the principle of
establishing an EMP, they have expressed strong
misgivings about its likely impact on their economies and
the structure of the peace process in the Middle East. The
arguments in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco seem to be
the same. Arab industries would be destroyed, and Europe
is a reluctant partner in the Middle East peace process. As a
result, as long as the EU insists on its unidirectional
approach, the Arabs will be ambivalent partners in the
Barcelona process. This is evident in the case of Tunisia and
Morocco. Although the two countries have signed
partnership agreements with the EU, they are now having
second thoughts about the viability of this process. In Egypt
there is a deep concern about the potential impact of the
EMP on Egyptian agriculture. Further, the unilateral
military actions of some EU countries in the Mediterranean
will only serve to reinforce Arab suspicions.
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CHAPTER 7
THE SECURITY CHALLENGE IN KOSOVO:
TOWARD A REGION-STABILIZING SOLUTION
Steven L. Burg

Introduction.
The current violence in Kosovo has already drawn the
United States and its NATO partners to the brink of
another military intervention in the Balkans. Intervention
in Bosnia, however, has demonstrated the difficulty of
resolving such conflicts by force alone, as well as the
difficulty of extricating oneself from involvement once
troops have been deployed. Despite the apparent
irreconcilability of the three sides in the Kosovo
conflict—the Milosevic leadership in Belgrade, the
Albanian leadership in Kosovo clustered around Ibrahim
Rugova, and the Kosovo Liberation Army waging an armed
struggle against Serbia—there may yet be a way to resolve
the conflict short of military intervention. To do so, however,
will require the discovery of innovative political solutions to
the clash between the claims of an ethnic group to national
self-determination, and the claims of a state to preserve its
territorial integrity. This is the conflict of competing
principles that underlies many such ethno-regional
conflicts, and the solution adopted in Kosovo may well
determine the course of similar conflicts elsewhere in the
Balkans; most immediately, of course, in neighboring
Macedonia, where a large Albanian minority with close ties
to Kosovo is waging its own struggle for greater
1
recognition.
There is no way to reconcile the competing and
conflicting claims of the Serbs and Albanians to historical or
political “ownership” of Kosovo. Any explicit effort to choose
between these claims must result in failure. Instead, a
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solution must focus on stabilizing medium-term relations
between Belgrade and Kosovo without shutting off any
future options, so as to permit the negotiation of a
longer-term solution. The process of resolving the conflict
must first provide an interim agreement that immediately
alleviates the present state of repression in Kosovo and
begins restoring both Kosovo and Yugoslavia to “normal”
social, political, and especially economic activity. It should
contribute in the medium-term to weakening the social
bases of support for violence among both Kosovar Albanians
and Serbs, and open possibilities for democratic
development in Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia, without
which no longer-term solution is possible. Interim
arrangements should give way quickly to transitional
arrangements that create pathways to a lasting negotiated
resolution of the conflict. Neither the interim agreement nor
the transitional arrangements should preclude either side
from pursuing its long-term goals through continuing
peaceful negotiations.
The scholarly literature on ethnic conflict focuses on
three main strategies for managing conflict: integration,
2
power-sharing, and partition. Four European examples of
the application of one or more of these approaches to the
solution of ethno-regional conflict are sometimes cited as
potential “models” for the solution of the conflict in Kosovo:
3
the power-sharing approach adopted in Belgium, the
cultural and territorial autonomy strategy adopted in the
4
South Tyrol/Alto Adige region of Italy, the partition
5
strategy adopted in the Jura region of Switzerland, and the
autonomous communities/devolution strategy adopted in
6
response to ethno-regionalisms in Spain. These models
have drawn the attention of Western scholars and some
7
Serbian analysts. Developments in Spain, in particular,
are now the object of intensive scrutiny sponsored by the
8
Belgrade regime. Kosovar Albanian writers, in contrast,
have focused in their public discourse almost exclusively on
arguments denying Serbian claims to rule over Kosovo and
advancing Kosovar claims to outright independence for the
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9

region. The recent example of the settlement negotiated in
Northern Ireland, which incorporates elements of
power-sharing, may now also draw the attention of
Westerners or Serbs interested in solving the crisis in
Kosovo. But none of these conflicts was/is directly
equivalent to the conditions present in Kosovo, and none of
these solutions can be applied wholesale to the Kosovo
conflict. Rather, selected elements of these examples of the
successful management of ethno-regional conflict must be
adapted to the particular, and difficult conditions in Kosovo.
Constraints.
A solution to the conflict in Kosovo must take into
account certain constitutional, political, economic, and
regional parameters, which are themselves in some ways
contradictory. Constitutionally, Kosovo is a region within
Serbia, which is itself a republic of the federation of
Yugoslavia. This is the status presently recognized and
supported by the international community as part of its
efforts to underscore the inviolability of borders in the
region. This simple fact distinguishes the conflict in Kosovo
from that in Bosnia-Herzegovina and complicates its
solution. It is also the status on which the Serbian
leadership insists, and on which the Serbs base their
opposition to international third party involvement in what
they define as an “internal” matter. Yet, the refusal to
recognize or accept this status is at the heart of the
nationalist resistance movement among the ethnically
Albanian Kosovars. The Kosovar Albanians argue that the
constitutional/international legitimacy of this status ceased
to exist when the former Yugoslavia ceased to exist. Kosovar
leaders further argue that the persistent pattern of
repression and abuse carried out by the present Serbian
regime negates any claim it might have to rule over Kosovo.
The apparent deadlock between Serb and Albanian
positions is, in many ways, similar to the deadlock between
Republican and Unionist positions in Northern Ireland
prior to negotiations. Kosovar leaders, however, insist on
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their right to establish their own independent state rather
than demanding immediate integration with the Albanian
state across the border—although many Kosovars openly
advocate integration of all Albanian populated territories
into a “greater Albania.”
No formula that retains the existing constitutional
status of the province—or simply returns to the status quo
prior to 1988—will be acceptable to the Kosovars. Indeed, no
Kosovar political leadership can afford to accept such a
formula in the face of the armed opposition of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (UCK), which has demonstrated its
readiness to assassinate individuals it deems to have
betrayed its nationalist-separatist goals. Hence, any
solution to the Kosovo conflict must reconcile the
contradictory—indeed, seemingly irreconcilable—Serb and
Albanian positions by finding some formulation that
addresses both the demand for independence and the
demand to uphold territorial integrity, and thereby gives
both the moderate Kosovar Albanian leadership and the
Serbian supporters of compromise some basis for mobilizing
their respective constituencies in support of a settlement.
Politically, a compromise settlement must also take into
account the fact that Serbian leaders and many
Serbs—including intellectuals otherwise inclined toward
“liberal” positions on the national issue—fear the
consequences of Albanian participation in Serbian, or even
10
Yugoslav politics. For the local Serbs of Kosovo, the return
of the Albanians to formal political participation raises the
threat that the Serbs of Kosovo might be reduced to an
oppressed minority—a fear magnified by the prospect that
Kosovo might become independent. For Milosevic, the
return of Albanian voters, and the representation and
participation of a self-governing Kosovo entity in the
federation raises the prospect of a weakening of his hold on
power—both locally, in Kosovo, and on the level of the
federation. At the same time, however, the Kosovar
Albanians refuse to participate in either Serbian or
Yugoslav politics, for they view such participation as
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acknowledging or even legitimating the constitutional
status to which they object. They view participation as
undermining their claim to full independence as the only
acceptable expression of their right to self-determination.
For the Kosovars to accept a settlement, therefore, it must
hold out at least the possibility—if not the
inevitability—that further negotiations would result in
11
independence. This is an inevitability that some Serbian
intellectuals already accept—they are concerned not so
much with preventing independence for Kosovo (or some
part of it) as with preventing independence for Kosovo from
becoming a precedent for the further disintegration of
12
Serbia. This perspective opens the possibility of achieving
an interim solution that affirms territorial integrity, but
leaves the door open to later separation, as does the
Northern Ireland agreement.
Thus, while Serbian leaders refuse to recognize Kosovar
claims to independence, they do not wish to see the
Albanians re-enter Serbian and Yugoslav political life. The
Serbian leadership (Milosevic) would be content to allow the
Albanian refusal to participate in Serbian or Yugoslav
institutions to go on indefinitely. Indeed, for many Serbs,
the prospect that Kosovar Albanians might have influence
over internal Serbian matters, as they did under the
provisions of the 1974 Yugoslav and Serbian constitutions,
is unacceptable. Hence, any solution to the Kosovo conflict
that attempts to uphold the territorial integrity of Serbia
and Yugoslavia—as may be required by the regional
constraints noted below—must include some form of
participation in a common state. But, it must also allow the
Serb and Albanian communities each to avoid the influence,
or perceived domination, of the other at either the local or
federal levels. Such contradictory arrangements are
characteristic of the power-sharing approach as adopted in
Belgium, and of the autonomy/devolution strategy adopted
in Spain.
Some Serbs assign special emotional significance to
Kosovo because of the importance of the region in the
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historical development of the Serbian nation—an argument
often couched in terms of Kosovo as the “Jerusalem” of the
13
Serbs. However, Albanian analysts sometimes make
similar arguments about Kosovo, centered on the historical
importance of events in Prizren for the formation of the
14
modern Albanian nation. Other Serbs outside of Kosovo
focus their concerns on the fate of the many important Serb
cultural institutions and monuments in Kosovo, such as the
monasteries of Pec, Decani, and Gracanica, rather than on
the region as a whole. Any settlement of the conflict over
Kosovo will have to address at least these specific concerns
in an effort to defuse the larger emotional issue among the
Serbs. Yet it will have to do so in a manner that does not
devalue or neglect the cultural and historical institutions of
the Albanians.
Opposition to any settlement can be expected to be fierce
within some constituencies in Serbia. For nationalistextremist Serbs who win election to the Serbian/Yugoslav
parliament from Kosovo, the return of Albanian voters to
the Serbian and Yugoslav electorate will eliminate their
sinecures and, perhaps, reduce their numbers in
parliament. Some Serbian analysts suggest that Serbs who
emigrated from Kosovo might become a base for political
opposition to such a settlement and to any Serbian
politician who agreed to it. It is therefore essential that any
settlement be accompanied by the delivery of concrete
benefits to Serbia that can be used to mobilize support
among the general population. Nor can a settlement allow
the continued impoverishment of the Kosovo population.
Economic assistance to the province will be required to
create support within the Kosovar population for a peaceful
approach, and draw support away from the UCK. Extensive
economic authority over the region will have to shift from
Belgrade to Pristina. But the Serbs are unlikely to sign any
such agreement unless it offers parallel benefits to
Serbia/Yugoslavia. While assistance to Kosovo will most
likely require the allocation of even more resources than are
presently being committed through the U.S. Agency for
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International Development (USAID) and other Western
agencies, economic benefits can be delivered to Serbia most
easily by matching Serbian implementation of each
agreement with the lifting of economic and other sanctions,
on a carefully linked basis.
Finally, a solution to the Kosovo conflict must be
constructed with certain regional constraints in mind. The
most immediate of these are the probable consequences of a
settlement in Kosovo for Albanian-Macedonian relations in
Macedonia. The large and restive ethnic Albanian
population in Macedonia is territorially concentrated in
provinces along the borders with Kosovo and Albania, and is
closely linked to both Kosovo and Albania through personal,
familial, and political ties. Although political views among
the Albanians of Macedonia are diverse, there are strong
popular sentiments and political support for ethno-regional
autonomy, or even outright independence. The UCK has
claimed responsibility for isolated bombings carried out in
Macedonia, and may be active in the country. The formula
adopted in Kosovo must therefore underscore the territorial
integrity of Yugoslavia and, perhaps, even Serbia, if it is not
to lead almost immediately to the disintegration of
Macedonia. Similarly, nationalist Serbs in Bosnia
(Republika Srpska) will scrutinize any settlement in Kosovo
to find a basis for legitimating their own claims to
independence on the basis of self-determination, as will
some Montenegrins, Muslims in the Sandzak, and
Hungarians in Vojvodina. For a solution in Kosovo to avoid
escalating conflicts in these neighboring regions, it must
provide clearly for the territorial integrity of the existing
state (Serbia and Yugoslavia) within the limits imposed by
the need to accommodate Kosovar Albanian demands. Such
an approach does not, it should be made clear, constitute
“rewarding Serbia.” Indeed, if elements of the settlement
contribute to democratization in Serbia, then it will produce
additional pressure for change in the current regime.
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Relevance of Other Cases.
The clash between ethno-regional demands for
autonomy or independence and the claims of an existing
state to sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the
presence of an armed movement carrying out violent action
against state authority, was/is common to most of the other
European cases of ethno-regionalism cited above. The
Basque ETA and the Irish Republic Army (IRA) provide
close parallels to the Kosovar UCK. The intensity of the
conflict in Kosovo has already reached levels equal to, or
more deadly than the worst period of “troubles” in Northern
Ireland. In South Tyrol and the Jura, in contrast, violence
was more limited and, in the Jura, of more limited duration.
In Belgium, and in the Catalan region of Spain, there was
little or no violence associated with claims to self-rule. Yet,
even in the cases of violent conflict, peaceful settlements
were reached. The ethno-regional conflicts in Belgium,
Spain, Switzerland, and Italy all have been resolved and
institutionalized, and the conflict in Northern Ireland now
appears headed toward the institutionalization of a
peaceful settlement. These successes may be attributable to
factors and conditions that are not—as yet—present in
Kosovo. One of the challenges in forging a settlement in
Kosovo, therefore, is to induce conflict-resolving behaviors
in the conflicting parties in the absence of these factors.
All five European ethno-regional conflicts were resolved
in the context of democratic states, although the conflicts in
Spain each involved a centuries-long history of centerperiphery tensions, and a decades-long history of cultural
repression under the fascist authoritarian regime that
preceded democracy. The autonomy/devolution strategy
adopted in Spain was an essential element of the transition
to democracy itself. Democratization and devolution/
autonomy were mutually-reinforcing processes in Spain.
Nevertheless, the negotiations of regional autonomy
agreements were long and contentious processes, in which
central institutions proved resistant to relinquishing power
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to the regions.Moreover, democratization and devolution/
autonomy did not immediately end the violence in the
Basque lands. Indeed, ETA violence, and especially the use
of the military in a counterinsurgency role, endangered not
only democracy, but devolution as well. Violence in the
Basque lands ended only when the successful development
of the autonomous ethno-regional community within a
democratic Spain, and the deepening of a democratic
political culture, undermined the popular legitimacy of ETA
demands and methods. The support of the European
Community for democratization, and especially the promise
of membership contingent on democratization was an
important factor contributing to success in the Spanish
case. Both Basque and Catalan nationalists—like
ethno-regional leaders in Belgium—recognized that the
Spanish state provided a path, or gateway to membership in
the European Community, which they highly valued and
which was not otherwise available to them.
Successful resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland
has taken place in the context of two well-institutionalized
democratic states—the United Kingdom and the Republic of
Ireland—that exercised enormous influence over the
conflicting parties. The convergence of interests between
these two states in ending the violence and achieving a
peaceful settlement, and their commitment to democratic
principles of governance that enjoy widespread legitimacy
in the population of Northern Ireland itself, pushed the
conflict toward settlement. Similarly, the South Tyrol
conflict was settled in large part through negotiations
between democratic states—that is, between the state
within whose territory the conflict was taking place (Italy),
and the neighboring state with which the local minority
identified, or at least shared an ethnic identity (Austria).
The commitment of the external, “homeland” state (or
European Community, in the case of Spain) to democratic
processes, and especially its rejection of the violent
alternative, eliminated an important basis of resistance to
negotiated settlement on the part of the nationalist-
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separatist/independence movement. However, as the
Basque, Tyrolian, and Northern Ireland cases demonstrate,
violence in the form of terrorist acts often continues to occur
even after a conflict is well on the road to solution. Security
arrangements that address this problem, and which are
acceptable to both sides, are therefore essential elements in
a negotiated solution to such conflicts.
The democratic context, and especially the strength of a
democratic political culture, was an especially important
factor in Belgium, and Switzerland as well. In these cases,
the inclination and institutional mechanisms to resolve
conflicts through compromise were already wellestablished. The principle that all interests should be
represented and participate in decisionmaking processes in
Belgium pre-dated the rise of ethno-regionalism.
Representation of ethno-regional identities and interests
was thus introduced into the Belgian party system without
major upheaval in the 1960s. This facilitated the process of
constitutional change and the institutionalization of
ethno-regionalism in the 1970s. Paradoxically, a similar
process of institutionalizing such cleavages in national
decisionmaking institutions and processes was unfolding in
the former Yugoslavia at the same time. But in the Belgian
case, power-sharing facilitated an increasingly-complete
dismantling of the common state through peaceful means,
and creation of distinct, ethnically-defined, territorial
entities with increasingly comprehensive independent
decisionmaking authority. There is now little left of the
Belgian state over which the territorial entities can argue,
other than the existence of the state itself. In the former
Yugoslavia, in contrast, power-sharing produced deadlock,
which accelerated the descent into war. Although political
culture is difficult to quantify, there is little doubt that the
inclination to democratic compromise in Belgium and
Switzerland is a critical factor in explaining successful
conflict resolution in these states, and that that inclination
cannot be established in Yugoslavia in the short-run, if ever.
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Two factors appear to have held Belgium together
throughout the dismantling process. One was the continued
presence of a shared identity that overarches the
ethno-regional identities. The second, and more important
factor was the presence of interests and identities that cut
across the ethno-regions and provide the basis for common
political action in central decisionmaking institutions. The
most important of these, of course, has been class identity,
and the class interests and political agendas that cut across
the ethno-regions. The presence of common, cross-cutting
interests and identities led to preservation of the unified
market and, therefore, the requisite common monetary,
financial, and other economic institutions and functions of
the Belgian state. In Spain, too, the disintegrative effects of
devolution and the creation of autonomous communities
were counterbalanced by strong economic interests that
linked Catalonia and the Basque lands to the rest of Spain.
Perhaps the most important factor contributing to
peacefulness in Belgium as well as Spain, however, has
been the strongly democratic character of the state, and the
resultant high level of legitimacy of existing decisionmaking processes. Democratic legitimacy created the
certainty that no single actor could or would attempt
unilaterally to override a decision arrived at through
established decisionmaking processes. In Belgium, these
factors contributed to moderating the expanding mutual
veto power enjoyed by each of the ethno-linguistic/regional
groups, making compromise on the dismantling of common
state institutions and the devolution of state powers
possible.
Power-sharing has led to a more complete dismantling of
the state in Belgium than in Spain. That dismantling
process is unlikely to go further because of the apparent
absence of any further economic or material gains to be
made by the regional leaderships from eliminating the
common state entirely, the difficulty of resolving the status
of certain ethno-linguistic border regions (including
Brussels), and the unpredictability of the consequences of
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full dissolution for membership in the European Union. In
the absence of such limiting factors, the features of powersharing might very well have provided the institutional and
organizational foundations for successful partition of the
Belgian state.
In the Swiss case, both the principle of local selfdetermination and the mechanism of territorial partition
were recognized long before the political movement for an
independent Jura intensified its efforts and a separate
group initiated violence. The path toward a peaceful
settlement was initiated when Bern cantonal authorities
responded to separatist intransigence by opening a
reconsideration of the issue that did not exclude any
outcome. Partition was carried out through a series of
changes to the Bern Canton constitution and referenda at
the regional (Jura), district, and local (commune) levels that
allowed local communities to express and—under certain
conditions—to act on their preferences, independently of
the overall majority. (A referendum on the federal level to
amend the Swiss constitution was the final step in the
process.) As a result, the creation of the Jura canton left
Bern divided into noncontiguous areas. Despite provocation
by separatist extremists that included the use of violence,
and the escalation of tensions that accompanied some local
15
referenda, the entire process of partition was carried out
peacefully, and with due regard for the preferences of
minority populations that constituted local majorities.
Thus, in all the cases cited above, the prior existence of
well-established democratic political cultures or the
presence of influential and democratic outside actors
committed to peaceful settlement, or both, were important
factors contributing to successful conflict resolution. In
some cases, mechanisms for addressing demands for
self-rule were already well-established, such as the powersharing principles operating in Belgium and the principles
of partition and territorial self-rule operating in
Switzerland, and these were applied to the conflict at hand.
In other cases, new arrangements were negotiated by actors
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committed to both democracy and peace, as in Spain and
Northern Ireland. In all cases, however, the process of
resolution—from immediate or interim settlement to
eventual partition—was agreed in advance; that is, political
actors on both sides defined the “road map” for resolving the
conflict and then adhered to it. Willingness of Kosovar
Albanian and Serbian leaders to agree on such a road map
thus represents only the first step in the settlement process;
they must also adhere to it even in the face of internal
opposition.
The pluralism of political actors in the regions was a
critical element in the ability of regimes and regional actors
to negotiate settlements in Belgium, Switzerland, Spain,
Italy, and Northern Ireland. In each of the ethno-regions,
the nationalist-separatist or independence movement—and
especially the advocates of violence—faced political
competition from other parties or movements interested in
compromise, or even loyal to the larger state. In some cases,
the constituency of support for compromise and moderation
was rooted in “immigrant” populations with strong ties to
the larger state. But economic interest—the economic ties of
local actors to the larger state and its market (or the larger
European market accessible through that state)—played a
key moderating role in Belgium and in both Catalonia and
the Basque lands of Spain. Thus, democratic culture,
political pluralism, and cross-cutting economic (and
therefore, political) interests, as well as supportive external
actors, are important factors explaining successful cases of
ethno-regional conflict resolution. Most of these conditions
are not as yet present in Kosovo. However, while neither the
neighboring “homeland” state (Albania) nor the existing
state (Yugoslavia/Serbia) is democratic or supportive of
negotiating a solution, other external actors (including the
United States and the European Union) may be able to
provide incentives to negotiate an interim settlement, and
to assist in mobilizing popular support for an interim
settlement once it is concluded. In order to increase the
probability of a stable, long-term solution, an interim
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settlement should be constructed so as to support processes
of pluralization and, eventually, democratization in both
Serbia and Kosovo. But one should have no illusions about
the difficulties of negotiating a long-term solution in the
absence of genuine democracy in either Serbia or Kosovo.
Mechanisms adopted for the management of ethnoregional conflicts in nondemocratic contexts share many of
the characteristics of the settlements achieved in
democratic contexts. In Russia, for example, the dispute
between Moscow and Tatarstan over sovereignty was
settled by the devolution of limited self-administration
authority to Tatarstan, which included symbolic
concessions to the statehood of the territory. Although the
February 1994 treaty located most authority in the
federation, it did give local government control over natural
resources, housing and family law, and granted the right to
alternative military service to the local population. The
treaty assigned joint authority to the federation and local
republic governments in the administration of
transportation, social welfare (including health, culture,
sport, and education and research), and police and security
services. Agreement between Tatarstan and Russia was, to
be sure, facilitated by two unique structural factors: first,
the fact that Tatarstan is located wholly within Russia, with
no other international borders; and second, the large
proportion of ethnic Russians in the population and the
important roles they play in the local economy. Russia faced
no realistic security threat from the Tatarstan sovereignty
movement.
The situation in Chechnya offers a sharp contrast to the
situation in Tatarstan. In Chechnya, the conflict between
Moscow and local nationalists/separatists was especially
violent, and Moscow realized that it could not achieve a
military solution to the conflict. It was this realization that
led to agreements that de-escalated the armed conflict
through a withdrawal of Russian forces, stabilized local
government, and restored some degree of confidence by
establishing joint Russian-Chechnyan administrative
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bodies. These agreements opened the door to peaceful
negotiation of a political settlement by freezing the status of
the region for 5 years. But they did not provide a
long-lasting solution. In both Tatarstan and Chechnya,
de-escalation of the conflict involved significant concessions
by the center to local self-administration and, in the case of
Chechnya, opened opportunities to negotiate more
extensive local autonomy.
Once regional conflict in a nondemocratic context turns
violent, however, there is a tendency for it to become
prolonged, and to be resolved by force. The conflict in the
Sudan between the Muslim government and secessionist
Christian forces in the south remains unresolved even after
15 years of conflict. In Ethiopia, the Eritrean secessionist
movement succeeded only after a 30-year armed struggle
that ended with a military victory over the government and
cost 500,000 lives. In Sri Lanka, it was the government that
eventually achieved a costly military victory over Tamil
separatists after 15 years of fighting. But even where one
side or the other has achieved a military victory, violence
has reemerged, fueled by the lack of a political resolution of
the ethno-cultural and political issues at the foundation of
the conflict. Thus, a political agreement between the
conflicting parties that resolves these issues (or at least
provides mechanisms for reducing frictions over them)
seems essential to a stable settlement. Indeed, the failures
of intervention by outside forces to resolve the conflicts
between the Kurds and Iraq, between Armenian
secessionists in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azerbaidzhani
government, and between the Sri Lankan government and
secessionist Tamils, caution against becoming involved in
any intervention in the absence of a prior political
agreement between the warring sides—even if that
agreement is imposed by outside pressures.
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Potential Elements of an Interim Settlement.
External Supports . Elements of the devolutionary
strategies negotiated in democratic and nondemocratic
cases can be adapted to devise a settlement for Kosovo. But
the clear absence of democratic political cultures on both
sides of the Kosovo conflict will require outside actors to
provide significant negative and positive incentives for each
side to accept norms of behavior consistent with a peaceful
settlement. Salient external actors must establish clear
limits on the aspirations or expectations of local actors.
They must promise and deliver rewards for compliance with
these limits, as well as imposing costs on those who violate
them. The ethnic “homeland” state—Albania—must not
only support a peaceful settlement, but it must actively
reject the violent alternative. While it may be unreasonable
to expect any leadership of Albania publicly to oppose the
UCK, that leadership can—with support from the United
States and Europe—exercise more effective control over its
border so as to reduce the flow of arms and other supplies to
the UCK. The leadership of Albania can also provide
important political support to a Kosovar leadership that
undertakes the task of negotiating a settlement. Outside
actors will also have to provide the negative and positive
incentives necessary to persuade the “host” state—
Serbia/Yugoslavia—to forego violence and repression as a
solution and open the door to negotiating a solution without
excluding any outcome in advance; a commitment that will
have to be matched by the Kosovar Albanian leadership
despite its apparent inability to control the UCK.
The Kosovar Albanian leadership is internally divided
on the basis of both politics and personality. In the absence
of significant progress, the Kosovar Albanian leadership
may quickly fall prey to the internal violence characteristic
of the Chechens—an outcome even more likely in light of the
apparent absence of any linkages between political leaders
around Rugova or opposed to him and the armed UCK.
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The Violence/Security Issues. It will be difficult, if not
impossible, for the Kosovar Albanian leadership around
Rugova to enter into actual negotiations (as opposed to more
tentative “talks about talks”) as long as the present level of
violence and repression continues.Certainly, no negotiations can succeed as long as there is no improvement in
conditions . Hence, significant steps must be taken by
Serbia/Yugoslavia to normalize conditions in Kosovo in
order to get meaningful negotiations underway. These
steps, beginning with the lifting of the state of emergency
declared in 1989, would constitute confidence-building
measures rather than a solution to the conflict. To take such
steps would, however, raise an immediate security dilemma
for Serbia/Yugoslavia: how will security be assured in the
face of UCK violence?
In other cases of ethno-regional conflict that turned
violent, such incidents continued to occur even after the
conflict moved toward settlement (as in the Basque,
Tyrolian, Northern Ireland cases) or after an apparent
agreement or demilitarization had been reached
(Chechnya). The deployment of NATO forces to Albania and
Macedonia to assist in securing the borders of Kosovo
against the infiltration of arms and guerrilla forces from
these states (and against the movement of armed guerilla
forces from Kosovo into Macedonia) can play an important
role in preventing further escalation of the violence inside
Kosovo, and thereby make it somewhat easier for the
Yugoslav government to de-escalate its own use of force in
the region. It can also help prevent spillover of the conflict
into neighboring countries. The deployment of NATO forces
inside Kosovo to prevent such violence is not practical.
NATO forces cannot be deployed under conditions that
would leave them defending a situation that might easily
become defense of the status quo rather than progress
toward a settlement (the fate of the U.N. Protection Force
(in Bosnia) or, even more problematic, the defacto
dismemberment of a state through armed intervention—an
act likely to arouse considerable opposition in the United
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Nations and other multilateral organizations from other
states vulnerable to internal ethnic conflict. Deployment of
NATO forces inside Kosovo will produce a defacto partition
along the lines of deployment. If NATO troops are deployed
in an effort to end the violence in the province, they may
very well face the task of suppressing UCK violence. A
NATO air campaign directed against Serbia and Serb
targets in Kosovo would almost certainly encourage such
violence. Short of a NATO intervention in support of an
independent Kosovo, the Yugoslav leadership will insist on
its right to defend the security and territorial integrity of
the state.
The right of a state to defend its security and integrity is
one that the Yugoslavs cannot be expected to give up. But
efforts to end the violence associated with other
ethno-regional conflicts suggest how the exercise of that
right by the Yugoslavs can be subjected to scrutiny and
constraints. In the Basque lands, where a terrorist
organization remained actively opposed to an emerging
settlement, the security issue was addressed through
creation of a joint Basque-Spanish security commission. A
key element in the Khasavyurt accord ending the fighting in
Chechnya was the establishment of similar joint
Russian-Chechnyan commissions. In Kosovo, the creation
of a joint security commission consisting of Yugoslav
(federal) Serbian, Kosovar Albanian, and international
actors might provide an equivalent solution.
Such an organization could provide effective verification
of events, and oversee a rapid, phased reduction to “normal”
levels of the military and special police units in the
province—or to levels consistent with the level of violence
that continues to be directed against the regime. It could
also begin the process of reforming civil police organizations
in the province. This commission could also exercise
international monitoring of judicial and penal institutions
in the province. The presence of international monitors
would serve the interests of both the Yugoslav/Serbian
leadership (intent on retaining the ability to defend itself
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against what it defines as terrorist acts, as well as against
unfounded charges of repression) and the Kosovar
leadership (intent on defending its people against the use of
force for repression and intimidation).
However, it is important to note that even in democratic
Spain, use of the military in a counterinsurgency role nearly
derailed the regional autonomy approach. Cooperation
between the Serbian and Kosovar Albanian leaderships is
not likely to be achieved if the extensive use of force against
the Kosovo population is sustained for much longer, and
especially not if it escalates. But, in the almost certain event
of continued attacks by the UCK after the onset of
negotiations or implementation of an interim agreement,
the joint security commission will be faced with the
challenge of overseeing the legitimate use of force in Kosovo.
Only the accession of the UCK to a cease-fire agreement
can avoid this dilemma. In Northern Ireland, the IRA
participated in peace talks through its political party, Sinn
Fein. The talks produced an agreement in principle on the
necessity of decommissioning (disarmament) by all
paramilitary organizations, to be overseen by an
independent international commission. While disarmament has not yet taken place and is unlikely ever to take
place, the agreement in principle contributed to
establishing an atmosphere supportive of a cease-fire. In
Kosovo, however, no existing political party appears to have
such links to the UCK, and the UCK has not yet established
a political party of its own. Any Kosovar Albanian
leadership committed to negotiating a settlement of the
conflict will therefore have to establish its influence, if not
some degree of control, over the UCK if it is to make any
cease-fire agreement credible. This might be possible if
Kosovar Albanian leaders could deliver both a reduction in
Yugoslav security/military forces in Kosovo, and
international monitoring of the forces that remain. But it is
unlikely to happen if Western involvement appears aimed
too clearly at supporting independence for Kosovo.
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The negotiations over Northern Ireland also produced a
commitment by the British government to “normalization of
security arrangements and practices” and “as early a return
as possible to normal security arrangements in Northern
Ireland, consistent with the level of threat and a published
16
overall strategy.” This formulation offers a possible
solution to the dilemma of reconciling the Serbian/Yugoslav
government’s insistence on the right to combat what it
views as terrorism, and the Kosovar Albanian demand that
violence against the civilian population be halted.
International Monitoring. The restoration and
expansion of international monitoring missions in
Yugoslavia would be required in order to establish such a
joint security commission. But no restoration of
international monitoring missions is likely to take place
until Yugoslavia’s insistence on restoration of its
membership in the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is addressed. Hence, the
initial steps toward negotiations over the future status of
Kosovo will require a complex set of tradeoffs among
Kosovar, Serbian (Yugoslav), and international actors.
Yugoslav leaders will have to accept the return of OSCE
monitoring missions to their country, and a significant
expansion of the authority of OSCE monitors in Kosovo to
enable them to participate effectively in a joint KosovarSerbian-Yugoslav-OSCE security commission. It is unlikely
that nongovernment organizations could supply the
police/military expertise necessary to the success of such a
commission. The OSCE-NATO relationship might provide
the institutional means through which to furnish such
expertise, but without involving NATO as an organization
on the ground inside Kosovo.
Kosovar leaders will have to accept “normalization” with
international monitoring instead of independence as a
short-term outcome, as well as the right of the Yugoslav
government to continue to carry out security operations
consistent with the level of threat, and conducted in a
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manner consistent with OSCE human and civil rights
norms. Agreement on “normalization of security
arrangements and practices” should include an explicit plan
for the phased reduction of the number of Yugoslav security
and military forces in the region over time. Agreement on
“normalization” and international monitoring should be
accompanied by agreement between Serbian/Yugoslav
leaders and Kosovar Albanian leaders to enter into
good-faith negotiation over the longer-term status of the
province. Successful implementation of the normalization/
monitoring agreement and the onset of good-faith
negotiations should be recognized by the international
community as a sign of significant progress, and result in
some improvement in the status of Yugoslavia in the
international community.
“Joint Administration.” Initial negotiations should
therefore be focused at the outset on achieving a
“normalization” of social and political conditions in Kosovo,
paralleling the “normalization” of security arrangements.
“Normalization” should not be understood as a solution in
itself, but as a means of creating conditions under which the
compromises necessary to achieve a solution might become
possible. The “normalization” of social, economic, and
political conditions in the province will require an
immediate interim resolution of the ongoing dispute
between the Albanian Kosovar and Serbian leaderships
over the division of competencies between Serbian and
Kosovar authorities, so as to permit public institutions such
as schools and health facilities to function normally.
The deployment of NATO forces to Albania and
Macedonia, a step that would strengthen the security
dimensions of this package, need not and should not be part
of the interim agreement itself. But deployment should be
undertaken as a means of supporting the operation of the
joint security commission described above, as well as
strengthening NATO intervention capabilities.
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Potential “Transitional” Arrangements.
The interim agreement outlined above consists very
largely of confidence-building measures. They do not
constitute a solution to the conflict over control of Kosovo. In
order to provide a medium-term, or “transitional” solution
to the constitutional issues surrounding Kosovo in a
manner that does not destabilize the region, it will be
necessary to grant substantial independence to the Kosovar
Albanians, but not necessarily to Kosovo. This distinction
between territory and ethnic community lies at the heart of
the Belgian approach. It allows each ethno-linguistic group
to exercise the right of “self-determination” through
“self-administration” of those activities most directly
related to ethno-linguistic cultural identity. Such
self-administration of cultural affairs transcends, rather
than replaces, territorial divisions. Thus, the Albanian and
Serbian “communities” of Kosovo could be granted
extensive powers of self-administration in such areas as
education and occupational training; youth, sport, and
cultural activities; and the media, although the precise
areas of cultural self-administration would have to be left to
negotiations between the parties themselves.
At the same time, self-administering territories or
regions could be established within Kosovo, based primarily
on the ethnic composition of the population. Elected
authorities in these self-administering regions would take
over the formulation and implementation of public policies
with respect to such matters as local planning, public works
(roads, transportation, utilities, etc.) housing, agriculture,
local resources management, and other activities usually
associated with local government. As in Belgium,
ethnically-mixed areas might be designated as dual-culture
regions (Prishtina and Pec, for example, might be treated in
a manner analogous to the treatment of Brussels) and
existing administrative units (opstina) that overlap a
demographic divide might be divided between regions (as
Brabant was divided between the Flemish region, the
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Walloon region, and Brussels). Regional authorities would
be prohibited from actions that violate the rights of citizens,
including the rights of citizens to exercise selfadministration over cultural affairs through their cultural
“communities.” Particularly significant cultural
institutions or monuments of a cultural community would
be subject to the administration of that cultural community
rather than the region in which they are located, although
the cultural community would necessarily have to negotiate
with the regional authority over a whole host of practical
issues. The definition of objects subject to such
administration would be determined through negotiations,
but could be facilitated by reference to the already existing
list of significant historical/cultural monuments established during the communist era, with the participation of
Kosovar Albanian communist officials. The extra-territorial
dimension of cultural self-administration would address
Serbian concerns outlined earlier.
The territory of Kosovo would thus encompass two
self-administering cultural communities (Albanian and
Serbian) and a number of self-administering regions (to be
determined through negotiation, but including regions with
predominantly Albanian population, predominantly
Serbian population, and mixed population). Although there
has been some public discussion in Yugoslavia of a recent
proposal to devolve governmental authority in Serbia to
geographical regions, the self-administering regions
proposed here involve the creation of substantially smaller
units (the regional devolution proposal foresees the division
of Kosovo into two regions: “Metohija” and “Kosovo”).
Because of the presently nondemocratic nature of the
Yugoslav/Serbian state, the national judicial institutions of
the state cannot be relied upon to provide just judgments
when the actions of public authorities in Kosovo are
challenged by citizens claiming the violation of their rights.
An alternative path for citizen challenges to public
authority can be established by incorporating the right of
citizens to appeal to European transnational institutions,
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as is the case even in the agreement on Northern Ireland. To
establish such a right, however, would require the
admission of Yugoslavia into the corresponding
transnational organizations—an additional reason for
including this as part of the initial, confidence-building
measures outlined earlier.
The need to secure justice in Kosovo extends to the
victims of past repression, as well. The return of Kosovar
Albanian personnel who left or were expelled from public
institutions is one element of the interim agreement and
must be achieved expeditiously. As part of the transitional
arrangements, a judicial review process must be
established for cases involving arrests, prosecutions, and
convictions for activities protected by the human and civil
rights norms articulated in Helsinki documents and usually
not considered criminal in democratic states. Because the
Helsinki process documents are not binding treaties and
because these documents contain potentially contradictory
elements to which the Serbian and Kosovar sides may
simultaneously appeal, it may be necessary to obtain
international representation in the judicial review process
to secure the interpretation of these documents in a manner
consistent with democratic norms. As in Belgium, and more
recently Northern Ireland, the organization and
decisionmaking rules of the provincial organs of
government would have to incorporate power-sharing
principles that assured each group the opportunity to
participate in, and influence the shape of, each decision. The
adoption of such principles in Kosovo must avoid the
deadlock of a mutual veto, and can do so if most
governmental functions are devolved to the communities
and regions. Moreover, establishment of both cultural and
regional communities with their own separately-elected
authorities would create opportunities for the emergence of
inter-ethnic cooperation among those responsible for
technical, or functional issues in the regions and, perhaps,
the emergence of shared values and interests among them.
This might contribute to moderating tensions during the
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ongoing negotiations over the longer-term status of the
province.
Provincial-Republic Relations. As a transitional
measure, Kosovo would have to be granted “selfadministering” (i.e., autonomous) status. All autonomous
power of self-administration would be exercised by the
elected leaderships of the self-administering cultural
communities with respect to cultural affairs. The kinds of
activities to be carried out by these communities was
suggested above, but the precise list of legal competencies of
these communities would have to be negotiated by the two
sides. With respect to local or regional affairs, the
autonomous power of self-administration granted to the
province would be exercised by the elected governments of
the self-administering regions, with the precise list of
competencies to be negotiated.
Provincial-Federal Relations. Provincial-federal
relations are at the heart of the conflict over Kosovo. The
“transitional” arrangements for Kosovo must include the
convening of further negotiations on l o n g - t e r m
arrangements for governing the province itself and defining
its relationship to the rest of Yugoslavia. This is necessary
in order to make it possible for Kosovars to participate in
federal institutions without fear that, by doing so, they will
give up the opportunity to change them. But it must also
make it possible for them to continue to boycott such
participation. Some changes in the federal parliament
paralleling those outlined for the republic parliament may
be necessary as part of the transitional arrangements.
These may include defining the size and composition of the
Kosovar parliamentary delegation, as well as its role in
parliamentary decisionmaking.
From a “Transitional” to a Long-Term Solution.
Power-sharing in the context of a province that is still
part of Serbia and continued subordination to the federation
in international and security affairs is unlikely to satisfy the
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demands for independence on the part of Kosovar
Albanians. These relationships must become the focus of
further negotiations, with no limits on their eventual
outcome. Movement toward further autonomy for Kosovo in
these areas is, effectively, movement toward independence.
The so-called “third republic” scenario, in which Kosovo is
separated from Serbia to become the third republic in the
Yugoslav federation, is widely seen as little more than a step
toward what the Serbs see as “secession,” and the
independence demanded by the Kosovar Albanians. Thus , if
the issue of independence is to be dealt with, it must be dealt
with directly, and the outstanding issues of concern to both
sides must become the subjects of explicit negotiation.
It is important to define as early as possible the actual
mechanisms, or process, by which independence might be
secured. But negotiation of a separation process should not
begin until at least the transitional arrangements outlined
above have been implemented, and they have been allowed
to operate over some agreed period of time—thereby
creating an opportunity for inter-ethnic tensions in the
region to subside. The process of separation/independence
should be defined in the course of the further negotiations
over the long-term status of the province. If it appears that a
long-term agreement is within reach, it might be possible to
leave the definition of a separation/independence
agreement until long-term arrangements are operating, but
this is highly unlikely. It is far more likely that
separation/independence and the establishment of
long-term arrangements will have to be developed as
alternative proposals.
Independence, in turn, necessarily raises the question of
partition; that is, of whether all or part of Kosovo should be
subject to the Kosovar Albanians’ claim to independence.
Independence for Kosovo has long been linked to partition
in Serbian discussions, but partition is uniformly rejected
as an option by the Kosovar Albanians, who lay claim to the
whole province. Yet, the Albanian claim to all of Kosovo
serves only to provoke intense resistance to any
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independence for the Kosovar Albanians, at all. If
separation/independence is to be achievable peacefully,
both the question of independence and the question of which
territories are to become independent must be decided
together.
Certain lessons drawn by a Canadian journalist from the
17
Swiss experience of creating a distinct Jura canton may
usefully be applied to addressing these questions in Kosovo.
First, the process for achieving independence must be
established in advance of any decision to separate. The
negotiations suggested above to develop constitutional and
other frameworks for defining the long-term status of
Kosovo must develop as an alternative to provisions for
initiating and carrying out a process for separating
Kosovo—that is, for achieving independence. Second, the
process for achieving separation/independence must be
democratic; that is, it must allow local populations to
express and fulfill their preferences. In the absence of a
significant transitional period and a meaningful alternative
to separation, even a democratic referendum will be little
more than an ethnic census. Third, the expression of
popular preferences must take place at the most local levels
possible. The self-administering regions proposed as part of
the transitional arrangements outlined above—which
should reflect the actual composition of the population in
the province—may also serve as the electoral units in this
process. Fourth, the preferences of local majorities,
articulated in a democratic referendum process, should take
precedence over any provincial majority, as well as over any
historical or other arguments concerning the ownership or
future fate of any territory. Hence, statutory provisions for
achieving separation/independence must incorporate
provisions for allowing local majorities in the
self-administering regions to choose different outcomes,
limited only by considerations of geography.
Referenda and competitive democratic elections have
provided important mechanisms for allowing populations to
carry out processes of separation peacefully, and for
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legitimating negotiated solutions. The referendum just
completed in Northern Ireland has underscored the
legitimacy of the settlement process negotiated by elites.
The demonstrated popularity of the settlement is likely to
compel political parties in Northern Ireland to increase
their support for it in order to secure voter support in the
next round of elections. In Switzerland , the referendum
mechanism was applied at three different territorial levels
of the electorate to ensure that the separation of the Jura
from Berrie canton had the support of a majority of the
population in the region, and that the populations of
localities in the new Jura canton agreed with their
incorporation into it. By allowing for voting in relatively
small communities, the Swiss referendum process
permitted communities on the border of the proposed new
canton to choose whether to be separated from Bern. It even
allowed a noncontiguous district (Laufen) to remain part of
Bern. The Swiss approach thus minimized—but did not
eliminate entirely—the problem of local populations being
separated from Bern (partitioned) against their will. In
order to implement a Swiss-like strategy of
separation/independence/partition by referendum in
Kosovo, it will be necessary to secure prior agreement on the
minimum criteria for allowing a given population to decide
its own fate (i.e., size, location, composition, economy, etc.).
This, as the Swiss experience demonstrates, would amount
to agreement on the broad criteria for partition. In the
absence of such an agreement, the use of a referendum
might result in territorially-isolated “micro-autonomies.”
Dilemmas of Implementation.
The current escalation in Serbian/Yugoslav use of force
against the UCK, and the violent response by the UCK, are
undermining the chances for any kind of negotiated
settlement. If such violence, and the forced population
displacement that is accompanying it, continues much
longer, no Kosovar politician will be able to mobilize popular
support in Kosovo for a negotiated settlement. These
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developments thus are more likely to lead to prolonged
guerrilla warfare in the province than to a negotiated
settlement of the conflict.
The interim agreement outlined above will not provide a
basis for other groups to mount demands against
Serbia/Yugoslavia or other states. But it will prove
exceedingly difficult to prevent Muslims and Hungarians in
Yugoslavia, and Albanians in Macedonia, from seeking the
same “self-administering” status granted to Kosovo and the
Kosovar Serbs and Albanians as part of the “transitional”
arrangements proposed above. In Spain, for example, it
proved impossible to limit the grant of autonomy to the
“historic” regions of Galicia, Catalonia, and the Basque
lands; the movement for autonomy quickly spread to all of
Spain, which now contains 17 autonomous regions, with
differing elements of autonomy. In Serbia, the province of
Vojvodina has the same constitutional status as Kosovo and
may claim the same rights of self-administration. In
Vojvodina, Serbs constitute the majority and Hungarians
the largest minority, but only about 17 percent of the
population. Much of the Hungarian population is, however,
located along the border with Hungary, raising the prospect
that populations in these areas might seek the same right to
separation/independence as the Kosovar Albanians. And
the lack of constitutional status as an autonomous province
cannot be expected to prevent the Muslims of the Sandzak
region from demanding the same treatment as the Kosovar
Albanians, as well.
However, by limiting the interim and transitional
arrangements to the realm of statutory rather than
constitutional change, and by deferring the issue of
separation/independence until after transitional
arrangements are operative, it may be possible to weaken
the attractiveness of these changes for other groups.
Moreover, by adopting the three-tiered, referendum-based
approach to the question of separation/independence
outlined above, Serbs in Vojvodina (more than 57 percent of
the population) and in “narrow” Serbia (almost 90 percent of
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the population) could defeat any such proposal in a
democratic referendum at the first stage; although the
Hungarians of Vojvodina and Muslims of the Sandzak could
demand the same right as Kosovar Serbs to pursue
preferences that contradict those of the regional majority.
The potentially most destabilizing consequences of the
approach outlined above may appear in Macedonia.
Nationalist-separatist sentiments have been growing
among the large and restive ethnic Albanian population in
Western Macedonia in recent years. But the strategy of
self-administration differs only in degree, not in kind, from
the Macedonian strategy of granting local communities
extensive, self-government rights. The main difference—
and what may be the most disconcerting element from the
Macedonian perspective—lies in the extra-territorial
cultural rights and the joint administration of common
cultural institutions such as the university called for by the
approach outlined here. Control over Skopje University has
been a focus of Albanian-Macedonian confrontation, and the
university is, itself, a bastion of Macedonian nationalist
resistance to equality between the cultures. Hence,
implementation of the above changes in Kosovo might lead
to renewed confrontation over Skopje University, as well as
demands for the establishment of self-administering
regions in the Albanian-majority areas of western
Macedonia.
Paradoxically, however, movement toward ethnic
Albanian self-administration in Kosovo may actually
reduce separatist pressure in Macedonia. Much of the
nationalist-separatist leadership among the Albanians of
Macedonia consists of individuals formerly from Kosovo. To
the extent that conditions in Kosovo are normalized and
Kosovar Albanians gain extensive autonomy through
self-administration, some Macedonian Albanians may be
drawn back to Kosovo to participate in the construction of
Albanian institutions there. Much of the pressure to create
an Albanian university in Tetovo, for example, can be traced
to the effective closure of Prishtina University to the
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region’s Albanian population. Restoration of Prishtina
University to normal operations may very well draw
students and faculty away from Macedonia and thus relieve
pressure to create an Albanian university in Tetovo.
The steps outlined above for an interim agreement and
transitional arrangements are not likely to provoke further
unrest among the Bosnian Serbs. The potential powers of
the Bosnian Serbs and the Republika Srpska in the
post-Dayton constitutional system of Bosnia-Herzegovina
already exceed those proposed here for Kosovo. It is
movement toward the long-term, or “final,” status of Kosovo
that may provoke renewed political demands by the
Bosnian Serbs for independence. Steps toward granting
Kosovar Albanians the opportunity to achieve
independence through democratic means will likely set off
similar demands not only among the Bosnian Serbs, but
among the Bosnian Croats, as well as the Albanians of
Macedonia. Thus, while it is essential to the preservation of
regional stability that the “transitional” arrangements for
Kosovo outlined above be achieved as soon as possible, it is
also essential that movement beyond these arrangements—
to the definition of the long-term, or “final” status of the
province—be deferred for as long as possible. The Bosnian
Serbs and Croats already enjoy more autonomy and greater
blocking power over the Bosnian government and Bosnian
Federation, respectively, than is granted to the Kosovar
Albanians by the strategy outlined above—not to mention
military power. Only the successful operation of
transitional institutions in Kosovo offers the possibility of
achieving agreement on a long-term solution that amounts
to de facto autonomy within the framework of the Yugoslav,
or even Serbian, state and the protection of other state
borders—in Macedonia and Bosnia—against secessionist
pressures. External support for both the integrity of
existing borders and the operation of such transitional
arrangements is essential to that success.
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CHAPTER 8
THE CULTURAL SCOPE
OF BALKAN SECURITY
Stefano Bianchini

SECURITY: A CHANGING NOTION
According to a common and largely shared opinion,
security is a notion strictly connected to the defense of a
state. As a result of concerns of policymakers, experts on
international relations and strategic studies have placed a
special emphasis on the military and diplomacy, as the two
scopes able to guarantee security, exclusively or primarily.
Short-term and long-term measures are taken into
consideration in this framework, albeit a certain attention
has been paid in more recent times even to the economic
1
sphere.
In many respects, this “traditional” approach to security
has been founded in truth in the past decades. Different
factors contributed to this, for example, the long-term
attitudes to power policies and the relevance of the pattern
based on the balance of powers; the peculiar relations
between the camps during the Cold War (“containment” and
“roll back” in the American policy, the “besieged fortress” in
the Soviet policy, détente and nuclear balance in both
approaches); the worldwide increasing interdependence in
politics and economics. All these features mirrored a
situation where the military and diplomacy played an
evident crucial role in international relations.
Nevertheless, and however provocative it may sound,
these approaches are inadequate to understand and face the
challenges of the post-Communist international balance
and particularly the Balkan events. In fact, a radical change
occurred in Europe when communism collapsed. New
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trends, which were perceived with difficulty in the previous
decades, emerged powerfully. In this context, security is
depending increasingly on a wide variety of factors. Besides
the military, diplomacy, and economic interdependence,
other features crucially contribute to define the sense of
security of a political community. A special evidence has
been showed by demography (particularly the rate of birth
and the immigration/emigration flows); by the domestic
degree of economic and social development of different
strata and regions; by the quality and the distribution of
information and media systems; by the attractive power of
symbols and myths in a group; by the complex and
contradictory relations between history and memory. All
these elements have a great impact on the perception of
security of people and political communities.
Additionally, the 20th century has been a century
characterized by a predominant role of ideologies. An
unpredictable acceleration of the stages of social
developments—through the industrial revolution, the role
of machines, the improvement of medicine, the mass
society, and, finally, the universal suffrage—has imposed
an epochal transformation to human societies. On the one
hand, a new system of production (with industries, services
and, later, new communication systems) emerged, while
world space was shrinking drastically, time was pressing
increasingly, and the health of populations improved
2
significantly. On the other, the sources of legitimization of
powers and the system of selection of the elites, which
remained similar for thousands of years, radically changed
when the whole adult population of a political community,
regardless of sex, education, or income, had the right to vote
and was included into the institutions. In the end, the
system of building human societies has changed quickly and
radically in few decades.
In this new system, political elites sought to preserve
their predominant role by obtaining the support of the
population by any means, legal or illegal, ethic or violent,
according to the situations and the countries. Consistently,
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different values, political beliefs, foci of identification and
loyalties, political knowledge and expectations, and
cultural backgrounds of the populations became
increasingly relevant in a political community and in the
relations between rulers and ruled.
Therefore, political cultures increasingly influenced
policymakers and different strata of a society since the
beginning of the 20th century. Hence, it is evident that even
the perception of security has to be considered in this
framework. In fact, the impact of these transformations on
security issues is relevant indeed.
The emphasis on these aspects, however, does not mean
that the impact of the military and the diplomatic factors
are to be underestimated or marginalized, both in general
terms and in the specific context of the current Balkan
crisis, either at local or international levels. Simply stated,
referring to a deep changing context may better clarify that
any approach to security issues restricted to the military
and diplomatic factors only, is, today, inadequate to
understand the evolution of the events and to influence
their developments, particularly in the Balkan peninsula.
In fact, and despite the successful intervention of NATO in
Bosnia in 1995, stabilization of the area is unlikely to be
reached in a short while, and even in medium terms, mainly
because of the neglected (by international subjects), but
extremely relevant, cultural scope of the Balkan crisis.
In other words, the origin of the Balkan crisis in the
1990s cannot be traced back merely in an attempt to
establish a political and military predominant role of a state
(or a group of states, or a specific leadership, or a specific
political elite) over a certain territory or region. We are not
facing a crisis where the aggressor can be merely identified
with a state whose leadership wishes to recast the regional
balance of powers by establishing its predominant role
3
through a medium-sized power policy.
Truly, the reasons why this interpretation of the events
has been often supported by some Balkan leaderships is
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understandable, because they wished to present themselves
as the “victims of the aggressor” by appealing to a
traditional scheme of international conflicts. However, they
offered an “easy political answer” to a problem which is, in
fact, more complex.
The “power policy” interpretation, in fact, is powerless to
explain why, during the Yugoslav secession war, all the
parties involved violated cease-fires and agreements
systematically, in spite of their being internationally
mediated or even imposed. Additionally, this interpretation
fails to clarify why all the parties involved carried out
domestic policies aimed at sanctioning individuals and
groups who wished to reestablish dialogue between the
populations of the parties. Particularly in the SerboCroatian cultural space, all parties promoted ethnic
cleansing, violence against civilians including rapes,
regardless of the, albeit evident, different responsibilities of
leaderships in provoking the war.
The more the separation from those events is
chronologically growing, the more this picture is becoming
evident, in spite of the fact that sources of information are
still fragmented. As a result, not only is the “power policy”
interpretation showing a lack of effectiveness, but also the
categories of aggressors and victims strictly applied to State
attitudes are becoming powerless to explain what happened
and what should be needed, in order to find a lasting
solution to the crisis.
Crucially, aggressors and victims did exist and are still
existing (for example, in the Kosovo case). This is not
disputed. What is disputable is to what extent and to which
subjects these categories have been ascribed. In fact, the
effectiveness in applying these categories with the goal of
understanding the events depends on the peculiarities of
the conflict. In the Balkan case, the conflict was provoked
only to a certain extent by wishes or aspirations of power
policy.
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On the contrary, instability in the Balkans has been
mainly provoked by a political culture, namely nationalism ,
which has been used by local political elites in order to
redefine the territory of the state and its membership.
Truly, nationalism as a political culture played a crucial
and progressive role for a certain period, particularly during
the 19th century when emancipation and modernization
were the main goals to be achieved with the overcoming of
the backward institutions of the great empires. In this
context, Giuseppe Mazzini has played an indisputable
4
influential role.
Since then, however, the world changed deeply, and
political ideologies changed as well. At the end of the 20th
century, any attempt at identifying the political thought
and action of Giuseppe Mazzini with those of Radovan
Karadzic sounds extremely difficult. Still, each relies on
nationalism and claimed (or claims) to be a nationalist.
Nevertheless, and albeit any comparison between these two
personalities is an hazard, the enormous distance between
Mazzini and Karadzic makes evident the transformation of
nationalism: in fact, this political culture has been
gradually transformed in a peculiar state/party ideology.
As a result of this transformation, a realistic approach is
currently unavoidable by both scholars and policymakers. It
means that both have nothing to do but recognize the nature
of this change. This change implies that, especially in the
Balkans, nationalist ideology and nationalist political
culture have gradually become effective tools used by
political elites for recasting the territory of a state and its
membership. In this context, members of a newly
established political community have difficulty being
considered as “citizens,” but are something else that has
still to be defined. Additionally, it has to be emphasized that
nationalist transformation of the society and state is
considered by nationalists as a crucial prerequisite for (a)
the achievement of political modernization, (b) economic
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development and (c)—extremely important—the security of
the state and its members.
All these factors roughly lead to the conclusion that the
idea of state is the main focus of post-Communist transition
in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, and to a certain extent
5
even in East-Central Europe. In fact, after the Communist
collapse, the meaning, the scope, and the perspectives of any
change have implied the recasting of the state as the
powerful structure able to guarantee the conditions for
development and wealth. This belief was not only a legacy of
Communism (in spite of the fact that the state did play a
central role under Communist rule). It was also a legacy of
the pre-Communist period, when backward countries in
Eastern Europe faced the challenge of development in very
difficult conditions, because they lacked capital, and
technologies were increasingly expensive. Without a rooted
and reliable financial system, these societies were doomed
to rely on the fiscal system of the state, in order to collect
resources for development. This crucial role played by the
state was studied effectively by Alexander Gerschenkron
and other prominent scholars of economic history in the
6
1950s and 1960s. We do not need to insist further on these
aspects. Additionally, we can emphasize that such a
process, encouraging the state to become the lever for
development, has strengthened its magnet role for
bureaucracy and policymakers who tried to use it as a tool
for establishing their predominant control over society.
After the collapse of three political systems in 80 years
(namely, the empire, the interwar authoritarian state, and
7
the Communist state) —when, simultaneously, a mass
society was created—the implications of these factors have
proved to be extremely broad: changes of the state
structure, in fact, have implied changes of territories, of
people, of history, of language, of monuments and symbols,
because the legitimization of the newly created realities
needed both a confirmation from an asserted continuity of
the past and the charging of previous failures to “outer
subjects.” Consistently, the establishment of new forms of
198

control over the society and a management of power, both in
terms of development and corruption, according to the
quality and the choices of the ruling class, appeared a great
8
opportunity to many groups and individuals.
Since the goals of corruption, self-social promotion, and
self-enrichment were not openly claimed for evident
reasons, new political parties turned their attention to
state-building and development issues, by emphasizing
that the economic crisis of the 1980s had been provoked by
neighboring peoples or countries. By blaming “otherness”
and claiming development simultaneously, nationalists in
particular were able to collect significant support from an
exhausted population and, at the same time, to emphasize
the achievement of the development of the community as
9
the main goal of their political action.
In this sense, a radical change occurred to the idea of
State, because this was considered the prerequisite for
strengthening political modernization, economic development and (ethnic) security. As a result, nationalism—
better, its ethno-nationalist interpretation— has been
promoted by the new ruling class as a state or state/party
ideology with the aim of encouraging and spreading
simultaneously into the population a peculiar set of political
beliefs, expectations, foci of identifications, symbols, and
perceptions of self. Thanks to this, the cultural
identification of rulers and ruled has become the main
source of both the legitimization of power and security of the
newly established political communities.
Crucially, nationalist political culture has proved to
have a great impact in the society in terms of (a) legitimacy
of the rulers; (b) loyalties of the ruled; and, (c) state-building
processes. In this context, which has been even
strengthened by uncertainties of post-Communist
transition, the nationalist approach is aggressive in order to
recast territory and membership of the states. While
competing with each other for territories, they follow
similar mechanisms in domestic policies because they share
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a common idea of security and stability through cultural
homogenization. This explains why ethnic homogeneity has
been pursued by all nationalisms in former Yugoslavia. As
cynical it may appear, differences in their aggressive policy
and praxis depended primarily on the quantity of weapons
nationalist movements had when they sought to carry out
their project.
Milosevic first made nationalism a tool for political
actions and popular support in Serbia; the dismemberment
of Yugoslavia and the war were provoked by him. The
brutality against the population, the systematic massacres,
and the humanitarian disasters which occurred from
Slovenia to Kosovo since the beginning of the 1990s are
10
definitely to be considered the outcome of his policy.
However, he was not the sole culprit of those events or of
those that followed. Besides the political responsibility of
the Slovenian leadership, which is unquestionable,
although often neglected, a largely-shared nationalist
political culture made possible the war of HVO against
Bosnia, the ethnic cleansing of Krajina by the Croatian
Army, the Kazanj massacre against the Serbs of Sarajevo,
and the killing of no-nationalist Albanians in Kosovo by the
UCK.
In all the above-mentioned cases, nationalism has been
the political culture which created turmoil and insecurity.
By way of confirmation, it was not by chance that the way of
conducting the war in the Yugoslav region in the 1990s
differed from previous European experiences radically.
Instead of battles between opposing armies, the Yugoslav
secession war was characterized by an aggression primarily
against civilians. Traditional battles played a secondary
role, because the question of borders, however important,
was less relevant than the goal of achieving (a) ethnic
homogeneity, (b) forced assimilation and/or at least (c) the
11
subjugation of the “other” within a certain State.
In contrast, brutality of attitudes characterized military
operations of both regular and irregular corps when they
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faced ethnically mixed areas (as, for example, in the case of
Vukovar), anti-nationalist individuals, and those who
declared themselves as “Yugoslavs.” The fate of the latter is
particularly interesting. With the Yugoslav collapse,
Yugoslavs lost their country and their foci of cultural
identification, because Milosevic embezzled the name of
“Yugoslavia” in order to establish his control over the
property of the federation. Additionally, no one significant
political organization or country in the international arena
claimed the protection of the right of self-determination for
12
“Yugoslavs.”
As a result, the categories of “aggressors” and “victims”
are to be recast, not with reference to the ethnic
membership, but by taking into consideration the political
culture to which they belong. In other words, “aggressors”
are not whole people, but nationalists of all peoples;
“victims” are not people in a generic way, but those who
share an intercultural or multiple identity.
In sum, because the traditional intercultural web of the
Balkans is put under discussion by nationalists, the current
Balkan dilemmas on state building and security—which
emerged since the Dayton Agreement was signed in
1995—confirm how the nationalist idea of state and the
persistence of destabilization are strictly connected.
THE BALKANS UNDER NATIONALISM:
A COMPARATIVE PICTURE OF THE SITUATION
Let us observe what is going on in the area recently. A
short comparison among the situations of Kosovo and rump
Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Slovenia,
and Moldavia offers a good picture of the role played by
political cultures in a security/insecurity context.
Kosovo and FRY.
In Kosovo, both the parties in conflict do not seem
interested in reaching a compromise. A perspective of
201

autonomy in the Serb context is rejected by Albanian
leaders with good reason; they fear that autonomy can be
threatened by Serb leadership at any time to come, as it has
occurred in the past. In contrast, Serb leaders are reluctant
to accept autonomy, and they have good reason, too. The
international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1992
has proven that administrative borders may be recognized
as international borders in the event of a claim for
independence led by the majority of a local population.
Independence of Kosovo is firmly rejected by Serbian
leaders, who claim their right to protect state borders in a
context which has been de facto legitimized by the
International Community through the mechanism of
recognition adopted for successor states of the Soviet Union,
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. In contrast, any change of
this principle may lead to a threat of stability in Bosnia,
Macedonia, and Cyprus. Indeed, the perspective of a
partition of Kosovo is questioned, too, and can lead to a war.
In fact, both Serb and Albanian parties claim their
sovereignty over territories with rich natural resources. In
the end, the large autonomy of Kosovo in a federation of
three equal subjects is rejected by Montenegro. The solution
has been seen as an attempt at diminishing the current
overestimated role of Montenegro in the federation,
particularly in a period when Milosevic aims at doing it. In
the end, Milosevic is aware that the participation of the
Albanians in Serb polls and/or the full membership of
Kosovo in the federation may affect seriously his
predominant position in the country and even provoke his
political defeat. In other words, the three subjects involved
in the issue (Albanian, Serb, and Montenegrin political
elites) are unwilling to find a political solution at least in
medium-to-short terms. They lack a mutual confidence as
an outcome of 10 years of tensions and Serb repression of
Albanians claims. This situation has led both the parties in
Kosovo to violate the agreements imposed by the diplomacy
of the contact group, and the agreement reached by
Milosevic and Holbrook in October 1998 in order to stop (or
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postpone) NATO intervention has been rejected repeatedly
by Fehmi Agani (and not only by UCK, FARK, and Adem
Demaqi).
Meanwhile, the autonomy of the University of Belgrade
has been suppressed without any international reaction,
and state control over the media systematically imposed. As
a result, an international military operation in Kosovo is
doomed to radicalize the situation and particularly make
impossible the persistence of Kosovo within Serbia. This
means that changes in state borders will be forced by an
international intervention. The unavoidable outcome of this
is that the ethnic state is a welcome solution. In such a case,
the risks of a destabilization of Bosnia, Macedonia, and
Albania are likely to be strengthened. In conclusion, the
Kosovo question reveals an evident geopolitical scope,
which is strictly connected with a broad problem of statebuilding.
Bosnia.
At the end of 1998, the picture in the Serb camp is not so
dark as it may appear. In fact, recent elections have proved
that a political differentiation is increasing, in spite of the
fact that the radical Nikola Poplasen has been elected
president of the entity. In contrast, both the assembly of the
entity and the Serb representative in the Bosnian
presidency are characterized by more moderate approaches
than those of the president of the entity. Additionally,
members of the Serbian elite are increasingly attracted by
the idea of being the first Serbs to be included in a process of
European integration in the event that the support of
European Union (EU) to Bosnian integration is going
further. This perspective is really serious and may open new
differentiation processes between Serbia and the Republika
Srpska.
The new European common currency which has been
instituted in 1999 is another factor that can have a great
impact as a magnet on Bosnia, and particularly on the
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attitudes of local policymakers. The most popular currency
for the everyday needs of the population, the German mark,
presumably will be replaced by the Euro soon. As a result,
Bosnia possibly may be included in the EU, although any
specific process of enlargement to this country has not been
started yet.
It will be extremely interesting to see how the future of
Bosnia will evolve in the years to come in connection with
the European integration processes. On the contrary, it
seems that threats to the Bosnian integrity can emerge in
the Croatian camp. Although in Herzegovina political
differentiation is increasing, and the hard-liner Ante
Jelavic has been elected to the Bosnian Presidency with
only 52 percent of the votes (in the past elections, the Croat
candidate, Kresimir Zubak, got 88.7 percent of the poll), it is
a fact that the most extremist member of this government is
Jelavic. Tensions between Croats and Muslims are
emerging on many occasions, while domestic events with
neighboring Croatia are not encouraging. In this context, a
negative repercussion is likely to be the outcome because of
the efforts made by U.S. representatives who forced the
reluctant Muslim leaders to sign a special treaty with
Croatia in November 1998, in order to accomplish Dayton
Agreements. This was, in fact, the most ambiguous part of
the treaty because its nationalist interpretation (from both
the Croatian and Serb sides) is in evident contrast with the
goal of preserving the integrity of Bosnia, also included in
the Dayton Agreements. As a result, a similar treaty
between the Republika Srpska and the rump Yugoslavia
presumably will be signed, despite opposition efforts by
Biljana Plavsic and Milorad Dodik in 1997.
In such a way, the process of differentiation in the Serb
camp can have a negative impact on attempts at relaxing
tensions in the area. Hard-liners and the Radical party will
be encouraged to achieve their goal of erasing borders
between Serbia and Republika Srpska. Additionally, this
perspective will be strengthened whether Serb borders in
rump Yugoslavia are going to be changed in Kosovo as a
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result of a war. In the end, the future of the Bosnian State is
still truly disputed. Integration and disintegration are still
to be considered open options, for domestic and
international reasons.
Croatia.
In Croatia, Tudjman’s succession has commenced. A
great economic crisis is threatening the country because of
the high value of the currency and the lack of production.
The Dubrovnik bank scandal and the death of Gojko Susak
have strengthened a settlement of the accounts within
HDZ. Despite the information launched by the press, it is
not true that only soft-liners resigned recently. Even a
hard-liner but dogmatic figure such as Andrija Hebrang
was forced to resign when he started to make order in the
ministry of defense where the Herzegovinian lobby, and
particularly the young and ambitious Ivic Pasalic, were
absolute bosses. A quite intricate connection is emerging
between the economic/financial interests of a powerful
group within the state and the role played by this group in
defining the Croatian interest in Bosnia. In other words, the
effort of HDZ hard-liners to establish their own strong
control over the ruling Croatian party is likely to affect
Bosnian stabilization by encouraging Herzegovinian
extremists to carry out the goal of Croatian unification. By
contrast, HDZ is clearly loosing its appeal in the ballots.
Local elections in Osijek and Dubrovnik in Fall 1998
confirmed a coalition of opposition parties was able to get a
solid majority, successfully defeating HDZ. This
perspective, however, can encourage both a split in HDZ
between soft- and hard-liners and the attempt of
hard-liners to get a stronger control over the levers of power
before their central power system in Zagreb is seriously
threatened. In conclusion, the political future in Croatia is
dominated by an uncertainty which may have effects, not
only within Croatian borders but also in neighboring
countries—particularly Bosnia. Also, a repercussion in
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relations with Slovenia and Serbia, with which a series of
contested issues need to be resolved, is not excluded.
Macedonia.
In Macedonia, the key issue for the future of the country
is the complexity of the ethnic question. How the relations
between Slav Macedonians and Albanians may evolve plays
a predominant role. The elections of November 1998
provoked a great change in the government of the country
when a new contradictory coalition of nationalist and civic
parties defeated the former communists, and a new balance
emerged in the country. The reasons for this change are
based mainly on social dissatisfaction rather than on ethnic
tensions, and this is why a coalition between Macedonian
nationalists of VMRO and the newly created civic party led
by Vasil Tupurkovski (the Democratic Alliance) became
possible. Furthermore, Tupurkovski is the strongest
candidate for the 1999 presidential elections when current
President Kiro Gligorov will be unable to run again. In other
words, Macedonia is facing a drastic turnover. However,
stability is still unpredictable. Macedonian-Albanian ethnic
polarization is far from overcome, although the most
extremist of the Albanian parties, the PDPA led by Arben
Xhaferri, has been included in the government with VMRO
and DA. Paradoxically enough, the moderate Albanians of
PDP (which supported former Communists in the past
government) were not. In this framework, it is unclear
whether the coalition can survive when old unsolved issues
(such as that of the Tetovë University) are coming back
again to the agenda. Truly, both VMRO and DA pointed out
that economic recovery is their first and main commitment;
however, they do not share similar ethno-political
strategies. VMRO is still a Macedonian nationalist party,
while DA is a civic movement which includes in its own
ranks members of Serb, Roma, and Albanian minorities. It
can be expected that a contrast between these two parties
will emerge after the presidential elections as Tupurkovski
needs the VMRO support to win. However, he may not need
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the support of VMRO after the elections if ethno-national
relations worsen. In this context, the role of the Albanian
parties will be crucial, taking into consideration the impact
of the Kosovo events.
Strong links were established between Albanians of
Kosovo and of Macedonia during Titoist Yugoslavia, as well
as after the dismemberment of the country when Serb
repression policies increased dramatically in Kosovo. As a
result, migration flows from Kosovo to Macedonia
intensified, threatening ethnic balance in Macedonia and
making more interdependent the events in Serbia and
Macedonia. In this context, appeals to moderation can lose
any effectiveness, and Albanian politicians will be
encouraged to claim independence or the establishment of
an autonomous region, at least while Macedonian parties
oppose both these goals. In the end, many unpredictable
factors are still affecting regional stability. In other words,
as in Albania, the further existence of the Macedonian State
remains under discussion, and the possibility of a collapse
has not been avoided yet.
Albania.
Turmoil in Albania is far from being contained. The
collapse of the state is still a possible outcome as a
consequence of several factors.
After the election of a new, young premier, Pandeli
Majko, untainted by a communist past and committed to
overcoming Berisha-Nano animosity, the country approved
in a referendum on November 22, 1998, a new Constitution,
still strongly contested by the Democratic Party.
Previously, this party boycotted the Parliament and the
commission where the draft of the Constitution was
prepared in order to reject any compromise. The attempt
was that of convincing the population that the current
government has no legitimization. A further step of this
policy was that of claiming new elections with the hope of
revenge over the socialists. In fact, the real victim of such an
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approach was the reliability of the political institutions of
the country, which was affected by the double collapse of the
state in 1991 and in 1997.
To make the picture even darker, these developments
are occurring simultaneously with the worsening of the
Kosovo issue. Politically, the Kosovo leadership established
good relations with Berisha and the Democratic Party since
the early 1990s, while serious contrasts emerged with Fatos
Nano when he met Milosevic in Crete in Fall 1997.
Meanwhile, the Albanian governments of Nano and Majko
proved unable to reestablish their control over the northern
borders of the country, where Kosovo’s war was becoming an
economic lifeline. In this framework, the relations between
the two military forces operating in the Yugoslav region
(FARK and UCK) deteriorated and endangered the
territorial integrity of Albania, because of the flows of
weapons, armed irregulars and refugees across the borders.
Since 1997, the situation has become increasingly
complicated. In fact, the attempts of Berisha at taking
advantage of the crisis in Kosovo are likely to increase
negative reactions of the Albanian population in the south
of the country. Truly, Berisha does not seem to have a great
support in the country, but his relations with the Kosovar
political elite are still close, and it cannot be excluded that
Berisha may have a new opportunity to take over the power
in the event that Kosovo is included in Albania. However, it
remains to be seen whether this perspective will be accepted
in the south or lead to a new collapse of the Albanian State
by encouraging a North-South or Gheg/Tosk confrontation.
In other words, because of the weakness of Albanian
political institutions in a unstable regional context, the risk
of a new collapse of the state is still possible and may be
provoked by an interaction of factors, most of them
unpredictable.

208

Slovenia and Moldavia.
Albeit geopolitically marginal in respect to the Balkans,
both Slovenia and Moldavia are to be considered countries
open to possible threats in terms of regional security.
Two-thirds of both land and maritime borders between
Slovenia and Croatia are contested. Despite repeated
attempts at mediating, bilateral relations are sometimes
exacerbated. In these cases, tensions increase suddenly
with unpredictable outlets which can lead Ljubljana to a
nationalist confrontation with Zagreb—under the pressure
of extremist movements which are at the moment contained
into the opposition ranks, but which have sometimes proved
to have a significant impact on the population.
As for Moldavia, the country is located in a delicate
geopolitical crossroad between two big destabilized areas,
the Balkans and the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). By way of confirmation, a document recently signed
in Chisinau by the leaders of Moldavia, Ukraine, and
Romania urged Russia to withdraw its troops from
Transdniester region, a reminder of a careless international
public opinion that another recent ethno-national conflict
was not over. In fact, the Russian Duma has not yet ratified
the treaty that ended the 5-month war in 1992.
Furthermore, domestic tensions in Russia, combined with
the uncertainties of the economic and political
(presidential) situation, may intertwine with the
international developments in Kosovo in the event of a
NATO intervention without a supporting vote of the
Security Council. As a result of worsening East-West
relations, Duma is likely to postpone indefinitely the
withdrawal of the troops still arrayed in the CIS by affecting
simultaneous relations in the area. In this context, because
Russian policymakers are still uncertain whether to build a
civic state, an ethno-nation state or—again, when
possible—an empire, it is evident that local tensions and a
possible subsequent international intervention are doomed
to have a great impact on the process of state-building in a
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broad area, where, additionally, the form of state-building
may eventually have destabilizing effects.
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND PROPOSALS
This rapid overview makes evident the following
conclusions:

•

The different crises in the Balkans are strictly
intertwined. They require an overall solution, which
cannot be found when a situation is exacerbated and
the International Community appeals to military or
diplomatic tools only, in order to restore a truce.

•

The main factor which connects these crises is
nationalism, namely its idea of state which is
embodied in the attempt at establishing an
ethno-national legitimization of powers. However
pursued, such a legitimization affects security in
neighboring countries, because it is based on both
mistrust towards the “others” and disputed
historical/territorial/cultural claims. With these
premises, the future of a political community is
increasingly built against (and not along with)
neighbors. As a result, defense reasons encourage a
country which perceives itself as threatened to react
in similar ways. In the end, the criteria of geopolitical
arrangement that will be carried out by local and
international subjects in a specific area are going to
influence radically the future of the whole Balkans, in
terms of rules and patterns to be applied in the name
of the “equality” of nations.

•

The effectiveness of the military and political tools of
the International Community in order to create (even
force) conditions for stability at the beginning, and
later for peace, run serious risks of being influenced
by the political culture of local political elites. In this
context, a great disaster in terms of regional and
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European security may be achieved if the appealing to
military and diplomatic intervention is interpreted by
the local parties as a support offered by the
International Community to a nationalist approach
against the other.
This can be particularly the case of Kosovo, which differs
radically from those of Bosnia and Albania in the 1990s.
Previously, in fact, NATO intervention in Bosnia was
authorized by the United Nations (U.N.) and became
possible because the Bosnian war had been considered an
international war provoked by domestic uprising, with
direct support coming from Serbia and Croatia. (Truly, this
interpretation of the facts has been denied by a contested
decision of the Hague tribunal which pointed out the civil
character of the Bosnian war and dropped a long series of
charges in the Tadic case. In contrast, this approach has
been later overthrown by a different court, which
emphasized the international scope of the war and the
Croatian military involvement in its decision on the Celebici
13
case.)
As for Albania in 1997, the “ALBA” operation was
14
formally requested by the local government.
In this
context, the Kosovo situation is peculiar indeed. On the one
hand, a military intervention of NATO is likely to be
opposed by the veto of Russia and China in the Security
Council; on the other, it has no chance to be requested by the
Serb government. Albeit for different reasons, these
attitudes are originated by a common principle—the
absolute sovereignty of the state. In the former case,
because Russia and China are concerned for possible
domestic consequences in delicate issues such those of
Chechnya and Tibet; in the latter, because Serbia wants to
protect its borders.
As a result, without an undisputed U.N. legitimization,
the military intervention of NATO is going to be “simply”
considered an action of a military alliance, rather then an
action of the International Community (however this
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concept may have a sense). Whether security has to be
guaranteed by worldwide recognized supranational
institutions (as the U.N.) or by the most powerful military
subject is a topic for a specific study on security and
international relations, which exceeds the approach of the
present analyses. Rather, let the attention of the reader
turn to the impact that both these forms of interventions
(with or without U.N. support) are going to have on the
perception of the state in the specific context of Kosovo and
the Balkans. In fact, it is evident that the political culture,
which suggests and supports such a military action, is based
on the conception that the absolute sovereignty of the State
15
has to be contained.
This is neither an accident nor an unpredictable outcome
of the post-Cold War politics. Truly, since the end of World
War II, an increasing series of events has confirmed that
state sovereignty as a principle is coming to an end. After
the Communist collapse and the end of the Cold-War
confrontation, this trend has been even more strengthened.
Both globalization and regionalization are threatening the
predominant role of the nation-state, the Westphalian
system of international relations and the principle of
absolute sovereignty of the state. This change is a great
challenge for the existing political communities and one of
16
the main repercussions of the post-Communist transition.
Consistent with this general framework, the threat of a
military intervention in Kosovo has been justified in 1998 in
order (1) to stop Serb repression, (2) to stop a humanitarian
disaster, and (3) to reestablish the autonomy of the region.
In other words, the goals to be achieved by a possible
military intervention in Kosovo are doomed to affect the
sovereignty of Serbia/Rump Yugoslavia in a very peculiar
way, because its main reason—as it was stated in the NATO
camp—is the desire to change the domestic policy of this
state, not its borders.
By contrast, the current predominant political culture of
the local political and military elites suggests exactly the
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opposite interpretation. Namely, both Albanian and Serb
leaderships consider that a NATO intervention has to be
encouraged, or blamed, because it aims at diminishing the
territorial sovereignty of Ramp Yugoslavia, while the
impact of the action on domestic policy is largely neglected.
This interpretation is largely shared by the current
leaderships of the other Balkan States.
In a sense, an approach emphasizing territory rather
than domestic policy is understandable in a nationalist
context. Actually, the intimate nature of nationalism does
not allow accepting the idea of a both “inner and outer
contained sovereignty of the state.” However, this general
approach is softened, as for the outer sovereignty, because,
at least temporarily, a state may suffer a loss of territory
because of a war. Additionally, a state may submit to strong
international pressures as an outcome of an adverse
balance in the system of international alliances, which can
be reversed when a new opportunity emerges. In contrast,
any threat to inner sovereignty is not even taken into
consideration, for the simple reason that it is unthinkable.
As a result, a great cultural misunderstanding threatens
the effectiveness of any action promoted by international
bodies in the Balkans. In other words, the goals of military
interventions and other engagements of international
bodies in the Balkans need an evident anti-nationalist
cultural support if they want to be effective.
In fact, nationalism as a state ideology is a threat to
international security because it aims at strengthening the
sovereignty of the state against neighbors, while the
International Community—through the role of the U.N.,
the creation of an International Penal Tribunal, the
protection of human rights, and the process of European
integration, just to mention a few—is increasingly
supporting interdependence, multilateral cooperation, a
new supranational legal system, and, finally, a containment
of sovereignty extended to domestic policies. The events at
the end of 1998, with the arrests of General Pinochet in
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Great Britain and of Kurd leader Ocalan in Italy, are a
confirmation of a general trend of interdependence and
containment of the state, which is not any more the sole
institution able to persecute a crime committed within its
17
borders.
It is exactly this interdependence that is clashing with
nationalism as an ethno-cultural ideology and a form of
protection of the absolute sovereignty of the state. Because
nationalism is a mutant with multifaceted statements, it
may express forms emphasizing either sovereignty or a mix
of ethnicity and sovereignty. This quite complex picture
makes unclear—for the concrete political world—the
boundaries between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism, albeit
they are well-defined in the more sophisticated academic
18
world.
Additionally, the persistence of a “national”
legitimization of state powers is contributing to stress the
ambiguous nature of the nation-state, weakening the
effectiveness of international actions. In fact, it is evident
that any, open or surreptitious, support to a nationalist goal
against another nationalist one is doomed to affect the
international effort to find a peaceful solution to tension.
Furthermore, in this case, a sense of dissatisfaction and
revenge may arise among local elites, encouraging the
search for an outer, more powerful “protection,” which can
be used, once it has been found, for further destabilization.
These mechanisms are well-known. However, it is the
persistence of a “national” legitimization of state powers
that makes evident why the European Community has been
powerless in facing the Yugoslav crisis in 1991. Moreover,
the difficulties which arose during the negotiations for the
Maastricht Treaty, the political and cultural limitations
which suffered from the final version of the treaty, and the
attempts at containing the European integration process
within the economic sphere for a longer period of time, have
a common origin and can be explained mainly in a context of
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resistance to interdependence coming from an obsolescent
19
leadership seized with the idea of nation.
In the end, this framework permits an understanding of
why the Balkan challenges on the threshold of the new
millennium are embodied in a modern (or maybe
post-modern) process of change in international relations,
rather than originated by medieval attitudes and
traditions. The focus is on the state-building process
through a new articulation of the roles of state and nation.
New patterns are emerging from the current Balkan
tensions and showing a potentially attractive ability, which
is a serious threat to peace.
As a result, stabilization and security in the Balkans can
be achieved only in a new, anti-nationalist framework,
which has yet to be built. This means that the national
legitimization of state powers has to be overcome and new
patterns offered in terms of:

•

secularization;

•

citizenship;

•

softening borders;

•

free flows of labor and capital;

•

democratic management of differences; and,

•

recognition of existing multiple identities within
individuals and within communities, with an evident
impact on state symbols, use of languages,
administration (devolution), education systems in
terms of flexibility, and permeability of cultures.

The main assumption is as follows. The more
neighboring societies are articulated and mutual
knowledge is rooted, the more security is strengthened. By
contrast, the more neighboring societies are closed,
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homogeneous and without communication, the more their
insecurity is going to affect peace in the area.
In this context, the actions of the international
community may be effective and prepare a lasting security
framework for Europe if they are supported by a clear
strategy of encouraging permeability and communication
among neighboring countries in the Balkans. Definitely, the
implementation of such a strategy may provoke the
opposition of local political elites, as in the case of current
nationalist leaderships in the Balkans. However, because
the sovereignty of states is under discussion even in
domestic policies, this opposition cannot stop an
international engagement in order to encourage alternative
education systems, strengthening democratization
(through the free flow of ideas and their free
representation), and freedom of the media.
Since the Helsinki agreement was signed in 1975, the
policy of human rights played a crucial role in preparing the
20
collapse of communism. A similar approach has to be
developed towards nationalism. In this sense,
21
strengthening alternative political cultures —which are
emerging all over the Balkans, while needing strong
supports in order to break isolation in the country—is to be
considered a prerequisite for stabilization.
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the threat of an
international intervention in Kosovo has confirmed that the
principle of the sovereignty of a state can be affected when
an ethnic group is persecuted and collective rights are
denied. However, in the Balkan context, the effectiveness of
an international engagement depends mainly on its ability
to encourage regional permeability and flexibility. This can
be done through a series of tools able to guarantee, for
example:

•

the autonomy of the universities in Serbia, Bosnia,
and Croatia;

•

the freedom of media;
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•

the education in history and political science (which
means civic education) of the population; and,

•

the education of specific categories of workers, such as
teachers, policemen, judges, and all those who play a
relevant role in spreading a sense of belonging to
democratic institutions as the institutions of the
whole society.

It is quite evident that the lack of democracy in Serbia is
worsening the Kosovo issue and, vice versa, the worsening
of Kosovo issue is affecting the existence of a civil society
and the role of anti-nationalist opposition in the country.
Therefore, no political solution of the Kosovo issue will
cause dramatic repercussions in Macedonia, Albania,
Bosnia, and Cyprus, at least.
Crucial questions include: Are military interventions
and diplomatic or other international engagements justified
when an ethnic community is threatened only? Is the ethnic
issue the unique one that may affect regional security? Or,
vice versa, is the lack of democracy in a country the main
factor that is affecting security? If the answer is the lack of
democracy, as the author of this chapter does believe, this
means that nationalism and democracy are incompatible,
as well as are nationalism and security. As a result, without
a radical change in political culture, namely a change able to
distinguish democracy from nationalism and to offer
security to individuals and groups as well as the respect of
ethnic identities without nationalism, it is impossible to
have an effectiveness in military and political actions in the
current Balkan and Eastern European crisis.
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CHAPTER 9
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
AT THE BRINK OF THE NEW CENTURY:
THE SECURITY ASPECT
Valeri Ratchev

Introduction.
The sole mentioning of the Balkans (or southeastern
Europe, as all the countries of the region prefer it to be
called) is often sufficient to spoil the mood of and to
introduce skepticism among the participants at any
conference on international security issues. That
immediately reminds them of the scenes of violence on the
TV screens since the end of the 1980s, starting with
Timisoara in Romania, passing through Bihac and
Srebrenitsa in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and ending in
practically any village in Kosovo.
It would be wrong to say that people were not used to
seeing violence on TV before 1989. The terrorist acts in
Northern Ireland and Spain, for example, were not pleasant
to watch, either. The difference, however, is not so much in
the essence of the problems, but rather in their political
interpretation, in their print and televised media coverage.
The Balkans in Fire: Nightmare in Yugoslavia, Balkan
Ghosts: A Journey through History, Fifty Years of War and
Diplomacy in the Balkans, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and
Dissolution After the Cold War , and Summer in the Balkans:
Laughter and Tears After Communism are only samples of
the titles and headlines of books and publications by such
prestigious international figures as James Hill, Yves Delay,
Robert Kaplan, Carol Sforza, Susan Woodward, and Randal
Baker. The apotheosis of this rhetoric is in the words (and
the way of thinking) of a senior European diplomat,
“Whether we like or not, NATO has become the sheriff in
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Europe’s ‘Wild Southeast’." In Bulgarian parlance: a word
spoken is past recalling.
The Situation in the Balkans.
Rightly or not, the Balkans will enter the 21st century as
a by-word for instability and conflicts. Researchers from all
over the world are seeking the roots of this unhappy
situation in the conflicting nature of the Balkan peoples, in
the heritage of the Ottoman Empire and the Cold War, in
the contradictory policy of the great powers for centuries
and, even now, aiming at redistribution of the space of the
region, and in new geopolitical and economic interests.
The truth probably includes elements of all these
reasons. However, what is strategically important for all
the nations of the region is that ongoing and potential
conflicts isolate it from the rapid integration processes in
Europe, divert huge resources from development programs,
increase the technological backwardness of the countries
and of the regional infrastructure as a whole, and
immensely reduce the standard and quality of life of all
peoples.
As a result of these circumstances, the Balkan Peninsula
became a specific space from the perspective of European
security:

•

the largest military operation in Europe for half a
century was carried out in this region;

•

this is the region, where, contrary to all other parts of
Europe, the level of heavy armaments continues to be
maintained at the highest possible level, and in many
cases is being increased;

•

the level of political contacts between the Balkan
countries continues to carry signs of geometrical
configurations (the well-known axes and triangles)
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from the beginning of this century, instead of applying
the necessary contemporary approach;

•

the regional infrastructure, the economic exchanges,
and the regional distribution of labor are still at a very
low level compared to the other parts of Europe; and,

•

the standard and quality of life of the Balkan peoples
lag considerably behind that of the rest of Europe, and
this makes the region unattractive, even for its
inhabitants.

Risks and Threats to Security.
The main threat to security in Southeastern Europe is
the economic, social, and ethno-religious instability
emerging against the background of still powerful
nationalism, of aspirations for national and ethnic
self-determination, and of related territorial disputes. The
collapse of the totalitarian form of government activated a
number of latent contradictions, hidden forcefully by the old
regimes. These contradictions create new risks and
challenges to security.
The dismantling of the biggest Balkan state began with
the collapse of the bi-polar system. The bloody Yugoslav
quake sent tectonic waves all over the region that caused
threats of different degrees to the neighboring countries.
The 5 years of war in former Yugoslavia, the 2 1/2 years of
efforts to implement the Dayton Peace Agreements, the new
orientation of the former communist states, the Albanian
and the Cyprus crises—all these circumstances profoundly
altered the geo-political picture of the region. From a
political prospective, the Balkans are so radically different
now that the use of the term, Balkans , is already
unreasonable.
The level of stability, the security policy orientation, the
relations with the other European states, the European
Union (EU), the United States, NATO, and Russia, for the
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countries of the Northern Balkans (Slovene, Croat, Bosnia,
and Herzegovina) are completely different from those of the
southern sub-region (Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and
Turkey) and the central sub-region (Albania, Macedonia,
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). It is precisely in
the Central Balkans where the ongoing and potential
conflict sources are concentrated. On the background of this
approach to the configuration of the Balkans, the crisis of
the last decade is the epicenter of the tensions that sends its
tectonic waves to the southeast.
In the northern sub-region, the tensions, accumulated in
the period after World War II, resulted in the rupture of the
Yugoslav Federation by force of arms. After a long “starting
period," however, the commitment of the West was of a high
intensity and eventually lead to a large scale peacekeeping
operation, to the Dayton formula for creation of a new state,
and to a program for economic recovering of the region.
The shift of the conflict to the central Balkan sub-region
could be expected because of the almost identical character
of the contradictions and their nonsettlement in the
framework of the Dayton process in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Although similar in roots, the cases of Kosovo,
Macedonia, and Albania are very different from the ones in
the north, and very little of the accumulated experience can
be mechanically applied. Precisely these circumstances
opened the way for some Bulgarian initiatives on Kosovo
that were supported by its neighbors.
The contradictions in the Southern Balkans are of
another nature and do not stem from the crisis that began in
Yugoslavia a decade ago. Their dimensions are at a higher
strategic level because they affect the interests of the
United States, Russia, and the states of the EU in the
Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Nevertheless,
there is a threat of a chain reaction of the conflict spreading
from the central sub-region to the Southern Balkans.
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Flash Points.
Three crisis areas with different degrees of intensity
dominate in Southeastern Europe:

•

the “hot crisis” in Kosovo and the issue of Albanians in
Macedonia;

•

the “fading (for the time being) crisis” in Bosnia and
Herzegovina; and,

•

the “cold crisis” in the Aegean Sea and Cyprus.

There was nothing unusual in the development of the
Kosovo crisis. In Chechnya and Kurdistan and in Africa and
Central America, the regular armies deal with the rebels
and the separatists in the same way—through cleansing of
the ethnic groups and the social groupings that support
them. The Serbs applied the same tactics in the beginning of
the war against the dismantling of the Yugoslav Federation.
The Croats and the Bosnians did the same towards the end
of the war.
Throughout the Kosovo crisis, the West could not find
the right tune. It declared some Serb operations as
legitimate defense against the separatists and others as
requiring immediate NATO interventions, while the
cleansing operations in Central Kosovo in July 1998 were
passed with silence. The western countries looked on as
actors in a drama in which they play the roles that they have
chosen themselves, depending on their culture and using
their own languages.
For the time being, NATO succeeded in halting the
violence without military intervention, but much time was
wasted. Because of this, the main motive for such an
intervention became the refugee problem. There is no doubt
that this problem is important, but its possible solution will
not eliminate the roots of the conflict in the province. The
Albanians will probably accept some parts of the
agreements, but giving up the demands for independence
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will not be among them. The Serbs will also make
concessions on obvious issues, but giving up the de facto
control over Kosovo and the border with Albania will not be
among them.
The problem is that none of the parties involved in the
conflict—the Serbs, the Albanians, or the part of the
international community that has authorized it to make
decisions—has a strategy for its real solution. The lack of
strategy creates the possibility for offensiveness of the
claims, opens the door for expansionism, and leads to
permanent escalation of pretensions of an IsraelPalestinian type.
The way in which the conflict was prevented at this stage
is characterized by some important elements that will leave
a lasting imprint on the future situation in the region.

•

It was admitted that the conflict is stained with blood
to a stage when “the victims cannot be forgotten."
Whatever the political development in the future is,
these victims will hang as a “sword of Damocles” over
the ethnic peace in the province.

•

Although the western leaders and media see the roots
of evil in the person of Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic, the United States again decided to
negotiate with him for the solution of a crisis created
by his government. The end of the Milosevic era is
postponed for the indefinite future. The questions are
for whom is that “good," and for whom is that ”evil."

•

The countries of the region were once more isolated
from the decisionmaking on issues that concern their
vital interests, although the West admitted that the
mistake to isolate the neighbors around the Dayton
Agreements should not be repeated. There are
continuous statements that partnership and
associated membership status make states
participants in the crisis management, the last ones
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with which the United States and NATO coordinated
their intentions and acts were the countries of this
region. And this is an overstatement, in fact these
countries were not consulted at all. There was no
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
mechanism, there was no “strategic partnership."
There was just a note requesting air space corridors
that could be dispatched with the same wording to
Sweden as well.

•

Despite the obvious potential “domino effect," the
approach to the management of this crisis was again
dominated by military threats. The efforts to force the
Albanians to work out a common position in a few
weeks that they have not succeeded in doing in 20
years is an example of pseudo-diplomacy. The only
result of the diplomatic pressure on Serbia was the
consolidation of the nation around Milosevic’s
political camarilla. The pick was reached when
Milosevic was called to Moscow to accept the demands
of the Contact Group, while at the same time in
Brussels, Rugova was instructed to avoid
negotiations.

•

The solution of the crisis even at this stage put an end
to Russia’s geo-political presence in the Central
Balkans. Bulgaria and Romania were lost for the
Russian cause forever. For the first time, Serbia felt
Russia’s weakness on its back and will probably no
longer count on its support. The area of the Northern
and Central Balkans will remain under NATO’s hat,
with all evolving consequences.

The other regional conflict, one that could be qualified as
a “fading” or ”cooling” crisis, is the one in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in other words, the zone of action of the
Dayton Peace Agreements. This crisis became a strategic
challenge of a new type for the democratic community. It is
precisely in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the NATO
horizons started to expand, and the idea that peacekeeping
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operations outside the Alliance’s zone of responsibility
could, if not be dominant, be at least equally important for
the collective defense.
Second, it is very important to note that in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, NATO demonstrated abilities to overcome
contradictions with nonmember countries and other
international organizations, such as the Western European
Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Russia’s participation in
the peacekeeping operations is a historic precedent of
cooperation with NATO and facilitated the signature of the
Founding Act in May 1997.
Third, the NATO peacekeeping Implementation Force
(IFOR)/Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation demonstrated
that, in a period of general reduction of the armed forces, the
activities in coalition and cooperation between armed forces
of different states is the approach that will lead to the
creation of a base for a collective instrument for
maintenance of international peace and stability.
What is new in the development of the situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the change of the general
situation.

•

The Milorad Dodic government was the first in the
Bosnian Serb Republic that was pro-Dayton, and this
facilitated the implementation of the agreement. A
nationalistic-oriented government took over after the
last elections in 1998, and it remains to be seen how
this will influence the future developments. The
Muslim-Croat Federation improves slowly as a state
formation, but the national and religious disunion at
the community level is still very strong. It remains
evident, however, that further implementation of the
Dayton Peace Agreement is impossible without
external pressure, including military presence.

•

The SFOR contingent is the only dominant military
force in the region, and, as a result, no threat exists
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that the Bosnian Serb army will confront the
international forces in the implementation of their
future missions. The Bosnian Federation Army is
being slowly formed, and its main problem is the lack
of well-trained commanders. The Serb army is losing
its superiority in heavy armaments, but it is still
much better manned with qualified personnel.

•

The probability of resuming the combat activities is
practically nonexistent for the time being. The threats
to security come mainly from the unsolved issue of the
return of refugees and the related possible clashes at a
local level. The existence of scores of armed criminal
groupings and persons that pillage the population and
the refugees in the less controlled regions is also a
serious problem.

The disputes between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus and
the Aegean Sea are a sort of Cold War with an unpredictable
prospective. Two elements continue to further complicate
the situation.

•

The first is last year’s official statement of the EU and
the leading member-states that they are not ready to
consider the application of Turkey for full
membership (at least for the time being). Despite
some softening of the EU position, Turkey again was
not invited to participate in the Vienna Summit in
December 1998 as a potential member of the Union.
The scalding of the more than two decades-long
ambitions of Turkey introduces new elements in its
European and Balkan policy. They can hardly be
expected to be entirely positive to Europe, although
Ankara is likely to initiate steps for improving the
bilateral relations with the Balkan countries, Greece
excluded. Last year, certain differences of the U.S.
and Turkish positions concerning the regional
military cooperation could be registered. The fading of
the European integration goal will inevitably feed the
pro-fundamentalist moods and actions in the country.
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It should not be forgotten, however, that Turkey is a
very important factor with regard to the Balkans, and
it is of common interest that its political stability is
preserved.

•

The second element was the deal between Russia and
the Republic of Cyprus for delivery of ground-to-air
missiles C-300 to the Greek Cypriots, i.e., their
deployment in the integrated Greek-Cypriot defense
space. This led to the freezing of initial detente
between Greece and Turkey. The decision to deploy
the missiles on Crete Island and the possible purchase
of other types Russian ground-to-air missiles by
Nicosia will hardly ease the tensions between Greece
and Turkey. The present situation leads to the
following conclusions that may change under the
influence of new developments: (1) in the Cyprus issue
there is another “player”—Russia; (2) a chain of
contrameasures and possible answers to them will
probably follow; (3) it will give another argument for
delaying the beginning of possible political
negotiations; and, (4) the policy of all external factors
to the region will have to become more cautious.

It is evident that, whatever the international mediation
efforts might be, the solution of the open issues between
Greece and Turkey continues to be in the hands of the two
countries.
Transnational Risk Factors.
The organized crime in Southeastern Europe is growing,
due to the transition processes in some of the countries and
the existence of sources of tension and military conflicts in
the Balkans as well as in the adjoining geo-strategic
regions. One of the main “traditional” (the so-called Balkan)
roads for narcotics traffic to Western Europe passes through
Southeastern Europe from the “Golden Crescent”
(Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran) as well as from Syria,
Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. (It is estimated that 75-80
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percent of the heroin in Western Europe passes through
this route.) “The Balkan Road” is also used in the opposite
direction—for the transportation to the Near and the
Middle East of chemicals produced in Western Europe
needed for drug production. In the last years, growing
efforts are being observed for the creation of new channels
for drug traffic.
There is a tendency for increasing the illegal traffic of
arms, ammunition, and explosives. Several channels pass
through the Balkans—from Western Europe to Turkey and
the Middle East, from Russia to former Yugoslavia (through
Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece), to Turkey and the Middle
East, from Serbia to the neighboring countries, and,
recently, from Albania to Kosovo and Macedonia. The
increase of the quantities of arms, ammunition, and
explosives in the illegal markets in the Balkans is an
objective factor for the expansion of political and criminal
terrorism.
The traffic of strategic goods and raw materials is a
relatively new phenomenon in the region. Besides the usual
criminal results, this traffic creates a real danger of nuclear,
chemical, and bacteriological terrorism on a regional,
European, and world-wide scale.
Due to its geographic situation, Southeastern Europe is
one of the migration “highways” from Asia and Africa to the
developed countries of Western Europe and the United
States. One of the touch-lines between the Christian and
the Muslim worlds passes precisely here, and there is a
constant danger of infiltration of Islamic fundamentalist
groups and activists. The balance of security of the
Southeastern European countries is particularly sensitive
to these processes. In fact, in defending their national
interests, the countries of the region, including Bulgaria,
are buffers on the way of the migration waves.
The region is very vulnerable to money laundering. The
liberalization of the internal and external economic
relations and the great increase of the number of financial
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and credit institutions in the new democracies of the region,
that are not being sufficiently controlled, create favorable
conditions for money laundering.
The acts of terrorism in southeastern Europe show that
the degree of terrorist threat is very different in the
different countries of the region. The terrorist activities
have mainly internal characters. At the same time, the
different terrorist pressures on the states lead to differences
in their reactions. The varying degrees of preparedness of
the defense systems of the individual countries create a field
of maneuver for terrorist organizations and conditions for
the “transfer” of terrorism. This converts internal terrorism
into a regional threat.
The Caspian Energy Resources: Impact
on Southeastern Europe .
The picture of southeastern Europe will not be complete
if the situation in the adjoining region—the Black Sea, the
Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea—is not kept in mind.
The shallow waters of the northeastern Caspian Sea
have become an obsession for the world’s biggest industry
and some of the world’s most powerful countries. Geological
studies have suggested that the salt dome there sits atop a
potentially gigantic oil field, called Kashagan, and that,
together with the large Tengiz field nearby and thousands
of other smaller wells in the region, could be worth billions
to the companies that control it—and to Kazakhstan itself.
In recent months a near hysteria has enveloped Kashagan
for perhaps the richest prize of this decade’s high-stakes
competition for Caspian oil and natural gas.
The U.S. Government has made the energy-rich region a
strategic priority. The official statements in the winter of
1998 suggested that the goal of the United States is to have
the investment and revenues generated by the Caspian and
Caucasus region’s energy resources play a crucial role in
furthering its economic and political development. Even
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then the United States strongly opposed the construction of
pipelines through Iran that would be of interest to neither
the western countries nor to Russia.
The United States declared that it supports the
construction of multiple pipelines in order to ensure
unimpeded oil and gas supplies in the future. “We strongly
support the development of transport routes for Caspian
energy through Russia, which we believe is in the interest of
all the regional states,” Jan Kalicki, the U.S. Commerce
Department envoy to the region, said on February 25, 1998.
He particularly supported the completion of the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium (CPC) project from Kazakhstan to
Novorosiisk.
This considerably diverges from the recent U.S. stand.
Washington wants to deprive the neighborhood toughs,
Russia and Iran, control over more than a token share of the
2
oil from Kashagan. To do that, the United States has
proposed the construction of a massive 1,087-mile (1750
km) east-west pipeline, which would start from Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan, then run west under the sea to Baku,
the capital of Azerbaijan—and the center of the Caspian oil
business. From there, it would cross Georgia and terminate
in Ceihan, a Turkish port city on the Mediterranean. The
key is that no oil would pass through Russia or Iran.
What is odd about the rush on the pipeline issue is that
nobody yet knows whether Kashagan is flush with oil or
only a major dud. The results of the definitive drilling tests
by a consortium of major oil companies that should have
started in December 1999 will not be available until next
summer, at the earliest. Still no one has forgotten the early
seismic studies showing that Kashagan could be
two-and-half times as large as Kazakhstan’s Tengiz, the
Caspian’s largest proven field. Tengiz has 6 billion to 9
billion barrels of producible reserves—a remarkable field by
world standards. The governments backing Baku-Ceyhan
worry that, unless the pipeline is started soon, a major
geo-strategic opportunity will be missed.
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But the uncertainty, plus generally soft prices for oil
world-wide, has set off a tense squabble between the oil
companies, which would have to foot most of the estimated
$4 billion pipeline bill, and the U.S. Government which is
determined to press ahead with the project.
In the end of October 1998, the oil companies—among
them Shell, Mobil, and British Petroleum—held a top-level
meeting with U.S. officials to discuss the matter. The
outcome of the talks was as muddy as some recent
disappointing dry holes in the Caspian. “We all agreed that
Baku-Ceyhan makes sense. What we need to do is find ways
to make it commercially viable in the shortest possible
time.” said an American official. “Baku-Ceyhan is going to
happen. The main reason is that the governments want it,
and politics do matter,” Jan Kalicki, the U.S. Commerce
Department envoy to the region, said.
In the meantime, it was announced that the Western oil
consortium would be prepared to build a shorter pipeline,
which would terminate at Georgia’s Black Sea port of
Supsa. It would be roughly half the length of the
Baku-Ceyhan plan—and cost roughly half as much.
U.S. Government officials considered the Supsa idea a
temporary solution. Before their meeting with oil executives
at the end of October 1998, they were at pains to dismiss any
notion that the original pipeline idea was untenable.
Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Stroub Talbott called reports
of its imminent demise “wrong and inaccurate."
Washington’s Caspian allies also spoke out. Turkish
president Suleyman Demiril said: “Azerbaijan is
determined [to go ahead with the Baku-Ceyhan plan],
Georgia and Turkey are determined, and the United States
is backing the project.”
In Ankara, Turkey, on November 3, 1998, the presidents
of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and
Uzbekistan signed a joint statement, supporting the
Turkish Baku-Ceyhan project. The statement, that has a
“symbolic character,” was signed also by U.S. Energy
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Secretary William Richardson. The surprise was the
last-moment withdrawal of the President of Turkmenistan
without further explanations.
Just before signing the statement, Turkish Foreign
Minister Ismail Jem threatened that his country might
address itself to other energy sources and producers to cover
its needs if the “mistake” were made not to finalize the
Baku-Ceyhan project. He repeated Turkey’s position that it
would not allow the Bosporus and the Dardanelles (the
Straits) to become a “pipeline."
Commissary of the European Commission Christos
Papautsis emphasized, however, that “from a political and
strategic point of view, it is better that more than one route
exists” for the transportation of the Caspian oil, adding that
Russia should not be excluded. The diversification of the
energy supplies is one of our principle goals in guaranteeing
these supplies, he added.
The unsolved status of the Caspian Sea is an obstacle to
the development of the Caspian energy projects. More
important, however, is that many of them are competing
and may cause serious conflict situations in the region.
It can be expected that, at this stage, the ambitious plans
of many companies for exploitation and transportation of
Caspian gas and oil will not be implemented. Actual
investments are considerably lower than previously
announced, and the conclusion may be made that the goal is
the conservation of the Caspian fields rather than their real
and complete exploitation. This is due both to the
international conjuncture (energy overproduction and
considerable decrease of their international prices) and to
the interests of the main geo-political and economic actors.
In the regions that are main energy transport knots, a
serious increase in the political, social, and ethnic tensions
may be expected, even to the creation of more large-scale
conflicts. That is particularly valid for the Caspian states,
Turkey, and the Balkans.
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What conclusions could be made from the available
information?

•

The U.S. Government is considering the issue as a
strategic and political one; its main goal is to isolate
Iran and Russia (it is to be discussed which of the two
should occupy the first place in this negative rating).
In fact, the United States is trying to isolate the whole
Eurasian region (the oil field countries and Turkey
excluded) from the supply route to the world markets.

•

As it is still not absolutely sure that the Caspian oil
and gas are worth the huge investments that are
planned, the interests of the U.S. Government and
those of the major oil companies do not entirely
coincide. Another reason for such possible differences
is that the Caspian oil and gas may undermine the
world energy prices that are at a low even without the
appearance of the new supplies.

•

Although five countries (Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan) plus the
United States already supported the Baku-Ceyhan
project, this should not be regarded as anything more
than a political declaration. The implementation of
the project will inevitably lead to economic
contradictions that will be not easy to solve.
Turkmenistan’s last-moment withdrawal is an
indication of this.

•

Russia evidently will be against the southern route as
the only solution. Moscow will insist on the western
route (using the already existing pipeline to the Black
Sea port, Novorossiisk) and probably much more on
the future north-western pipeline (through Russia,
Ukraine, and Poland to Western Europe). It is almost
sure that Russia will be supported by Ukraine and
Poland (mainly for economic reasons), but very
probably will be also supported by several EU
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countries, particularly Germany and France.
Guaranteeing the diversification of the energy
supplies will be among the main arguments for such
support.
The main conclusion for us is that the Balkans (Bulgaria
and Romania, and, to a certain extent, Greece) will again
remain outside of the energy highways to Western Europe.
Nobody seems to be very keen to invest in a pipeline under
the Black Sea from Novorossiisk or Supsa (Georgia) to
Romania and Bulgaria (at least for the time being). In the
best case, some oil will be delivered by tankers to the Black
Sea ports of the two countries, but the quantities will be
marginal. The situation with the gas might be slightly
better because of the existing infrastructure. The project for
construction of a gas pipeline from the Bulgarian Black Sea
port of Burgas to the Greek Aegean Sea port of
Alexandroupolis will still remain under question. (Russia
has already declared that it will not support the project
because it is economically unprofitable.) The political,
strategic, and economic importance of Turkey will increase
enormously, compared to her Balkan neighbors.
Conflicts and Integration.
Security is the key word for any region, and, of course, for
the Balkans, too. Investing in the security of this region as a
whole will certainly have a direct positive impact on the
zones of conflict as well. In such a case, the conflict will not
only be “capsulated” and the risk of its expansion beyond its
zone will sharply diminish, but a sort of political “magnet"
will be created, attracting the sides of the conflict to a
certain type of behavior encouraged by external factors.
Such a powerful “magnet” or stimulation should be
membership in the EU, and—as far as security is
concerned—in NATO, of countries with proven political
stability and democratic development.
In fact southeastern Europe has its strategic
advantages. The region is a linking point between East and
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West, between North and South. It is a strategic, political,
economic, and information linch pin of the EU to the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Central
Asia. The region shapes the NATO Southern Flank, it
increases the Alliance’s strategic depth without
significantly extending its outer borders.
The countries of southeastern Europe may have an
important contribution to make to conflict prevention and
the struggle against the new threats to international
security. If integrated, they will be a reliable ally in
preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and in cutting the channels for illegal traffic of
narcotics and arms. These are threats against the security
of Europe and the United States, but not all the allies are
ready to fight them unconditionally.
The crises in Former Yugoslavia and Albania and the
problems in Cyprus and the Aegean Sea have a painful
influence on the image of the whole region. Several
countries that were not involved in any conflict, and even
contributed substantially to the success of international
efforts for their solution, are de facto partially isolated
geographically, economically, and politically from the
processes in the part of Europe west of the conflict zone.
They are in the shadow of the conflicts that determine the
ways of political thinking and behavior. The general
characteristic of the countries of the region is their
insufficient decisiveness in carrying out the obviously
needed radical reforms in the economic, internal, and
foreign policy fields. The rating of the Balkan countries from
an economic and financial point of view is low, and to a great
extent continues to be determined by the conflicts’ intensity.
As a result, a conceptual vacuum is created concerning
the states of the region. Western Europe and the United
States define their main accents and strategy using the
conflicts as a point of departure (starting point). Their
actions are directed mainly by “point decisions” (often
unfortunate), aimed at settling already existing
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military-political crises. The economic and social aspects of
the conflict solution are not sufficiently considered (if at all),
and no strategy for the political and economic investment in
the region is worked out. The military and political-military
measures have priority in the attempts to master the
situation.
In its policy towards southeastern Europe, Russia, as a
power with traditional interests and influence in the region,
also has as a main priority the settlement of the crises in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Albania and Kosovo. Russia
also tries to maintain friendly relations with the
governments there, to preserve the inherited militarystrategic balance in the region through which to encourage
the countries to adopt a policy of neutrality, and, above all,
to ensure favorable conditions for functioning of the Russian
infrastructure energy systems passing through or feeding
the countries of the region. These energy systems became a
part of the political instrument for achieving Russia’s goals
in the region. (Boris Yeltsin stated, “What is good for
GASPROM is good for Russia.”)
It should be emphasized that in this context the Balkan
states are not offered the possibility to actively defend “their
case.” In a much lesser degree, they are regarded as serious
(and reliable as far as investments are concerned) allies in
the efforts to build up a homogeneous security zone. Despite
their ambitions, they are forced to feel rather as a part of the
problem than a part of the solution.
The countries of the region are particularly sensitive to
some aspects of the implementation of the Western
integration concepts. NATO has always been considered
here as a political test for the attitude of Western Europe
and the United States to the Balkans. Excluding countries
such as Slovenia and particularly Romania from the first
enlargement wave dispatched to the region a clear signal of
the prematurity of the expectations. The ground was
created for spreading doubts concerning the place of the
region in the geo-strategy of the 16 capitals. Concerns were
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revived of the establishment of new separation lines
between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that
share the same political heritage and do not dramatically
differ in their post-communist development. The
“Yalta/Malta” syndrome became actual again in several
countries. The governing reformist majorities in countries
such as Bulgaria and Romania were forced to render an
account of why countries, distant from areas that are
neuralgic for the Euro-Atlantic security, were preferred to
join the first group invited to adhere to the Alliance.
In Expectation of Washington 1999.
With the approaching of NATO’s 50th Anniversary and
the Washington Summit, the public debate on the Alliance’s
enlargement is inflaming again in the candidate countries.
The reactions of the “strong” candidates—Romania and
Slovenia—to the Madrid Summit decisions were that of
deception, and even offense, because of placing them among
the “second rate states." The NATO member-states that
supported their candidacy were declared “friends forever,"
even some heads of state became honorary citizens of the
unfortunate candidates. Those who were against almost
became enemies of the nation.
In Bulgaria the decisions of the Madrid Summit were
accepted with understanding from both supporters and
opponents—it was clear to everyone to what extent the
Bulgarian candidacy was desperately late and to what
extent the country was unprepared for the task when the
decision was taken.
Despite everything else, all Balkan countries have the
bitter impression that they still are the “bad boys," and
there are still numerous and important considerations for
their isolation from the real integration that have nothing to
do with strategy or even politics.
It is still not entirely clear whether new states will be
invited in Washington or if the issue will be left for the
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future. If we judge the words of Secretary of Defense
William Cohen in Portugal, no new invitations are foreseen
in April 1999. If we judge the statements of some European
leaders, they will insist on a second group. However, this is
an internal NATO debate and will obviously remain that
way. It is understandable that the Alliance needs time to
absorb the three new members and to make the needed
conclusions on the basis of accumulated experience.
The improvisations on the thesis—will there be another
wave of NATO enlargement in April 1999—are unfruitful
and even senseless. While we were dealing with such
improvisations in 1994-1997, we missed the time to carry
out the necessary reforms that were successfully done by
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. We should not be
upset that the opinion not to invite any country in 1999 is
prevailing. Our main task is to achieve the criteria for
membership with the clear understanding that, due to the
NATO open-door policy, our turn will inevitably come in due
time. A different long-term development would be
unfortunate not only for the candidate-countries, but the
Alliance and the European security as well.
The countries of southeastern Europe, however,
continue to make enormous efforts in order to attract
attention. Some extremes can also be watched: effective
promotions are being carried out, avalanches of PfP actions
are being proposed, and multinational military formations
are shooting up like mushrooms and are expecting a crisis
anywhere so that they may demonstrate their high
“NATO-like” abilities. All this is understandable and even
right because the stakes are very high. At the same time,
however, this strains the questions that naturally emerge,
the main one being, “If the enlargement is postponed
indefinitely (we should not forget that the enlargement
costs were calculated for a period of 10-12 years), what will
the European security system look like?”
It seems obvious that the promised all-European
security system will be replaced by a collective security
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system for the NATO and EU member-states, and
cooperative system for the others. On the border between
them, a very important division line will emerge. From a
purely military point of view, this is not all that essential,
but it becomes extremely important because of the
restrictive measures for crossing the borders, of trade
protectionism, of information and cultural domination, etc.
If NATO does not expand, the military aspect of the
security of the countries that remain outside the Alliance
will not change considerably; it can hardly be expected that
bilateral or multinational regional military alliances will be
formed, even under the threat of new crises. What will
change, however, is the assessment of the general security
level, the state of the so-called enhanced national security .
It is a question of principle for us whether the NATO
member-states are in a position to change their
enlargement philosophy from “adherence of stability” to
“adherence for stability." This is unthinkable today, but
precisely this attitude opens possibilities to those who have
“other” geo-strategic and geo-economic interests to draw the
conclusion. If the conflicts stop the integration, then the
best way to keep enormous areas fluid is to maintain the
conflict situations through arms sales, supporting ones and
confronting others, economic and customs restrictions,
splitting friendly and friendly to our enemies states and
governments, etc.
So we come to the question, “Will NATO continue to
emphasize and develop the collective defense as a dominant
function, i.e., if Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is
stressed, how will the difference between membership and
partnership be gradually eliminated (what was promised in
a lot of statements after Madrid)?” Defense , even if they try
to modify the notion, is dealing with precise concepts, such
as war theaters, adversaries, military potentials, strategic
and operational areas, etc. In Southeastern Europe we are
trying to adopt the liberal way of thinking, but it is very
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hard to understand how our Partnership for Peace (PfP) will
compensate for the advantages of the membership.
These questions may be easy to answer from an
academic point of view, but they are very difficult to answer
from a political point of view. Our governments need success
in order to carry out political and economic reforms, success
that should have a small but steady development. And when
practically everything in our countries is invested in
integration, and this integration is practically non-existent,
one day somebody may ask unpleasant questions about the
wasted resources, about the wasted political confidence,
and about the lost opportunities. We hope that in NATO,
nobody fools himself that in their present shape EAPC and
PfP may exhaust the integration issue. It is fully possible
that the NATO and EU states close themselves in their own
problems (they have enough of them and have full right to
do so because their governments must also render accounts
of the spent resources), and to marginalize their strategic
responsibility of the countries which are still in “the gray
zone." This will not be the end of life in the Balkans, and all
the people will not emigrate to the West. But the picture in
southeastern Europe will be complicated and its
development—unpredictable:

•

For a long period, the borders between the Balkan
countries will remain frontiers. These frontiers will
have to be protected and defended. The issue of the
military balance will continue to occupy the
militaries’ minds when they propose or make
decisions on defense issues. The defense of a classical
type will be a main trend of the military buildup and
the basic task of the military policy. The regional
military cooperation will consist rather in
compensating the imbalances than in an expression of
a high mutual confidence.

•

The threat of the “domino effect” will paralyze the
relations between the countries of the region for a long
time. Kosovo, the Serb Republic in Bosnia and
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Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, the
Turks in Bulgaria and Greece, the Kurds, Cyprus—
all these are elements of one and the same domino.
The problem of the Balkans, however, is not in the
ethnic diversity, the problem is in the poverty. A
poverty that is not very different than the one in the
beginning of this century when the Balkans became
known as the “powder keg” of Europe. Today,
however, the poverty is placed in a new political and
information environment. This environment
complicates the solution of the problems “at
peace-work,” it unifies causes that are at a distance of
many hundreds of kilometers.

•

The policy of Western Europe towards the eastern
part of the continent will be dominated by the big
states. The weak relations of the Balkan countries
with the EU combined with the further restrictions
due to the future adherence of the Czech Republic,
Poland, Hungary, and Slovene in EU will lead to
shrinking of the markets, the communications, the
political contacts, and the cultural exchanges. If to all
this is added the possible limitation of the U.S.
presence and the practically complete disengagement
of Russia from European affairs, their policy will have
no alternative and no corrective. For the countries
that fall in the zone of direct interests of some Western
European countries, this could be the source of a
progressive development. For all the others, however,
the solution will be to return to the Russian and
Ukrainian markets where the crisis will lead to a
demand for goods that are not of the quality of the
western or Japanese, but are of much lower prices.
The increased trade exchanges with Russia and
Ukraine will not be based on direct payments but on
barter. And our 10-years’ experience shows that
barter is the most powerful source of illegal income
and organized crime.
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•

The liberal and pro-western intellectuals will be the
first to perceive the lack of perspective in their own
countries and will seek ways to realize themselves
abroad. This will have as a consequence the
diminishing of the reserve of democratic politicians.
At all elections the political elite will be gradually
replaced by figureheads of the economic groupings.
Every crisis will revitalize the nationalistic moods,
just because no other ideology will get support. The
civil society institutions, whose creation required
such enormous efforts in the last years, will gradually
politicize.

•

Evidently, we have to admit that in the Balkans there
are problems which are impossible to solve . The
impossibility to solve them is, above all, a
consequence of the lack of resources. The problem
solution of all sorts is becoming more and more
expensive, and the lack of operative resources is
becoming a critical factor in crises management and
conflict prevention. The lack of resources results in
lack of alternatives. The lack of alternatives makes
the armed forces the only real argument. That is why
Turkey adopted a $125 billion rearmament program,
Greece declared the purchase of modern weapons,
Romania is negotiating a deal to buy combat
helicopters, and Macedonia is planning to deploy a
30,000-man army.

We understand that the enlargement of a militarypolitical alliance like NATO by accepting new members, and
going through difficult political, economic, and social
reforms in a radically changed international environment,
is a very complicated and long process. We do not
underestimate the complexity of the tasks which NATO and
the member countries have to solve in this context. But at
the same time, we expect from NATO a reciprocal act of
solidarity, giving Bulgaria concrete perspectives. We are
convinced that we have the right to expect that in the final
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documents of the Washington Summit, Bulgaria at least
will be especially mentioned as a serious applicant for
membership, and South Eastern Europe will be defined as
the natural direction of the next phase of the enlargement
process.
Going Ahead: Alone? Together?
When discussing the security issues in southeastern
Europe, it is difficult to say what is pessimistic and what is
realistic. It is even more difficult to make concrete and
specific suggestions to Balkan governments to do this in
Bosnia, or that in Kosovo, or something else in Cyprus. The
approach of the countries of the region—reserved or
positive—is very important.

•

We may criticize the hasty, short-sighted decisions in
the first stages of the Yugoslav crisis which certainly
exacerbated an already tense situation.

•

We may shake our heads critically at the optimism
with which the United States thought that a
crazy-quilt pattern, as concocted in Bosnia, might
work effectively.

•

We may reproach the EU, the United States, and the
United Nations that they have known for years that
Kosovo would sooner or later explode, yet they did
nothing to prevent it.

•

We may regret that, in particular, the EU has not
been able to go beyond talks, visits, and high-flying
words and take any positive steps.

•

We may be also critical of unrealistic schemes, such as
bringing the war criminals to justice, which have not
gone beyond a few paltry cases.

What the countries of southeastern Europe can do is to:
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•

Inform and advise both the international
organizations and the major power governments on
situations which we, because of our proximity and of
our greater knowledge of the area, are better
equipped to know and to assess;

•

Keep in touch with each other in a spirit not just of
cooperation, but rather in the awareness of a common
problem in our own backyard;

•

Talk in a friendly and firm way to all parties involved,
official or unofficial, trying to show them that any gain
they may secure by the force of arms is bound to cost
them much dearer in terms of losing touch with the
realities of this beginning 21st century; and, finally,

•

Show by our own example of creative cooperation that
the path we have chosen for our countries, as
members or candidates in the European construction,
is more promising for our future.

An extraordinary example of a positive approach to the
regional cooperation is the establishment of the
Multi-National Peace Forces-Southeastern Europe
(MNPFSEE) by seven countries—Albania, Bulgaria,
Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey. This may
be considered as an extremely positive achievement,
because MNPFSEE unites three NATO member-states,
they unite two of which do not maintain the best possible
relations, two countries that have no diplomatic relations
and the name of the one is disputed by the other; they
consist of countries with very different status in the
European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.
The establishment of these forces is a practical
expression of the political will for military cooperation with
the goal of building confidence among neighboring states.
MNPFSEE is a concrete element of the military reform and
the preparation for accession to NATO, and a way to
materialize the new policy of participation in solving the
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security issues in cooperation with the democratic
international community.
And last but not least, the establishment of MNPFSEE
demonstrates that, when the spirit of cooperation prevails
over the differences, our region has a future.
ENDNOTES- CHAPTER 9
1. William Drozdiak, International Herald Tribune, October 14,
1998.
2. Steve LeVine, Newsweek, November 2, 1998.
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CHAPTER 10
TURKISH CHALLENGE
AND EUROPEAN OPPORTUNITY:
GREEK FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES
IN A POST-COLD WAR SETTING
Theodore A. Couloumbis

Greek Foreign Policy Priorities in a Post-Cold War
Setting.
The post-Cold War period (let us better call it the 1990s)
seems to have falsified the prophesies of both the universal
1
order and the universal disorder schools of thought. At
present, the world appears to be moving toward a new
variant of bipolarity defined primarily in economic rather
than military/political/ideological terms. One pole groups
advanced, industrial, and democratic states; while the
second pole comprises regions of the Third World and the
former Soviet bloc that are characterized by economic
scarcity and underdevelopment, as well as by political
systems that vacillate between traditional authoritarianism, unstable democracy and praetorian managerialism.
The first pole, a world island of economic
interdependence, democracy, and political stability, is made
up of North America, the European Union (EU), Japan, and
the remaining economically advanced countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). Greece has managed to consolidate its presence in
this zone of stable interdependence by virtue of entering the
European Community on January 1, 1981.
In the second pole, the so-called “poor south” of the
planet, one finds countries with developing economies and
conflict-prone polities that are unable as of yet to sustain
consolidated systems of democracy founded on pluralist and
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self-balancing civil societies. Recent and well-publicized
examples of flash points in this region include
humanitarian nightmares in Rwanda, Burundi, Congo
(Kinshasa), Algeria, Zaire, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan,
Kashmir, Cambodia and North Korea, just to name a few.
Hovering somewhere between the two poles are some of
the former communist countries of central, eastern, and
southeastern Europe. These states are in the middle of a
very sensitive transition process that will either guide them
safely into the ranks of the pole of stability and peace, or to
the second pole of instability, civil strife, and war. Unlike
former Yugoslavia and certain regions of the former Soviet
Union, countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) seem,
despite occasional difficulties, to be moving well on the road
to a market economy and consolidated democracy.
Greece belongs institutionally to the pole of stability but,
unlike its remaining EU partners, it borders on a region of
fluidity and real or potential conflict north and east of its
frontiers. Therefore, the gamut (nearly) of Greece’s political
parties as well as an overwhelming majority of public
opinion have supported, increasingly since the mid-1980s,
the process of Greece’s multidimensional integration into
the mechanisms and institutions of the Western family of
nations. The dominant paradigm premised on multilateralism and reflecting Greece’s foreign policy priorities
could be summarized as follows.
The first priority of foreign policy since 1974 has been
the consolidation of democracy and the adoption of an
economic convergence strategy (with the more advanced EU
partners) designed to safeguard Greece’s historic European
option. In their efforts to secure full integration into the
“hard core” of post-Maastricht Europe, Greek policymakers,
whether drawn from the ranks of New Democracy (in
government between 1990 and 1993) or of PASOK (in
government since October 1993), have avoided the so-called
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dilemma between a Europeanist and an Atlanticist profile.
They have opted instead for a Euro-Atlanticist stance (akin
to the British, Portuguese and Italian models) recognizing
that there is adequate complementarity in a strategy that
pursues political and economic integration through the EU
and, simultaneously, relies chiefly on NATO for the
provision of the collective defense and collective security
values.
The second (first from a defense and security standpoint)
priority in Greek foreign policy is the maintenance of a
sufficient regime of military balance in the Greek-Turkish
nexus of relations. Since 1974 (following the Turkish
invasion and continuing occupation of northern Cyprus), all
of Greece’s political parties have been perceiving Turkey as
posing a major threat to Greece’s territorial integrity in the
Aegean and in Western Thrace. In this connection, Greek
bipartisan policy calls for the maintenance of an adequate
balance of forces (especially in the air and sea) while
avoiding highly destabilizing and economically costly arms
races. NATO has been repeatedly urged by Greece’s foreign
minister, Theodoros Pangalos, to seriously consider the
development of an intra-NATO dispute settlement
mechanism which would help resolve differences peacefully
as well as strengthen the appeal of the Atlantic Alliance as a
collective security as well as collective defense providing
institution.
Under the Constantinos Simitis government (but also
under New Democracy rule in 1990-93), the Greek stance
vis-à-vis Turkey’s oft-declared European option has been to
move away gradually from a strategy of conditional
sanctions and toward one of conditional rewards. In other
words, Greece now openly declares its willingness to lift its
objections (given its veto power in the EU) to the building of
a close relationship between the EU and Turkey, provided
the latter abandons its threats of going to war over the
Aegean question and contributes substantively toward a
functional and mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus
problem, permitting the reunification of Cyprus as a
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federal, bizonal, and bicommunal state that is also a
member of the EU and NATO. Cyprus could thus become
one of the first candidates for NATO expansion in the
Eastern Mediterranean setting.
The remaining priorities of Greek foreign policy involve
relations with post-Communist Balkan neighbors and with
the non-EU and non-NATO states of the Mediterranean
region. In the case of the Balkans, after a painful interlude
(1992-94) of near involvement in a regional imbroglio,
Greece has opted for a multilateralist foreign policy
(together with its EU, WEU, OSCE and NATO partners)
designed to contribute to successful transition policies
toward democracy and market economy in each of the states
north of its borders. After smoothing its troubled relations
with Albania and FYROM and while continuing to cultivate
good relations with Bulgaria and Romania, Greece has also
proceeded to adopt a purely equidistant stance (vis-à-vis
Serbia, Croatia, and Albania) in the questions of Bosnia and
Kosovo, respectively. The Greek policy toward the Balkans
could be summarized today as “not becoming a part of the
problem but joining, instead, the coalitions of the willing
that act collectively as part of the solution.” In this respect,
Greece has joined Western peacekeeping and peace
enforcement initiatives in Albania, Bosnia, and elsewhere
in former Yugoslavia, including its mid-May 1997
participation in PfP military exercises on the territory of
FYROM and mid-summer 1998 NATO exercises in Albania,
together with troops from the United States, Italy, and
Turkey, among others.
The process of EU and NATO enlargements fits well
with Greece’s strategic objective of encouraging stability
and peace in the Balkan region, thus distancing the
unpleasant contingency of having to face a second
diplomatic/military front in addition to what has been
widely perceived as a clear and present danger emanating
from Turkey. Further, Greece’s substantive support and
involvement in EU regional, developmental programs fit
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the strategy of a multilateral and stabilizing presence in the
Balkans.
With respect to Greece’s role in the Mediterranean, the
multilateralist formula applied to the Balkans is the
orienting principle for Greek foreign policy in this region as
well. Here the opportunities for NATO and EU initiatives
are more than apparent. The EuroAtlantic community has
every incentive to extend the values of security and
cooperation into this structurally unbalanced region (where
the EU North is rich and demographically stable while the
non-EU South is economically disadvantaged and
demographically explosive). For the time being, the
EU/MEDA fund, which amounts to a very substantive sum
of 4.7 billion Ecus for the 1995-99 period, is a concrete and
much needed first step in a gradual convergence strategy
designed to facilitate economic and political development in
the disadvantaged littoral states of the non-EU
Mediterranean south.
Greek policymakers also find that NATO offers excellent
opportunities for military cooperation (beyond
confidence-building measures) between the alliance and
critically important eastern Mediterranean states such as
Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Cyprus. The opportunities for
substantive cooperation between NATO and these states
will increase geometrically if the nexus of Greek-Turkish
difficulties (which we will address later in this chapter) is
adequately addressed, and Cyprus is permitted to join the
ranks of NATO and the EU (given the overwhelming
benefits that such a prospect ensures for both communities
on the embattled island).
Finally, in Greece’s list of priorities, the relationship
with the United States occupies a critical position. There
has been a dramatic improvement in the U.S.-Greek
relationship during the 1990s. One could argue that the
profile of this relationship from 1947 (the Truman Doctrine)
to 1974 (the collapse of the Athens dictatorship) had been of
the classical patron-client variety. The United States, a
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dominant superpower, and Greece, a strategically located
but internally divided small state, could not have avoided
the center-periphery dependence relationship. It was,
indeed decisive American intervention in the 1947-49
period which prevented a Communist take-over in the
Greek Civil War. The victors, the majority in Greece, were
indeed grateful, and Harry Truman’s statue was erected
overlooking a central and busy Greek boulevard. However,
the vanquished, a sizable minority, viewed the United
States as an “evil Empire” that had been responsible for
their final defeat in 1949.
In the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, Greek-American
relations were adversely affected by a constantly escalating
Greek-Turkish conflict over the fate of the island of Cyprus.
Perceptions in Athens were that the United States was
systematically tilting in favor of Turkey (whose strategic
value was heavily exaggerated by American strategic
thinkers). Anti-Americanism assumed even greater
proportions by what the Greek people considered an
American stance of benign neglect (if not outright support of
the dictators) during the 1967-74 period, when Greece was
placed under the oppressive regime of the Athens Colonels.
The Greek military regime not only violated basic human
rights but also triggered a criminal coup against President
Makarios of Cyprus (July 15, 1974) which—in turn—led to
the Turkish invasion and the subsequent occupation of 37
percent of Cypriot territory.
In the years following the restoration of democracy in
Greece (1974), despite the anti-American rhetoric of
Andreas Papandreou and his left-of-center political party
(PASOK), the image of the United States began improving
again. The gradual consolidation of democracy, the
incorporation of the vanquished of the Civil War into the
political process, continuing economic development, entry
into the EU (January 1981), the alternation of
Left-and-Right-of-Center parties in power, and the
establishment of strict civilian control over the Armed
Forces, have permitted Greece to move in the direction of
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becoming a “civil society.” Pluralistic discourse and the rise
of independent and antagonistic media (radio and television
that had been previously state controlled) have also
permitted the kind of complex public exchange that reduces
dogmatism and challenges Manichean (light vs. darkness)
oversimplifications.
A Path toward Greek-Turkish Reconciliation.
The points of friction between Greece and Turkey are
multiple, and much ink has been spilled in description,
analysis, and interpretation of these problems as well as in
the presentation of a variety of Greek-oriented, Turkish2
oriented, and third-party perspectives.
Regardless of the merits and demerits of the case of each
of the disputants, the central question that needs to be
asked is whether Greece and Turkey, which have been
involved in an undisguised Cold War since the mid- to
late-1950s, will be better off in a condition of protracted
conflict, as compared to entering into a new phase of mutual
and active engagement and even cooperation.
Unequivocally, the answer is that both countries would be
much better off if they were to reach a final reconciliation, a
new historic compromise, reminiscent of the Lausanne
settlement of 1923, and the Venizelos-Ataturk treaty of
friendship of 1930.
The Imia islets and Cyprus crises of 1996, however,
underscore the ease with which a state of protracted tension
between the two countries may degenerate into organized
violence and warfare. Hopefully, the leaderships in Greece
and Turkey will have realized by now that Greek-Turkish
war is unthinkable because, to begin with, it will isolate
both belligerants from their Western institutional
affiliations. Further, even if Greece or Turkey were to
secure some marginal territorial gains after some initial
battles, a chain of revanchist conflicts will surely follow,
classifying both countries as high risk zones with a
devastating impact on their economies and societies.
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The ingredients of a lasting settlement, given the
current international setting, can only be based on the
assumption that Turkey will cement its West European
profile. Greece, since 1974, has developed durable and
tested democratic institutions and has become a member of
the EU. Turkey is currently at the crossroads of the great
choice between a European and a non-European
orientation. Like post-World War II France and Germany,
Turkey and Greece can bury the geopolitical divisions of the
past, accept and respect the territorial status quo that
emerged after World War II, and resolve to proscribe the use
of the force in their bilateral relations.
A comprehensive Greek-Turkish settlement will most
likely not be achieved without a just and mutually
acceptable solution to the prickly problem of Cyprus.
Cyprus has long been at the center of Greek-Turkish issues
and still remains so. As long as the present situation in
Cyprus continues, whereby the armed forces of Turkey
occupy 37 percent of the island’s territory, Greek-Turkish
relations will remain tense, and a solution to Cyprus
question will most likely not be forthcoming.
A genuine settlement of the Cyprus problem, which is
3
today “ripe” for a solution, would exclude enosis (union of
Cyprus with Greece) and taksim (partition of the island).
The historic compromise, therefore, calls for independence
of a federal, bizonal, and bicommunal state, along the lines
of the Makarios-Denktash (1977) and Kyprianou-Denktash
(1979) agreements. Furthermore, Greece and Turkey
cannot, and must not, attempt to impose a settlement on
Cyprus. Reconciliation and peace in Cyprus are matters for
4
the two Cypriot communities to agree upon.
The new state of Cyprus that will emerge, following a
putative agreement between the representatives of the
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, will be given an
excellent chance to survive and prosper if, at the time of its
second birth, the “Federal Republic of Cyprus” were to
become simultaneously a member state of the EU and, if
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deemed desirable, NATO. EU membership, together with
genuine collective guarantees, demilitarization (except for
the British sovereign base areas), and a United Nations
(U.N.) or preferably a NATO-commanded multinational
implementation force (until mutual confidence is
established), will allow the troubled Cypriots to forge
gradually a long-lived unity based on all the rights, duties,
and freedoms that democracy provides.
A genuine settlement of Cyprus, while presupposing
political equality of the two communities, cannot rest on a
premise equating (in terms of shares of territory, gross
national product, and federal parliamentary and executive
powers) the 80 percent of the Greek-Cypriot community
with the 18 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot community. In
fact, all states and governments in the ethnically volatile
Balkan and eastern Mediterranean regions must begin to
abide by a simple and logical rule of behavior; otherwise, the
chance of having peace in the region will be very slim. This
rule could be articulated as follows: “Treat minority
communities and other dual identity groups residing in
your own country as well as you would expect third
countries to treat minorities and other dual-identity groups
that are ethnically related to you.” For example, Greece
should treat its Moslem (i.e., Turkic, Pomak, and Roma
minority in western Thrace as well as it would like Albania
to treat the Greek minority in southern Albania. Similarly,
Turkey should treat (i.e., offer similar rights and
guarantees) its Kurdish community in eastern Turkey as
well as it would prefer Turkish minority communities to be
treated outside of Turkey, whether in Cyprus, Greece,
Bulgaria, or elsewhere. Albania, to give one more example,
should treat the Greek minority in southern Albania as well
as it would like Albanian minorities living in neighboring
states to be treated. One could proceed offering examples
involving a variety of states with ethnically heterogeneous
populations in the eastern Mediterranean and Balkans, as
well as in other parts in the world.
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Turning to the Aegean dispute, a much needed historic
compromise between Greece and Turkey must rest on two
general and two operational principles of foreign policy
behavior. The first general principle involves the mutual
denunciation of the use of force by Greece and Turkey (e.g.,
by both countries signing and ratifying a non-aggression
pact). The second general principle, which follows from the
first, is that the Greek-Turkish dispute(s) in the Aegean will
follow the road of peaceful settlement involving time-tested
methods such as bilateral negotiations and, in case of
deadlocks, arbitration and adjudication.
The two operational principles apply to Turkey and
Greece respectively. For the benefit of Turkey and other sea
faring countries traversing the Aegean, it must be made
clear that the sea will not be transformed into a “Greek
lake.” For the benefit of Greece, it also must be made clear
that the Aegean cannot be partitioned or subdivided in any
fashion that encloses (enclaves) Greek territories such as
the Dodecanese and eastern Aegean islands into a zone (or
zones) of Turkish functional jurisdiction. The two principles
together add up to the mutual acceptance of the status quo
and the mutual commitment to exclude force as an
instrument of policy in the relations of the two countries.
Concluding Remarks.
Looking from a Greek perspective at the record of
Greek-Turkish relations since the July 1997 Madrid
summit, the optimist would say the glass is half full, the
pessimist would retort it was half empty, and the
pragmatist might say to both “get a smaller glass.” The
arguments that the optimists tend to employ include the
following: Greece’s domestic conditions (political and
economic) have improved considerably since the days of the
Papandreou succession saga (November 1995-July 1996);
Greece has a prime-minister with a pragmatic and
Eurocentric orientation who has managed to establish
control over his party, while enjoying a comfortable
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majority in parliament and projecting a credible image
abroad. The party of the loyal opposition, under youthful
and modernizing leadership, has lowered the tones of
criticism on vital foreign policy questions abandoning a
“tradition” in Greek politics of automatic dissent on all
issues in order to score points with the permanently
frustrated Greek public. In Madrid (1997) the Turkish
President (with the implicit blessing of his armed forces)
committed his country to the non-use of force and to the
employment of peaceful process for the settlement of
disputes. The obdurate behavior of leaders such as Rauf
Denktash and Bulent Ecevit has met with mildly to highly
critical responses in the international community, and
Turkey (and the Turkish Cypriots) is singled out as
primarily responsible for the lack of progress in the tortuous
Cypriot peace process. All this is happening while the
inflation of Greece is falling toward the 2.5 percent mark,
and the remaining Maastricht (EMU qualification) criteria
are within plausible striking distance before the end of
1999.
The pessimist, wearing dark glasses, shakes his/her
head and dismisses the above as reflecting a mixture of
utopian thinking and mirage-making. For the pessimist,
the Maastricht regime is being pursued at the expense of the
poor and disadvantaged in Greece. Turkey is continuing,
despite Madrid, to escalate its revisionist demands in the
Aegean and in Cyprus, and the “good boy” approach adopted
by the current Greek government is being perceived in
Ankara as a sign of weakness. Exhibiting a longing for the
now gone “strong, proud, and charismatic” leadership, the
pessimists are sounding the alarm for the declining Greek
population that is “turning decadent, consumerist, selfish,
and, at best, indifferent.” Greece, for the pessimist, still has
a chance to survive if it arms well, abandons wishful
thinking, trusts less on the so-called solidarity of its
European partners, and embarks on an international
crusade condemning Turkey for its miserable human rights
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record and for its reliance on force so as to attain its foreign
policy objectives.
At first blush, one might think that both approaches
make sense and, in Nasreddin Hodza fashion, might
pronounce them both right! Obviously both optimists and
pessimists have similar long-range objectives. They both
want a Turkey that respects the international status quo in
the Aegean and permits the peace process in the Republic of
Cyprus to continue as accession talks for its admission to
the EU are proceeding toward their logical conclusion. Both
optimists and pessimists have no illusions about the
chances of Turkey (given the current fluidities and
contradictions in its society, economy, and polity) opening
the gates of a historic reconciliation with Greece. Both
optimists and pessimists agree that effective deterrence
vis-à-vis Turkey depends first and foremost on the
maintenance of a sufficient balance of power, while
avoiding—if possible—a costly and destabilizing arms race.
But here the similarities end.
The optimists believe that a policy of European
integration adds considerably to Greece’s diplomatic
calculus of deterrence. The pessimists, on the contrary, are
unilateralist and ethnocentric in orientation. The optimists
argue that a policy of tension-reduction is to Greece’s
advantage, given its privileged condition in political and
economic terms. The pessimists retort that time is working
in favor of the rapidly growing (in population and military
prowess) Turkey. Between the lines, one reads in the
pessimist argument that eventually war is inevitable, and
their conclusion is “si vis pacis para bellus.” Finally, for the
optimists, ultimately, the argument is summarized with
“how can we avoid war without losing in peace.”
This writer shares the problematique of the optimists
and believes that the objective of Greece should be to engage
Turkey in a patient, clear-sighted, and long-range
campaign in order to convince it that its own best choice is
the Euro-Atlantic community of nations. This strategy calls
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for a collectively orchestrated stance of offering “conditional
rewards” to our complex and vacillating eastern neighbor.
The Turks will hopefully realize that Europe offers them the
best future and that in order to join its family fully, they
must abandon rusty, geopolitical instruments of statecraft.
The desired result may take time, but there seems to be no
better way whether one wears rosy or dark glasses.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10
1. The literature on post-Cold War systemic changes is vast and
growing. On the side of those predicting a new world order founded on a
concert of great powers that projects the values of pluralism, democracy,
and market economy, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and
the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992; and Charles A. Kupchan and
Clifford A. Kupchan, “The Promise of Collective Security,” International
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, pp. 52-61. On the other side,
predicting the return of history in a world of great conflict, see Samual P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996; and Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century, New York:
Scribner, 1993.
2. For a detailed and detached review of the positions taken by
Greece and Turkey on their bilateral dispute(s), see Andrew Wilson, The
Aegean Dispute, Adelphi Paper No. 15., London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 1979-80; see also Theodore A. Couloumbis, The
United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle, New York:
Praeger, 1983; Thanos Veremis, “Greece,” in Douglas T. Stuart, ed.,
Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance,
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1988, pp. 137-156; Ali L.
Karaosmanglou, “Turkey’s Security Policy: Continuity and Change,” in
Douglas T. Stuart, ed., Politics and Security in the Southern Region of
the Atlantic Alliance, pp. 157-180; Tozun Bahcheli, Greek-Turkish
Relations Since 1955, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990; and Monteagle
Stearns, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and
Cyprus, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992.
3. In the view of the author, the end of the Cold War offers powerful
incentives to the parties in the dispute (Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities) to proceed with a settlement which would add to all
Cypriot citizens’ welfare and security by facilitating the entry of Cyprus
into the EU and its defense umbrella, NATO.

261

4. It should be noted, however, that any settlement that does not
enjoy the concurrence of Greece and Turkey will be less likely to take
hold and succeed, given both Cypriot communities’ close affinities with
Greece and Turkey respectively.
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CHAPTER 11
TURKISH SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN THE 1990s
Duygu Bazoglu Sezer

Introduction.
This study will use the term “security” to refer primarily
to its external dimension rather than internal, and to the
political-military aspect of security rather than its purely
political, diplomatic, and social aspects.
It is nobody’s secret that Turkey is faced with a domestic
challenge to its territorial integrity in the form of Kurdish
separatism led by the the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK)
since 1984. It is also widely known that the Kurdish
question has negatively penetrated several areas of Turkish
foreign policy, souring Turkey’s diplomatic and military
relations with many of its traditional friends and allies. Two
developments in September 1998 have caused a deep sense
of disillusionment in Turkey: the re-sponsorship by
Washington of preparations for Kurdish autonomy in
Northern Iraq, and the meeting of the so-called “Kurdish
deputies” at the Italian parliament with several Italian
parliamentarians on September 29.
This paper will limit the discussion of the role of the PKK
for Turkish security to those cases where its manipulation
of the external environment to enhance its ability to weaken
the Turkish resolve to resist has been narrowing the
threshold of human and material damage acceptable by
Turkey. The sanctuary and direct assistance provided to the
leadership of the PKK by Syria is the most glaring example
of such cases. For years Turkey has maintained that the
freedom enjoyed by the PKK in Syria and the Bekaa Valley
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in Lebanon allows it to consolidate its power base so as to
inflict increasingly greater, and therefore unacceptable,
damage to Turkey. In early October 1998, Turkish and
Syrian troops stood face-to-face across the border following
the Turkish warning of October 1 to Damascus that it either
cease to nurture the PKK or else face the consequences.
This paper will first survey the main features of the new
security environment for Turkey, then follow with a
discussion of the specific challenges as seen by it.
The New Security Environment.
Turkey has been in the forefront of those countries
whose security situation has dramatically shifted in the
1990s. This shift has entailed two contradictory directions,
one positive, the other negative.
On the positive side, the end of the Cold War has
removed the threat of war between the United States and
the former Soviet Union which, according to conventional
strategic wisdom, would have escalated to the nuclear level
at some point.
Turkey, situated directly on the former Soviet Union’s
southwestern borders and hence forming the most
southeastern flank of NATO, most plausibly would have
been physically drawn into such potentially cataclysmic
war. The end of the Cold War appears to have greatly
diminished the plausibility of such war. This has been an
enormous relief for Turkey, the target of outright nuclear
intimidation and attempted blackmail by Soviet leaders
several times during the height of the Cold War.
However, the anticipation of near-perfect security and
the concomitant peace dividend that the phasing out of the
Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union
heralded in the early 1990s for the world, in general, and for
Transatlantic nations, in particular, has proven to be
largely illusory for Turkey. Granted, the threat of general
war seems to have been greatly reduced, and Russia, the
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sole nuclear weapons successor state to the former Soviet
Union, is much, much weakened. Yet, the regional
environment around Turkey breeds both old and new types
of political and military risks and threats that challenge, at
times intrinsically and at others extrinsically, the core
prerequisite of Turkish security. I define that core
prerequisite as “the preservation of Turkey’s will and ability
to maintain its domestic unity and socio-economic viability
as a democratically-governed, independent political entity
while at the same time keeping intact the country’s
territorial integrity.”
The Crescent of Instability.
A crescent of instability encircles Turkey almost full
circle: from the Balkans in the north, down to the Aegean in
the west and the eastern Mediterranean in the southwest,
through the northern Gulf in the south, and, finally, to the
Caucasus in the northeast. No other part of the world—not
even Northeast Asia— parallels this multi-regional
crescent of instability in terms of its vast space, the number
of inter-state and intra-state conflicts, the number of fragile
cease-fires, the coercive involvement of the world’s most
powerful military alliance, namely NATO, for peacemaking,
etc. Turkey is the only land bridge that physically connects
the three sub-regions of instability situated in two
continents, Asia and Europe.
This exposure to several regions of instability might
have direct and indirect bearing on Turkish interests. For
example, Turkish interests would be adversely affected if
some of the regional conflicts resulted in the violation of the
security interests of those states in the region that are
friendly towards Turkey, like Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Albania, Macedonia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Second,
developments that would usher in a radical shift in the
regional configuration of power through irredentist policies
and/or coalition-building would threaten Turkish interests
by undermining its relative standing in the region. During
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the 4-year war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the idea of a possible
Greater Serbia and a Greek-Serbian-Russian (Orthodox)
Alliance were feared, both for their impact generally on the
Balkan balance of power and specifically on what they
would imply for Turkey’s place in that balance. Turkey
would be outnumbered and outmaneuvered.
The crescent of instability around Turkey presents it
with direct challenges as well. For example, the intention of
Iran, Syria and Iraq to obtain weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) capability of one sort or another purportedly to
counter Israeli capabilities presents a direct challenge to
Turkish security. Or, the presence of Russian military bases
and troops in the southern Caucasus (not only for
peacekeeping in Abkhasia but also to man the military
bases in Georgia and Armenia, and to stand guard at the
Armenian-Turkish and Georgian-Turkish borders)
certainly is not a source of security for Turkey. Such specific
challenges to Turkish security will be discussed in more
detail in the following pages.
Transformation of the Western Alliance.
The seriousness of the instabilities and vulnerabilities
in the 1990s emanating from the regions around Turkey
acquires added significance against the background of the
transformation that the Western alliance has undergone
since 1990, in response to the elimination of the Soviet
threat and the emergence of regional conflicts such as the
wars in the former Yugoslavia. Thus, NATO is no longer the
NATO of the Cold War years. More specifically, the
relevance of Article 5 is very much in doubt under today’s
circumstances. This implies that Turkey, or any other ally
on the flanks, should have less confidence than it might
have had during the Cold War that the principle of collective
defense would be invoked in case of aggression against it.
Moreover, Turkey is only an Associate Member of the West
European Union (WEU), by virtue of the fact that it is not,
nor is it likely to be, a member of the European Union (EU).
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Other institutions of the post-Cold War security
architecture in Europe have not been designed to offer hard
protection or assurances, anyway. As a result, NATO ally
Turkey can no longer count on its protection, presumably
still in force.
Security Challenges in the 1990s: Old and New.
While for the sake of convenience one can categorize
today’s security challenges as “new,” and “old,” one would
need to note the interconnections and linkages among them.
Through a process of cross-mutation, new and old
challenges get tied to each other at various junctures of time
and space, thus acquiring complex and novel new
dimensions. For example, the security challenge from
Greece is old, but it has acquired altogether new dimensions
in the 1990s when Athens is pursuing a strategy of the
encirclement of Turkey by promoting an anti-Turkish
coalition among Greece, Syria and Armenia, three
neighboring countries not reputed for their friendship for
Turkey.
The Threat from Greece and Cyprus.
The perception of Greece as the single most important
security threat is at its zenith today in Turkey. This is ironic
compared to the nearly half a century of the Cold War when
this perception was not so all-pervasive, but when the two
countries even went to the brink of war several times.
There is a qualitative difference in the nature of the
Greek threat in the post-Cold War era. Previously, Greece
posed a threat to Turkish interests in the Aegean and
Cyprus. In the 1980s, immediately upon winning entry into
the European Union (European Community then), it
concentrated its diplomatic energies on barring Turkey’s
admission into the processes of European integration. Thus,
the primary Greek objectives with regard to Turkey were to
gain exclusive control over the Aegean, and indirectly over
Cyprus; and, to secure Turkey’s exclusion from Europe.
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In the changed circumstances of the 1990s, Greek
strategic objectives with regard to Turkey have been
broadened to include the following: 1) to entertain, in Greek
strategic planning, the possibility that Turkey might be
headed for dismemberment by Kurdish separatism
spearheaded by the PKK; and, 2) to promote the formation
of an anti-Turkey regional coalition in Turkey’s immediate
neighborhood in the south and east by exploiting the strains
in Turkey’s relations with Syria and Armenia. The following
pages will discuss Turkish views of the two new elements in
the Greek strategy towards Turkey in the 1990s. The
traditional conflict over the Aegean and Cyprus and the
struggle to bar Turkey from Europe will not be addressed
here.
The logic behind the two new elements incorporated into
Greek strategic thinking with regard to Turkey was simple.
A Turkey that might be embroiled in a country-wide civil
war against Kurdish separatism; a Turkey that might be
isolated by and subjected to the pressures of a coalition of
unfriendly forces on its borders in the south and the east;
thus a Turkey that would find itself much beleaguered
domestically and externally would give Greece the freedom
to pursue the realization of its objectives on the Aegean, and
possibly also those on the western coasts of Turkey.
Turkey has repeatedly charged that Greece, encouraged
into such thinking by the PKK’s terrorist successes, has
viewed the latter as a natural ally in its struggle against
Turkey, extending it political and material support in order
to facilitate the division of Turkey at no cost to itself.
Clearly Kurdish separatism and its terrorist arm, the
PKK, have played into the hands of Turkey’s antagonists in
the immediate region. Any country with grievances against
Turkey theoretically could, and in many cases actually have
used the issue to pressure Turkey into “correct behavior.”
This has been true most critically for Syria, and to a lesser
degree for Iraq, Iran, Armenia, and Russia. While most
European countries and Washington have tried to deal with
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the challenge posed to Turkish territorial integrity by
Kurdish separatism by applying a human rights
perspective and an anti-terrorism posture, Turkey’s
neighbors in the east have been bound by no such
constraints that inherently showed deference to the
systemic features and norms of the international order
which honor the territorial integrity of states. Generally
speaking, Turkey’s immediate neighbors have viewed the
issue of Kurdish separatism more like a zero-sum game
whose successful exploitation was anticipated to serve their
respective self-interest. In the event that Turkey ultimately
lost to the separatists and was divided, in the zero-sum
thinking Turkey’s loss would automatically result in gains
for them, above all for Greece and Syria.
It is in this frame of mind that Turkey has been watching
with concern the progression of national and regional
initiatives towards the creation of what appears to be an
anti-Turkey grouping in its immediate vicinity,
spearheaded by Greece and Syria. The first formal
manifestation of this process was the signing of a defense
cooperation agreement between Greece and Syria in June
1995. In response to expressions of concern by Turkey, Syria
apparently immediately assured Ankara that the
agreement did not give Greece a right to use Syrian air
bases.
Between 1995-98, the diplomatic horizon of Greece
vastly expanded as it concerned Greece’s anti-Turkish
strategy. Greece simultaneously engaged in a bilateral and
multilateral diplomatic campaign, first, to establish good
working relations with Damascus, Teheran and Erevan on a
one-on-one basis, and, second, to promote the idea of a
regional grouping between Greece, a Balkan country, and
three physically and culturally distant countries among
whom no tradition of institutionalized multilateral
cooperation had ever existed before. All of a sudden in 1995,
Greece decided to launch a diplomatic initiative and to
present itself as a leading external force willing and capable
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of making a contribution to regional peace and stability to
the east of Turkey.
Since 1995, a pattern of annual consultations called
Trilateral Meetings have taken shape among Greece, Iran,
and Armenia with the participation of their respective
foreign ministers. The first meeting took place in Athens in
1995, the second in Teheran in 1996, and the third in Athens
in 1997. The fourth, and final, Trilateral Meeting was held
in Teheran on September 9, 1998. In the meantime,
numerous high-level bilateral visits have been exchanged
among the three capitals during which a series of trade,
communications, energy, and military cooperation
agreements were concluded.
What is important at this point is the perception that an
anti-Turkey impulse appears to have energized the
momentum for cooperation among Greece, Syria, Teheran,
and Armenia since 1995. The fact that these contacts have
not yet assumed a militarily significant phase capable of
posing a coordinated military challenge to Turkey fades in
significance from a long term perspective. What one is
witnessing in the Athens-Syria-Teheran-Erevan
interaction is a process that has the potential to be
dangerous to Turkey’s long-term interests. No country
would feel safe in the long term if and when it is encircled by
a potential coalition of three hostile states, namely Greece,
Syria, and Armenia. The Iranian motive in joining this
explicitly antagonistic grouping is more ambivalent, more
complex.
In summary, Turkey at this point can only determine the
presence of the Greek intention to leapfrog to Turkey’s east
in order make life difficult for Turkey in its own vicinity. The
arguments and statements of officials like Defense Minister
Yerasimos Arsenis, who have declared that Greece should
conclude military alliances with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Armenia,
Russia, and Bulgaria to establish an anti-Turkish bloc,
verify the Greek thinking behind these developments.
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The military cooperation agreement between Turkey
and Israel reached in February 1996 should be seen against
the background, first and foremost, of growing
Greek-Syrian ties in 1995. While the Arab world has reacted
to Turkish-Israeli military cooperation angrily, they have
failed to take into account the impact of Greek-Syrian
defense cooperation on Turkish perceptions of threat.
Cyprus.
Two developments in the 1990s concerning Cyprus pose
serious challenges to Turkish security—the decision by the
EU to admit Cyprus as a full member at the end of accession
negotiations, and the purchase by Nicosia of reportedly 30
S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia for deployment in
southern Cyprus in Fall 1998.
Turkey is opposed to the accession of Cyprus to the EU
above all else on the argument that the Guarantee
Agreements of 1960 rule out the accession of Cyprus before
that of Turkey. In other words, the proposed accession of
Cyprus to the EU would be in violation of the international
agreements that created the republic in the first
place—until after Turkey has joined.
Obviously neither the arguments of Ankara nor the
Turkish-Cypriot government’s opposition to being excluded
from the accession negotiations (except on the EU’s own
terms) have carried weight before Brussels. The Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Ankara have
been forced to seek their own solution to coping with the
approaching new order on the island: the Greek part of the
island becoming EU-territory, and the Turkish part of the
island being left to struggle for survival in the shadow of a
hostile neighbor protected now by the EU hat. The answer
has been agreement for eventual integration between the
two. Clearly, this is not the best of solutions for the
long-term interests of either the Turkish-Cypriots or of
Turkey. On the other hand, Brussel’s decision to admit
Cyprus in the first round of EU enlargement has set in
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motion this dynamic that has inherently invited a new,
perhaps irreversible stage in over 20 years of transitional de
facto division of the island.
Developments in the military field are not promising
either. The upgrading of military relations between Athens
and Nicosia with the signing of a military cooperation
agreement and the adoption of a joint defense doctrine in
1993-94, and the planned deployment of Russian-made
S-300 air-defense missiles at the recently opened air base at
Paphos are all very serious challenges to Turkish security.
Turkey has warned that it would not tolerate their
deployment. Greece, for its part, has declared that it would
view Turkish military strikes against Greek-Cyprus a casus
belli.
In summary, the triangular relations between Greece,
Turkey, and Cyprus have reached an unprecedented level of
complexity and tension since mid-1990s. In addition, with
the planned deployment of the S-300 SAMs on Cyprus,
Russia will have gained, for the first time in history, a direct
military/technical presence on the island. Moscow and some
circles in the West argue that the sale of these weapons
systems to Cyprus is a commercial rather than a strategic
deal. However, simple strategic logic defies this argument;
that logic dictates that a power like Russia not overlook the
enormous strategic advantages such a deal would accrue to
its power position in the eastern Mediterranean especially
at a time when NATO’s eastward expansion, the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities in Central Asia, and
the West’s intense engagement in the Caspian Sea region
have been taken very hard by the Russian political class.
On The Brink of War with Syria.
On October 1, 1998, Turkey issued the strongest
warning to Syria to date to immediately stop supporting
PKK-terrorism or face Turkish retaliation. In the days
since, diplomatic channels and mediation attempts by
Egypt and Iran have somewhat defused the anticipation of a
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Turkish-Syrian war. This does not rule out, however, the
possible use of force at some point in the near future for, as
the leaderships of all major political parties have agreed,
Syria’s role in PKK terrorism has reached intolerable
proportions, and Turkey is using its right of self-defense
when threatening the use of force. The Turkish action thus
comes at a moment when there is a national consensus that
the country will not tolerate more damage from PKK
terrorism that is sheltered and materially aided by Turkey’s
neighbors, most dangerously by Syria.
Is there a reasonable motive for Syria to harbor
ill-feelings for Turkey? The answer lies in the following:
Syria is a country which refuses to recognize Turkey’s
international boundaries, claiming for itself the province of
Hatay, which acceded to Turkey in 1939 following a 20-year
French protection since the end of World War I, which saw
the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab and
Balkan lands. Damascus and Baghdad also resent Turkey’s
grandiose dam projects on the Euphrates River, which it has
been developing on an accelerated pace only over the last 20
years. No other major upstream country has waited this
long to exploit the water resources it derives from such
major transboundary river systems, willfully allowing the
downstream countries to get unlimited benefits from
unlimited flow of water. On the basis of a Turkish-Syrian
agreement worked out during the tenure of Prime Minister
Turgut Ozal, Turkey is obligated to release 500 cubic meters
of water per second at the Turkish-Syrian border, an
obligation which it has been faithfully honoring.
Northern Iraq.
Northern Iraq is another sancutary from where the PKK
has conducted its operations against Turkey with impunity.
The transformation of Northern Iraq virtually into a no
man’s land following the Gulf War, with Kurdish warlords
roaming the area, has allowed the PKK the freedom to
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engage in a campaign of inflicting unacceptable damage to
Turkey in human and material terms.
Clearly, the unsettled question of the future status of
Iraq in the regional order nourishes a most destabilizing
neighborhood for Turkey. Control over Northern Iraq by
Baghdad would most probably have curtailed the most
destructive aspects of PKK activity. President Saddam
Hussein is frustrated with Turkey primarily because of the
latter’s support of the Gulf War and the United Nations
(U.N.) resolutions, and therefore takes anti-Turkey
positions at times. Bilateral relations would be normalized,
however, if Iraq resumed a normal place in the region—
which would, in the first instance, require it to honor its
disarmament obligations to the U.N.
The PKK is only one dimension, the armed dimension, of
the question of Northern Iraq. As mentioned in the
Introduction, the political and diplomatic dimension of the
future of Northern Iraq is of utmost importance to Turkish
security. Turks feels that any federated Kurdish state in
Northern Iraq would affect Turkish security extremely
negatively—hence the deep concern over Washington’s
revival of Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq.
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Three countries in the Middle East which are known by
the international community either to have had some type
of WMD capability or to entertain the intention eventually
to develop it are Iraq, Syria, and Iran. All three are also
noted for their ballistic missile capability. These very
countries are Turkey’s immediate neighbors. Turkey, for its
part, possesses neither the capability in any of these
weapons nor the intention to develop them.
Of the three, the potential threat from Iraq’s WMD and
missile capabilities have been eliminated to an important
extent as a result of UNSCOM’s operations on the ground in
Iraq—until they were halted by Baghdad last summer.
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There is no assurance, however, that Baghdad will desist
from a concerted effort to reacquire WMD capability in the
event that Saddam Hussein somehow succeeds in ridding
Iraq of UNSCOM’s thorough and intrusive inspections in
the future.
Until recently, Turkey tended to rationalize the growing
WMD missile capability to its south in the context of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, believing that Israel was the potential
target. However, the current confrontation with Syria has
sharpened the sense of danger to Turkey from Syrian
missiles and chemical weapons, just as the Gulf War in 1991
had done concerning Iraqi missiles and chemical weapons.
We did not know then that Iraq had virtually mastered
nuclear weapons capability. Iran’s nuclear and missile
programs are serious potential security challenges not just
to Turkey, but to the region as a whole. Iran insists that its
nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, and that it has
passed the IAEA inspections that verified Iran’s compliance
with the NPT. American and Israeli intelligence
communities believe otherwise, pressuring Russia, Iran’s
major source of supply of nuclear technology, not to sell
sensitive technologies to Iran. Under pressure from U.S.
President William Clinton shortly before the U.S.-Russia
summit in Moscow in 1995, Russian President Boris Yeltsin
agreed not to sell Iran gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment
technology, which could be used to make bomb-grade
uranium, and not to train Iranian nuclear physicists.
This incident was illuminating also from another
perspective: that such a critical deal could be made without
authorization by the Kremlin or the Russian Foreign
Ministry, as neither the Kremlin nor the Foreign Ministry
purportedly had prior knowledge of the intention of then
Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov to sell
this technology to Iran.
Amid the controversy about Iran’s real intentions
concerning nuclear weapons, Turkey and other non-nuclear
weapon states in the region will have to keep in mind that
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Iraq advanced towards a nuclear weapons capability
clandestinely, while at the same time seeming to adhere to
the NPT.
In July 1998, Iran successfully tested the Shahab-3
medium-range missile. Iranian officials described the
test-firing as a defensive move aimed at creating a balance
in the region, meaning specifically a balance that would
neutralize the American presence in the Gulf. The
demonstration of Iran’s medium-range missile capability is
certainly not a welcome development from the perspective
of Turkey, especially in view of the fact that Iran is strongly
suspected—despite strong denials—of pursuing nuclear
weapons capability. It is interesting that, following the
firing, Iran took pains to send a message virtually to the
whole world that none of its neighbors seemed troubled by
the successful testing of the missile.
Russia.
Turkey and Russia do not contest each other over any
hard sovereignty questions. The closest sovereignty-related
controversy between the two is the Turkish decision since
Summer 1994 to regulate the traffic going through the
Turkish Straits in order to improve the safety and security
of the city of Istanbul and its environs against the potential
risks and hazards of projected increasing volumes of tanker
traffic to be carrying Caspian Sea oil as it is shipped to world
markets. Russia argues that the Turkish move is in
violation of the Montreaux Treaty of 1936 that establishes
the legal regime of these straits. It charges that Turkey is
motivated by a desire to eliminate Russian territory and the
port of Novorossisk as the most attractive route for the
export of Caspian Sea oil to world markets.
The absence of hard sovereignty disagreements has not
meant the absence of political tensions, however. Rivalry for
influence first and foremost in the Southern Caucasus and
secondarily in Central Asia has been the fundamental cause
of the uneasiness in Turkish-Russian relations in the 1990s.
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The competition over the main pipeline that would
transport Caspian Sea oil to world markets is a
manifestation of this rivalry in the economic/commercial
realm with significant long-term political implications.
Chechen separatism in Russia and Kurdish separatism
in Turkey have adversely affected the two countries’ mutual
security perceptions, each accusing the other of instigating
separatism in order to undermine the other’s territorial
integrity. On the other hand, while no Turkish
parliamentarian has been cited for his activities in support
of Chechen separatism, Russia’s Duma members have been.
Russia’s regional diplomacy in general and its arms
exports to Iran and the Greek-Cypriot government in
particular are among the most serious challenges to
Turkish security interests—even if Moscow seems to stand
only in the background. Like Greece, Moscow seems to see
utility in the idea of an anti-Turkey coalition among Greece,
Iran, and Armenia, as suggested by ample evidence in
official and unofficial statements to this effect. As
mentioned before, the Turkish-Israeli military cooperation
agreement of February 1996 emerged against this
background of unfriendly regional diplomacy.
Notwithstanding these tensions, Russia is not likely to
confront Turkey with a conventional threat in the
near-to-medium term for two main reasons: political and
economic stability that underwrites a country’s military
muscle does not seem likely to dawn on the Russian state
and society in the near future, and political and economic
independence in the Southern Caucasus—except in
Armenia—where Russian and Turkish long-term strategic
interests compete with each other most intensely seems to
be getting firmer roots. The nature of Russian-Armenian
relations obviously defies this generalization.
On the other hand, one cannot rule out circumstances
that might lead to another type of Russia, an aggressive
Russia: the coming to power of Russian ultra-nationalists in
Moscow, and a new round of fighting between Armenia and
277

Azerbaijan in which one side might seem to be headed for
defeat. A contingency of this nature might ultimately drive
Turkey and Russia into the imbroglio, the former to defend
Azerbaijan and the latter to defend Armenia. Russian
military bases and Russian troops in their various roles
scattered around Georgia and Armenia—and directly at the
borders with Turkey—and upgraded forces of the North
Caucasus Military District legitimized in the CFE’s
adaptation in 1997 will undoubtedly be activated in order to
repulse any Turkish action against Armenia. If things do
not go right in such a contingency, Russia might be tempted
to resort either to nuclear blackmail, or failing to get Turkey
to retreat, might use limited nuclear strikes. The official
military doctrine and Russian elite’s thinking about the
utility of tactical nuclear weapons in regional conflicts have
already set in place the conceptual and political framework
to make resort to tactical nuclear weapons in such
contingencies politically acceptable and legitimate.
Conclusion.
As the discussion in the previous pages suggest, Turkish
security perceptions are dominated primarily by concerns
over long-term Greek intentions to gain control over the
Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, and over the
multi-faceted regional strategy of encirclement that it has
been pursuing since mid-1990s to realize those aims.
Syrian claims on the Turkish province of Hatay and
implicit claims by a newly independent Armenia on parts of
eastern Turkey have turned them into potential allies of
Greece. It appears that in the new scheme of things in Greek
strategic thinking, a weakened and possibly divided Turkey
would cease to be an obstacle to the realization of Greek
aspirations in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.
The challenge of Kurdish separatism to Turkish
security, a challenge with powerful domestic roots, has
nevertheless been magnified in its scope only in conjunction
with the nurturing it has been receiving from the external
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environment. Turks believe that Syria, and to a lesser
extent Iraq and Iran, have been extending material support
to the PKK, recognized as a terrorist organization by several
leading governments in Europe and by Washington. This
belief has been documented by Turkish authorities—hence
the recent confrontation with Syria. PKK terrorism and the
support it receives from Turkey’s neighbors not only
threaten Turkish territorial integrity, but they forestall the
consolidation of Turkish democracy.
The consequences of attempts by Turkey’s revisionist
neighbors to tamper with the territorial integrity of Turkey
would, if eventually successful, naturally be extremely
destabilizing for a very broad region stretching from the
Balkans to the Persian Gulf and to Central Asia,
threatening the geopolitical status quo for nearly two dozen
countries inhabiting this vast space.
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CHAPTER 12
GREEK-TURKISH RIVALRY
AND THE MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY
DILEMMA
R. Craig Nation

Introduction.
In the best of all possible worlds, Greece and Turkey
would be pillars of stability amidst the turbulence of
southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. With
their privileged access to European institutions,
substantial economic prospects, and powerful state
traditions, they have multiple assets that could be brought
to bear to help promote development and security. In
reality, however, existing Greek-Turkish relations present
a depressingly diverse aspect. Athens and Ankara are arch
rivals, whose mutual enmity often approaches the level of
preoccupation. Rather than contributing to a resolution of
the Mediterranean security dilemma, Greece and Turkey
are among its biggest progenitors.
Greek-Turkish rivalry is unusual in that the
protagonists are very unevenly matched. Greece is a small
Balkan state with a population of 10.5 million, but also a
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European
Union (EU) member with an international agenda
dominated by its relationship with institutionalized
Europe. Turkey has a large and rapidly growing population
of almost 65 million. It has European aspirations but also a
significant Asian frontier, and it confronts an international
situation that is extremely threatening and complex, “at the
centre of a crescent-shaped wedge of territory stretching
from Kazakhstan to the Gulf and Suez and finally to the
North African coast, containing the most volatile collection
1
of states in the world.”
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Like Greece, Turkey has been a NATO member since
1952, but its relationship with the EU is contentious. It has
assumed significant commitments in the war-torn
Caucasus and Central Asian regions since the break-up of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), its relations
with Syria and Iraq are potentially explosive, and it
confronts an open-ended domestic insurrection in
2
Kurdestan with important international ramifications.
Greece and Turkey are highly militarized—Turkey devotes
3.8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product to defense
spending and Greece 4.7 percent (against a NATO average
of 2.2 percent), and both have launched ambitious military
build-ups. There is, however, little doubt that the Turkish
side has the wherewithal to prevail in an armed
confrontation. Turkish Gross Domestic Product is
approximately 1.5 times that of Greece, and in purely
military terms, Turkey enjoys something like a 4-1 ratio of
superiority, with 594,000 men at arms (477,000 in land
armies, 63,000 in the air force, and 54,000 in marine forces)
compared to a Greek force of 168,700 (116,000 on land,
33,000 in the air, and 19,700 at sea).
Despite its physical superiority, the unresolved conflict
impacts negatively upon Turkey’s foreign policy agenda as
well. Ankara’s long-standing goal of accession to the EU has
been sacrificed on the alter of Greek-Turkish rivalry, and in
view of the many and substantial challenges that it
confronts on other fronts, eternal bickering with Greece
might well be portrayed as a luxury, if not an extravagance.
The rivalry is nonetheless alive and well, irrespective of the
constant ministrations of NATO, the good will of
innumerable mediators and profferers of good offices, and
the real best interests of almost all those involved.
There are at least two reasons why this is so. First,
though sometimes concerned as much with symbol as with
substance, Greek-Turkish rivalry is deeply rooted and
complex, with multiple dimensions that have tended over
time to become mutually reinforcing. The underlying issues
are neither trivial nor straightforward, and they will
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continue to defy facile solutions. Second, the rivalry is set in
a larger spacial and temporal context, and has been
sensitive to patterns of change in the geostrategic and
historical environment. Greek-Turkish relations are often
discussed on the basis of “ancient hatreds” assumptions
that emphasize their timeless and unchanging
character—what Henry Kissinger has called the “atavistic
3
bitterness” and “primeval hatred of Greeks and Turks.”
But the relationship is also a dynamic one, and at present is
very much conditioned by circumstances specific to the
post-Cold War period.
Historical and Cultural Foundations.
Greek nationalism has three foundations; the legacy of
the great classical civilization of the age of antiquity, the
Byzantine and Orthodox Christian heritage of the Middle
Ages, and the national revival of the modern period. The
classical legacy is timeless and in a sense universal, though
its fundamental importance as a source of specifically Greek
identity is revealed by the furor unleashed by the 19th
century Austrian historian J. P. Fallmerayer’s attempt to
deny an organic link between the modern Greek peoples and
4
their classical ancestors. The conquest of the Orthodox
Christian civilizations of the Balkan peninsula and Aegean
island groups by the expanding Ottoman dynasty in the
14th and 15th centuries, culminating with the fall of
Constantinople in 1453, is almost universally regarded as a
tragedy of epic proportions and the prelude to a dark age of
cultural effacement, the Turkokratia or period of
unadulterated Turkish domination.
Modern Greek national identity is a direct product of the
19th century national revival, waged as a bitter struggle
against Ottoman overlordship beginning with the first
Greek uprising in 1821. The Greek national state, created in
1830 at the behest of the European great powers, included
only about a third of the Greek peoples of the Balkan region.
Thereafter, the Greek state was built up piece by piece, as
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the consequence of a long sequence of wars, diplomatic
maneuvers, and uprisings on behalf of the goal of enosis or
union, inspired by the Megali Idea (Great Idea) of uniting all
the Greek peoples of the Aegean and Anatolia within a
single national entity. In Turkish national memory, this
process is conterminous with the long decline of Ottoman
civilization, and therefore linked with the Turkish peoples
loss of great power status and cultural preeminence.
The tragic culmination of the Megali Idea came at the
end of World War I, with the defeat of the Greek
expeditionary force in Asia Minor at the hands of Mustafa
Kemal’s new Turkish national movement, the fall of
Smyrna in September 1922 and the ensuing massacre of the
city’s Greek and Armenian populations, and the treaty of
Lausanne in 1923. The treaty regularized a Greek-Turkish
border at the expense of the nearly one and a half million
Greek and Turkish refugees forced to participate in an
officially sponsored population transfer. For the Turks, this
is remembered as the “war of independence” whose outcome
ensured the survival of a Turkish national state. For the
Greeks it is “the catastrophe,” a cataclysmic defeat which
brought a violent end to the millennial Hellenic civilization
of Asia Minor. Like other peoples whose national idea rests
upon a cult of martyrdom derived from a long and only
partially realized struggle for independence, the Greeks’
national identity has been culturally constructed as a myth
of resistance to a barbaric, alien, and permanently
menacing other. In the case of Turkey, national identity has
been defined against the foil of rivalry with an eternal Greek
enemy, always ready to take advantage of Turkish
5
weakness, that is simultaneously resented and scorned.
Outside the context of this mythic structure, of course,
Greek-Turkish relations have been considerably more
nuanced. The peace of Lausanne was followed by a period of
rapprochement under the direction of Mustafa Kemal
(Ataturk) and Elefterios Venezelos, architects of war in
1919 but by the late 1920s determined to prioritize the goal
of domestic restructuring and reform. The policy survived
284

its architects, and Greek-Turkish feuding was not a
significant factor in international relations during the
6
period 1930-55. It was only with the rise of anti-British
national agitation in Cyprus that the Greek-Turkish rivalry
made a comeback. In the postwar decades, both Greece and
Turkey were modernizing societies undergoing a process of
traumatic social change, including rapid urbanization,
progress toward universal literacy, and the rise of mass
democratic cultures where the evocation of an “invented”
national tradition against the foil of a despised rival played
well in public forums. On both sides, political elites
manipulated national sentiments to further their quest for
power, in the process conjuring up and exacerbating a
strategic rivalry that would quickly take on a life of its own.
Aegean Issues.
The essence of Greek-Turkish strategic rivalry is the
struggle for physical control of the Aegean and eastern
Mediterranean. This is by any measure a vital interest for
both sides. For Greece, the Aegean represents an essential
part of the national whole, linking the Greek mainland with
major islands and island groups. For Turkey, the Aegean
covers the north-south maritime artery attaching the
Dardanelles to the Mediterranean coast including the port
of Izmir, and the air corridors providing access for civil
aviation toward the west. The Aegean and eastern
Mediterranean also possess geostrategic significance as the
western pole of a commercial axis stretching east and
southward toward the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf.
Marcia Christoff Kurop notes that “the eastern
Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf form a single entity
with Turkey and Egypt providing a continental and
7
maritime bridge between Europe and the Middle East.” For
Margarita Mathiopoulos, the Aegean is “a geopolitical
region of vital interest” as “NATO’s corridor of stability
between Europe, the Middle East, and the former Soviet
8
Asian territories.”
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In the recent past, stability has been in short supply. By
imposing population transfers and clearly delineated
spheres of influence, the treaty of Lausanne was broadly
successful in creating a kind of equilibrium between Greece
and Turkey in the region, but that equilibrium began to
unravel with the emergence of the Cyprus question in the
1950s. By the 1970s, a long list of points of discord had
emerged which continue to defy resolution.
Sovereignty and the Militarization of Strategic
Islands.
There are some 3,000 Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, of
which only about 130 are inhabited. At Lausanne in 1923
and in the 1947 treaty of Paris, which effected the transfer of
the Dodecanese island group from Italy to Greece, Athens
agreed to keep only lightly armed security forces on western
Aegean islands and to refrain from the construction of
fortifications. The militarization of selected islands was
nonetheless begun in 1964, and by the 1970s, over 25,000
Greek soldiers were stationed in the Dodecanese island
group adjacent to Turkey’s Mediterranean coastline, on
Lemnos, Samothrace, and smaller islands near the
entrance to the Dardanelles, and on certain central Aegean
islands.
Greece has argued according to the clausala rebus sic
stantibus that the Montreux Straits Convention of 1936 lifts
the demilitarized status of islands adjacent to the
Dardanelles; that Turkey is not a signatory to the 1947
treaty of Paris and that therefore the Dodecanese can be
armed; and that, especially in the wake of the Cyprus
occupation of 1974 and the creation of a 4th Aegean army
unattached to NATO on the eastern coast of the Turkish
mainland with its headquarters in Izmir in 1975, Greece
perceives a Turkish threat to which it may legitimately
react on the basis of the principle of self-defense under
article 51 of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter. Turkey has
responded that the demilitarization of eastern Aegean
islands is a legal condition of Greek sovereignty; that no
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essential changes in circumstances have occurred; that the
Paris treaty of 1947 also applies to nonsignatories; that the
Montreux convention does not change the status of Lemnos
and adjacent islands; and that there was no prior Turkish
threat motivating Greek actions—Ankara has only taken
countermeasures in the face of severe Greek provocations.
These issues remain unresolved, and the militarized islands
are points of constant friction.
The problem of militarization is complemented by
disputes over sovereignty. The maritime frontier between
the Dodecanese group and the Turkish coast was precisely
delineated in a 1932 agreement between Italy and Turkey,
but since April 1996 Ankara has posed new concerns about
“grey zones” of uncertain sovereignty further to the north,
where the terms of the 1923 Lausanne treaty are less clear,
as well as in the sea of Crete. The Turkish demand for
adjudication of the issue has been portrayed as a means to
obtain leverage in a future comprehensive resolution of
9
Aegean issues, but it also has a strategic dimension. The
sensitivities evoked by the issue were demonstrated when a
January 1996 naval incident posing the issue of sovereignty
over the tiny rock of Imia (Kardak in Turkish), in the
Dodecanese group adjacent to the Bodrun peninsula and the
island of Kos, brought the two Aegean antagonists to the
brink of war. Strong U.S. diplomatic pressure was required
to reverse the course of events, in a scenario that could be
replayed in any number of other settings at almost any
moment.
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.
The issue of control over the Aegean sea bed became a
contentious one following the discovery of oil deposits off the
island of Thasos in 1974. Bilateral negotiations begun in
1981 were broken off at Greek initiative in 1987. Turkey
responded by initiating seismic activities and drilling in
disputed areas, giving rise to a sharp crisis in the spring of
that year. In the years since 1987, the issue has lost some of
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its sharpness, due in part to the steady decline in the price of
hydrocarbons on world markets and to the modest extent of
the resources in question, but it is far from having been
resolved. Athens argues that (a) the islands facing the
Turkish mainland are a part of Greece, and that Greek
lands must be considered as an integral whole; (b) the
Geneva convention of 1958 on the continental shelf specifies
that islands possess continental shelves; and, (c) the
continental shelf border between Turkey and the adjacent
Greek islands must be based on the equidistance principle
measured from the nearest Turkish coast. If applied in
practice, these premises would give Greece effective control
over nearly all the Aegean Sea, leaving only a narrow
coastal strip for Turkey.
In response, Ankara has argued that (a) islands located
on the natural prolongation of a continental land mass do
not have continental shelves of their own; (b) the 1982 Law
of the Sea Convention disallows consolidation of Aegean
islands with continental Greece by forbidding an
“archipelago regime” or “national integrity” principle; (c)
there is no rule of law or logic that dictates an “equidistance
principle” between small islands and a large adjacent land
mass; and, (d) the treaty of Lausanne requires a
Greek-Turkish balance that allows each side to utilize the
Aegean on an equitable basis. A broad range of factors
specific to the nature of the Aegean, including its
semi-closed character, the Greek archipelago regime, the
distribution of natural resources, mutual security interests,
and accessible transportation routes must thus be
considered in measuring access. Turkey’s ideal solution
would impose a line of division allowing it to exploit a
significant part of the eastern half of the seabed. Ankara
has, however, consistently refused Greek requests to bring
the issue before the International Court of Justice,
preferring the route of bilateral negotiations, perhaps less
due to the merits of the case in question than because of the
potential implications of a definitive court ruling for other
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unresolved disputes, notably its differences with Syria and
10
Iraq over control of the waters of the Euphrates.
Territorial Waters.
At Lausanne, territorial waters in the Aegean extended
for only three miles. In 1936, Greece unilaterally expanded
its own territorial waters to six miles, and following World
War II, Turkey reciprocated. At present, with a six-mile
limit as standard, Greece possesses 48.86 percent of the
Aegean and Turkey 7.47 percent, leaving 48.85 percent as
international waters. The Law of the Sea Treaty of 1985,
which the Turkish regime has refused to sign, allows a
12-mile extension of territorial waters, the extension that
Turkey itself applies to its Mediterranean and Black Sea
coastlines. In 1995, after the entry into vigor of this treaty,
the Greek parliament stated its right to enforce a 12-mile
limit in the Aegean, a gesture whose realization Ankara
promptly stated would become a casus belli. Though the
Turkish response was aggressive, the Greek claim was
clearly provocatory. The imposition of a 12-mile limit would
bring together Greek territorial waters between the
Cyclades and Dodecanese archipelagos, giving Athens
hypothetical control over Turkey’s vital north-south
maritime route, as well as over maritime access to the Black
Sea.
The issue is arguably more symbolic than real. The
extent of effective control that an extension to the 12-mile
limit would bring is not necessarily great. International law
does not permit interdiction of peaceful commercial traffic,
nor even of the passage of warships, except in cases of strong
tension or open conflict. A 12-mile extension is moreover
opposed by almost every other power with maritime
interests in the Aegean, and not least the major NATO
powers. If the issue persists, it is in some measure because
of its implications for the related problem of control over
airspace.
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Airspace Control.
International law and the Chicago convention of 1944
require that the extent of national airspace correspond to
the extent of territorial waters. Since 1931 Greece has
asserted a national airspace limit of ten miles, valid for both
continental Greece and the Greek archipelago, despite its
formal adherence to six-mile territorial waters. From 1974
onward, Turkey has formally protested against this
incongruity, and reinforced its position by systematically
conducting overflights in the four-mile grey zone. These
interventions are regularly challenged by Greek aviation,
leading to numerous instances of mock combat and
occasional crashes. Disputes over airspace have given rise
to other sources of tension, including differences over the
Istanbul-Athens flight region, international flight routing,
terminal areas, and military flight issues such as
early-warning borders, command and control areas, and the
extent of air maneuvers. The argument directly affects
flight borders for two NATO commands, the south-central
NATO headquarters in Izmir (Izmir also hosts Turkey’s 6th
Allied Tactical Air Force) and the 7th Tactical Air Force in
Larisa, Greece.
Treatment of Minorities.
Greece and Turkey have been chronically at odds over
the treatment accorded their respective minorities. Despite
the mass population transfers carried out under the terms
of the Lausanne treaty, a sizable Turkish minority
remained in western Thrace (in 1923 the Muslim
population of western Thrace was estimated at 130,000, out
of a total regional population of 190,000) together with a
large Greek population in Istanbul (somewhat over
100,000) as well as smaller minorities on the Turkish
islands of Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Gokceada (Imbros)
(7,000 and 1,200, respectively). Lausanne made specific
reference to these “Muslim and non-Muslim” minorities and
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guaranteed them the right to maintain autonomous
religious, cultural, and educational institutions.
The Greek side is fond of pointing out that the Greek
population of Istanbul has been reduced today to well under
10,000, and that only 250 Greeks remain on Gokceada and
100 on Bozcaada, while the Muslim population of western
Thrace has remained fairly stable at around 120,000.
Ankara retorts that a natural rate of increase would have
more than doubled the minority population of western
Thrace were it not for mass migration provoked by a Greek
policy of denial of identity and systematic repression. The
numbers are disputed, but the larger climate of hostility
that infects Greek-Turkish relations probably lends some
11
degree of truth to both positions.
Athens has reacted to international criticism of its policy
in western Thrace by offering a number of concessions
including educational incentives and limited selfgovernment, but it refuses to designate the minority in
Thrace as Turkish, clinging instead to the “Muslim”
designation used in the text of the Lausanne treaty.
According to Greek sources, about 50 percent of this
minority are of Turkish descent, 35 percent are
Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks (Muslim Slavs), and 15
percent are Muslim Roma (Gypsies). The concerned
populations have a long list of grievances that include the
expropriation of land by the Greek state, denial of
citizenship to members of the Turkish minority returning
from trips abroad, educational discrimination, refusal of the
right of election of local religious leaders or Muftis (in 1990
Greece suspended the election of local Muftis in favor of
appointment by the state), and electoral gerrymandering
aimed at denying the Turkish minority fair
12
representation. The status of the Greek minority and
Orthodox patriarchate in Istanbul remain sore points with
Greek public opinion, and, as an ethnically Turkish region
with a long list of grievances that is territorially contiguous
with Turkey proper, western Thrace is militarily exposed
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and a point of potential leverage in a larger pattern of
strategic competition.
The Cyprus Question.
The beautiful island of Cyprus, mythical birthplace of
Aphrodite, has a vital location some 80 kilometers off
Turkey’s southern Mediterranean coast and a complex
political history accurately reflecting its strategic
importance. Culturally and socially, it has been subjected to
waves of Byzantine, Venetian, Hellenic, Turkic, and British
influences. From 1571-1878 it was part of the Ottoman
empire, but at the Congress of Berlin in the summer of that
year, which presided over a peace settlement after the
Ottoman defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, it was
leased to Britain for use as a naval basing area. Cyprus was
annexed in 1918 and declared a crown colony in 1925.
The population of Cyprus today is around 780,000,
divided between a Greek majority representing about 80
percent of the total and a Turkish minority representing 18
percent. These communities traditionally lived
interspersed throughout the island, including within
numerous mixed villages. The anticolonial movement
launched in the 1950s, however, was simultaneously a
Greek nationalist movement that sought to link the call for
independence to the goal of enosis, or attachment to Greece.
The Turkish Cypriot community responded with a call for
taksim, or partition.
In 1955 the United Kingdom, whose government had
originally resisted the idea of granting Cypriot selfdetermination, sought to resolve the problem by convening
a London conference, in the course of which a bomb exploded
at the Turkish consulate at Salonika (in the immediate
vicinity of the house in which Ataturk was born). This act of
terrorism was eventually discovered to have been a Turkish
provocation, responsibility for which became one of the
items in the indictment brought against then prime
minister Adnan Menderes that would lead to his execution
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by hanging in September 1961. The immediate result was a
series of anti-Greek pogroms in Izmir and Istanbul, where
over 2,000 Greeks were killed and many more driven from
the cities as refugees.
Between 1956-60 Cypriot politics were dominated by the
terrorist anti-British agitation of the National Organization
of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) led by Georgios Grivas, a retired
army colonel with extreme right-wing political affiliations.
After a British expeditionary force of over 30,000 soldiers
proved incapable of controlling the violence, a Zurich
agreement in 1960 defined terms for independence. Greece,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom were designated as
guaranteeing powers. Britain was granted two military
base areas (which it still maintains), and Greece and Turkey
were permitted to garrison 950 and 650 soldiers,
respectively, on the island. The constitution specifically
forbids attachment to another state, uniting Cyprus with
Austria as the only other state in the world whose
sovereignty is similarly circumscribed. The text also defined
a power-sharing arrangement according to which the
president would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice president a
Turkish Cypriot, with four Greek and three Turkish
ministers. Thirty percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were reserved for the Turkish Cypriot
minority, 40 percent of commissions in the National Guard,
and 30 percent of positions in the police force and civil
service—percentages that granted disproportionate
representation to the Turkish Cypriot community. In
August 1960 Greek Archbishop Makarios III became the
first president, and the Turkish Cypriot Fazil Kucuk the
first vice-president, of an independent but badly divided
Republic of Cyprus.
The Cypriot constitution was badly flawed and quickly
proved to be unworkable. Makarios provoked the crisis that
undermined the fragile equilibrium which it sought to
define on November 30, 1963, by proposing 13 amendments
designed to curtail the special advantages of the Turkish
minority and create a unitary state. Within a matter of
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weeks, communal strife exploded, driven forward by the
systematic harassment of Turkish Cypriots, including
attempts to “ethnically cleanse” whole districts by expelling
them from their homes. In 1964 a U.N. multilateral
peacekeeping force (the U.N. force in Cyprus-UNFICYP)
arrived on the island to police a 180-kilometer long “Green
Line” of separation between the warring communities,
where it has remained to this day at a cumulative expense of
over $3 billion.
These events were decisive. The atrocities committed by
Greek irregulars terrorized Turkish Cypriots, driving many
as refugees into protected areas and shattering the island’s
delicate ethnic balances. Reliance upon U.N. peacekeepers
was both an admission that the island’s problems were
unresolvable in their own terms and a panacea that made
division provoked by violence appear tolerable. The
Makarios government was discredited, and outside powers
were quick to move into the void of power—the Turkish
military contingent assuming strategic positions in the
north of the island and occupying the Nicosia-Kyrenia
highway, Greek forces building up to over 10,000 by 1967,
and the United States taking up the role of the United
Kingdom as great power sponsor and crisis manager. In
both 1964 and 1967 Turkey threatened to invade the island
to restore order and protect the Turkish Cypriot minority,
and was only dissuaded by vigorous warnings from
Washington.
In 1968 inter-communal talks began, mediated by U.S.
envoy Cyrus Vance, with Rauf Denktash representing the
Turkish Cypriot community and Glavkos Clerides the
Greek Cypriots, both lawyers, associates since their school
days, and seemingly permanent pieces of the Cypriot
puzzle. But events had already spun out of the hands of local
actors. The increasing intensity of East-West competition in
the eastern Mediterranean, U.S. distrust for the nonaligned
orientation and left-wing supporters of the Makarios
regime, the increasingly desperate search of the colonels’
regime in Athens for some kind of dramatic success to
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bolster its failing domestic support, and the quest of the
Turkish armed forces, after overthrowing the government
for the second time in a decade in 1971, for new sources of
domestic legitimacy, created a volatile intermingling of
interests which would soon set the Cyprus tinderbox afire.
In November 1973 a student uprising against the
colonels’ junta culminated with a massacre in the heart of
Athens. Under growing pressure, the new Greek strongman
Dimitrios Ioannides turned to Grivas and his right-wing
nationalist allies in Cyprus, apparently hoping to restore
his position by attaching the island to Greece with a sudden
coup de main. On July 15, 1974, National Guard and Greek
national contingents seized power in Cyprus, but failed in
their attempt to capture and murder Makarios, who
managed to escape to London with British assistance. The
Cypriot presidency now fell temporarily into the hands of
the former EOKA gunman Nikos Sampson, while
inter-communal violence flared up in all directions. On July
19, a Turkish expeditionary force set sail from Mercin,
securing control of a narrow coastal strip but failing to seize
Nicosia airport. On July 22 a U.N.-imposed cease-fire took
hold, and on July 24, after the Greek armed forces refused to
follow Ioannides’ desperate call for an all-out attack on
Turkey, the Greek junta fell in Athens, with power placed
into the hands of a civilian coalition led by Konstantinos
Karamanlis.
The military fiasco was followed by a diplomatic fiasco in
Geneva. Here, in a hastily organized diplomatic forum,
Ankara presented demands for a federated Cyprus with
equal status for the Turkish Cypriot minority and Turkish
administration for numerous scattered ethnic cantons. The
disorganized Greek government was not in a position to
react to these claims, and a distracted United States (in the
midst of its domestic Watergate crisis) did not choose to
oppose them. After articulating its demands, and winning
time to regroup its forces, on August 14 the Turkish “peace
force” in Cyprus fanned out to the east and west, eventually
seizing about 40 percent of the island’s territory and
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culminating a process of ethnic cleansing that would drive
about 200,000 people from their homes (180,000 of them
Greek Cypriots), grouping the Turkish Cypriot population
under Ankara’s protection in the north and forcing the
Greek Cypriot population across a military demarcation
line into the south. On February 11, 1975, the process was
completed by the creation of a “Turkish Federated State of
Cyprus” with Denktash as president, formalized in 1983 as
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), but to
date accorded diplomatic recognition only by the Turkish
Republic itself.
Christopher Hitchens has argued that the essence of the
Cyprus tragedy from 1960 onward was “the exploitation by
outside powers of internal differences that were genuine in
themselves” with the purpose “to suborn the independence
13
of the island.” His thesis is controversial, but there is little
doubt that, in the Cold War context within which events
unfolded, specifically Cypriot issues were interpreted in the
context of an overriding western interest in managing
Greek-Turkish rivalry and frustrating the emergence of an
independent-minded and nonaligned Cypriot regime.
Though the second Turkish invasion clearly went
beyond reasonable bounds in asserting physical control over
more than a third of the island, the final result was in some
ways comparable to the U.S. agenda for a combination of
enosis and taksim outlined prior to the invasion in the
so-called Acheson plan—an imposed partition, an
independent, Greek-oriented Republic of Cyprus, and a
permanent Turkish presence in a northern Cypriot
dependency. This was an acceptable, if less than ideal,
solution, and it has proven to be enduring. For Athens the
outcome was a defeat and a humiliation, but it remained in a
position to cultivate special relations with the Republic of
Cyprus. Ankara warded off the worst-case of a successful
Greek coup, reinforced its military position, and ensured
that the Turkish Cypriot community would remain
dependent upon Turkish sponsorship. The United States
avoided a direct Greek-Turkish clash with the potential to
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weaken NATO and removed the Cyprus imbroglio from its
strategic agenda. Or so it thought. In fact, the Cyprus
question was left as an open wound that has subsequently
poisoned all attempts to effect an enduring Greek-Turkish
rapprochement.
Greek-Turkish Rivalry after the Cold War.
The Cyprus problem has changed remarkably little in its
overall contours in the quarter century that has passed
since the Turkish invasion. The TRNC, with 37 percent of
the island’s territory and 18 percent of its population almost
uniquely of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot extraction, is
permanently occupied by approximately 35,000 soldiers of
the Turkish 3rd Army. Turkey also maintains a dominant
position within the TRNC’s police force, militia, and secret
services. The mini-state is isolated internationally and is to
all intents and purposes a Turkish protectorate. To the
south, across the Green Line patrolled by 1,200 soldiers of
the UNFICYP, lies the predominantly Greek Cypriot
Republic of Cyprus, internationally recognized as the
legitimate government of the island but without any
authority over the Turkish zone. The record of initiatives
aimed at overcoming the impasse, pursued over decades by
U.N. secretary generals, U.S. presidents, and multilateral
negotiating forums, reads like an encyclopedia of
diplomacy, but nothing of substance has been achieved. The
Cyprus problem, like the poor, seems destined to always be
with us.
The perception of stasis is, however, misleading, both in
the case of Cyprus and as pertains to the Greek-Turkish
rivalry as a whole. During the Cold War decades, GreekTurkish competition was constrained by a number of
domestic and international factors. Both sides were aware
that they shared an overriding interest in helping to contain
Soviet power. Both were significantly dependent upon their
links to the North Atlantic Alliance for security assistance.
Not least, because the driving force of the rivalry was not in
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essence strategic competition, but rather nationalistic
self-other images, neither had any real reason to allow an
escalation of tension to sweep out of hand. Greek-Turkish
rivalry was played out in the shadow of the arsenals of the
superpowers, and, like many other Cold War conflicts with
direct implications for the East-West balance, constrained
by the exigencies of competitive bipolarity.
The end of the Cold War has removed many of these
constraints, and transformed what was a chronic but
contained rivalry into a potentially more volatile and
dangerous one. The new configuration of power in the “arc of
crisis” along Russia’s southern flank has enhanced Turkey’s
strategic weight, lent impetus to the emergence of a more
assertive foreign policy agenda, encouraged familiar Greek
fears of a bigger and more powerful neighbor, and
stimulated renewed cultural friction. In the new geopolitics
of the post-Cold War, the eastern Mediterranean has
become a seismic point for “a multi-regional strategic
calculus incorporating southeastern Europe, the Middle
14
East, and the Caucasus.”
As a result, the fragile
Greek-Turkish relationship is being subjected to new kinds
of strains and tensions that it is ill-prepared to bear.
Neither Greece nor Turkey succeeded in utilizing the
window of opportunity opened by the end of the Cold War to
forward a policy of reconciliation. The Greek administration
of prime minister Kostas Simitis began its tenure in 1996
with proposals for the creation of a joint committee under
EU auspices to ameliorate Greek-Turkish relations, but
Simitis has confronted strong opposition from the national
15
populist wing of his own ruling party. On the Turkish side,
disappointing economic performance, political instability
(Turkey has experienced five governments since the general
elections of December 1995), and a crisis of confidence in
ruling institutions provoked by corruption scandals have
encouraged a tendency towards nationalistic posturing and
self-preoccupation. Each side, because of internal
weaknesses, has opted to play the nationalism card
repeatedly.
298

Greek-Turkish relations have also been degraded by the
new tensions that have emerged in Turkey’s relations with
Europe. Ankara concluded an EU association agreement in
1963, and in 1987 it applied in due form for full membership,
but in 1989 its candidacy was pushed to the back of the line
of new post-communist democracies. In its July 1997
blueprint for enlargement entitled Agenda 2000, the EU
eliminated Turkey from its list of candidates altogether.
This gesture was partly motivated by a pragmatic
awareness of developmental and demographic imbalances,
and partly by a sincere concern for Ankara’s less than
adequate human rights record. But it also seemed to draw a
line between a European “Christian club” and the lands of
the East, perceived in Orientalist fashion as the domain of
16
backwardness and cultural exoticism.
Turkey’s clash with the EU has coincided with an
intensifying search for alternative patterns of cultural
identification and diplomatic alignment, provoked by a
17
weakening of the Kemalist consensus domestically.
Kemal’s original vision included the rejection of the
Ottoman imperial tradition on behalf of a unitary Turkish
national state, centralized political control under the aegis
of the progressive officer corps, strictly enforced secularism,
a statist and Listian philosophy of economic development,
and a pro-Western strategic orientation. The disappearance
of the Soviet Union, and with it a centuries-old common
border with Russia to the north, weakened one pillar of the
edifice of Kemalism by calling the necessity of a pro-western
alignment into question. Turgut Ozal’s opening of the
Turkish economy during the 1980s removed another. The
electoral victory of Necmettin Erbakan’s Islamic Welfare
party in December 1995 and Erbakan’s appointment as
prime minister in January 1996 seemed to threaten a third.
These trends have been accompanied by a new interest
in Turkey’s Ottoman past, regarded not as a model to
emulate but rather as a neglected source of cultural
18
orientation. For centuries Turkey considered itself to be
the center of an autonomous geopolitical space and an
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independent great power, not a peripheral extension of
greater Europe. The Kemalist assertion of a European
destiny contradicts this tradition, but it may yet prove to be
incapable of replacing it. The dynamics of the Balkan
conflict, where the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovar
Albanians have been widely viewed as victims of campaigns
of genocide at least passively abetted by the Western
powers, the outcome of the Gulf War, where Turkey is
perceived to have made important sacrifices on behalf of the
allied coalition and to have been rewarded by Western
championship of Kurdish nationalism in northern Iraq, and
the EU’s apparent indifference to Turkey’s professed
European vocation, have all contributed to the
crystallization of a sharper and less dependent Turkish
national idea. The “soft coup,” which led to Erbakan’s
resignation under military pressure in June 1997 and the
subsequent outlawing of the Welfare party by the Turkish
Constitutional Court, has represented a Kemalist
reassertion of sorts, but at the expense of an ever-more
intrusive political role for the Turkish military hierarchy,
traditionally committed to the pursuit of a hard line against
Athens.
Intensified political tension and cultural friction have
been accompanied by aggravated strategic competition. The
area’s Cold War status as the “southern flank” of the
extended front of East-West confrontation has become
irrelevant with the demise of the Soviet Union. The
strategic stakes at issue are, however, at least as great if not
greater than in the past. In the post-bipolar context, Greece
and Turkey may once again be perceived as part of a
“Levant” that opens to the economic promise of the extended
Middle East and southwestern Asia. They represent the
westernmost pole of a new strategic axis stretching through
the Black Sea and Caucasus to the untapped natural gas
and oil reserves of the Caspian basin. Many issues
concerning the construction of a main export pipeline to
bring Caspian oil into world markets, including the
short-term economic viability of the entire endeavor,
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remain to be resolved, but there is no doubt that Caspian
resources represent a long-term strategic asset of some
importance, and that the issue of access has upped the ante
of strategic competition in the eastern Mediterranean
19
theater as a whole.
From a Western perspective, the importance of the
Greek-Turkish relationship has been enhanced by NATO’s
extensive engagement in Balkan conflict management.
There is no realistic “exit strategy” for the 30,000 NATO
troops deployed since 1995 in war-ravaged BosniaHerzegovina. The Bosnia elections of the summer of 1998,
which reinforced intolerant nationalist leadership in all
three of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s mutually hostile ethnic
communities, made clear that NATO’s peacekeeping
responsibilities will be indispensable for the foreseeable
future. NATO plays an important role in propping up the
fragile institutions of governance in Albania and the
Republic of Macedonia, and it has recently been drawn into
responsibilities for monitoring the Kosovo conflict.
“Whether we like it or not,” argues an anonymous senior
European diplomat, “NATO has become the sheriff in
Europe’s wild southeast. We need to expand our perception
from the microcosm of Bosnia to an overall strategy for the
Balkans, because NATO has become the central organizing
20
force for the entire region.”
Unfortunately, Balkan turmoil has also sharpened the
competitive edge of the Greek-Turkish relationship. Greek
concern with Turkey’s superior military potential,
reinforced by the perception of an ambitious Turkish
Balkan policy inspired by the imperial premises of
neo-Ottomanism, has been reflected in a combative search
21
for unilateral advantage.
Simultaneously, Turkey’s
exposure on multiple fronts makes it highly sensitive to real
and imagined Greek provocations. The Aegean feud has
thus become entangled with international engagement in
the Bosnian conflict, the complicated relationship between
Turkey and the EU, the emerging Turkish-Israel strategic
partnership, the role of Turkey as an arm of the West in the
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politics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, the politics of
22
NATO enlargement, and a host of other issues.
Many of these dynamics have crystallized around the
Cyprus problem. In 1992, then U.N. Secretary General
Boutros Boutros Ghali launched a major diplomatic
initiative designated as the “Set of Ideas,” intended to
provide a comprehensive formula for overcoming the
post-1974 stalemate. These proposals, in the tradition of the
U.S.-sponsored Nimetz Plan of the 1970s and U.N. General
Secretary Javier Perez de Cuellar’s Proximity Talks of the
1980s, recommended the creation of a Cypriot republic with
a single international personality and citizenship presiding
over broadly autonomous federal units in the north and
south.
The Set of Ideas suggested reducing the northern zone to
28 percent of the island’s territory by returning to Greek
Cypriot control the Varosha district of Famagusta, the
northern citrus growing area of Morphou, and 34 other
villages. The federal units were to receive equal powers,
with safeguards to prevent impingement upon their
authority by the central government, whose responsibilities
would be limited to foreign affairs, defense, federal juridical
and police matters, central banking, customs and
immigration, posts and telecommunications, patents and
trade marks, and health and environmental issues.
Politically, the hope was to resurrect the principle of
proportional representation, with a Greek Cypriot
president and Turkish Cypriot vice president and a
bicameral legislature with 50/50 percent representation in
the upper house and 70/30 percent in the lower house.
The framework was accompanied by a series of
confidence-building measures (the transfer of Varosha to
U.N. control and its gradual opening to commerce involving
both communities, the reopening of Nicosia airport under
the auspices of the U.N. and the International Civil
Aviation Authority with freedom of access for both sides,
and the relaxation of the Greek Cypriot embargo on the
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north) designed as incentives to cooperation. Greek Cypriot
president Georgios Vassilou accepted the Set of Ideas as a
basis for discussion, but in the end, the project broke down
around the core issue of sovereignty, with Denktash
demanding prior recognition of the TRNC as a condition for
negotiations and formal equality between federal units
including a rotating presidency, separate communal
elections, strict equality in representation in governmental
institutions, and a rule of consensus for Council of Minister
decisions.
In the wake of this failure, the United States picked up
the torch, presiding over the signing of a brief document at
NATO’s Madrid summit in July 1997 in which Greece and
Turkey declared that they would respect each others “vital
interests” in the Aegean and pledged to resolve disputes
peacefully, and kick-starting U.N.-sponsored negotiations
on Cyprus in the summer of 1997 at Troutbeck, New York,
23
and Montreux, Switzerland. These initiatives, like so
many before them, were quickly side-tracked, this time by
Turkish reactions to the EU’s Agenda 2000. The failure of
the Set of Ideas and subsequent U.S. proposals left many
with the conviction that in Cyprus diplomacy had arrived at
the end of the road.
Already in 1990 Vassiliou had opened a door leading in
another direction by filing a formal application to enter the
EU. Accession was a legitimate goal in view of the Republic
of Cyprus’ economic achievements, but it was widely
considered impossible prior to a negotiated agreement
between north and south. Vassiliou’s real hope was
probably to win negotiating leverage and to encourage the
EU to become more active in facilitating a diplomatic
outcome. In 1995, however, in part as a result of Greek
pressure, in part as a consequence of annoyance with
Turkish Cypriot diplomatic intransigence, and in part due
to a desire to discipline Ankara for its continued refusal to
move forward on European concerns with humans rights
abuses and respect for democratic norms, the request was
accepted by the EU Council of Ministers. In April 1998
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negotiations on accession were formally opened. The
reaction of Denktash was an uncompromising refusal to
participate in any accession negotiation, accompanied by a
threat to encourage the annexation of the north to Turkey in
the event that EU membership should become a reality.
This was not an empty threat. In the course of 1998, Turkey
and the TRNC proceeded to establish a joint economic area
and put into place the institutional foundations for full
annexation.
The friction provoked by the EU accession agenda has
been paralleled by rising military tensions. In 1993 Greece
and the Republic of Cyprus announced a strategy of
common defense intended to bring Cyprus inside of the
Greek national defensive umbrella. Under the terms of the
agreement, Greece and Cyprus have conducted joint
military exercises and opened a naval and air station,
appropriately named “Andreas Papandreou,” on the
southwest coast near the tourist resort area of Paphos.
When fully operational, this facility will extend the range of
Greek air-power to include a militarily vital stretch of
Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. As such, it has been bitterly
resisted by Ankara. When, on June 16, 1998, in the midst of
a European summit in Cardiff, Wales, United Kingdom,
with the Cyprus problem on the agenda, four Greek F-16
warplanes and two C-130 transports visited the base as part
of a military exercise, another sharp crisis in bilateral
24
relations ensured.
In 1996, the Republic of Cyprus announced the purchase
of four systems of Russian-made S-300 (SA-10 in the NATO
designation) surface-to-air missiles, each equipped with 12
25
missiles with a range of 160 kilometers. The purchase, if
brought to fruition, would have served several distinct
functions. The missile systems are capable of contributing
to a more credible defensive capacity for the Republic of
Cyprus, which, at present, lacks an air force altogether.
They could also also serve to protect the Andreas
Papandreou facility. Less tangibly, but of considerable
importance, deployment would to some extent salve the
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deep frustration at the lack of diplomatic progress felt by
most Greek Cypriots. “The missile crisis,” writes Niels
Kadritzke, “is rooted in the fears of men and women who feel
26
themselves to have been abandoned by the entire world.”
The announcement of an intention to deploy the missiles
encouraged a good deal of belligerent rhetoric. Turkey
unambiguously condemned the move as an aggressive
gesture which “poses a direct threat to Turkish security,”
and announced its intention to attack the sites, should
27
deployment commence. Taken aback by the potentially
dramatic consequences of its actions, the Clerides
government offered to suspend the purchase in exchange for
an acceptance of a 1979 agreement, never honored, defining
the terms of a demilitarization of the island. Not
surprisingly, the offer was abruptly refused.
The Turkish ultimatum made deployment an extremely
high-risk undertaking, but the Clerides government
confronted considerable domestic pressure to make good on
its commitments. In the midst of the controversy, the Greek
Cypriot minister of defense Iannakis Omirou demonstrably
described the deployments as critical to Cypriot security,
and threatened to resign should they be canceled or delayed.
Twenty percent of the Greek Cypriot electorate presently
backs a “Front of Refusal” which is committed to reunifying
the island under Greek hegemony and strongly supports the
missile purchase, and many Greeks are convinced that the
demilitarization of Cyprus would amount to an
acknowledgment of forced partition as a legitimate status
quo. Despite these pressures, in December 1998 Clerides
backed away from a commitment to deploy, suggesting the
island of Crete as an alternative venue—a suggestion which
Ankara promptly labeled as equally unacceptable. In the
end it is likely that Turkish intransigence will be sufficient
to block deployments on Cyprus. The larger climate of
strategic rivalry out of which the controversy has grown
will, however, remain intact.
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The entire Cyprus imbroglio rests upon an extremely
unstable foundation. Western policy has been built upon the
minimalist foundation of sustaining the post-1974 status
quo. Simultaneous efforts to encourage a negotiated
settlement have never been accompanied by the kinds of
pressure that would be necessary to provoke decisive
concessions. The currently preferred diplomatic initiative is
the direct heir of Boutros Ghali’s Set of Ideas, calling for the
creation of a “bi-communal and bi-zonal federation” that
would create a facade of unity while providing the TRNC
with nearly full sovereignty in all but name. But trends are
at work that will soon make the status quo unsustainable,
28
and the ideal of the bi-zonal federation unobtainable.
Diplomatic alternatives to de facto partition rest upon
resurrecting a common Cypriot identity as a foundation for
reconciliation, but on both sides of the island that identity is
29
at risk. Economic success and Greece’s status as an EU
member have inevitably oriented the Republic of Cyprus
towards western Europe. The foundation for its high-risk
strategy of accession, described by Denktash as “ enosis
through the EU,” is a deeply-rooted frustration with an
eternal stalemate on the diplomatic front that only works to
30
the advantage of the Turkish side. Should the Republic of
Cyprus come into the EU without the north, however, a
gauntlet will have been thrown down that will inexorably
lead toward the TRNC’s annexation by Ankara.
Within the TRNC, the emigration of the indigenous
Turkish Cypriot population combined with a steady influx
of Turkish immigrants from Anatolia provides an ever more
substantial foundation for a long-term strategy aimed at
reducing the north to the status of a Turkish province.
According to Alpay Durduran, head of the Turkish Cypriot
opposition party Yeni Kibris (New Cyprus), over 40,000
Turkish Cypriots have left the island since 1974, the
majority taking up permanent residence in Great Britain.
The 80,000 indigenous Turkish Cypriots who remain make
up almost exactly half of the TRNC’s total population of
31
160,000 as recorded in the 1997 census.
The
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autochthonous population provides the political base of
opposition to Denktash. That opposition strongly supports
the agenda for a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. But
it soon risks becoming a minority within its own land.
Alternatives for the West.
The Greek-Turkish rivalry has brought low so many
carefully considered programs for conflict resolution that it
seems superfluous to attempt to develop yet another
integrated set of proposals. In lieu of an ideal solution, it
may be more useful to consider points of orientation that
could be helpful in addressing or understanding the
problem in new and positive ways.
1. Although it is usually treated as a unique case, the
Greek-Turkish rivalry displays much in common with many
other contemporary inter-state and regional conflicts. On
one level it is a civilizational conflict waged across
linguistic, cultural, and confessional fault lines. On both
sides it rests upon a culturally constructed and assiduously
cultivated image of the enemy with a strong mythic
component. It is part of a larger crisis of regional order
affecting all of southeastern Europe, pitting politically
fragile polities one against the other in a series of contests
over sovereignty and status. It is a quarrel between
modernizing societies subject to all sorts of strains, where
nationalism and national enmity are prone to manipulation
by ambitious political elites in search of a rallying cry. It is a
strategic rivalry between insecure neighbors with mutually
exclusive claims to strategic terrain, maritime choke points,
and air corridors, fed by an international military order that
prioritizes competitive bidding for arms markets. And, at
least in regard to Cyprus, it has engaged and bogged down
the international community as peacekeeper and would-be
conflict resolver. One part of a long-term solution to the
Greek-Turkish rivalry will have to address the world order
concerns—cultural, developmental, strategic—from which
these kind of dilemmas derive.
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2. Greek-Turkish relations are not frozen in place or
immobile. From 1930-1955, bilateral relations were
reasonably stable, and it was only with the emergence of the
Cyprus problem that the current phase of more intense
rivalry ensued. During the Cold War decades, rivalry was
imbedded within the Western Alliance and constrained by
the presence of a common external threat. In the post-Cold
War strategic environment, these constraints have become
less relevant, and the potential for an open clash has in
some ways actually increased. Bilateral relations between
Athens and Ankara have become an integral part of a larger
pattern of geopolitical rivalry stretching from the Balkan
peninsula and Aegean Sea, through the Black and Caspian
Seas, into post-Soviet Central Asia. Policymakers
committed to encouraging rapprochement need to be
sensitive to the dynamic character of the relationship and
the altered strategic context that has intensified, rather
than reduced, its volatility.
3. There is also a positive side to the picture. All is not
amiss in Greek-Turkish relations, and there are some
grounds to hope that a self-generated process of
rapprochement could eventually take hold. Building
bridges between neighboring cultures, that in the end have
a great deal in common through institutionalized dialogue
and cultural exchange, has long been a goal of progressive
minded artists, intellectuals, and well-meaning citizens.
Both sides have agreed to terms of participation in a
brigade-sized Balkan peacekeeping force, and are engaged
in efforts to generate an ongoing regional dialogue on the
32
foreign ministers level. Neither has any interest in
allowing their rivalry to slip beyond the edge of open
confrontation; angling for leverage is one thing, but an out
and out fight, which would inevitably be vastly destructive,
is quite another. And none of the issues that have divided
the two sides in the past are unresolvable in their own
terms.
The International Court of Justice is a perfectly
adequate venue for the resolution of differences over access
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to the Aegean. By applying the premise of equity, Turkey
could be granted an economic zone encompassing about a
third of the sea’s nonsovereign area, proportional to its
share of the Aegean coastline and comprising two or three
broad passages stretching past the Greek islands of Chios
33
and Lesbos. Such an outcome would represent a true
compromise that would deny Greece the vain hope of
transforming the Aegean into a mare nostrum , and
simultaneously recognize the Greek islands lying off the
Turkish coast as integral parts of the Greek whole, rather
34
than enclaves in the “Turkish half” of the sea. The status
of respective minorities could be resolved on the basis of
OSCE norms, if need be, with the help of international
monitoring. Even the Cyprus imbroglio is amenable to
reasonable compromise. The bi-zonal, bi-communal
federation agenda is far from ideal, but it takes into account
the minimal demands of the respective communities and is
probably the best compromise that circumstances permit.
4. None of these benign outcomes can be achieved
without progress in addressing core security concerns—the
Turkish military threat to Greek sovereignty and frustrated
Turkish desire for fuller access to European institutions.
The keys to resolving these concerns lie in the hands of the
United States and the EU.
U.S. policymakers have defined Turkey as a critical
strategic ally whose allegiance is to be cultivated at all
costs—"I think it is very important that we do everything
reasonable to anchor Turkey to the West," in the words of
35
U.S. President William Clinton. This has encouraged a
great deal of tolerance for assertive Turkish policies and for
the dominant political role of the Turkish armed forces, a
reliable ally of the West in many ways but also the champion
36
of a geostrategic agenda with destabilizing implications.
Washington has looked on impassively as Ankara has
maintained an illegal occupation of northern Cyprus over
several generations, pursued the chimera of a military
resolution to the Kurdish question by focusing its efforts on
the destruction of the Kurdestan Workers’ party, repeatedly
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threatened its Greek neighbor and NATO partner with
military reprisals, reinforced a strategic partnership with
Israel that threatens to alienate much of the Arab world,
launched military incursions into northern Iraq, mobilized
its forces against Syria, presided over three armed coups,
and most recently engineered the resignation of the
democratically elected government of Erbakan’s Welfare
37
party. The United States has considerable influence over
its Turkish ally, and should perhaps contemplate using it in
a more positive manner—to restrain the Turkish military
leadership, encourage political pluralism, and deter the
kind of aggressive posturing that Greece cannot help but
38
perceive as an existential threat.
The EU, on the other hand, by turning its back on
Turkey’s European aspirations and opening the door to
accession for the Republic of Cyprus, has all but publicly
lined up with Athens against Ankara. In so doing, it has
viscerally threatened what can fairly be defined as Turkish
vital interests. While this situation prevails, Ankara can be
expected to continue to place pressure upon Greece as a
source of military and diplomatic leverage. Only a more
open and flexible European process can supply the positive
incentives necessary to move Turkey toward a policy of
rapprochement and concession. The problem of GreekTurkish rivalry cannot be resolved so long as Ankara
perceives the door that leads to Europe to be locked and
barred.
5. Western policy has focused on “managing” the
problem of Greek-Turkish rivalry and in so doing has
contributed to perpetuating it. The more ambitious goal of
transcending the rivalry by focusing on the two antagonists’
core security concerns may prove to be more productive in
the long term. Neither Greece nor Turkey can be coerced to
accept arrangements that they do not feel contribute to
their national interests, but they can be encouraged to buy
into mutually beneficial trade-offs designed to integrate
and reconcile. These kind of trade-offs can only be arranged
within the larger European and Euro-Atlantic context.
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They might include a Greek agreement to surrender claims
to disproportionate rights in the Aegean in exchange for
Turkish recognition of Greek sovereignty over disputed
islands; a negotiated nonaggression pact guaranteed by the
United States, including demilitarization agreements
affecting militarized Greek islands as well as Turkish forces
on the mainland in Izmir or adjacent to Rhodes; or the
acceptance of a bi-zonal arrangement in Cyprus monitored
by NATO with significant Turkish military participation as
a prerequisite for the island’s accession to the EU—the
prelude to a revived relationship between Brussels and
Turkey itself. However they are defined, such trade-offs
should involve mutual concessions, shared advantage, and
consistent Western monitoring.
All of these initiatives involve considerable risk, but
there is even greater risk in not pursuing them.
Greek-Turkish relations are subject to severe new
pressures, the status quo cannot be maintained indefinitely,
and, in the worst case of an open rift, U.S. and Western
interests in the Mediterranean basin would suffer
39
severely. Greek-Turkish rivalry is a fundamental barrier
blocking the way to an effective Mediterranean security
regime and a critical risk for NATO. It is also a challenge
that balanced, coordinated, patient, and persistent Western
policies can still hope to confront successfully.
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CHAPTER 13
THE STALLED PEACE PROCESS:
ISRAELI-SYRIAN TRACK
Sami G. Hajjar

Shimon Peres is a great diplomat who wants peace, Ehud
Baraq is on the road to peace; but Netanyahu. is a strange man
whose declarations are strange.
Hafiz Al-Asad1

Introduction.
In this chapter, the author examines the stalled Middle
East peace process and focuses especially on the
Israeli-Syrian track. He argues that, for ideological and
strategic security considerations, the Likud government of
Prime Minister Benjamin Netenyahu is unwilling to abide
by the “land for peace” formula established in the 1991
Madrid Peace Conference. Also, Mr. Netenyahu and his
foreign policy advisors hold certain assumptions about
Syria, whereby the return of the Golan Heights is a lesser
national priority for President Asad. Syria, on the other
hand, will not agree to any territorial compromises on the
Golan Heights and refuses to endorse any separate deal
between Israel and Lebanon. The future prospects for a
lasting peace in the Middle East is in doubt. The author
believes that a vigorous U.S. involvement, along with a
meaningful European role, hold the best chance for reviving
the peace process leading to a settlement of the
Israeli-Syrian (and Lebanese) track.
On October 23, 1998, at a White House ceremony
witnessed by U.S. President William Clinton and King
Hussein of Jordan, Prime Minister Netenyahu and
Chairman Yasir Arafat signed the Wye River Memoran-
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dum. The “Wye Agreement,” as it is commonly referred to in
the press, represented a considerable investment in time
and effort on the part of President Clinton and his senior
foreign policy advisors to revive the Palestinian-Israeli
peace track and gave hope that the Middle East peace
process could be resuscitated after almost 2 1/2 years of
2
hiatus. However, the agreement suffered a series of quick
setbacks, including the decision of the Israeli cabinet to
require added conditions for implementing the pact, and the
decision of the Knesset to hold general elections in the
spring or early summer of 1999 has placed the
implementation of the Wye Agreement on hold at least until
3
after Israel elects a new prime minister and a new Knesset.
The peace process is again frozen. How did it get frozen
in the first place? A brief background focusing on Prime
Minister’s Netenyahu’s first 2 years in office may help to
understand why and how the process was placed on hold.
Background.
The election of hard-line Likud leader Benjamin
Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel on May 29, 1996,
profoundly changed the tempo and direction of the Middle
East peace process. Netanyahu’s disdain of the Oslo
agreement reached between the previous Labor
government and the Palestinian Authority, his attempt to
separate the Lebanese-Israeli peace track from the
Israeli-Syrian track, and his insistence that the
Israeli-Syrian negotiations be resumed with no
preconditions and irrespective of progress made between
the Syrians and the Labor government negotiators have
effectively frozen the peace process between Israel and its
two neighbors to the north. The current deadlock based on
deeply-held ideological beliefs, sovereignty claims, and
national security consideration is not likely to loosen
without the continued direct personal involvement of the
President of the United States along, perhaps, with a role
4
for the European community. Vital U.S. interests in the
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Middle East are in jeopardy if a comprehensive peace
process, begun in Madrid in 1991, is not successfully
5
concluded.
The process had its roots in United Nations (U.N.)
Resolution 242 that, following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war,
recognized the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war,” and the need for the “establishment of a
just and lasting peace in the Middle East.” These aspects of
U.N. 242 became popularly known as the “land for peace”
formula that led to the Israeli -Egyptian peace based on the
Camp David Accords of 1979. It was also the basis on which
the Madrid Conference of 1991 was convened that resulted
in an Israeli-Palestinian Agreement in 1993 and an
Israeli-Jordanian full peace treaty in 1995. Furthermore,
the “land for peace” formula generated a strong momentum
toward regional peace as relations between Israel and
several Arab states began to normalize.
Prime Minister Netanyahu made it clear during the
election campaign and after his victory that he rejects the
“land for peace” formula and will seek instead “peace with
security.” He vowed never to return the Golan Heights to
Syria, accept Palestinian statehood, or compromise the
6
sovereignty of Jerusalem. Having made clear what he will
not do, he called on the Arabs to negotiate peace with no
preconditions.
A 2-day Arab summit in Cairo in late June 1996
produced a communique in which Arab leaders
representing 21 nations “called on Israel to withdraw from
all occupied Arab lands and to permit the Palestinians to
establish an independent state with East Jerusalem as its
capital.” They warned that, if Israel is to delay or proceed
differently, this would “compel all the Arab states to
7
reconsider steps taken in the context of the peace process.”
In a written statement issued by his office, Mr. Netanyahu
responded, “One-sided demands that harm security are not
reconcilable with peace talks. In order for the process to
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continue successfully and fruitfully, such demands must
8
stop.”
With the hardening of positions on both sides, former
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher traveled to
Israel for meetings with the new Prime Minister to explore
ways in which the peace process could continue. Press
reports following their meeting on June 25 suggested that
Mr. Netanyahu,
refused to yield on his hard-line stands that have raised fears of
a slowdown in Arab-Israeli peacemaking . . . and [d]espite
Christopher’s lawyerly effort to skirt points of contention,
Netanyahu stood firm on several points that, if maintained in
negotiations, would differ markedly from what the United
States has been promoting in the Middle East for the last
9
several years . . .

Still, many analysts advised then that Mr. Netanyahu
needs to be given a chance to develop his foreign policy
priorities. The logic of the advice was that election campaign
rhetoric will eventually give way to the responsibilities of
governing. As one Israeli investment manager who
experienced the economic benefits of peace with the Arabs
has stated, “People are a little afraid of what he
[Netanyahu] says. But between what he says and what he
10
does there is a difference—at least I hope so.”
During the next 2 months after the Arab summit in
Cairo, a flurry of high-level meetings and diplomatic
activities took place. These included the well-publicized
Netanyahu visit to Washington on July 9-10 where he met
President Clinton and addressed a joint session of Congress
and his visit to Cairo July 18. Press and analysts’ reports
were mixed, but most suggested that no substantive
progress toward resumption of the peace process was made
because of these meetings. In fact, when in Washington and,
Despite royal treatment, Netanyahu made no concessions to
U.S. peace policies . . . Specifically, [he] did not embrace the U.S.’
land for peace formula or agree to curb settlements to lift the
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closure of the Palestinian territories, to withdraw troops from
Hebron or the Golan Heights, to meet Yasir Arafat or to
recognize Palestinian statehood. Instead he emphatically
asserted that Jerusalem would forever be Israel’s capital. His
unabashedly hard line must have come as a surprise to many
Americans, who have been assured by much of the U.S. media
that he is simply ‘pragmatic politician, whose views will be
11
tempered by high office.’

On the other hand, the respected Jordanian weekly
Shihan, quoting special sources in Washington, reported
that Netanyahu offered to the U.S. Administration,
to revive the secret forum between Israel and Syria as an
irreversible Israeli condition if Syria wants to join real talks
that could culminate in its recovery of the Golan Heights and
12
secure Israel against any future Syrian military threat.

The report went on to detail the elements of the
Netanyahu proposal including the decoupling of the
Lebanese and Syrian tracks, Israeli complete withdrawal
from the Golan Heights in return for guarantees for its
security along certain lines including the stationing of
10,000 American troops in the Syrian Heights to monitor a
demilitarized zone between the two countries, and a fair
distribution of common water sources. The substance of this
Israeli offer, according to the source, should have been
acceptable to Syria, however, the stall in the talks had to do
with mechanics, rather than details.
The Syrian leadership sensed that the Americans and Israelis
would be setting a trap for them if they proceed with the secret
talks, without bringing in another world power, like Russia,
that would strengthen Syria’s hand in the negotiations and
hold the Israelis and Americans to the provisions of the
13
treaty.

If Prime Minister Netanyahu made such an offer to the
U.S. administration, this would explain why U.S. peace
process coordinator Dennis Ross was dispatched to the
region in late July 1996 to revive the peace talks. One would
assume that if Netanyahu’s secret offer to the Syrians was
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as inflexible on the Golan Heights as his public statements,
then Mr. Ross could have had little basis on which to
rekindle the stalled talks. In short, there were mixed signals
on the future of the peace process and specifically the
14
Israeli-Syrian track.
Between the time of Netenyahu’s election and the
meeting at Wye River Plantation, there were many
attempts to move the peace process forward. However, and
despite many meetings between regional leaders, trips by
several U.S. and European envoys, and the floating of new
and fresh proposals, the peace process was no further along
than where it was when Netenyahu took office in May
15
1996. For in this time period, Netanyahu’s hard-line
stances were designed to change the basis on which the
peace process was predicated. On the Palestinian track, he
objected to the Oslo agreement entered into by the previous
government as endangering Israeli security, and gave the
green light for the building of a new settlement on Har
Homa in East Jerusalem. The decision to build this
settlement was the primary reason for the freezing of the
16
peace process.
On the Israeli-Syrian track, Netanyahu declared that
negotiations must begin anew and not proceed, as the
Syrians demanded, from where they left off with the
previous government. Netanyahu also proposed the
“Lebanon First” option—a non-starter proposal for the
Lebanese and Syrians who considered it a trick designed to
split the Lebanese-Syrian tracks, and therefore weaken the
17
negotiating position of each side.
Finally, it was Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair who
invited Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Arafat to meet in London in
May 1998, in an effort to restart the process, at least
initially on the Israeli-Palestinian track. The London
meeting succeeded only in revealing a rift between the
United States and Israel over the American proposal of an
Israeli withdrawal from an additional 13.1 percent of the
West Bank. Before the London meeting, Arafat had
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accepted this proposal, but Netanyahu offered to withdraw
18
from 9 percent only. American diplomacy did eventually
reach a deal with Mr. Netanyahu on the size of the
withdrawal that was also acceptable to the Palestinians.
That deal was, of course, the Wye Plantation Memorandum.
This agreement, however, while an important step forward,
is hardly the key to “unlock the door to the long-elusive
regional peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors,” as
19
Vice President Gore hoped. The key to regional peace
remains a comprehensive “land for peace” formula.
This remainder of this chapter will focus on the
Israeli-Syrian peace track. It contends that little difference
exists between what Mr. Netanyahu says and what he does.
The same should be true of any Likud successor to
Netenyahu. The reason, besides traditional Likud
ideological arguments in favor of retaining captured lands,
is that Netanyahu (Likud) and his foreign policy advisors
hold certain assumptions about Syria whereby the return of
the Golan Heights is a lesser national priority for President
Asad. In addition, Netanyahu seeks to benefit from the
policy of istifrad—a rich Levantine-Arabic term meaning
isolation, separation, seclusion, and loneness—that could
weaken Syria and leave it with virtually no bargaining
options vis-à-vis an Israeli government that values security
above peace. Finally, Israel’s hand is further strengthened
through its 1996 military agreement and alliance with
Turkey which has created a new regional geopolitical
reality in which Syria has become encircled by hostile
20
states.
The United States faces solemn challenges in trying to
move the peace process forward in the current
circumstances. It is difficult to assess how President
Clinton’s domestic political problems will impact his ability
to be fully and personally engaged in the peace process.
Equally uncertain are the results of the Israeli 1999
elections and the choice of prime minister. Still, even if U.S.
diplomacy, during the remaining time of the Clinton
administration, with all its attendant arsenals of economic
323

and military aid is to succeed in convincing the Israeli
government to return to the “land for peace” formula, the
size of the aid package and the domestic political pressure
the administration will have to endure may be too great a
price to pay. The chapter will conclude by postulating some
general policy recommendations.
The Golan Heights and Israeli-Syrian Relations.
The Golan Heights as an area of friction and contention
between Israel and Syria dates back to 1949 when the two
countries signed a U.N.-brokered armistice agreement to
end the state of hostilities following the 1949 Arab-Israeli
war. Relations between the two countries over the Golan
issue could be divided into two periods. The first is the
period before 1967 when the Heights were under Syrian
control. The second period beginning 1967 to date is
characterized by Israeli occupation of about 1,250 square
kilometers of the 1,750 square kilometers that comprise the
Heights, and Syria’s attempt to regain sovereignty over
them.
During the first period, Israeli-Syrian relations involved
border incidents often culminating in major military
clashes. According to Muhammad Muslih,
At issue was the DMZ [demilitarized zone], an area of less than
100 square miles stretching from above Lake Huleh to south of
the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberia). The zone was composed of
three separate sectors of land along the Israel-Syria border. The
northern sector was formed by Syrian, Palestinian and Israeli
villages, while the central and southern sectors were more
important from a strategic point of view because they were
heavily populated and straddled the Jordan River between the
21
Sea of Galilee and Lake Huleh.

From the beginning, Israel sought to have exclusive
control over the Sea of Galilee for settlement and economic
purposes. Israel, acting under the counsel of its legal
advisors as to the legal status of the DMZ, began:

324

to implement a carefully planned policy whose quintessence
was the imposition of Israeli sovereignty over the DMZ. The
objective was to drain the Lake Huleh marshes, win exclusive
control of the Sea of Galilee, and complete Israel’s Natural
Water Carrier, a project whose aim was to divert water from
the Jordan River to the northern part of the Negev desert in
22
the south.

Syria, therefore, was determined to check Israeli
encroachment that involved such measures as the planting
of mines and minefields, erection of fortifications, extension
of Israeli cultivation and the restriction of the movement of
U.N. military observers—all viewed by Syria as creeping
annexation of the DMZ which, from a Syrian legal
viewpoint, was neither under Syrian nor Israeli
sovereignty. The point here is that both sides have come to
regard the region as important economically and militarily
for their national interests. Numerous incidents took place
during the period before the Six-Day War of 1967 that
demonstrated the value of the area to each side.
The second period in Israeli-Syrian relations began in
June 1967 after Israel captured the Golan Heights and the
high point on Mount Hermon (2,224 meters) from Syria.
Acquisition of the Golan has given Israel tremendous
strategic advantage with its army stationed only 35
kilometers from the Syrian capital of Damascus, allowing it
to install highly sophisticated eavesdropping devices on
Mount Hermon, giving it control of water sources including
the Banias River—a major tributary of the Jordan River
feeding it with 14,000 cubic meters of water every
hour—and providing opportunities to create new Jewish
23
settlements in the area.
From a Syrian perspective, the loss of the Golan Heights
makes it extremely vulnerable to an Israeli land attack, as
the Heights formed a critical natural defense against Israel.
Their return is a vital geo-strategic objective. Furthermore,
the Israeli occupation of the Golan has had other costs.
Control of the water sources was an obvious cost, given the
significance of water issues in a situation of increasing
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shortages. Israeli occupation has also meant that Syrian
citizens on the Golan are left unprotected and abused.
Because of Israeli policies, only 16,000 people in five Arab
villages remain, compared to 130,000 people in 139 villages
in 1967. Additionally, Syria regards the 15,000 Israeli
settlers in some 35 Jewish settlements to be intruders on
25
Syrian sovereignty.
Compared to the first period, the 1967-to-present period
in Israeli-Syrian relations has been largely characterized by
the relative quiet and lack of border incidents between the
two countries on the Golan with one major exception.
Instead, Syria has used the surrogate Hizballah in south
Lebanon as its main military weapon against Israel. The
exception was the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War during
which Syria attempted a surprise attack to recover its
occupied territories. That war ended with the return of a
small strip of territory in 1974 and the establishment of a
U.N.-patrolled buffer zone between the two armies as a
26
result of Henry Kissinger’s mediation efforts.
For the Israelis, the occupation of the Golan poses a
serious dilemma which is reflected in the division among the
Israeli public over this issue. To some, the Golan offers the
opportunity to trade captured territories for real peace with
Syria (and by extension with Lebanon), thus ending the
50-year old Arab-Israeli dispute. Apparently, the previous
Labor government was moving in this direction, having
concluded that President Asad had indeed made a strategic
decision to enter into a lasting peace with Israel.
Consequently, the Rabin-Peres governments were prepared
to trade land for peace. To other Israelis, however, the Golan
should never be given up to the Syrians, for its possession
affords Israel the best security guarantee against any
future Syrian attack. Finally, there are those who take a
somewhat middle position, arguing for partial withdrawal
27
as the price to be paid for peace with Syria.
The late-1997 news regarding a Mossad agent who
fabricated reports on Syria is likely to add an intricate
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dimension to Israeli-Syrian relations. Spy master Yehuda
Gil, responsible for watching Syria, apparently provided
false information for several years that influenced key
Israeli decisions on Syria which nearly caused two wars. It
was Gil’s information portraying the Syrian leadership, and
especially President Asad, as opposed to making peace that
played a role in Rabin’s decision to emphasize the
28
Israeli-Palestinian track vice the Israeli-Syrian track.
The Israeli Position.
The position of the current Likud Israeli government on
the Golan Heights is largely shaped by Israel’s U.N.
Ambassador Dr. Dore Gold—formerly Netanyahu’s
principal national security advisor, and director of the U.S.
foreign and defense policy project at the Jaffee Center for
Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University.
Gold’s writings are largely centered on operational and
tactical considerations as the principal factors to be met
according to Israeli security requirements. In turn, these
requirements constitute the only bases for the peace
process. In addition, the U.S.-born and educated Gold
argues in favor of settlement arrangements with the
Syrians that would preclude the stationing of American
troops as peacekeepers on the Golan. Of course, this is a very
popular stance in the United States, especially among
members of Congress who are loath to place American
troops in what might be harm’s way. Consequently, Israel
must retain significant portions of the Golan to guarantee
its security. Similarly, operational and tactical factors
require that Israel does not withdraw completely from the
West Bank, and the Oslo Agreement, that the previous
Labor government concluded with the Palestinian
Authority, is viewed with extreme suspicion by Gold and the
Likud government.
Gold’s starting premise is the existence of two types of
structural asymmetries between Israel and its Arab
adversaries that seriously imperil Israeli security. The first
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asymmetry is the wide disparity between Israel’s Jewish
population and the populations of its Arab neighbors that
allows the Arabs to maintain relatively large military
establishments. The numbers imbalance becomes more
significant, considering that the bulk of Israeli formations is
reserve units compared to Arab divisions that are standing
active service units.
The other asymmetry pertains to coalition formation
potential. Within the region, and despite inter-Arab
rivalries, the Arab military have managed to form
multi-state coalitions against Israel in every Arab-Israeli
war. By contrast, Israel has no regional alliances save for
cooperative ties with “periphery states” such as Iran under
the Shah, and recently Turkey.
The net effect, as Gold sees it, is that “these asymmetries
mean that the central strategic challenge for Israel is
countering the potential conventional military superiority
of its Arab state adversaries individually, and especially in
29
coalition.”
To overcome the strategic challenge posed by the
conventional military power asymmetries, Gold argues for
Israeli military control of the Golan Heights and the West
Bank as these occupied territories afford Israel with three
important security advantages. The first is denial, whereby
Syrian forces can no longer threaten the Sea of Galilee from
the Golan and are denied the ability to control the sources of
the Jordan River. Control of the West Bank denies the
Arabs (Palestinians and/or Jordanians) the ability to
threaten Israel’s coastal plain where 70 percent of its
population dwell and that is the principal site of Israeli
industrial plants. It also increases the distance between the
Mediterranean and the pre-1967 border that was only 10
miles and made Israel vulnerable to Arab attack at its
30
narrow waist.
The second advantage is warning, whereby control of the
territories gives Israel early warning capabilities. In the
case of Syria, Israel can detect Syrian military activities as
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far as the Syrian capital. The loss of the Golan has by
definition denied Syria comparable coverage of the Galilee
region. In the West Bank, Israeli deployment of air defense
units reduces the threat of air attacks by Arab forces
originating from the direction of Jordan or Iraq. Control of
West Bank airspace “is vital for the defense of the skies of
31
Israel against Arab war coalition aircraft.
The last advantage is defense, and Gold makes it clear
that this is because of Israeli control of topographically
favorable terrain.The Golan Heights and the West Bank
provide Israel with an excellent shield against conventional
military attack. They also improve Israeli counter-offensive
capability that traditionally has emphasized mobile
warfare with the objective of taking the war to the enemy’s
32
heartland.
Gold concluded his essay by positing the dilemma facing
Israel: “. . . to hold on to all the 1967 territories and make
Israel more defensible or give up these territorial barriers
and reduce the enmity of its neighbors?” Put differently, the
difficult security choice is between military strategic
considerations and diplomatic political arrangements. The
answer depends on the nature of the Middle East at any
given time and “peace between Israel and the Arab states
could not be superior to the relations between Arab states
33
themselves.” Therefore, and with respect to Syria, Syrian
intentions and capabilities are critical elements for a peace
arrangement with Israel. They are, however, difficult to
measure. Consequently, Israel will require agreed-upon
limits on Syrian offensive capabilities in exchange for
Israeli withdrawal from Golan territories. Syria may not,
however, agree to any force structure reduction since it can
claim threats to its security from other quarters. An
alternate consideration might be a demilitarized Golan
Heights. This, according to Gold, is unacceptable, for unlike
the Sinai, the Golan does not provide a deep enough buffer
against Syrian forces who will remain within close striking
distance to Israel.
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On the other hand, Gold believes that, although the
Palestinians are not a military power, nevertheless Israel
must have access to the West Bank as defense against
potential Arab enemy attack from the east. His conclusion:
. . . Israel will have to take a conservative approach to
outstanding territorial differences with its neighbors.
Premature Israeli withdrawal, while the basic elements of
Middle East instability persists, [ethno-religious conflicts,
frontier disputes, serious economic differences] would
destabilize the region and could increase the chances of war
34
more than continuation of the status quo.

It is the desire to perpetuate the status quo that is the
key to Netanyahu’s attitude and policy toward the peace
process. The military strategic considerations are
buttressed by Likud’s ideological inclination to claim the
occupied territories as part of the historical land of Israel
35
that belongs to the Jews.
Since coming to power, Netanyahu’s government has
purposefully pursued a policy of not accommodating the
“land for peace” formula that is at the heart of the
U.S.-sponsored peace process. The alleged assumption is
that such a formula does not guarantee Israeli security. But
what about the use of U.S. forces on the Golan Heights in a
post “land for peace” settlement as a buffer between Syrian
and Israeli forces? Gold provides the arguments about why
such a proposal is unworkable or at least undesirable.
In a Jaffee Center memorandum, Gold argued that U.S.
forces on the Golan, for reasons already stated, would likely
have to perform peacekeeping and peace-enforcing
activities. The former involves monitoring activities similar
to the Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO) in Sinai.
Peace-enforcing would involve early warning and possibly
to act as a deterrence force in case of Syrian hostile intent,
and as a defense force in case of a Syrian attack. Gold
carefully weighs each of these peace enforcing functions and
notes that their performance by U.S. forces, beside negating
long-standing Israeli national security doctrine by making
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Israel dependent on the United States, they are likely to
lead to friction between the two countries that could alter
their strategic relationship. The conclusion he reached was
that
. . . the presence of a large American force on the Golan Heights
would, in the final analysis, be disadvantageous for Israel’s
security. Beyond the risks associated explicitly with the
deployment of a substantial American presence on the Golan,
there are a number of domestic American political factors that
in any case reduce the chances that such a presence would be
36
acceptable to the U.S.

It should be evident that Gold’s arguments are at the
heart of the Netanyahu policies regarding the peace
process. Israeli security is very important and could only be
achieved by direct Israeli military strategic advantage.
Peace agreements that diminish Israeli military strategic
advantage or the presence of surrogate forces such as the
United States as guarantors of peace are unacceptable
alternatives. Given the general conditions of the region, it
would be unrealistic to expect Israeli-Arab relations to be
superior to existing Arab-Arab relations. Consequently, the
status quo with its attendant Israeli military superiority is,
for the time being, an acceptable option.
The security arguments of Dore Gold are not Likud’s
only supporting arguments. There are the contentions of
Daniel Pipes who at one point argued that Asad was
primarily interested in absorbing Lebanon. The implication
is that he is willing to reach a deal by which the Golan
37
Heights are “traded” for Lebanon. Later, Pipes argued
that Asad was not truly interested in achieving a settlement
on the Golan; his goal, for reasons of regime survival, “is not
38
peace but a peace process.” There were, furthermore, the
arguments of Professor Beres and Ambassador Shoval
(Israeli Ambassador to the United States) that, beyond the
immediate security concerns, withdrawal from the Golan
Heights would “uproot 32 Golan Jewish communities and
39
threaten a third of Israel’s water supply.”
These
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arguments simply fuel the propensity of Likud to hold on to
the Golan. The Times (London) recently reported that the
number of Jewish settlers on the Golan is increasing and
continues to rise. The central thesis of this report was that,
Israel is consolidating its presence on the occupied Golan
Heights to the extent that leaders of the Jewish settlers here no
longer fear the land being handed back to Syria as they did
40
before the 1996 election.

To all the above discussion could be added the
observation that in the post-Soviet world, the perpetuation
of the status quo on the Israeli-Syrian front clearly favors
the Israelis. Syria’s lacking a superpower patron, and
Israel’s success in forging a military alliance with Turkey,
mean that the gap between Israeli and Syrian military
strength is widening in Israel’s favor. The longer the status
quo continues, presumably the less is Syria’s ability to
negotiate a favorable peace settlement. This is the
realization that both Israel and Syria must have arrived at
which explains Israeli government stalling tactics and
Syrian eagerness for the resumption of the negotiations on
the basis of the “land for peace” formula.
The Syrian Position.
The geo-strategic environment of the region in the
aftermath of the Gulf war provided the United States the
opportunity to cooperate with the Soviet Union and convene
the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference based on the “land for
peace” principle. Syria, which until then had depended on
the Soviet Union for political and military support,
concluded that relations between the two superpowers were
changing rapidly, and blanket Soviet support was no longer
assured. Madrid was a viable option to achieve peace. After
all, Syria and several Arab states had participated in the
U.S.-led coalition against Iraq and could now hope to count
on a vigorous and even-handed peace role by the United
States.
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Syria’s approach to the Madrid Peace Conference was
based on two conditions: all lands occupied by Israel in 1967
were to be returned as a precondition for any peace
agreement, and the peace agreement should be
comprehensive. This meant that Israel must agree to
withdraw from all the lands occupied in 1967. Indeed
Israel’s participation in the Madrid Conference meant
acceptance of the “land for peace’ formula as the basis for
future negotiations. Syria also preferred that a
comprehensive peace agreement be reached simultaneously
settling all outstanding issues between Israel and those of
the Palestinians, Jordanians, Lebanese, and Syrians. Such
an approach would strengthen the Arab negotiating
position in addition to salvaging what has remained of Arab
solidarity after the Gulf war.
Syria’s approach to the peace process and a detailed
accounting of its negotiations with Israel was recently
revealed by Walid Al-Moulalem, Ambassador to the U.S.
41
and head of the Syrian delegation to the peace talks.
Ambassador Al-Moualem made it clear that Syria would
never negotiate with Israel if it was not understood that
Israel was willing to withdraw from the entire Golan to the
42
June 4, 1967, international boundary. In other words, the
purpose of the negotiations was for Syria to regain
sovereignty over all of its territory in exchange for peace and
normalization of relations with Israel. He claimed that
Prime Minister Rabin understood this point and committed
Israel to withdrawal. The Syrian Ambassador stated:
From Madrid onward, the only issue we would even consent to
discuss was full withdrawal. Under Likud, of course, it was a
dialogue of the deaf—I think Ben Aharon, the head of the
Israeli delegation, was following to the letter [former Prime
Minister Yitzhak] Shamir’s instructions to continue talking
for ten years without result. After Rabin became prime
minister in June 1992, we still insisted on discussing
withdrawal only. When Rabin finally realized that the Syrians
would not move a step ahead in discussing any of the other
elements of a peace settlement before being convinced of
43
Israel’s intention on full withdrawal, he made the opening.
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After Rabin was assassinated, Peres made the same
commitment, and the reason an agreement was not reached
then was because Peres decided to call for elections.
Al-Moualem made it clear that, precisely because the
Israelis accepted the principle of “land for peace,” i.e.,
withdrawal, that negotiations were progressing on the
other elements of a peace agreement including normalization, security arrangements, and the timetable of
fulfillment. Al-Moualem also noted the negotiating strategy
of Rabin that sought to separate each of the peace tracks
that Israel was engaged in. Consequently, when progress
was being made on the Israeli-Palestinian track in 1993, “he
[Rabin] informed us through the Americans that he could
not proceed on the Syrian track because the Israeli public
needed time to digest the Oslo Accord. So he suspended our
talks.” Peres, by contrast, wanted to “enter the elections
with a Syrian-Israeli agreement in his hand. He wanted to
44
‘fly high and fast’ . . .” The Syrians, however, were not
prepared to move that quickly since the issues to be settled
with respect to the other elements of a peace agreement
were complicated, and time was needed to sell the
agreement to the Syrian public. Still, Peres called for
elections less than 3 months after taking office and the talks
45
were suspended in 1996.
Syria has made its position very clear to Netanyahu’s
government. First, Syria has opted for peace as a strategic
choice. Second, negotiations must be resumed from the
point they were left off. All understandings reached
between the parties concerning withdrawal of Israeli forces
from the Golan and agreements about security
arrangements must be considered valid. Third, the Syrian
and Lebanese tracks are inseparable.
The Syrian option for peace was stated clearly by
President Asad during a joint news conference in Geneva in
January 1994, following meetings with President Clinton.
He said,
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Syria seeks a just and comprehensive peace with Israel as a
strategic choice that secures Arab rights, ends the Israeli
occupation, and enables all peoples in the region to live in
peace, security, and dignity, and in honor we shall make
46
peace.

This statement, made for the benefit of the Israelis and
international mediators, especially the United States, was
meant to convey the sincerity of the Syrians in reaching a
final settlement with the Israelis if the Golan Heights are
47
returned to Syrian sovereignty. Pragmatically, Asad’s
“strategic choice” was the only one left for him under the
circumstances. As a realist, “driven not by ideological
considerations but by raison d’etat . . . Asad is very aware of
48
his strategic predicament vis-à-vis Israel.” Lacking a
superpower patron, his predicament is Syria’s inability to
effectively balance Israel’s power or else contain it.
Consequently, the peace option as a “strategic choice”
49
exposes his weakness and, therefore, vulnerability.
A major difference separates the Syrian and Israeli
positions with respect to possible resumption of
negotiations between them. Netanyahu believes that
negotiations should be resumed without any preconditions
so that “both sides would be free to raise any negotiating
50
demand they wish . . .” He justified his position on the
strength of the argument that,
there is no contractual mechanism between the two states
with regard to a peace arrangement. He [Netanyahu] asserted
that the United States understands it and agrees that issues
discussed in talks conducted by the previous government are
51
not binding on Israel.

Put differently, Netanyahu would honor signed agreements
entered into by the previous government, but is not
obligated to accept his predecessor’s bargaining positions.
In yet another statement attributed to him, the Israeli
Prime Minister suggested that he was in no hurry to
conclude a peace treaty with Syria:
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We are not on the verge of war with Syria and the road to peace
with it has not ended. There are obstacles on the way, but we
will achieve peace. We will work for it during the current phase
(phase ending in the year 2000), otherwise in the next (year
52
2004).

Syria, on the other hand, insists that agreements
reached in negotiations with the previous government,
including Rabin’s willingness to withdraw to the June 4,
1967, line, should be the starting point for the resumption of
talks. Syrian negotiator Al-Moualem claims that the Israeli
offer to withdraw from all of the Golan was in writing. This
was also confirmed by Defense Minister General Mustafa
53
Tlass. To go back to point zero as Netanyahu demands,
means, in the words of the Syrian Vice President Khaddam,
that “the negotiations could last another century . . . since
every time there is a new Israeli government we have to
54
return to point zero.” Accepting Netanyahu’s position
would also mean accepting his harder line, and give the
false impression that Syria might be willing to make
territorial concessions.
Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon has become its surest
weapon against the policy of istifrad. If Israel could be
denied the option of a separate peace with Lebanon, then
Israel will have to continue its involvement in the
increasingly unpopular “security zone” on its northern
border. It also means that the goal of achieving peace
between Israel and all of its neighboring states will be only
half fulfilled. Not surprisingly, therefore, the relatively
recent Israeli proposal to implement U.N. Security Council
Resolution 425 (calling on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon)
met with strong Syrian condemnation. This is because the
Israeli withdrawal plan would take away an important
Syrian weapon—using Hizballah against Israel.
The Israeli proposal offered to comply with Resolution
425 if Lebanon takes steps to insure security along the
border. In Netanyahu’s words,
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There is no policy of unilateral withdrawal, because in our
assessment that would increase Hezbollah attacks into the
Galilee . . . If the government of Lebanon will join us in
establishing the proper security arrangements in southern
Lebanon, we will be happy to get out of Lebanon in the
55
framework of implementing U.N. Resolution 425.

For Syria (and Lebanon), Israeli withdrawal must be
unconditional as called for by Resolution 425. The Syrian
message is clear, security on the border and peace in Galilee
is obtainable once Israel agrees to withdraw simultaneously
from south Lebanon and the Golan Heights. 56
Finally, and with respect to the broader issue of alliances
and “encirclement,” it is not surprising that Syria’s response
has been an attempt to balance Israel’s alliance with the
United States and the more recent Turkish-Israeli alliance.
Since the United States is viewed by Syria as biased toward
Israel, Syria has vigorously advocated for a European role in
the peace process, especially after Netenyahu came to
power. President Asad believes that, given the stalemated
peace process, the European Union, and particularly
France, should have a role to play in the peace process, “not
to replace the Americans, but to have a role along with the
57
Americans in pushing the peace process forward.”
It
remains to be seen what role Europe can play, given “Israeli
animosity toward French and European diplomatic
58
intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict.” The TurkishIsraeli military alliance has sufficiently worried Syria so
that President Asad traveled to Iran in July 1997 to bolster
Syria’s relations with that country. Syria has also taken
steps to establish contacts with Iraq, its neighbor and Ba’th
Party ideological enemy. “Together with them, the Syrians
could face Turkey and signal the Americans that they still
59
have partners in spite of attempts to isolate them.” The
Turkish-Israeli military agreement concerns not only Syria,
but also most nations in the region leading to the emergence
60
of “a front led by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.” It
remains to be seen, however, if the new realignments taking
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place in the region will endure and effectively balance one
another.
The above discussion discloses why the Israeli-Syrian
peace track is deadlocked. The problem is the inverse
relationship between the defining elements of the
stalemate: Syrian demand for sovereignty and Israeli quest
for security. If American diplomacy is to succeed in moving
the Israeli-Syrian peace track forward, it must do so based
on proposals that can accommodate these conflicting claims.
Observations and Policy Recommendations.
On May 6, 1998, Hillary Rodham Clinton, speaking to a
group of Arab and Israeli teenagers, said that creating a
Palestinian state is “very important for the broader goal of
61
peace in the Middle East.”
Not surprisingly, this
statement touched off criticisms of the First Lady in many
pro-Israeli quarters in and outside of the United States.
However, it is precisely this realistic future assessment of
the region that is required of the United States if it is to
secure its long-term vital interests. One such interest is a
lasting and comprehensive Middle East peace. On the
Israeli-Syrian peace track, a comparable realistic
assessment is the fact that Syria will not make territorial
concessions in the Golan Heights, and will not waver in its
demand for full sovereignty over its occupied lands.
Additionally, there is absolutely no reason to believe that
any post-Asad government will accept anything less.
In this author’s view, the long-standing U.S.
commitment, by word and deed, to the security and
well-being of the State of Israel was a major factor in
bringing the Arabs to the realization that Israel is in the
region to stay. Today, no responsible Arab leader or citizen
harbors any false hopes that Israel could be eliminated from
the political landscape of the Middle East. Arab willingness
to recognize and negotiate with Israel since the Madrid
Peace Conference attests to this fact. Similarly, the United
States must now dispel any false hopes entertained by the
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current and any future Likud government, and by some
Israeli citizens (and their U.S. supporters), that they could
permanently annex all or some of the Golan territory; just as
the First Lady’s statement helped dispel the notion that
somehow Palestinian national aspirations could be
negotiated or withered away. A realistic assessment of
future regional conditions by the principals involved in the
peace process is the prerequisite step to breaking the
deadlock. As major mediator between the parties in the
peace process, but also as the sole superpower with vital
interests in the Middle East, the United States must
publicly endorse the reasonable and legitimate demands of
the parties—Syrian sovereignty over its occupied
territories, and Israeli demands for security concerns in the
Galilee and northern Israel.
With the dawning of a new international era following
the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new reality has emerged
in the Middle East. It is the linkage and the interconnectivity that exist between the various subregions of
the Middle East. Saddam Hussein proved vividly that
connection when he fired Scud missiles on downtown Tel
Aviv. Also true is the interconnectivity between the various
tracks of the peace process. The failed Doha economic
conference of 1997 showed how failure on one track
(Israeli-Palestinian standoff over the proposed settlements
on Har Homa) can affect another. As the former Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs warned, “The
United States is making a dangerous mistake by focusing
its efforts in the Middle East peace process solely on Israel
and the Palestinians, without also involving Syria and
62
Lebanon.” The impression that the Israeli-Syrian track is
deliberately being put on hold reinforces the Syrian belief
that the United States is less than an “honest broker”
assisting in the Israeli tactic of ‘ istifrad’ing’ and ‘encircling’
Syria.
In the Arab street, the image of the United States as
responsible “honest broker” is less than positive and
continues to deteriorate. Anyone who follows the Arab press
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and is in touch with Arab elites is constantly reminded of
this fact. The most common charge is that of “double
standards” by which the United States is willing to look the
other way when Israel stands in violation of U.N. Security
Council resolutions, but insists on the strictest adherence
63
by Iraq to U.N. sanction resolutions.
The popular negative image of the United States forces
Arab governments, including friendly ones, to distance
themselves from U.S. policies. In years past, Arab
governments were in a far better position to influence and
shape public opinion in their countries through their control
of the media. But since the “migration” of the leading Arab
print media (e.g., the influential dailies Al-Hayat and
Ashorq al-Awsat , and magazines as Al-Watan al-Arabi and
Al-Wasat) to Paris and London, and the establishment of
the influential Middle East Broadcasting (MBC) television
in London—regarded as the CNN of the Arab world—
(because of increasing local censorship, and the Lebanese
civil war that forced many free Arab press out of Beirut),
local governments find it extremely difficult to continue
molding public opinion in their countries. This “immigrant”
and popular Arab press addresses itself to a wider Arab
audience and focuses on broad regional issues. Hence, for
example, the reader in a Gulf state is likely to be as informed
and concerned about the intricacies of the peace process as
the average reader anywhere else in the Arab world. The
rapid spread of the Internet and the satellite dishes
enhances this phenomenon and the interconnectivity of the
region as a whole. In short, the traditional local press with
its focus on the alleged accomplishments of the state, and
the antics of the rulers and their progeny is rapidly
becoming irrelevant.
The prevailing trend toward regional linkages and
interconnectivity of issues can potentially destabilize
regimes in the area friendly to the United States. Arab
governments are made aware of this trend by the increasing
public pressure to adopt policies more in line with popular
sentiments. Ironically, these developments are unfolding
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while the United States is scaling down its public diplomacy
efforts. The U.S. Information Agency, whose primary
mission is to foster an understanding and appreciation of
U.S. foreign policy among overseas nationals, is being
eliminated as part of a plan to restructure the foreign
service establishment.
The success of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the
Middle East hinge on the outcome of a peace process that is
currently stalled and frozen. Although President Clinton is
understandably reluctant to undermine his high approval
rating at home by pursuing a Middle East policy contrary to
the wishes of the powerful pro-Israeli lobby, he is in the
unique position of not having to face re-election and so can
move the process forward. The President, who is likely to
survive a Senate impeachment trial, must personally
become once again engaged in the process, and to offer a role
for the European Union in the search of a final settlement to
the Arab-Israeli conflict. A European role as a mediating
partner with the United States, at a time when Europe is
emerging as potentially the world’s strongest economic
power, will send clear signals that the Western alliance with
whom Arabs and Israelis have extensive economic and
political relations is serious about a final just settlement.
On the Israeli-Syrian track, this means pressuring the
Israeli government to accept concessions made by the
previous Labor government in its negotiations with the
Syrians. To argue that such a recommendation ignores the
results of the 1996 Israeli elections (or the 1999 elections if
Netenyahu is returned to power), and that only the Israeli
government can decide the parameters of its security
requirements, is to argue in favor of abandoning the peace
process and U.S. interests in the region. In this regard, it is
time that congressional leaders realize the anomaly of
allowing their institution to be used by a foreign leader to
pressure the U.S. President against his better judgement of
America’s long-term interests.
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In return for Israeli concessions, the United States
should offer Israel additional security commitments,
including the possibility of stationing U.S. troops on the
Golan Heights for a period of time. Similarly, the United
States and Europe should see to it that every phased Israeli
withdrawal from the Golan is reciprocated on the Syrian
side by confidence-building measures and concrete steps
toward normalization of relations between the two
countries.
Finally, Dore Gold’s arguments notwithstanding, it is
only with peace based on the “land for peace” formula that
Israel could be transformed from a nation in the Middle
East to a nation of the Middle East. By pressuring for a final
settlement, the United States, as the world’s only
superpower, transforms itself from a hapless mediator to a
responsible actor. A successful peace process will also
ensure the long-term interests of the United States in all of
the Middle East.
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CHAPTER 14
ISRAELI SECURITY IN A CHANGING
ENVIRONMENT:
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES
Gerald M. Steinberg

THE NEW THREAT ENVIRONMENT
The threat environment in the Middle East is changing
rapidly, reflecting the combined impacts of the uncertain
peace process, the end of the Cold War, the unresolved Iraqi
threat, concern over developing Iranian capabilities, and,
most importantly, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the region. These
factors have created new challenges for Israeli military
planners and decisionmakers in the Mediterranean and for
Israel, in particular.
As the dangers of a large-scale combined conventional
attack that threatened national survival from 1948 through
1973 and beyond seem to recede (although they remain
formidable), the WMD threats posed by neighboring and
more distant states are growing. In 1991, Iraq possessed a
large arsenal of chemical and apparently also biological
warheads, as well as ballistic missiles to attack targets in
Israel, as well as other states in the region. Despite over 7
years of United Nations (U.N.) inspections and sanctions,
Saddam Hussein’s regime has developed and implemented
a vast program of concealment to hold onto considerable
capabilities. Once the inspections and threat of military
action are lifted, Iraq will be able to reconstitute its
stockpiles in a very short period of time. As a result, Iraq
remains a formidable threat to Israel and to the region.
In addition, Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Iran all possess
significant chemical weapons capabilities (Egypt has had
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chemical weapons since the early 1960s, and used them in
its campaigns in Yemen, but not against Israel). There is
also increasing evidence that many of these states are
developing biological weapons.
In the past, the domination of the Israeli Air Force has
protected population centers from Arab air attacks, but the
proliferation of ballistic missiles has increased the
vulnerability of Israeli cities and other civil targets. Syria
has Russian SS-21 and North Korean Scud-C missiles,
Egypt is obtaining missiles and technology from North
Korea, and in July 1998, Iran tested the Shihab 3, with a
range of 1300 kilometers (based on North Korean and
Russian technology).
These missiles are of strategic importance when
combined with WMD warheads, and with nuclear weapons
in particular. According to most estimates, the Iraqi nuclear
weapons development program had progressed to within a
year of producing a weapon before the 1991 war. Former
United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspector
Scott Ritter has noted that Iraq maintains the completed
casings for three nuclear weapons, which will become
1
weapons with the addition of fissile material
There is also considerable evidence that Iran is pursuing
nuclear weapons, using technology and facilities acquired
from Russia, and Syria is acquiring a large research reactor
from Russia in order to develop a nuclear infrastructure.
These programs are in the first stages, and the development
of a nuclear threat to Israel is still likely to be at least 5 and
perhaps 10 years away, (assuming that the inspections and
other limitations on Iraq continue), but the developments
will be monitored carefully, and Israel must begin
developing its strategic responses to these developments.
The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in
1998 may have accelerated the rate of nuclear proliferation
in the Middle East. These tests shattered the relatively
static global nuclear framework, and it is very difficult to
predict the long-term impact of these developments.
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Although the talk of an “Islamic bomb” and fears of
technology transfer from Pakistan to Iran or Iraq may be
exaggerated, the sudden weakening of the international
nuclear non-proliferation regime could serve to increase the
incentives for Iran, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern states to
develop such weapons. If the responses and sanctions
imposed by the United States and the international
community appear to be weak in the views of the major
decisionmakers in these countries, the implications will be
drawn, and additional states will be willing to pursue such
weapons without fear of censure or stigma. Thus, in the
Middle East, the emergence of a multipolar nuclear
environment in the next decade seems to be very likely.
ISRAELI STRATEGIC OPTIONS
As a result of these developments, Israeli decisionmakers and analysts have recognized the need for
accompanying changes in security doctrine, budgeting,
procurement, and training. For many years, Israel relied on
the combination of preemption (against conventional
threats, as in 1967), preventive attack, conventional
deterrence, and qualitative superiority to offset the Arab
quantitative advantage. In addition, since the 1960s, the
perceived nuclear option provided a weapon-of-last-resort
to deter threats to national survival. This policy succeeded
in avoiding a direct clash with the U.S. Government, with
its emphasis on non-proliferation.
For many years, American-led export-control policies
may have slowed the rate of WMD and missile proliferation
in the region. However, in the past decade, these limitations
have become increasingly ineffective, in large part due to
Russian, Chinese, and North Korean technology transfers.
In addition, since the 1981 attack on the Iraqi nuclear
facilities, preventive attacks (under the Begin Doctrine)
have become far more difficult to implement. The WMD and
missile development programs of Iraq, Iran and Syria are
often placed underground and are well-defended, and the
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installations are dispersed over a wide geographic area.
Although the combination of tightened export controls and
military operations (not necessarily conducted by Israel)
might, under optimum circumstances, slow the rate of
proliferation, it is unlikely to be stopped. As a result, Israel
will have to adapt its military doctrine to this emerging
reality and threats to stability and security.
In a broad sense, three general approaches can be
2
identified: strengthened deterrence; defense; and regional
alliances. (Regional arms limitation is also a theoretical
option, but the experience to date in the multilateral Arms
Control and Regional Security talks has not been
encouraging, and it is clear that any agreements will take
many years.) Each provides advantages and limitations,
and the optimum security doctrine should combine aspects
of all three in order to maximize the benefits and minimize
the disadvantages.
Stable Mutual Deterrence.
As noted, both conventional and nuclear deterrence have
been prominent aspects of Israel security doctrine for many
years. In a Hobbesian world or region, in which there are no
rules of conduct or recognition of common interests, and in
which hatreds are very deep, the development of a credible
threat to inflict unacceptable punishment is seen as the best
means of enhancing stability and dissuading potential
aggressors.
Since defeating the Arab armies that invaded in 1948,
Israel has consistently emphasized deterrence policies in
preventing attacks. At that time, the narrow borders, small
population, and image of weakness and vulnerability were
seen as inviting attack, and in response, Israeli leaders such
as Ben Gurion and Dayan emphasized the creation of a
strong army able not only to defend the state, but also to
deter threats by carrying the war to the territory of the
aggressors and bringing it quickly to a conclusion.
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Deterrence became more important in both Israel and
Arab strategies following the wars between 1967 and 1973,
and for the past 20 years, the absence of major wars (with
the possible exception of Lebanon in 1982) might be
attributed, in part, to the success of deterrence.
Similarly, over the past 30 years, the “ambiguous”
nuclear deterrent policy has been viewed as very successful.
The perceived nuclear retaliatory capability is credited with
preventing Egypt from going beyond a limited attack in the
1973 war, and Egyptian military sources have
acknowledged this factor. In addition, the evidence
indicates that the fear of massive Israeli retaliation
deterred Saddam Hussein from using chemical or biological
3
weapons against Israel before or during the 1991 Gulf War.
(It is now clear that the Iraqis possessed Scud warheads
with chemical and biological agents at the time, and while
Saddam sought to bring Israel into the war, he was not
willing to accept the consequences of massive Israeli
retaliation.) During the war, U.S. Secretary of Defense
Cheney also invoked the prospect of Israeli nuclear
retaliation to deter the Iraqi leader from attacking Israel
with chemical weapons. Shimon Peres and other Israeli
leaders attribute the growing Arab willingness to accept the
existence and legitimacy of Israel, and to negotiate peace
agreements, to the recognition that Israel’s nuclear
deterrent capability prevents the Arabs from achieving a
decisive military victory that would put an end to the Jewish
4
state.
The Israeli monopoly has been steadily reduced as other
states in the region seek to gain nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons. In response, Israeli leaders have
increased the emphasis on and credibility of the threats of
massive retaliation and deterrence. In January 1995,
during a Knesset debate on the Iranian nuclear threat,
Deputy Defense Minister Gur warned Islamic nations that
if one of them uses nonconventional weapons against Israel,
no one will escape the consequences of that war.
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We have made this clear many times. In this issue, we will not
allow ourselves to be behind and we will not expose ourselves [to
this danger]. . . . The radical Islamic world knows the nature of
war. The Iran-Iraq war reached its end after 200 Iraqi missiles
were fired against Teheran. This means that even the
Khomenist leadership understands what happens when its
people are injured. Don’t think that a leader of a people with
60-65 million people could suddenly arise and go to war with
grave danger without taking into consideration the terrible
suffering that he would cause to his people. . . . Israel must take
this option into consideration; Israel decided that she will exist
despite the existence of nuclear weapons in the world. We have
to be ready across different fronts and time frames, and in this
5
area, we must not take any chances."

Similarly, after the Iranian missile test of July 1998, Prime
Minister Netanyahu remarked that “I think it should be
remembered that Israel is the strongest country in the
region. It has answers, and I think that every country in the
region knows Israel’s power.” 6
In the context of an eroding monopoly, the viability of an
invisible deterrent that is entirely separate from the Israeli
war fighting doctrine and order of battle is questionable. At
some point, this will be insufficient and a more visible and
robust deterrence capability will become necessary, capable
of a credible response to different levels of threat and
potential attack scenarios. There are increasing signs that
the Israeli leadership is considering the requirements for
these changes in its deterrent posture. Major General
Yitzhak Ben-Yisrael, head of the Armaments Research and
Development Administration at the Defense Ministry,
indicated that the policy is being reevaluated, and noted the
limitations of the invisible deterrent. “If Israel’s defense
doctrine is deterrence, you can’t deter anyone except by
7
showing him your capability.”
As long as Israel’s vulnerability to a strategic first strike
is very limited, survivable second strike capabilities,
including the appropriate command and control systems
(C3-I) are not a high priority. However, this situation is
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changing with the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
WMD systems. If another state in the region makes
progress towards a nuclear weapons capability, Israel is
likely to abandon the ambiguous nuclear posture and adopt
an overt nuclear deterrent. (Israel is a signatory to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and although it has not
yet ratified the agreement, policy makers are normatively
bound by the terms, unless the security situation changes
very radically.)
In developing a strategic response, Israel has begun by
investing in strategic intelligence and early warning. The
Ofeq 3 satellite, which was developed and launched by
Israel after the U.S. rejected Israeli requests for access to
American satellite data, is reportedly capable of returning
high-resolution images, and additional satellites are
8
planned. (The launch of Ofeq 4 ended in failure, but a
replacement is reportedly being prepared for launch.)
With respect to delivery systems, Israel has recently
acquired long-range F-15 I aircraft from the United States,
with the well-publicized capability of striking targets in
Iran without the need for refueling. Given Israeli
air-superiority and the ability to defeat or evade air defense
systems that are deployed or likely to be deployed in the
region, this represents an important and flexible deterrent
capability. In order to assure the maintenance of a
survivable second strike, a number of these aircraft can be
maintained on airborne alert during periods of crisis, as was
done with other initial approach fix (IAF) systems during
the 1991 Gulf War.
Israel also possesses a long-range ballistic missile
capability with ranges of at least 2,000 kilometers.
Although there is no official confirmation regarding the
9
existence of the Jericho missile, the evidence is clear. (The
Israeli Shavit launcher, which is apparently based on
similar technology, has placed three small satellites into
orbit, and any launcher can also serve as a ballistic missile.
The range will vary with the size of the payload.) With
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moderate hardening and underground or mobile
deployment, these systems are secure against all threats
with the exception of nuclear weapons. (The author of an
article in Jane’s Intelligence Review claimed that 50 nuclear
warheads on Jericho-II intermediate-range missiles are
deployed for this purpose.)
There are also unconfirmed reports that Israel is
developing a cruise missile (known as the Popeye Turbo)
10
with a range of 350 kilometers, to be operational in 2002.
The recent delivery of three new Dolphin-class submarines
built for Israel in Germany sparked speculation regarding
the possible development of a sea-based second strike
deterrent. Press reports suggested that these submarines
could be converted to carry “nuclear-tipped cruise
11
missiles.” However, given the absence of reliable evidence
and the plethora of unsubstantiated rumors dealing with
Israeli strategic capabilities, these reports must be treated
with a great deal of caution.
With respect to deterrence against attacks involving
chemical and biological weapons, the requirements are
subject to intense debate. Despite some claims that
chemical weapons are the strategic equivalents of nuclear
weapons, the damage caused by chemical weapons (CW)
attacks, particularly from a small number of missiles with
small payloads, is quite limited. As a result, the threat to
use nuclear weapons in retaliation is not credible, despite
the speculation that Israel might use such weapons in
response to Iraqi threats to “incinerate half of Tel Aviv with
nuclear weapons." Although a response in kind can be
considered to provide an effective deterrent, there is no
public information regarding Israeli chemical weapons
capabilities, if any. (There has been a great deal of
speculation on this issue, but no reliable evidence exists, one
way or the other.) This issue has come to be a central aspect
of the debate regarding ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, with opponents arguing that by
ratifying this treaty, Israel would be weakening the
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perceived deterrent capabilities and options with respect to
a chemical attack.
Deterring biological weapons (BW) attacks raises
additional problems, particularly given the high degree of
uncertainty with respect to the nature of the threat. If BW
are, as some analysts contend, far more lethal than CW,
then the threat to use nuclear weapons in response to a BW
attack is credible. However, if the scale is closer to the threat
posed by CW, the deterrence issues are also similar.
The Limitations Of Mutual Deterrence in the Middle
East. Any decision to adopt a strategy based on mutual
deterrence must face the basic requirements for stability,
particularly in a multipolar environment. While the
deterrence system developed during the Cold War may be
deemed to have prevented war (although critics argue that
the mutual deterrence strategy was flawed, and nuclear
conflict was avoided despite these flaws), there are many
different factors in the Middle East. In this region, the
conflicts are ethno-national and not ideological, the major
actors share common borders and have fought a number of
conventional wars, and there are questions regarding the
rationality of the leaders and their readiness to take major
risks. Instead of a bipolar deterrence system, as was the
case in the Cold War, Middle Eastern deterrence would be
multipolar, adding additional complexities and sources of
instability. The level and quality of communication is often
poor (Israel and Iran do not have direct links and
misperceptions are common.) The long history of violent
terrorism demonstrates the willingness of some individuals
and groups to kill large numbers of people in the name of a
particular cause. In this environment, the creation and
maintenance of a stable system of deterrence will be
difficult.
At the same time, the options available to Israeli
decisionmakers are limited, and, as noted above, the
historical record demonstrates that deterrence based on
massive retaliation and threats directed at the leadership
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and regime have been successful. (In the 1991 Gulf War,
Saddam Hussein first indicated a willingness to withdraw
from Kuwait after an American precision guided weapon
penetrated a command bunker that also housed members of
the Iraqi elite. When the Iraqi leader realized the extent of
his vulnerability, he acted according to a rational
12
calculus.) In the absence of a preferred alternative,
strengthened mutual deterrence is likely to continue to be
the basis for Israel’s military doctrine in the face of
proliferation of WMD and long-range ballistic missiles.
Defensive Strategies and Approaches.
Until the past few years, Israeli military planners did
not invest significant resources in defensive systems. The
very small size of the country and the need to bring wars to a
rapid conclusion in order to allow the reserve forces to
return to civilian life have led to adoption of an offensive
approach, in which battles are fought in enemy territory,
before the Israeli population is placed at risk. In addition,
the air superiority established by the IAF is also credited
with protecting the country.
However, the acquisition of missiles and CW in a
number of Arab countries has forced Israel to develop a
defensive strategy, both active and passive. The passive
approach to defense consists of the distribution of gas masks
to the entire population, and the creation of “sealed rooms”
in houses and other buildings as barriers to the penetration
of chemical and biological agents. This population defense
was applied during the 1991 Gulf War, and has been
maintained since, particularly in the face of renewed
concerns regarding the potential for an Iraqi attack.
At the same time, active missile defense programs have
been pursued, primarily in the form of the Homa (Wall)
ballistic missile defense (BMD) project, which includes the
Arrow missile system, the Green Pines fire-control radar
system, a command and control system and other
sub-systems. Research and development of the Arrow is
358

expected to cost over $2 billion (largely provided by the U.S.
Government), and most of the technology, including the
radar system, is being developed in Israel.
The operational Arrow 2 is designed to provide terminal
defense against incoming missiles, by destroying them at an
altitude of between 10 and 40 kilometers. A number of
development tests of the Arrow have demonstrated the
potential for this system, particularly given the difficulties
and much higher costs associated with the American BMD
programs (theater high-altitude area defense [THAAD] and
the Navy’s Theater-Wide systems).
In May 1998, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai
approved a multi-year project to build and deploy the Homa
BMD system. The U.S. Government has agreed to provide
some of the funding for three Arrow batteries (at an
estimated cost of $80 million per battery), with the first
operational capability expected towards the end of 1999. In
September 1998, a successful test of the integrated system,
which tracked and “destroyed” a simulated target, marked a
major milestone in the development process.
However, there are a number of obstacles to wider
deployment of the Arrow. These include an unfavorable
cost-exchange ratio (each Arrow defensive missile is
expected to cost from $1 to $2 million, and an average of two
Arrows must be allocated to each incoming warhead, while
surface-to-surface [ SCUD]-type offensive missiles can be
added at a fraction of this cost), and the ability of more
advanced weapons to defeat the Arrow.
As an alternative, or primary layer, Israeli military
planners are giving greater consideration to the
development of boost-phase intercept (BPI) BMD systems.
BPI has the advantage of being able to destroy offensive
missiles in the first stages of their flight, while they are
moving slowly, present large targets, and threaten to
release their payloads over the countries that are
attempting to launch these systems, rather than close to
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their targets, as is the case with terminal defense systems
such as the Arrow.
A number of approaches to BPI have been considered.
The United States is planning to develop and test an
Airborne Laser (ABL) system carried in a modified Boeing
747 aircraft. Israeli R&D funds have been directed towards
the development of a lower cost system, based on small
kinetic energy “kill vehicles” (Missile Optimized
13
Anti-Ballistic weapons or MOAB, also known as IBIS )
fired from hovering drones or unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs). This approach is strongly supported by Major
General (Res.) David Ivri, and some money has been
allocated for conceptual studies. Critics view Ivri’s role as a
combination of technological enthusiasm and an effort to
provide contracts for the Israeli defense industries, and
BPI’s future is highly uncertain.
In order to be effective, the BPI carriers must be on
station near the launch sites at the time of attack, and must
be able to survive attacks by air defense systems. This may
be achievable for relatively short periods, particularly
during times of crisis, and for longer periods with respect to
neighboring countries. For example, UAV-based BPI may
possibly counter the Syrian missile threat (although the
farther the launch sites are from the Israeli border, the more
difficult this will become), but it is much more difficult to
achieve with respect to Iraq and Iran. Although the
laser-based ABL has a theoretical range of 200 kilometers
(or more, depending on the laser), there are many technical
uncertainties, and such a large object, even if maintained
far away from the launch site, would be vulnerable to
preemptive attack. In addition, there are various
inexpensive countermeasures, such as coating missiles with
reflective paint, which could neutralize the laser.
More fundamentally, as Yisrael Tal has noted, unless
the defensive system provides 100 percent protection, which
no system can, it is not sufficient to protect a small country
like Israel against a nuclear threat. Tal noted that
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One of the things that worries me is that among policymakers
there is a certain belief that defense is stronger than offense.
That is, that we can best the enemy from defense positions.
This is very dangerous. The Arabs can afford to remain in a
14
defensive posture. We cannot afford this.

BMD, whether terminal, as in the case of the Arrow, or
BPI, or a combination, may be part of a new Israeli strategy,
but it will not remove the need for or primary emphasis on
15
deterrence and assured second strike capabilities.
Regional Security Alliances.
While the strategic debate continues, the development of
regional security relationships, and the growth of an
extensive system of security cooperation between Israel and
Turkey mark a very important change. In the past 5 years,
this relationship has grown to encompass use of each other’s
airspace for training flights and exercises, Israeli military
exports and upgrade packages, consultations and
exchanges at the highest levels, and a highly publicized
naval search and rescue exercise involving the United
States, and with Jordanian observers.
This strategic relationship and proto-alliance with
Turkey has ended decades of Israeli regional isolation, and
provided a balance to the Arab alliances that have linked
military forces against Israel in the past. The links between
Ankara and Jerusalem also serve to offset the IranianSyrian alliance which has been seen in Israel as an
additional concern and source of regional instability.
Turkey and Israel share concerns regarding Syrian threats,
including missile and WMD, and also about Iraniansupported Islamic fundamentalism in the region.
Beyond the defense cooperation with Israel, Turkey is
also developing a bilateral relationship with Jordan. Israel
also has good, although generally unpublicized cooperative
security links with Jordan, based on shared perceptions
regarding Palestinian and Iraqi threats. These shared
interests are likely to increase if a Palestinian state is
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created, and if Saddam Hussein is able to escape the
international sanctions regime and resume his efforts to
achieve regional dominance.
Thus it is possible that in the next decade, and
depending on political developments in all three countries
and the region, Turkey, Jordan, and Israel could form the
nucleus of a defensive regional security structure. Political
changes and reevaluations of Egyptian interests might
possibly create a situation in which Cairo would join this
framework, and then other states might follow.
There are, however, a number of uncertainties in these
relationships, and the future may not be as cooperative as
the Israeli optimists hope. If the Islamic forces gain
strength, and these groups oppose security links to Israel on
ideological grounds, the alliance could be frozen or rolled
back. In addition, the limits of the alliance need to be
defined. Turkey is likely to distance itself in the event of
confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians, and
Israel will avoid becoming involved in the conflicts with the
Kurds and any Turkish military involvement in Cyprus.
THE CENTRALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE UNITED STATES
Since the mid-1960s, the strategic ties between
Washington and Jerusalem have been a central and
growing factor in Israeli assessments, decisionmaking, and
policy. Israel receives most of its weapons platforms and
much of its technology from the United States, and
American military assistance helps to pay for strategic
systems such as the F-15 and Arrow.
In addition, Israel is aware that only the United States
has the potential power and global sense of responsibility to
attempt to slow the process of WMD and missile
proliferation in the Middle East. With Russia continuing to
provide technology and assistance, particularly to Iran, and
leaders in Moscow, such as Yevgeny Primakov, see such
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assistance as a means of increasing Russian power in
response to NATO expansion and other factors, American
counterpressure on Russia on these issues is extremely
important for Middle East stability. In this sense, the Cold
War may be returning to the region.
At the same time, there is a growing sense that both the
capability and the resolve of the United States to intervene
in the region is diminishing steadily. This is most apparent
in the case of Iraq, but is also visible with respect to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
missiles in Iran, Syria, and other states that pose a danger
to the region, in general, and to Israel, in particular.
From the 1970s and through the 1980s, many U.S.
intelligence and high-level policymakers consistently
missed or underestimated Saddam Hussein’s programs. In
1981, the U.S. Government was surprised when Israel
decided it needed to destroy the Iraqi reactor, and again in
1990 when the almost completed Iraqi nuclear weapons
capability was suddenly uncovered. The combination of the
tilt to Iraq during the war with Iran, the pro-Iraqi lobbying
of Arab states (primarily Egypt and Saudi Arabia), and the
fact that the vast majority of intelligence assets were
directed toward monitoring the disintegrating Soviet
Union, all contributed to this complacency and the
asymmetry in assessments between Washington and
Jerusalem.
Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United
States responded with a major military campaign, but this
war ended before Saddam Hussein had been removed from
office, and without the destruction of Iraq’s missiles and
nuclear, chemical, and biological technology and
infrastructure. Since then, Saddam Hussein has succeeded
in evading the UNSCOM regime, and in maintaining, and
perhaps even adding to his WMD arsenal. From an Israeli
perspective, the Americans have failed to fully redeem
pledges to destroy these capabilities during the 1991 Gulf
war, when the Bush Administration pressed Israel to act
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with restraint in the face of missile attacks. Although there
are many factors that have complicated the destruction of
the Iraqi capability, American credibility has eroded. For
the millions of Israelis who spent 6 weeks in sealed rooms
with gas masks and face this prospect again, the lapses and
frequent departures from a strong, consistent U.S.
leadership role have a strong impact.
Although the Clinton Administration has focused on
Middle East issues, the Arab-Israeli peace process has
claimed most of the time and resources of those responsible
for formulating and implementing U.S. regional policy in
the Middle East. The accelerating proliferation of WMD in
the region is often relegated to secondary status except
during periods of crisis and sudden and intense activity. (In
Washington, some policy makers have claimed that the
freeze in the peace process has weakened the American
ability to influence Arab states to support military action
against Iraq. However, the evidence suggests that the
causality is reversed. It is U.S. actions, or lack of action,
with respect to WMD proliferation that affects the U.S.
ability to influence the peace process.)
Criticisms of U.S. policy with respect to Iraqi weapons
capabilities have been highlighted both in Washington and
Israel. A 1998 report of the Senate Subcommittee on
International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services
concludes, “By speaking loudly but carrying a small stick
the Clinton Administration risks its nonproliferation
16
credibility and America’s security.”
In early 1998,
following the Iraqi suspension of UNSCOM inspections, the
dispatch of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Anan to negotiate
an agreement over further inspections, and the subsequent
agreement, was widely criticized. Claims by U.N. inspector
Scott Ritter and evidence that the U.S. Government had
asked the UNSCOM team to avoid searching too hard for
Iraqi weapons and facilities, in order to prevent a
confrontation with Iraq, were seen in Israel and throughout
the Middle East as signs of American weakness and lack of
17
resolve. This evaluation increased significantly in the Fall
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of 1998, when the United States was engrossed in the
Lewinsky Affair, and Iraq again suspended UNSCOM
inspections.
Similarly, the slow American response to Russian
exports of missile and nuclear technology and expertise to
Iran was seen as a sign of weakness. Although Israeli
intelligence information showed a steady flow of technology
from Russia to Iran beginning in early 1997, the U.S.
Government did not act for many months. After the U.S.
Congress passed mandatory sanctions legislation in
mid-1998, (and with a wide majority that insured the ability
to override Clinton’s veto), the Russian government
announced the opening of an investigation regarding some
of the firms involved in this technology transfer. At this
stage, the U.S. Government imposed sanctions of these
firms. However, in July 1998, the Iranians tested the
Shihab 3 missile, with a reported range of 1300 kilometers
(placing Israel within range), and even if all Russian
assistance were stopped, it appeared that the Iranians
would be able to complete the development independently.
More recently, the emergence of internal splits in Iran,
and the election of Khatami has led to a “softer” U.S.
approach and relaxation of sanctions, while the Iranian
nuclear and missile programs, as well as support for terror
and threats directed at Israel have not changed. This
process has not increased Israeli confidence in the American
ability to slow the flow of WMD technology to the region, or
to protect Israel’s vital security interests.
Perceptions of American Weakness.
In a broader sense, Israel’s threat perceptions and
strategic concepts very much depend on the degree to which
the United States acts as the world’s only superpower, and
accepts the new responsibilities that came with this role. All
other states—including Russia, Britain, and France—can
and do behave as ordinary states, emphasizing their own
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narrow interests and leaving the resulting problems to the
Americans.
However, the United States has acted inconsistently,
prevaricating and delaying, while WMD programs went
from early research to advanced development and testing.
In confronting Iraq, the United States has consistently
sought the backing of an international coalition—a strategy
that has distinct advantages but with costs generally
underestimated in Washington.
As Eliot Cohen has noted, other countries in the world
depend on America’s willingness to act “as a global empire,
rather than as one of two rival superpowers, or a normal
state.” However, the radical reduction in U.S. military
capabilities and frequent cycle of threats and concessions
have severely reduced American credibility in acting to
enforce the Iraqi cease-fire requirements and in other areas.
As Cohen notes, these changes have “steadily but noticeably
18
eroded morale and equipment readiness.”
When the United States acts like an ordinary state in the
Middle East, looking for allies before responding to the
growing threats from Iraq and Iran, this is inconsistent.
Cohen diagnoses the problem precisely, observing
When, as in Bosnia, it is prepared to act, its allies usually go
along; when, as in the recent confrontation with Saddam
Hussein, the United States wavers, friendly states retreat into
passivity.

When, on some occasions, the United States has
demonstrated an ability to act powerfully (although only
after a long period of deliberation and preparation), it has
not shown the staying power necessary to deal with the
persistent threats posed by countries such as Iraq, with a
well-entrenched WMD infrastructure. To cite Cohen, “U.S.
planners would prefer to prepare for quick, unconstrained,
knock-down fights with easily identified opponents.”
However, in the Middle East, the long haul is what finally
counts.19
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The Continuing Alliance.
Although Israel must retain the capability of responding
independently of the United States in the face of threats
posed from states in the region (as demonstrated in the case
of Iraq), the strategic relationship with the United States
will continue to be of primary importance to Israeli security.
As Cohen, et. al., note,
Israel’s strategic dependence on its patron will grow in coming
years. Developing an effective defense against missiles and
nonconventional weapons will require a high level of
technological cooperation. . . Israel is likely in a future war to
20
require some form of direct U.S. assistance. . . .

As result, as Israeli leaders consider the options and
their implications, it will be important to maintain and
intensify the strategic dialogue with the American
government, and to seek coordination and agreement to the
extent possible. (Between 1992 and 1996, under the Labor
Government, Israel considered a number of possible
formulae to formalize the defense relationship with the
United States. In 1996, following the assassination of Prime
Minister Rabin, his successor, Shimon Peres, raised the
possibility of a formal defense treaty in the context of a
possible agreement with Syria and withdrawal from the
Golan Heights.) Israeli leaders will have to put increasingly
greater efforts into convincing the American government
that its own (i.e., the United States) interests are served by
intervention in the region, and by military action, when
necessary.
At the same time, if Israel detects a steady weakening of
Washington’s capability to intervene in the region, or of its
resolve, the alternative is greater emphasis on unilateral
action.
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FINDING THE RIGHT MIX
To the extent possible, Israeli leaders should and would
prefer to pursue all available options. However, the high
cost of defense and stable deterrence has placed some limits
on their simultaneous pursuit. The acquisition and
operation of the D o l p h i n submarines, the Ofeq
reconnaissance satellites, the F-15 strike aircraft, and the
Homa BMD system, are each extremely costly, even with
substantial assistance from the United States.
As was demonstrated during the Cold War, the
maintenance of a reliable second strike deterrent in a
dynamic situation is costly, requiring constant
improvements in response to external developments.
Although, eventually, it is possible that the nations of the
Middle East will realize their common interest in verifiable
arms limitation agreements, this is still a long way off, and
in the interim, the costs will remain very high.
At the same time, the Israeli defense budget has been
declining steadily over the past decade, reflecting sharp
reductions in government spending in order to allow for
economic growth, and also a change in priorities and
increased emphasis on social programs, including health,
education, and welfare. Efforts by the Defense Ministers
and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff to reverse
this trend have failed to date.
Furthermore, as critics note, the bulk of the available
resources for weapons and technology are still allocated to
the acquisition of conventional platforms (fighter aircraft,
helicopters, and tanks), and in the current 5-year plan, $5
billion are earmarked for these weapons. With the
additional local costs of the Homa BMD and Ofeq, and for
operation of other major systems, the economy cannot
provide much more for research and development or the
acquisition of such systems. It will prove difficult to
maintain and modernize widespread missile defense
systems and an advanced second strike deterrent, and
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consistent priorities will have to be assigned to guide
decisionmaking at all levels.
In a broader sense, it is clear that the strategic balance in
the trans-Mediterranean and Middle East is changing
rapidly, with constantly shifting weapons, technologies,
and alliances. In this context, Israel, like other states
confronted with this situation, must be prepared to adjust
its strategic policies and doctrine accordingly. Budgets,
weapons acquisitions, research and development,
manpower policies, training, tactics, and operations must
all be adjusted and made consistent with these changing
requirements. The difficulties should not be underestimated, given the massive bureaucratic inertia of any
military organization, as well as the vested interests in the
status quo and the need to maintain a formidable
operational capability, while also introducing basic changes
in each of these areas. However, in the Middle East, and in
the Israeli environment, in particular, a static response to a
dynamic environment is doomed to failure.
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CHAPTER 15
AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE
EAST IN CLINTON’S SECOND TERM
Robert O. Freedman

INTRODUCTION*
While U.S. President Bill Clinton achieved a number of
successes in his Middle East policy during his first term in
office—most noticeably the Oslo peace agreement between
Israel and the PLO that was signed on the White House
lawn in September 1993—during his second term U.S.
1
Middle East policy has proved much more problematic.
Not only has the Oslo peace process run into serious
difficulty, but the U.S. “dual containment” policy toward
Iran and Iraq, which he inherited from the Bush
administration and then intensified during his first term,
had come close to collapse. The United States has also
encountered problems in peripheral areas of the region,
such as Cyprus, while also becoming beset by the problem of
terrorism. Compounding the President’s difficulties was a
Republican-dominated Congress which became
increasingly assertive as President Clinton became bogged
down in the Lewinsky affair which, after January 1998,
began to seriously threaten his presidency. This chapter
will examine U.S. policy toward the Middle East in the first
2 years of Clinton’s second term, looking first at what
American goals were at the time President Clinton was
reelected in November 1996 and then assessing the
administration’s success or failure in meeting these goals by
January 1999, with a concentration on the U.S. role in the
*I am indebted to Dr. Robert Lieber of Georgetown University and to
Dr. Steven David of Johns Hopkins University for their comments on
the first draft of this paper.
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Arab-Israeli peace process and U.S. policy toward Iraq and
Iran.
THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
U.S. goals for the Middle East in the period just before
the 1996 U.S. presidential election were clearly and
concisely spelled out by then U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs Robert H. Pelletrau in a
speech before the Fifth Annual Southwest Asia symposium
of the U.S. Central Command (CENTO).
Securing a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between
Israel and its neighbors remains a cornerstone of our overall
foreign policy. A successful peace process will enhance regional
stability, remove a rallying point for fanaticism, and enhance
prospects for political and economic development. The United
States is engaged in several fronts to advance peace
negotiations, an engagement which in turn helps achieve our
other objectives in the Middle East. These include preserving
Israel’s security and well-being; maintaining security
arrangements to preserve stability in the Persian Gulf and
commercial access to its resources; combating terrorism and
weapons proliferation; assisting U.S. businesses, and
2
promoting political and economic reform.

Pelletrau’s emphasis on the peace process as the key to
overall U.S. policy in the Middle East reflected a realization
that had become concretized in U.S. policy over the past two
decades: that it was very difficult for the United States to
simultaneously maintain good relations with Israel and
with friendly Arab states—especially the oil producers of
the Persian Gulf—unless Washington was working both
assiduously and successfully to bring about a peace
agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors. While
much of the Arab world, seeing a direct threat from Iraq, did
rally around U.S. efforts to repel Iraqi aggression against
Kuwait in the August 1990-March 1991 period, at a time
when the Arab-Israeli peace process was making little
progress; during Clinton’s second term, the United States
was to have a great deal of difficulty rallying Arab support
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against Iraqi violations of United Nations (U.N.) Security
Council Resolutions in November 1997 and January/
February 1998, at least in part because of the near collapse
of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Conversely, once the
United States got the peace process back on track with the
Wye Agreement in October 1998, Clinton got far more
support from the Arab states during the mid-November
1998 confrontation with Iraq, although as Wye faltered in
December 1998, this was to negatively affect popular
opinion in parts of the Arab world when the United States
finally decided to bomb Iraq.
A year before the U.S. presidential election of 1996, the
Arab-Israeli peace process had suffered its first blow when
an Israeli religious fanatic, Yigal Amir, assassinated Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin who had pioneered the effort
to reach peace with the Palestinians. In 1993 Rabin and
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser
Arafat had signed the Oslo I “Declaration of Principles” on
the White House lawn, a ceremony which underlined the
U.S. backing of the peace agreement which, however, had
been forged by direct negotiations between Israelis and
Palestinians. A year later, with President Clinton also
present, Rabin and King Hussein ibn Talal of Jordan signed
a peace treaty, which transformed the unofficial peaceful
relationship between Israel and Jordan into a public one. In
September 1995, despite a series of Hamas and Islamic
Jihad terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, Rabin and
Arafat signed the Oslo II agreement that turned over the
major Palestinian cities of the West Bank (except for
Hebron) to Palestinian rule, a process that was completed
by January 1996 and accompanied by elections for a
Palestinian Parliament and Palestinian Executive, the
latter won, to no one’s surprise, by Arafat.
As the peace process developed between 1993 and 1995,
the United States took the lead in fostering multilateral
working groups bringing representatives from Israel and 13
Arab countries, along with 30 countries from outside the
Arab world, to deal with problems that cut across the region
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as a whole, such as water, the environment, the refugee
3
issue, and arms control and security. The highlights of
these multilateral meetings were the economic summits
that took place in Arab capitals such as Amman, Cairo, and
Casablanca and brought together Arab and Israeli
businessmen to discuss possible business deals.
Following the assassination of Rabin, however, the
peace process began to deteriorate—in spite of the best
efforts of his successor, Shimon Peres, to hold it together. In
February and March 1996 Hamas terrorist bombings in the
heart of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv helped create an
atmosphere that led to the election of anti-Oslo Israeli
politician Benjamin Netanyahu as Israeli Prime Minister in
May 1996, despite the attempts of the United States to rally
support for Peres by organizing an anti-terrorism summit at
the Egyptian town of Sharm el-Sheikh in March 1996.
Following the election of Netanyahu, one of the first
things the Israeli leader did, once he put together his
governing coalition, was to journey to Washington. Besides
meeting President Clinton, he also addressed the American
Congress, and in his speech made assertions that were
clearly aimed at winning over the Republican-dominated
body, such as announcing his plans to privatize state-owned
Israeli companies, deregulate the Israeli economy and
eliminate U.S. foreign aid to Israel. The alliances
Netanyahu was to reinforce with key Republican leaders
(he had been a frequent visitor to Congress when he was the
Likud opposition leader from 1993-96) were to greatly aid
him when he came into conflict with Clinton over the peace
process, something he was soon to do. Indeed, while in his
inaugural speech in the Israeli Knesset, Netanyahu offered
peace to both the Palestinians (in return for “maximum
4
security for Israel in the face of terror and war”) and to
Israel’s Arab neighbors, his policy of expanding Jewish
settlements on the West Bank angered the Arabs.
Israeli-Palestinian relations hit a crisis in late September
1996 when, after unilaterally ordering the opening of the
Hasmonean tunnel near the Temple Mount which was holy
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both to Moslems and Jews, fighting erupted between
Israelis and Palestinians, causing the deaths of 70 people.
President Clinton, in an effort to defuse the crisis which took
place little more than a month before the presidential
election, invited Netanyahu, Arafat, King Hussein, and
Hosni Mubarak to Washington (Mubarak refused to go, a
sign of the chilling of U.S.-Egyptian relations). While the
emergency summit achieved little in substance, the crisis
was eased. Nonetheless, the degree of trust between Arafat
and Netanyahu, never very high to start with, all but
evaporated, and it was to be the United States that was
forced to get intensively involved in the peace process
(unlike the situation in the Oslo I and Oslo II negotiations)
in order to broker an agreement for the partial (80 percent)
Israeli withdrawal from the city of Hebron in January 1997.
The agreement also stipulated that Israel would undertake
three additional troop redeployments over the next 18
months.
Just a month later, however, Israeli-Palestinian
relations received a major blow. Prime Minister Netanyahu,
possibly reacting to pressure from the right wing of his
governing coalition, which had been strongly opposed to the
Hebron agreement, announced on February 26 that Israel
would build a new Jewish neighborhood, which he called
Har Homa, of 6,500 housing units in traditionally Arab East
Jerusalem. When he announced days later that the next
Israeli troop redeployment would turn over only 2.7 percent
of Israeli-controlled West Bank territory to the Palestinian
Authority, the peace process came to a halt. Arafat then not
only broke off talks with Netanyahu, he also sharply
diminished the security cooperation between the
Palestinian police and the Israeli army stipulated by the
Oslo II agreement, leading Israelis to charge that he was
encouraging terrorism. Terrorism in fact did resume, with a
bomb in a Tel Aviv cafe in March set off by Hamas, killing 3
Israelis, and additional bombs in Jerusalem on July 30 and
September 4, killing a total of 21 Israelis and wounding
hundreds more. Netanyahu reacted to the bombings by
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imposing a border closure that prevented Palestinians on
the West Bank and Gaza from working in Israel (a tactic
also periodically used by Rabin), by withholding tax
payments previously collected from Palestinians working in
Israel and owed to the Palestinian Authority, and by
threatening to send Israeli forces into Palestinian areas to
root out the terrorists.
In September 1997, after appearing to withdraw from
the Middle East peace effort, the United States again
intervened, this time with the peace process on the verge of
total collapse after the two Hamas bombings. The new U.S.
Secretary of State Madeline Albright, who had been sworn
in on January 23, 1997, but had not yet made an official visit
to the Middle East, came to Israel in an effort to jump-start
the stalled peace process. She appealed to Arafat to take
unilateral action to root out the terrorist infrastructure, and
called on Netanyahu for a “time-out” in settlement
construction in the occupied territories, a plea Netanyahu
rejected. The peace process continued to stagnate until
November when the Israeli cabinet voted in principle in
favor of another troop withdrawal but specified neither its
extent nor its timing. Meanwhile, Clinton had grown
exasperated with what his administration perceived as
stalling by Netanyahu and publicly snubbed the Israeli
Prime Minister during Netanyahu’s November 1997 visit to
the United States to talk to Jewish organizations.
Netanyahu’s ties to the Republicans in Congress and to
their allies on the religious right of the American political
spectrum (such as Jerry Falwell whose Liberty University
5
students regularly make pilgrimages to Israel) helped
insulate the Israeli leader from U.S. pressure, a process that
would continue into 1998 as a weakened Clinton got bogged
down in the Lewinsky scandal.
Despite his growing weakness, Clinton, acting through
his Secretary of State Madeline Albright, again sought in
May 1998 to salvage the peace process whose apparent
demise was badly damaging the U.S. position in the Middle
East. Arab friends of the United States, as well as its Arab
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enemies, increased their complaints about a U.S. “double
standard” in the region of pressuring Iraq (see below) while
not pressuring Israel. Albright, in an effort to reverse this
situation, following meetings with Netanyahu and Arafat in
London, issued an ultimatum for Israel to accept a 13
percent withdrawal. This, however, failed due to the
support Netanyahu received from Republicans in the U.S.
Congress, the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States led by
the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC),
6
and the Christian Religious Right. Interestingly enough,
however, American Jewry was badly split over Netanyahu’s
policy, with Reform and Conservative Jews, already angry
at Netanyahu for his favoritism to Israel’s orthodox Jews,
calling for Netanyahu to more energetically engage in the
peace process while Orthodox Jews (a clear minority in the
American Jewish community) tended to support the Israeli
Prime Minister.
Albright continued her efforts during the summer,
however, reportedly calling Netanyahu seven times
7
between July 5 and 8. On July 10, after Albright’s meeting
with two senior Palestinian negotiators—Saeb Uraqat and
Nabil Sha’th—U.S. White House spokesman Mike McCurry
stated that there was “a limit to the degree in which we
8
participate in a process that doesn’t have utility,” and on
July 13, State Department spokesman James Rubin
pointedly noted:
the ball is not in the Palestinian court; the ball is in the court of
the Israelis to try to work with the Palestinians and work with
us to come to a second ‘yes’. We have a ‘yes’ from the
Palestinians, and we are looking to get ourselves in a position
9
where the Israelis can say ‘yes’ as well.

During the summer of 1998 the U.S. effort took on a new
focus—seeking to get Israeli approval by linking the Israeli
withdrawal in stages, to Palestinian action to combat
terrorism and assure Israeli security. Meanwhile a new
element had been added to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
Yasser Arafat’s threat to unilaterally declare a Palestinian
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state upon the expiration of the Oslo I agreement on May 4,
1999. While Netanyahu issued a counter-threat of a
unilateral Israeli response, which many interpreted as
annexation of large parts of the West Bank if Arafat went
ahead to declare a state, the Palestinian leader’s threat may
have been enough to get Netanyahu to agree to meet Arafat
in late September 1998 in Washington when both leaders
would be in the United States to address the U.N. At his
first meeting with Arafat in a year, Netanyahu finally
agreed in the presence of Clinton to the 13 percent
withdrawal figure stipulated by the United States, but only
on condition that 3 percent of the area would be a “nature
reserve” on which the Palestinians would be prohibited
10
from building, a condition to which Arafat agreed. The 13
percent figure was a considerable concession for Arafat who
had initially demanded a 30 percent withdrawal, and the
Palestinian leader also toned down his speech at the U.N.
where he refrained from threatening to declare a state on
May 4, 1999. But other issues continued to raise questions
about the ultimate success of the negotiations even as
Netanyahu and Arafat agreed to return to Washington in
mid-October. First and foremost were the security
agreements which Israel demanded in return for its phased
13 percent withdrawal. These included the specifics of
Palestinian action to dismantle terrorist cells, extradite
prisoners, confiscate excess guns, and stop what the Israelis
called “incitement” of citizens through anti-Israeli
11
speeches, sermons, and propaganda.
Other issues
included the opening of an airport in Gaza, safe passage for
Palestinian officials traveling between the West Bank and
Gaza, and a clear repudiation by the PLO of its charter
calling for the destruction of Israel. Then, of course, there
were “final status” issues such as Jerusalem, borders,
water, refugees, and the future of Israeli settlements that
were supposed to be negotiated by May 4, 1999. Clinton met
with Arafat separately the next day to urge him to work
effectively to combat terrorism, although the ultimate
success of the U.S. President’s efforts remained to be seen.
Nonetheless, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), an
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organization with the confidence of both Israelis and the
Palestinian Authority, was proposed as a compromise
institution to monitor Palestinian efforts to curb terrorism.
Indeed, as far back as March 1998, the Hamas spokesman
Ibrahim Ghawsah, had noted the effectiveness of the CIA
when he complained that “military operations” against
Israel had “become difficult” because of security cooperation
between Arafat’s Palestinian Authority and Israel,
12
“especially after the CIA joined in this coordination.”
However, beside the security questions involved in a
Palestinian-Israeli agreement, there were real concerns
whether Clinton was strong enough to broker an
agreement, given the Lewinsky affair. Natan Sharansky,
Minister of Industry and Trade in Netanyahu’s government
and a close confidant of the Israeli Prime Minister, openly
wondered “America is weak, so Arafat must wonder
13
whether they can deliver and that affects their role here.”
On the Palestinian side, Ziad Amir Amr, a Palestinian
lawmaker stated:
Before the scandal, at least, [Clinton] had some credibility. He
could send an envoy or secretary of state and people would
take it seriously. I don’t think he can be taken seriously. He
has no ability to do anything about the peace process. Its not
14
even a realistic option.

If this situation were not bad enough, the United States
faced another dilemma, the illness of King Hussein whose
country, Jordan, was now not only Israel’s closest Arab
friend (at least on the elite level) but also, after some
disruptions during the Gulf War when the King supported
Saddam Hussein, was again a major U.S. ally in the Arab
world. Should Hussein die, not only could IsraeliPalestinian relations be further strained, but the entire
Middle East peace process could be jeopardized.
Despite the skepticism of both Israeli and Palestinian
parliamentarians and the illness of King Hussein, Clinton
was able to move the peace process several steps forward in
mid-October as Netanyahu, Arafat, and King Hussein (who
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left the Mayo Clinic to play an important mediating role)
gathered with U.S. officials at the Conference Center of the
Wye Plantation on Maryland’s Eastern Shore. After 8 days
of intense bargaining which involved the threat of a walkout
by Netanyahu and Clinton’s postponement of a trip to
California to aid the reelection campaign of the embattled
Senator Barbara Boxer, a modest agreement was achieved
between Netanyahu and Arafat. The agreement involved
Israel withdrawing in three stages from 13.1 percent of
West Bank land (3 percent of which would become a nature
preserve), transferring an additional 14.2 percent of land
jointly controlled to sole Palestinian control, releasing 750
prisoners, and agreeing to the opening of a Palestinian
airport in Gaza, of two corridors of safe passage between
Gaza and the West Bank, and of an industrial zone between
Israel and Gaza. In return, Arafat agreed to changing the
Palestine National Charter to clearly eliminate the 26
articles calling for Israel’s destruction, although the
manner in which the change was to take place was a bit
vague (reference was made to an assembly of Palestinian
notables). Clinton’s promise to be present during the
Palestinian action, however, would serve to dramatize the
event. Arafat also agreed to issue a decree prohibiting all
forms of incitement to violence, to cut the number of
Palestinian police to 30,000 (from 40,000), to arrest and
confine 30 terrorism suspects wanted by Israel, to collect
illegal weapons and suppress terrorism, with the CIA
attesting to the fact that the Palestinian Authority was
15
making every effort to crack down on terrorism. The two
sides also agreed to resume negotiations on final status
16
issues.
Given the issues still to be resolved between Israel and
the Palestinians, the achievements at Wye were quite
modest, and the modicum of trust between Arafat and
Netanyahu that had been achieved at Wye seemed to
evaporate following their return home, as each issued
bellicose statements while terrorist acts orchestrated by
Hamas threatened the process of the planned three-stage
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Israeli withdrawal.
Nonetheless, Clinton had achieved
several important things as a result of the Wye Agreement.
First, by demonstrating that he was still a leader with
international influence, he helped dispel the weakened
image of the American presidency caused by the Monica
Lewinsky affair. Second, by getting the peace process back
on track, he demonstrated to the Arabs that the United
States was not following a double standard vis-à-vis Iraq
and Israel. Indeed, in the subsequent confrontation with
Iraq in mid-November 1998, this development was to help
the United States isolate Iraq in much of the Arab world.
Third, Clinton’s political position vis-à-vis Netanyahu was
strengthened. The Israeli Prime Minister’s unwise raising
of the Jonathan Pollard affair in the latter stage of the
negotiations alienated some of Netanyahu’s Republican
supporters. Netanyahu suffered a second political blow as a
result of Republican losses in the House of Representatives
in the U.S. mid-term elections that took place less than 2
weeks after the Wye summit, and which were widely seen as
a repudiation of Republican efforts to impeach Clinton.
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Newt
Gingrich, perhaps Netanyahu’s closest ally in the
Republican-dominated Congress, was forced to resign as a
result of the Republican defeat (Gingrich had predicted
gains of 35-40 Republican seats), to be replaced (albeit only
temporarily due to his own sex scandal) by Robert
18
Livingston, who was considerably more cool to Israel.
While the House of Representatives, in a highly partisan
independent process, went on to vote two articles of
impeachment against Clinton, the President’s standing in
American public opinion polls soared, and the impeachment
vote did not serve to weaken him politically. Whether
Clinton could use his restored political position to bring
added pressure on Netanyahu to move the peace process
forward soon became a moot point, however, as the Israeli
Prime Minister, beset by defections from his own
government, moved to call for new elections. In the process,
implementation of the Wye Agreement, which had been
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suspended by Netanyahu in early December 1998, was
frozen.
Initially, the Wye Agreement appeared to restore a
modicum of confidence between Arafat and Netanyahu.
Israeli troops, in the first stage of the agreement, withdrew
from 2 percent of the occupied West Bank; Israel released
250 Palestinian prisoners, and allowed the opening of the
Palestinian airport in Gaza. However, the momentum for
peace was quickly reversed. Palestinians, complaining that
the prisoners who were released were only “car thieves,” not
the political detainees they wanted, carried on violent
19
protest activities. These protests, together with a series of
Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israelis, including the
attempt by a Hamas suicide bomber to ram a bus filled with
Israeli school children in Gaza, an attempt to set off a bomb
in the Mahane Yehudah market in Jerusalem, and an
attack on an Israeli soldier in Rainallah (actions which
Arafat proved unwilling or unable to prevent), led
Netanyahu, under heavy pressure from right-wing
elements in his governing coalition. to freeze additional
troop withdrawals on December 2. The Israeli Prime
Minister conditioned the resumption of the withdrawals to
Arafat, halting what he called a campaign of incitement
against Israel, foregoing his intention to declare a
Palestinian state on May 4, 1999, and acceding to Israel’s
20
selection of the prisoners who were to be released.
For its part, the Clinton administration, despite the
ongoing impeachment process, was making major efforts to
keep the peace process going. On November 29, speaking at
a Palestinian donor conference he had convened in
Washington, President Clinton pledged $400 million in
additional aid to the Palestinians, on top of the $500 million
he had pledged in 1993. All told, some $3 billion in aid was
pledged to the Palestinians, an amount that would greatly
help the beleaguered Palestinian economy, although
questions were raised at the conference about corrupt
Palestinian officials siphoning off previous aid for their own
21
personal use. The United States also sought to downplay
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the conditions Netanyahu had placed on further Israeli
troop withdrawals under the Wye Agreement, with State
Department spokesman James P. Rubin stating on
December 2, 1998, “The agreement should be implemented
as signed. We do not believe it is appropriate to add new
22
conditions to implementation of the agreement.” The most
important effort to restore momentum to the IsraeliPalestinian peace process was taken by Clinton himself
when he journeyed to Gaza in mid-December to witness the
Palestinians formally abrogate the clauses in the Palestine
National Charter calling for Israel’s destruction, an action
which the Netanyahu government had long demanded.
While Clinton was on hand to witness the vote that he, too,
had urged on Arafat, the end result of his visit was a
warming of relations between the United States and the
Palestinian Authority, which received increased
international legitimacy as a result of the U.S. President’s
visit—an outcome which Israeli critics of Netanyahu
blamed on Netanyahu. As Bar-Ilan University professor
Shmuel Sandler noted, “Netanyahu boxed himself in,
wanting to survive politically and believing he can have his
cake and eat it [too]. He will have to pay a price as
23
Washington opens up to the Palestinians.”
While U.S.-Palestinian relations, at least on the level of
the Palestinian “street,” were to suffer a serious blow when
the United States bombed Iraq 2 days after Clinton’s visit to
24
the Palestinian Authority, Clinton’s personal relationship
with Arafat was to remain strong, as Arafat was to meet
Clinton and Albright in Washington in early February. In
any case, Clinton’s summit with Arafat and Netanyahu
following the visit to Gaza proved unsuccessful despite the
U.S. president’s claims of reviving the stalled Middle East
peace talks, as Netanyahu held fast to his position that no
further withdrawals would take place until the Palestinians
25
met his conditions.
This position, however, proved the
death knell for his coalition government, as members from
within Netanyahu’s ruling Likud party, led by Defense
Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, threatened to pull out of the
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government because of Netanyahu’s obdurate position on
the peace process. Suffering a major political blow when his
Finance Minister Ya’acov Ne’eman resigned, Netanyahu
moved to call for new elections before his government would
26
fall on a non-confidence vote. With elections scheduled for
May 17, 1999, the peace process was in effect frozen, leaving
the United States somewhat nervously on the diplomatic
sidelines, hoping that Arafat would not prematurely declare
a Palestinian state, and thus strengthen the chances for
Netanyahu’s reelection.
At the same time, American leaders had to be concerned
about the sudden succession process in Jordan. Kina
Hussein, who was suffering a relapse of his cancer, left the
United States where he was undegoing cancer treatment to
fly back to Jordan. There the King replaced his brother,
Hassan, as Crown Prince, with Hussein’s eldest son
Abdullah. Given the fact that Hassan, who had been Crown
Prince for more than 30 years, was a strong supporter of the
peace process and that Abdullah, a general in the Jordanian
army, was politically inexperienced, U.S. officials had to be
concerned. While Secretary of State Albright quickly visited
the Crown Prince to offer U.S. support, and President
Clinton offered $300 million in additional aid, the death of
King Hussein, which came soon after his selection of
Abdullah as Crown Prince, added a new challenge to the
U.S. leadership because it removed a moderating influence
from the often volatile Palestinian-Israeli relationship, and
King Hussein, who had been so valuable at Wye, would be
27
sorely missed.
THE RISE AND FALL OF DUAL CONTAINMENT:
U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ AND IRAN
If President Clinton was encountering difficulty in
fostering peace between Israel and the Palestinians, his
efforts at containing both Iraq and Iran, a policy he actively
pursued during his first term in office, had all but collapsed
in the 2 years following his reelection in November 1996.
For dual containment to be effective, the United States had
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to be willing not only to support large U.S. military forces in
the Persian Gulf, but also to have the will to use them if
either Iran or Iraq got out of line, rather than use one to
check the other as the United States had done in the 1970s
and 1980s. Two states also had to be kept isolated from
countries in their immediate region and be prevented from
28
receiving support from outside countries.
Iran, with
which the European Union countries followed a policy of
“constructive engagement,” never really faced such
isolation, while Iraq, a pariah in most of the Arab world
because of its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, by 1997 began to
acquire increased support from Arab countries such as
Egypt and Syria, while having received support from Russia
as far back as 1993. In addition, U.S. policy toward Iran had
clearly shifted by June 1998 from containment to an effort
at a rapprochement, in large part because of the election of a
reform-minded Iranian cleric, Mohammed Khatami, as
President of Iran.
U.S. Policy Toward Iraq.
During his first term, Clinton had been challenged by
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein on a number of occasions. In
June 1993, following an abortive Iraqi attempt to
assassinate former U.S. President George Bush who was
visiting Kuwait, the United States bombed an intelligence
center in Baghdad. In October 1994, Saddam Hussein
moved his army toward Kuwait, and the United States
responded by airlifting military forces to Kuwait and
warning Iraq not to invade, a threat that achieved its
purpose. The United States was less successful in late
August 1996, however, when Iraqi troops, in cooperation
with the KDP (the Masud Barzani faction of the Kurdish
opposition), attacked the rival PUK faction of Jallal
Talabani which had been aided by Iran, and drove it from
Irbil, thus severely damaging U.S. efforts to forge a united
opposition to the Iraqi regime. The United States responded
by expanding its “no-fly” zone in the south of Iraq to the 33rd
parallel, and by bombarding Iraqi air defense installations,
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although France, which had hitherto cooperated with the
United States in maintaining the “no-fly” zone, did not in
29
the newly extended part of the zone. The Arab opposition
may have also been caused by their view of limited U.S.
cruise missile attacks as worse than useless, stirring up of
Arab popular anger while not threatening the bases of
Saddam Hussein’s power.
The major Iraqi challenges to the United States were to
come in the fall of 1997 and the winter of 1998 and were to
result in a weakening of the U.S. containment effort,
something that was to be the result both of a sharp erosion
in President Clinton’s domestic political stature, and in
support for his anti-Iraqi policies in the Arab world. Making
matters more difficult for the United States was the active
diplomacy of Russia which was seeking to rebuild its
position in the Middle East.
There were three main reasons for Russian leader Boris
Yeltsin’s support of Iraq. First, to demonstrate to the world
and to an often hostile Duma (Parliament) that Russia
remained an important factor in the world, both willing and
able to oppose the United States. Second, to obtain
repayment for the $7 billion owed Russia’s predecessor, the
Soviet Union—something that will not happen until after
the lifting of sanctions on Iraq. Third, Russian arms
manufacturers and oil and gas companies seek contracts in
Iraq, even though they cannot actually begin operations
until sanctions are lifted. With these interests in mind, it is
easy to explain Russian behavior in both the OctoberNovember 1997 and January-February 1998 crises,
although Russian policy was far more coherent in the
30
October-November crisis.
In the fall of 1997, U.S. weapons inspectors, who were in
Iraq as part of the U.N. inspection team (UNSCOM)
checking on Iraq’s development of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), were prohibited by Iraq from carrying
out their mission and left the country, followed by the other
U.N. inspectors. The United States threatened military
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action against Iraq and began to mobilize its forces. At the
peak of the crisis, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny
Primakov called Secretary of State Madeline Albright back
from a visit to India and met with her and other members of
the U.N. Security Council at 2:00 a.m. in Geneva on
November 20, 1997. With the help of France, which was also
pursuing lucrative arms and business deals in Iraq,
Primakov put together an agreement under which the
weapons inspectors would be let back into Iraq in return for
a vague promise about lifting the sanctions.
The agreement proved short-lived, however, and in
January Saddam Hussein, claiming that the U.S. sanctions
were starving the Iraqi people, began backtracking on the
agreement by prohibiting inspections of his “presidential
palaces,” which were suspected as weapons depositories.
This led to the United States and Great Britain massing
their forces in the Persian Gulf, and it appeared as if a
conflict was imminent.
Several factors, however, prevented the outbreak of war.
First, Clinton was now beset by the Monica Lewinsky affair,
which became public in late January and which eroded his
political position. Second, domestic support for an attack on
Iraq proved not as strong as the Clinton administration had
hoped, as on February 18, 1998, Secretary of State Albright
and some of her administration colleagues encountered a
hostile reception during a Town Hall meeting at Ohio State
University on U.S. policy toward Iraq that was broadcast
31
worldwide by CNN.
A third factor was a clear lack of
support from America’s Arab allies who appeared to be
moved by Saddam’s portrayal of his suffering people. In
November 1997, at the height of the first crisis with Iraq,
many of America’s major Arab allies, including Saudi
Arabia, Morocco, and Egypt, boycotted the U.S.-sponsored
regional Arab-Israeli economic conference held in Doha,
Qatar. As the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, which
usually reflects government opinion, noted—despite the
U.S. support for the “oil for food” agreement that allowed
Iraq to import substantial amounts of food and
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medicine—“The American position toward Iraq cannot be
described as anything but coercive, aggressive, unwise, and
uncaring about the lives of Iraqis, who are unnecessarily
32
subject to sanctions and humiliations.” The Arab leaders
also made clear their dissatisfaction with the United States
for not pressing the Netanyahu government to move ahead
with the peace process, complaining that the United States
had a double standard in the Middle East, pressuring Iraq
but not Israel.
Arab criticism of the United States continued into the
February crisis when Saudi Arabia would not permit the
United States to use bases on its soil to attack Iraq,
reportedly because of U.S. “inability to push forward the
33
quest for a broader peace between the Arabs and Israelis.”
The Arab opposition may also have been caused by their view
that limited U.S. cruise missile strikes would be worse than
useless, stirring up the anger of the “Arab street,” while not
threatening the bases of Saddam Hussein’s power.
In the face of these constraints as well as opposition from
Russia and France to a U.S. military attack, President
Clinton chose a diplomatic way out of the impasse, this time
with the help of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who
extracted the promise from Saddam Hussein that the Iraqi
leader would not interfere with UNSCOM inspections. The
agreement, however, was strongly criticized by Republican
leaders in Congress such as Trent Lott, Jesse Helms, and
John McCain, who, as Clinton weakened politically, became
34
increasingly assertive spokesmen on U.S. foreign policy.
Their clamor became louder in late August when the chief
U.S. inspector on the UNSCOM team, Scott Ritter, resigned
in protest at what he said were deliberate U.S. efforts led by
Secretary of State Madeline Albright to derail inspections in
35
order to avoid another military confrontation with Iraq.
The resignation occurred on August 26, 3 weeks after
Saddam Hussein on August 5, barred surprise inspections
and said he would only allow remote monitoring and repeat
visits to known sites. Since the Iraqi leader had long had a
policy of trying to hide evidence of Iraq’s efforts to construct
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WMD, and UNSCOM, with Ritter often in the lead, had
been successful in ferreting out the WMD information
primarily by surprise inspections (although the information
released by Iraq after the defection in 1995 of Saddam’s
son-in-law, Hussein Kamil, was also helpful). Saddam’s
barring of surprise inspections meant the effective end of
U.N. monitoring of Iraq’s weapons programs; and the U.S.
failure to react to the Iraqi move, which Ritter (and many
others) saw was in direct contravention of UNSC Resolution
687, precipitated his resignation. While the United States
was subsequently to get a unanimous U.N. Security Council
condemnation of the Iraqi leader’s action (following
Saddam’s decision to interfere with routine UNSCOM
36
monitoring) along with a deferment of any Security
37
Council decision on lifting sanctions, it appeared that Iraq
was now relatively free to engage in a crash program to
build WMD, although the continuation of the sanctions on
his regime appeared to limit Saddam’s ability to do so.
Following Ritter’s resignation, Congressional
Republicans held hearings on what they called a reversal of
U.S. policy toward Iraq, with House Speaker Newt Gingrich
saying that what was involved suggested a “secret shift
from confrontation to appeasement” that was in direct
38
conflict with the government’s public rhetoric. Gingrich
further attacked Clinton by stating that, if Ritter’s
accusations were true, “Your administration’s tough
rhetoric on Iraq has been a deception, masking a real policy
39
of weakness and concession.”
In response, Secretary of
State Albright, citing the unanimous U.N. Security Council
vote against Iraq, asserted that the administration’s policy
would be more effective in curbing Saddam Hussein than
40
that of Scott Ritter, although few Republicans appeared
convinced. The administration did score a success in its Iraq
policy, albeit perhaps only a small one, in mid-September
when it persuaded the Kurdish factions of Masud Barzani
and Jallal Talabani, whose internecine conflict had
facilitated the capture of Irbil by Saddam Hussein’s forces 2
years earlier, to work together and share power in Northern
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Iraq.
Whether the agreement would hold, however,
remained to be seen. Meanwhile, Senate Majority Leader
Trent Lott and House International Relations Committee
Chairman Benjamin Gillman introduced a bill at the end of
September 1998 that authorized the Clinton
administration to select one or more Iraqi opposition groups
that would receive up to $97 million in U.S. Defense
Department equipment and military training “to seek to
remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq and
42
promote the emergence of a democratic government.”
While the Clinton administration initially opposed the bill
(although Clinton was later to sign it) because it limited its
flexibility of action over Iraq, it appeared that the
congressional Republicans, unhappy with Clinton’s
handling of Iraq, were thrusting forward an alternative
policy.
Fortunately for Clinton, Saddam Hussein again
overreached himself and allowed the American President,
albeit for only a very short time, to seize the initiative
against the Iraqi leader. On October 31, 1998, Saddam
Hussein ended all Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM,
precipitating yet another unanimous Security Council vote
condemning Iraq and demanding that the ban on
43
cooperation with UNSCOM be ended. When Iraq refused
to change its policy, the UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq, and
Clinton again began to mobilize U.S. forces for a possible
strike against the Iraqi leader. But the political situation in
November 1998 was far different from what it had been
during the November 1997 and February 1998 crises. In the
first place, Clinton was greatly strengthened by the U.S.
mid-term elections which were seen, as noted above, as a
public repudiation of Republican attempts to impeach him.
Second, after Clinton concluded the Wye Agreement, which
involved a further Israeli withdrawal from occupied
territory, the Arab world was far less hostile to U.S.
pressure against Iraq. Indeed, the Arab Gulf coalition that
fought against Iraq—Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf
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Cooperation Council—issued a strongly worded warning to
Iraq on November 12, stating:
Iraq must heed U.N. Security Council resolutions and abide by
them to avoid military confrontation . . . The Iraqi government
will be solely responsible for all repercussions resulting from
its decision to block UNSCOM from carrying out its
44
inspections . . .

A third problem which had hampered U.S. action
against Iraq in the previous two crises, Russian opposition,
had all but dissipated by November 1998. Beset by a
monumental economic crisis, having defaulted on its foreign
loans, and now having to virtually beg the United States
and Europe for food to get through the winter, Russia was in
45
no position to try to block a U.S. military strike on Iraq.
In this strengthened political position, Clinton decided
to launch a major military attack against Iraq, only to call it
back at the very last minute after receiving information that
Iraq, under the imminent threat of attack, had agreed to
46
allow the UNSCOM inspectors to resume their work.
While Clinton claimed the Iraqis had “backed down” and
threatened to initiate attacks if Iraq failed to fully cooperate
47
with UNSCOM, many commentators thought Clinton had
lost a golden opportunity, now that he had both the Arab
world and a united Security Council behind him, to destroy
the bases of Saddam’s power, including the Republican
Guard, the suspected sites of WMD, and Iraq’s remaining
military capability. While in his November 15 news
conference Clinton asserted that,
the return of the inspectors, if they can operate in an
unfettered way, is the best outcome, because they have been
and remain the most effective tool to uncover, destroy and
prevent Iraq from rebuilding its weapons of mass
48
destruction,

Clinton’s critics asserted that it was only a matter of time
before Saddam Hussein again interfered with the
UNSCOM inspectors, and at that time Clinton might not
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have the favorable domestic and diplomatic situations to
enable him to launch a major military attack against Iraq.
Indeed, this was to be the case 1 month later when a
politically weakened Clinton decided, in cooperation with
the British, finally to launch a military attack against Iraq.
By mid-December 1998, Clinton’s position had
weakened on two fronts. In the Middle East, Israeli Prime
Minister Netanyahu, as noted above, had suspended Israeli
participation in the Wye River Agreement, and Clinton had
not been able to reverse the decision. At home in the United
States, the Republican-dominated House Judiciary
Committee, in what was generally seen as a highly partisan
action, had pushed through, on a party-line vote, a
four-count impeachment indictment against Clinton, and
the resolution was awaiting action by the full House of
Representatives. It was precisely at this point that Clinton,
citing UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler’s report that the
Iraqis had again seriously interfered with the activities of
the inspectors, and concerned that, with the Islamic holy
month of Ramadan coming in a few days, the United States
would have had to postpone the attack for more than a
month, giving Saddam time to hide his WMD equipment,
launched the attack. In the words of President Clinton:
The conclusions [of UNSCOM chairman, Richard Butler’s
report] are stark, sobering, and profoundly disturbing . . . In
short, the inspectors are saying that, even if they could stay in
Iraq, their work would be a sham. Saddam’s deception has
defeated their effectiveness. Instead of the inspectors disarming
Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors.
This situation presents a clear and present danger to the
stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people
everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one
last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors.
Saddam has failed to seize the chance.
And so we had to act and to act now. Let me explain why: First,
without a strong inspection system, Iraq would be free to retain
and begin to rebuild its chemical, biological, and nuclear
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weapons programs in months, not years. Second, if Saddam
can cripple the weapons inspection system and get away with
it, he would conclude that the international community, led by
the United States, had simply lost its will. He will surmise that
he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction. And some
day, make no mistake, he will use it again as he has in the past.
Third, in halting our air strikes in November, I gave Saddam a
chance, not a licence. If we turn our backs on his defiance, the
credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam will be
destroyed.
That is why on the unanimous recommendation of my national
security team, including the vice president, the secretary of
defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
secretary of state and the national security adviser, I have
ordered a strong sustained series of air strikes against Iraq.
The are designed to degrade Saddam’s capacity to develop and
deliver weapons of mass destruction and to degrade his ability
49
to threaten his neighbors.

The attack on Iraq, coming on the eve of the
impeachment vote, gave rise to strong criticism both in the
United States and abroad. While many Republicans such as
outgoing House Majority Leader Newt Gingrich and
Senator John McCain of Arizona supported the attack,
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, who heretofore had
urged Clinton to take a tougher stand on Iraq, stated, “I
cannot support this military action in the Persian Gulf at
this time. Both the timing and the policy are subject to
50
question.”
While Lott later backed away from the
statement, the political damage had been done, and was
reinforced by Republican Representative Gerald Solomon,
the Chairman of the House Rules Committee, who asserted,
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“Never underestimate a desperate President.”
Even before the United States launched the attack,
National Security Adviser Samuel Berger, in a speech at
Stanford University on December 8, had articulated in a
more detailed way than ever before, the administration’s
strategy toward Iraq. He noted that the United States
would be working “step-by-step, in a practical and effective
way” to undermine and eventually oust Saddam Hussein,
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and he linked that goal with a pledge “to use effective force if
necessary.” Berger’s statement was coupled with incentives
for people in the center of power in Baghdad to overthrow
Saddam, as the U.S. official promised “to ease economic
sanctions” against a new Iraqi regime and also “work to
52
relieve Iraq’s massive economic debts.”
In this light, an analysis of the military attack itself,
which lasted 70 hours, reveals that it was not only aimed at
weakening Saddam’s capacity to make WMD and threaten
Iraq’s neighbors, but also to weaken the very basis of his
regime. Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Harry
Shelton estimated that between 600 and 1,600 members of
the Iraqi Republican Guard, a main prop of the Iraqi
government, had been killed in the U.S. attacks, which also
targeted the headquarters of Iraqi military intelligence, the
special Republican Guard, and the special security
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organization, while leaving regular army units alone. The
U.S. strategy in doing so seemed aimed at encouraging a
future coup, on the assumption that regular army officers
were less likely to support Saddam than the Republican
Guard, the special Republican Guard, or the special security
organization. The United States also claimed success in
degrading Saddam’s WMD capability even though “dual
use” facilities such as pharmaceutical plants were not
targeted, to avoid civilian casualties. The U.S. commander
in the Persian Gulf, General Anthony Zinni, stated that, as
a result of the attacks, Iraq’s missile development might
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have been set back 2 years. The United States also hit an
oil refinery near Basra that Saddam was using to refine oil
to be smuggled out through the Persian Gulf in violation of
U.N. sanctions. Zinni asserted that the 300 ship-launched
cruise missiles were particularly effective, hitting more
than 85 percent of their targets; while overall, 75 percent of
55
the strikes were rated “fully successful.”
Following the end of the bombing campaign, Berger
again articulated U.S. policy toward Iraq, this time in a
speech to the National Press Club. He noted that there were
only two possible outcomes to U.S. policy toward Iraq—total
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Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security Council demands,
which he stated was “unlikely”; or the downfall of Saddam
Hussein, which he said was “inevitable.” Berger noted that
the United States opposed a return to the pre-attack
situation in which Saddam could instigate crises whenever
he wanted by promising to give UNSCOM unfettered access
and then obstructing the inspectors’ work. He also stated
that the United States now had an open-ended commitment
to use military force to block the rebuilding of the WMD and
communications equipment destroyed by the U.S. and
British attacks. In addition, Berger asserted that the
United States was prepared to devote resources to “practical
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and effective” efforts to build an opposition to Saddam.
However, Berger also stated that the United States was not
willing to ensure Saddam’s immediate departure through
the commitment of the hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops
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which would be needed for the task.
While the U.S. was evaluating the impact of the missile
and air strikes, and working to undermine Saddam’s
position within Iraq, it was coming under strong criticism
for its actions from Russia, France, and China. The
Russians, who had long sought to lift the embargo against
Iraq, seized on the U.S.-British attack not only to severely
criticize the United States, but also to push for the lifting of
the embargo. A sick Yeltsin, under attack from communists
in his Parliament who sought to impeach him, used the U.S.
attack to try to demonstrate Russia’s continuing
importance in the world, despite its serious economic
problems. He denounced the attack and withdrew, albeit
only for a short time, the Russian ambassadors from the
United States and Great Britain. Russian ambassador to
NATO Sergei Kise1jack went so far as to accuse the United
States of launching the strikes just to test its newest
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weapons.
In addition Moscow sought the ouster of
UNSCOM Chairman Richard Bulter, whom Russia’s
deputy UNSC representative, Yuri Fedotov, said, “We just
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don’t trust.”
Yeltsin also sought to increase the role of
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in dealing with the
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post-attack political situation in which Saddam Hussein
refused to readmit the UNSCOM inspectors.
France, which also denounced the attack and also
wished to secure economic benefits in Iraq, sought to
capture the diplomatic initiative by tying the lifting of the
oil and petroleum embargo against Iraq to the
establishment of a new “independent and professional
control commission under the authority of the Security
Council,” while continuing the ban on forbidden weapons
60
into Iraq. While Russia supported the French plan, the
United States opposed it, demanding that UNSCOM
remain the U.N. inspection arm, although in an effort to
demonstrate it was not opposed to the welfare of the Iraqi
people, the United States offered to allow Iraq both to sell
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more oil and to import spare parts for its oil industry.
Meanwhile, someone in the office of the U.N. Security
Council leaked the information that UNSCOM
investigators had collected eavesdropping intelligence, and
given it to the United States to help it undermine the
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Saddam Hussein regime.
Both the United States and
Butler denied the charge, and Kofi Annan himself stated,
through a spokesman, that he had “no evidence of any kind
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that UNSCOM had assisted U.S. intelligence.”
The
leaking of the story, however, timed as it was, appeared to
be an effort to undermine the credibility of UNSCOM in
general, and Butler in particular, and was utilized not only
by Iraq, but by Russia and France as well, to demand the
end to UNSCOM.
While the inconclusive discussions at the U.N. were
proceedmg, Saddam Hussein was seeking to recapture the
initiative in the Gulf, although once again his heavy-handed
actions appeared to backfire. Thus, after offering virtually
no resistance to the joint U.S.-British attacks, at the end of
December Saddam declared the U.S. no-fly zones “null and
void” and began to launch attacks against U.S. and British
planes patrolling the zones. The end result of the process
was the further weakening of Iraq’s defense capability as,
by the end of January, the United States claimed to have
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destroyed an estimated 20 percent of Iraqi air defense
64
installations, while suffering no losses of its own.
Meanwhile, on the Arab diplomatic front, Saddam was also
suffering losses. Frustrated because of a lack of Arab
support during the U.S. and British attacks, Saddam called
for an Arab summit, only to pull out his delegation when the
Arab delegations present demanded that Iraq renounce
“provocations” against its neighbors and that it comply with
all U.N. resolutions before economic sanctions could be
65
lifted. Before the meeting, Saddam had called for the Arab
masses to overthrow their leaders, and had directed
particular criticism against the Egyptian regime of Hosni
Mubarak. Speaking on Iraqi television, Saddam urged the
Arabs to “revolt and unseat those stooges, collaborators,
throne dwarfs, and cowards! Revolt against injustice.
Surely we will remain forever as revolutionaries against
66
them.”
Such statements were not calculated to win the
support of Arab leaders, and, by the end of January, Iraq
was even more isolated in the Arab world than it had been
before the U.S.-British attacks.
As Iraq remained isolated in the Arab world and
weakened militarily by its ongoing military conflict with the
United States, there was yet another attempt to forge a U.N.
Security Council consensus on action toward Iraq. At the
end of January, the Security Council agreed to a Canadian
proposal for a three-part review of the Iraqi situation under
which there would be a review of (1) Iraq’s disarmament
situation, (2) the condition of the Iraqi population living
under sanctions, and (3) an accounting of missing Kuwaitis
and others during Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait from August
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2, 1990 to March 1, 1991. While Iraq turned down the U.S.
proposal, demanding that the U.N. Security Council
condemn the U.S. and British air strikes and immediately
lift the embargo, at a minimum the Security Council was
again cooperating on Iraq, albeit on at a rather minimal
level.
As the U.N. was again grappling with the Iraqi situation,
the United States was stepping up its efforts to overthrow
399

Saddam Hussein’s regime. On January 21, Secretary of
State Albright appointed Frank Ricciardone to the post of
special representative to the opposition groups working to
overthrow Saddam. Earlier she had announced the Iraqi
opposition groups eligible for the $97 million in U.S. aid
under the Iraq Liberation Act (the Iraqi National Congress,
the Iraqi National Accord, the Islamic Movement of Iraqi
Kurdistan, the Movement for the Constitutional Monarchy,
the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of
68
Kurdistan). Given the differences among the six groups (a
seventh group, the Iranian-backed Supreme Council for
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, rejected U.S. help), the United
States faced a formidable task in coordinating an effort to
overthrow Saddam. This point was made abundantly
clear—albeit in a rather nondiplomatic way—by General
Zinni who, in testimony to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, stated that none of the Iraqi opposition groups
“had the viability to overthrow Saddam at this point,” and
he warned that, if the opposition did prove successful, the
end result could be “a disintegrated, fragmented Iraq . . . and
69
the last thing we need is another rogue state.” While the
administration sought to put the best face on General
Zinni’s remarks, with State Department spokesman James
Foley noting that he agreed with Zinni’s conclusion that
70
“this is not going to be an easy or short term effort,” there
was some question whether U.S. policy on Iraq was fully
coordinated. In any case, while Saddam had been effectively
isolated in the Arab world—mostly through his own
mistaken diplomacy—and his military power had been
considerably weakened, the United States still appeared to
have a long way to go before the Clinton administration’s
new policy toward Iraq, the overthrow of the Saddam
Hussein regime, was realized.
Iran.
While even during Clinton’s first term there were voices
in Washington calling for an improvement in relations with
Iran, the memories of the hostage crisis of 1979-80 and of
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the ill-fated Iran-Contra Affair of the 1980s, coupled with
Iran’s death sentence on the writer Salman Rushdie, its
conduct of terrorism abroad, its efforts to obtain WMD, and
its opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, which took
the form of military aid to such anti-Israeli terrorist groups
as Islamic Jihad, helped prevent any policy change, as did
the Republican sweep of Congress in the 1994 elections.
Indeed, Iranian-American relations actually deteriorated
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further during Clinton’s first term as the United States
refused to permit the U.S. airplane manufacturer Boeing to
sell passenger aircraft to Iran. Similarly, the United States
pressured Azerbaizhan to drop Iran from an international
consortium developing one of Azerbaizhan’s off-shore oil
fields, and in 1995 President Clinton signed a Presidential
order banning U.S. companies from investing in Iran’s oil
industry, thereby forcing U.S. oil firm Conoco to cancel a $1
billion agreement to develop two Iranian off-shore oil fields.
In 1996, Clinton went further and signed the Republicaninspired Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) which imposed a
number of sanctions against foreign firms investing more
than $40 million in Iran’s oil and gas industry. Yet another
blow to U.S.-Iranian relations in 1996 was the terrorist
attack against the Khobar Towers residence of U.S. airmen
in Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 U.S. airmen. At the time,
the terrorist attack was widely attributed to Iran which
made no secret of its opposition to U.S. forces in the Persian
Gulf, although more recently suspicion has shifted to
Osama Bin Laden.
While the United States was endeavoring to isolate Iran,
it did not receive much help from its NATO allies. The
French firm, Total, signed the off-shore oil deal that Conoco
had been forced to cancel, and Turkey, which faced a rapidly
growing demand for natural gas, signed a 20-year, $20
billion dollar agreement to import gas from Iran.
Energy-related issues also divided the United States from
its allies on the question of the preferred export route for
Caspian Sea oil and natural gas. Many Europeans who
depend more on energy imports than the United States,
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preferred the shorter, less expensive, and more secure route
from the Caspian through Iran to the Persian Gulf. The
United States backed the more expensive, longer, and much
more insecure route from Azerbaizhan through Georgia and
Turkey to the Mediterranean (the Baku-Ceyhan route).
The United States also clashed repeatedly with Russia over
Iran because Russia was Iran’s major supplier of
sophisticated military equipment, such as aircraft and
submarines, and was also selling nuclear reactors and
missile technology to Iran.
The hostility between the United States and Iran, so
evident during Clinton’s first term, began to diminish
during the early part of his second term. The precipitating
factor was the unexpected and overwhelming (70 percent of
the vote) election of Mohammed Khatami as Iran’s
President in May 1997. The moderate Iranian leader,
although challenged by hardliners in the Iranian regime
including Iran’s religious leader, Ayatollah Khameini, who
controlled important levers of power such as the army,
police, and Pasdaran, sought to increase cultural and
personal freedom in Iran, while also improving relations
with Iran’s Gulf neighbors, Europe, and, to a lesser degree,
with the United States.
Khatami’s efforts to improve Iran’s regional position
began with the dispatch of the new Iranian Foreign
Minister, Kamal Kharazzi, on a tour of Arab capitals with a
message that Iran wanted peaceful and cooperative
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relations with the Arab world.
Next came the
Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) Summit held in
Teheran in December 1997, where Khatami was
unanimously elected as chairman of the OIC for the next 3
years. At the summit, Khatami moderated Iran’s position
on the Arab-Israeli peace process, stating Iran would accept
any solution which the Palestinians accepted, and Iran got
the support of the other Islamic countries in opposing U.S.
73
sanctions.
The rapprochement between Iran and its
neighbors continued in March 1998 with the visit of former
Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, himself a
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moderate, to Saudi Arabia, where the two sides
discussed, inter alia, the drop in oil prices to below $13 a
barrel, a development that hurt both countries. Saudi
Arabia and Iran were subsequently to agree to an oil
74
production cutback. Iran also sent out feelers to Iraq, and
the hard-pressed regime of Saddam Hussein, looking to
escape its own isolated position, responded positively
although the two countries remained at odds over unsettled
issues from their 1980-88 war. By mid 1998, the only issue of
consequence remaining in Iranian-Gulf Arab relations was
the dispute over the three islands in the Persian Gulf (Big
Tunb, Little Tunb, and Abu Musa) which are claimed both
by Iran and the United Arab Emirates but are currently
occupied by Iran—an occupation that dates back to the time
of the Shah. In the new mood of Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC)-Iran cooperation, however, the islands issue now
appears to be far less of an area of contention that it was in
the past.
As Iran was improving its ties with the Gulf Arabs, it
was stepping up its relations with Russia and France, two of
its leading trade partners. Russia, which was Iran’s leading
supplier of military equipment as well as nuclear reactors,
saw Iran as a useful ally in a number of Caucasian and
Central Asian trouble spots from Chechnya to the Tajik civil
war to Afghanistan, as well as a major market for Russian
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military and civilian exports.
For its part, France also
rejected U.S. efforts to isolate Iran economically, and in
1997 Total joined with Russian and Malaysian energy
companies in an agreement to develop Iran’s South Pars
natural gas field—a direct challenge to U.S. efforts to limit
Iranian energy development.
The challenge, however, was not met by the United
States because Iran’s efforts at improving its ties with
foreign countries by 1998 now also included the United
States, which was to reply in kind. What could be called a
limited rapprochement began in December 1997 when, in a
news conference, President Khatami stated, “I first of all
pay my respects to the great people and nation of
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America.”
Three weeks later, in a CNN interview, he
proposed to the United States the idea of an exchange of
“professionals, writers, scholars, artists, journalists, and
tourists.” President Clinton responded in kind at the end of
January when he broke the U.S. public stereotype of Iran as
a hostage-holding terrorist nation by calling Iran “an
important country with a rich and ancient cultural heritage
of which Iranians are justifiably proud” and asserted that
the current differences between Iran and the United States
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were not “insurmountable.”
The first tangible results of the new atmosphere between
the two countries came in February 1998 when a group of
American wrestlers were triumphantly received by Iranian
wrestling fans during the Takhiti Cup tournament in
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Teheran. During the spring, the United States took two
further actions to build up momentum for a rapprochement.
In May Clinton waived sanctions against the French,
Russian, and Malaysian companies planning to develop
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Iran’s South Pars gas field, and in June Secretary of State
Madeline Albright, in a speech to the Asia Society in New
York, after noting that the United States had implemented
a more streamlined procedure for issuing visas to Iranians,
offered to “develop, with the Islamic Republic when it is
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ready, a road map leading to normal relations.”
During the summer and early fall, however, the road to
normal relations developed a few potholes. Under pressure
from the Republicans in the U.S. Congress, the United
States extended the mandate of Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty to broadcast into Iran to “promote
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democracy.” In addition, Iran’s testing of a medium range
missile, the Shahab 3, in July raised concerns in the United
States that Iran was making unexpectedly rapid progress
on its way to developing WMD, a concern shared by Israel
and its lobby in the United States. Despite these events,
there was a great deal of expectation of a further thaw in
U.S.-Iranian relations when Khatami and his Foreign
Minister Kamal Kharazzi journeyed to New York for the
opening of the fall session of the U.N. In his U.N. speech,
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Khatami continued his theme of dialogue, calling on the U.N.
to declare the year 2001 the “year of dialogue among
civilizations.” However, he took a sharply anti-Israeli tone,
stating that peace and security would come to the Middle
East only when all Palestinians had the right to “exercise
sovereignty over their ancestral homeland,” and that
“Palestine is the homeland of Moslems, Christians, and
Jews, not the laboratory for the violent whims of Zionists.”
The Iranian leader, nine of whose diplomats had been killed
by the Taliban in Afghanistan and whose army now
maneuvered menacingly on the border of that country, also
called for a broad-based government in Afghanistan,
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representing all ethnic groups and communities. The next
day, Khatami also took a critical stance toward the United
States in a news conference in which he rejected the idea of
government-to-government talks between the United States
and Iran, although he did welcome what he termed a “change
in speech” by the United States. He complained, however,
about a number of American actions, including the U.S.
economic embargo against Iran and U.S. opposition to
pipelines carrying Caspian Sea oil through Iran. He also
protested the failure of the United States to return the
Iranian assets it had frozen, and for allocating money to
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty for Persian-language
broadcasts that would “hurt the government of Iran.” In an
effort to diffuse criticism of Iran’s human rights position,
however, Khatami seemed to lift the Iranian death threat
against the author Salman Rushdie by stating, “We should
consider the Salman Rushdie issue as completely finished . . .
The Iranian government has officially announced that, in
practice, it has made no decision to act on this matter”—an
assertion which, while welcome in the West (Great Britain
immediately upgraded diplomatic relations with Iran),
provoked a firestorm of criticism among Khatami’s hard-line
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opponents in Iran. The Iranian President also met with a
group of Iranians living in the United States and Canada and
asked them to invest in Iran as he set out to develop a
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dialogue with the Iranian exile community.
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The official response to Secretary of State Albright’s
appeal for a road map to improve relations came in Foreign
Minister Kharazzi’s speech to the Asia Society on
September 28, and it was filled with criticism of the United
States, emphasizing a number of the points already stated
by Khatami in his news conference several days earlier.
These included attacking the United States because of its
imposition of sanctions against Iran, U.S. efforts to
“sabotage” Iran’s efforts to play a role in promoting regional
stability, the U.S. propaganda war against Iran because of
its Persian-language broadcasts on Radio Free Europe, and
America’s “retarding economic prosperity of Iran and the
region” by its obstruction of the building of a pipeline
through Iran to ship oil and gas from Central Asia and the
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Caucasus. Iran also chose not to exploit the opportunity
for person-to-person diplomacy on the Afghan issue, an area
of common interest with the United States. The Clinton
administration also opposed the Taliban and had just
bombed Osama Bin-Laden’s terrorist bases located in
Afghanistan. Nonetheless Kharazzi decided, reportedly on
the orders of Khameini, not to participate in a
U.N.-sponsored meeting on Afghanistan at which Secretary
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of State Madeline Albright was present.
In analyzing the hard-line positions of both Khatami and
Kharazzi, it appears that the central factor affecting their
behavior was the strong conservative counterattack against
Khatami in Iran during the summer. The mayor of Teheran,
Gholanhossen Karabaschi, an ally of Khatami, was
sentenced to 5 years in prison on alleged corruption charges
in July. Former Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri lost his
post in June and in early September was physically
attacked, along with Ayatollah Mahajerani, another
Khatami ally who was the Minister of Culture and Islamic
Guidance, by thugs apparently sent by hard-line
87
conservative forces.
Making matters worse, Iran’s
supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Khameini, launched an
attack against the Iranian media which had been acting
with considerably more freedom following Khatami’s
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election. Khameini charged that sections of the media had
abused their freedom, and that action would be taken
88
against their “creeping excesses.”
Soon afterwards, the
popular Iranian newspaper Tous was closed, and its
managing director and two of its staff members were jailed.
Then the weekly magazine New Way was also closed, two
senior editors at the state-owned Islamic Republic news
agency were jailed, and two-thirds of the Iranian
parliament (180 of 270) called for journalists who wrote
against “Islamic principles” to be tried for threatening
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national security. The situation got so bad that an Iranian
judge was quoted as saying that the jailed journalists could
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face the death penalty for “fighting God.”
It appeared that the Iranian conservatives were using
the war scare with Afghanistan to fight back against
Khatami’s policies of domestic and foreign moderation, and
by mid October, it was an open question as to which side
would emerge victorious. In any case, following the
Khatami visit to the United States, it appeared that
U.S.-Iranian relations had come to a crossroads. In both
countries there was opposition to moving ahead with the
rapprochement. In the United States, it was primarily the
Republicans in Congress, linked to anti-Iranian elements in
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the Israeli lobby. They remain suspicious of Iran, arguing
that Khatami can’t really control the radicals in Iran, even if
he wanted to, and they openly wonder whether Khatami’s
“charm offensive” is nothing more than a tactic to put Iran’s
enemies off guard, while Iran was acquiring WMD.
Khameini’s strong criticism of the Wye Agreement served to
reinforce their opposition. On the Iranian side, Khatami’s
conservative opponents, still smarting over his election
victory, have opposed not only his domestic reforms but also
his moderate foreign policy approach to the United States.
With President Khatami now under onslaught from Iranian
conservatives, it is not at all clear as to whether the
rapprochement can continue, unless the United States is
forthcoming with a major concession such as the release of
frozen Iranian assets, permission for U.S. companies to
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invest in Iran’s oil and gas infrastructure, or removal of U.S.
opposition to foreign investment in Iranian oil pipelines.
Whether Clinton, despite his improved political position
following the Wye Agreement and the midterm elections, is
strong enough to take such steps is very much in doubt.
CONCLUSIONS
In assessing U.S. policy toward the Middle East in the
first 2 years of the second term of President Clinton, several
conclusions can be drawn. First, the clear-cut policy
direction evident in his first term of office has now fallen
into disarray. Second, while Clinton secured a number of
Middle East policy successes during his first term, his
second term has been marked by some significant failures.
In the Arab-Israeli conflict, Clinton’s effort to promote the
peace process has run into serious problems as negotiations
between Israel and the PLO virtually ended between
February 1997 and September 1998, and the limited
progress he achieved in the fall of 1998 in the Wye
Agreement, which quickly ran into trouble, pales into
insignificance when compared to the issues that still need to
be negotiated between Israelis and Palestinians. In
Clinton’s first term, Israelis and both Palestinians and
Jordanians did most of the negotiating themselves, with the
United States essentially standing on the sidelines as a
cheerleader. During the American leader’s second term, the
lack of trust between Arafat and Netanyahu necessitated a
much more active role for the United States. Yet the
American effort, at least at the top level (President and
Secretary of State) seemed disjointed. Newly appointed
Secretary of State Madeline Albright did not even make a
visit to the Middle East until 8 months into her term and
then only after a series of terrorist bombings. For his part,
President Clinton, apparently exasperated by Netanyahu’s
policies, publicly snubbed the Israeli leader during his
November 1997 visit to the United States and then—
through Albright—gave an ultimatum to Netanyahu 6
months later, only to prove unable to enforce it. Given the
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history of high level U.S. activity in the Arab-Israeli conflict,
something regional leaders have come to expect, Clinton’s
policy of apparent benign neglect followed by frenetic
activity raised serious questions about U.S. policy, and the
freezing of the implementation of the Wye Agreement by
Netanyahu in December 1998, despite Clinton’s
protestations, could only raise further doubts about U.S.
policy capability.
If Clinton’s policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict have
had, at best, limited success, during the first 2 years of his
second term, U.S. policy toward Iraq has been even more
problematic, and the degree of success the United States
achieved in its zero-sum game conflict with Iraq was, in
large part, due to Saddam Hussein’s mistakes. During this
period, U.S. strategy evolved from supporting UNSCOM,
despite numerous infractions of U.N. resolutions by
Saddam Hussein who sought in every way possible to
impede the UNSCOM inspectors, to a policy of working with
Iraqi opposition groups under the Iraq Liberation Act to
overthrow Saddam, a policy that was stepped up following
Clinton’s decision in December 1998 to belatedly bomb Iraq.
This action, while it was aimed both a weakening Iraq’s
WMD capability and striking at the major supports of
Saddam’s regime like the Republican Guard, also led the
Iraqis to prohibit the return of UNSCOM inspectors. In an
effort to demonstrate to the Arab world that the United
States was only opposed to the regime of Saddam Hussein,
not to the Iraqi people, the United States also pioneered the
“food for oil” agreement, although the impact on the “Arab
street” of this measure did not seem significant.
Meanwhile, beginning in the summer of 1998, the
Republican-led Congress began to urge Clinton to take ever
stronger measures against Iraq, although several of these
Republican hawks, like Senator Lott, did not choose to
support Clinton when he finally attacked Iraq in December
1998—on the eve of the House impeacement vote.
Fortunately for Clinton, however, Saddam’s heavy-handed
attempts to overthrow opposing Arab regimes led to his
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isolation in the Arab world, while his efforts to belatedly
challenge the U.S. and British planes in the no-fly zones of
northern and southern Iraq led to the further degradation of
his military capacity. Finally, his main ally on the U.N.
Security Council, Russia, was far too weak economically
and politically, let along militarily, to take action to protect
him.
In the case of Iran, U.S. policy has had more of a mixed
result. The old policy of dual containment pursued so
strongly during Clinton’s first term seems now to have been
jettisoned, with the United States now seeking to improve
relations with Iran while keeping Iraq isolated. The United
States embarked on a policy of rapprochement with Iran
following the election of Mohamed Khatami as Iran’s
President in May 1997. Yet the policy of limited
rapprochement, replete with positive oratory and symbolic
actions by both sides, seems to have run its course, and it
remains to be seen if U.S. and Iranian leaders, each of whom
is beset by domestic opposition to the limited
rapprochement, can push the process much farther.
In looking to the reasons for the U.S. policy disarray and
Clinton’s relative lack of success in his Middle East policies
during his second term, several factors appear paramount.
First is the Republican Congress which provided support for
hard-line Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in
his efforts to slow the peace process and rebuff Clinton’s
pressure, and which challenged Clinton’s policies on Iraq
and Iran as well. While Clinton cannot personally be held
responsible for the election of Netanyahu which, along with
the Hamas terrorism that Arafat proved unwilling or
unable to suppress, proved to be a major obstacle to U.S.
efforts to forge a Middle East peace, he can certainly be held
responsible for the Monica Lewinsky affair which breathed
new life into the Ken Starr special counsel investigation of
his presidency and led to the beginning of an impeachment
process. This process strengthened the role of Congress in
U.S. foreign policy and enabled foreign leaders like
Netanyahu and Saddam Hussein to resist U.S. pressure.
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The Lewinsky crisis undermined Clinton’s efforts to build a
coalition against Saddam Hussein in February 1998, as
much of the world’s perception (whether true or not is
besides the point) was that the crisis stemmed, not from
Saddam’s defiance of the U.N. inspectors, but from Clinton’s
efforts to divert attention from the Monica Lewinsky affair.
Similar criticism was leveled against Clinton when he
finally decided to launch a major attack on Iraq in midDecember 1998, just as the House of Representatives was
preparing to vote articles of impeachment against him.
Indeed, one of the weaknesses of U.S. policy toward Iraq has
been Clinton’s unwillingness to use force when the political
situation favored it, and poor timing when he belatedly
chose to use significant force. There are times in
international crises when force must be used, and it is not
clear that Clinton fully understands this.
Finally, the weakness of his presidency appears to limit
how far Clinton can go in building on the opportunity
provided by the election of a moderate to the presidency of
Iran. With the administration’s dual containment strategy
now a matter of history, the chance to build a new
relationship with Iran is the first genuine opportunity for
the United States to change direction on Iran in two decades
and to improve the American position in the Persian Gulf as
a result. Yet the weakness of the Clinton administration
seems to preclude the steps needed to move the U.S.-Iranian
rapprochement on to the next stage, although the domestic
opposition faced by Khatami is certainly a major factor as
well.
In sum, despite some small and perhaps transitory
successes like the Wye Agreement, American policy toward
the Middle East during the first 2 years of President
Clinton’s second term has been a highly problematic one.
Whether the United States can be more successful in
pursuing its policy goals in the region during the remainder
of Clinton’s term is a very open question.
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CHAPTER 16
EUROPE, THE MEDITERRANEAN
AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Rodolfo Ragionieri

Introduction.
The records of European policies with respect to the
Mediterranean and the Middle East are mixed and
perplexing. On one side you have the attention permanently
devoted to the region by all the Southern and most Western
European countries. Moreover, more than one attempt was
started in the past to develop a common Western European
approach to the relations with countries of the Southern and
Eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, and particularly
Arab countries, since the Euro-Arab dialogue of the 1970s
up to the Barcelona process of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the
burden of past legacies, the pursuit of national policies and,
last but not least, the overwhelming presence of the United
States in the area have often (if not in most cases) weakened
these efforts.
This is especially apparent as far as the hottest issues in
the area, such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process or
the ongoing conflict in Algeria, are concerned. For example,
in 1993 the late Alex Langer, in a question at the European
Parliament, openly stated what is a widespread view
concerning the European role in the peace process in the
Middle East: “I have the impression that Norway has done a
great deal more in real terms than the European Union, and
1
I am rather sad about that.”
Does this impression correspond to reality? There is
certainly a part of truth: if you look at publications on the
history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the role of European
states (with the exception of Norway) and of the European

419

Community (EC) in the last decades is one of neglect, and in
the Israeli and Palestinian press, the interest given to
Europe is much less prominent than that granted to the
United States.
Generally speaking, many questions can be put forward
and should be answered. First, are national policies of major
European countries totally at odds with each other, or is it
possible to observe in some respect an even unwillingly
emerging European consensus? Second, can we speak in
some respect of a foreign policy of the European Union (EU)
in the area (if we can speak about that at all) ? Third, what
are the possible obstructions to this policy?
In order to give an answer, first an overview of general
European interests and perceptions of the area will be
given. After that, an outline of different national policies in
the area will be developed. Before coming to some
conclusion, the role of the EU in the peace process in the
2
Middle East will be discussed.
General Perceptions: From Threat to Risk.
It is important to stress the importance of the whole area
and of all of its problems and conflicts for European security.
It is not unusual to listen to people (especially American
scholars or officials) maintaining that , for Europe,
Mediterranean policy is important only as a tool to prevent
massive immigration. It is a curious view that the United
States (thousands of miles away from the Middle East)
would be more involved in Middle Eastern security than the
EU and single European countries. It would be equivalent to
the statement that the United States is interested in Latin
American politics with the only purpose being to put under
control the immigration from the southern part of the
Americas.
There are basically four reasons for European interest :
dependence on energy raw materials (and, generally
speaking, economic relations), geographic proximity,
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migration, and Islam as both a domestic and foreign policy
issue (this must be taken into consideration separately from
migration issues).
Economic relations. Energy supplies from Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) are more critical to Europe than
to the United States (obviously excluding European oil
producers, like the United Kingdom and Norway). For
example, in 1995 Western Europe imported 9.6 million oil
barrels/day; of these, 5.5 million from countries of MENA.
During the same year, the United States imported 8.8
million oil barrels/day; of these, 1.8 from the same region.
Import and export between the EU and these countries
is moreover much more relevant than between the region
and the United States: European exports to developing
countries represent 18 percent of the total, against a U.S.
percentage of 8.8 percent; imports are 15 percent , against 6
percent.
Geographic proximity. First of all, any crisis in MENA
threatens Europe by means of horizontal escalation. Europe
is the natural geographic rear of any military operations in
the area, as it was during the Gulf War. Thus, concerns
about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are
related to immediate security concerns and not only to
wider fears regarding conflicts and stability in the
international system.
Migrations. Large numbers of immigrants from
Mediterranean countries are hosted by most EU countries.
Among them there are older immigration countries like
France and Germany, and more recently ones like Italy and
Spain. Thus, migrations are a concern of domestic policies,
inner European policy , and foreign policies. The presence in
Western Europe of millions of immigrants from the whole
region—from Morocco to Iran—makes European concerns
about stability a very concrete issue. In case of crises in the
region, an influx of refugees could increase the already
consistent flow, as, for example , the case of Kosovo or
Kurdistan.
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Islam. The presence in most Western European
countries of substantial and often increasing Muslim
minorities makes Islam both a domestic and foreign policy
issue. This is related not only to immigration, because large
permanent Muslim communities are present in France and
3
Germany.
It is quite clear that the perception of the situation
evolved from a picture of threat that characterized the Cold
War era, to a more subtle awareness of latent risks. This is,
nevertheless, enough to define very basic security
perceptions and interests even in a very rough realist
framework. Moreover, there are historical ties to Israel and
Arab countries which cannot be described only in terms of
“national interests as power.” These historical ties and
heritages are obviously different for different countries.
Europe: Unity and Diversity.
Almost any European country has its own specific
problems with respect to the Mediterranean. Spain has
enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla. France has major maghrebi
communities and its historical ties, especially to Algeria.
Germany has the difficult problem concerning political
relations with Israel, without damaging the relations with
Muslim countries, and the relevant permanent Turkish and
Kurdish communities.
While dealing with the tensions between the
contradiction of a common European foreign and security
policy and national policies , one has to consider two main
complexes, which could be roughly defined as the “objective”
and the “subjective” variables. The first set is formed by
what are sometimes called “geopolitical variables.” The
second set is composed by inherited traditions, perceptions,
and, generally speaking, the foreign policy identity of
countries. These factors make, for example, two countries of
comparable size in population and gross national product
4
like Italy and France completely different in the
self-representation of their international role, and thus in
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their foreign policies . Starting from certain given
conditions, the elites of different European countries have
been constructing their different Mediterranean policies.
Even though foreign policies are often constructed and
formulated in terms of national interests, perceptions of
threat and the search for relative or absolute gains are
shaped into foreign policies by so -called national traditions.
Inherited perceptions and prevalent ideas on national
identity and their relative places and roles in international
society shape the action of political, diplomatic and military
5
personnel in each country.
In this outline the main features of policies of major EU
countries are reviewed. Greece and Turkey are excluded for
two reasons. First, because their respective policies are
considered elsewhere. Second, because they are entangled
in a conflict making them at the same time actors and an
issue in European policies.
Italy. Italian policy with respect to the Mediterranean
has been characterized by a permanence, i.e., the existence
of an Arab policy, since the 1950s. It would perhaps be more
precise to speak about a Mediterranean policy, or of an
attention with respect to Arab countries and actors, because
many scholars argue that these policies have been often
contradictory and pursued by different actors in the Italian
6
political and economic arena .
These policies have not only been ideological and
Third-World-ist, as Italy’s critics claim, but have also
corresponded to a certain construction of Italian national
interests. They were defined in the 1950s by a part of the
Christian Democrats, and by the national agency for energy
(ENI, Ente nazionale idrocarburi, i.e., literally National
Agency for Hydrocarbons), and its director , Mattei.
Moreover, during the 1970s and after, there was a
substantial agreement between most of government parties
and the leftist opposition (i.e., the Italian Communist Party)
with respect to Middle Eastern policy. At the beginning of
that decade the Christian Democrat Aldo Moro, foreign
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minister in the last two Rumo ur cabinets, was among the
7
promoters of the Euro-Arab dialogue .
It is remarkable that during the 1980s, a period of
highest confrontation (at least in declaratory policies)
within the government and particularly between the
Socialist Party and its leader , Bettino Craxi, and the
Communist Party and its leaders, among them Enrico
Berlinguer, there was substantial agreement on the
relations with Arab countries and on the possible solutions
8
of the Israeli-Arab conflict . This was made stronger by the
personal ties of Giulio Andreotti, Bettino Craxi, and Enrico
Berlinguer with many Arab leaders, first among them Yasir
Arafat. The orientation of the Italian foreign policy was
made evident by the Sigonella affair (December 1985), when
a confrontation between Carabinieri and the Seals took
place during the Achille Lauro hijacking.
A potential discontinuity in this policy was declared by
Antonio Martino, the Foreign Minister of the center-right
Berlusconi government (May-December 1994). Just after
the formation of the cabinet, during a visit to the United
States, he declared that “the Berlusconi government will
pursue the most pro-Israeli policy in the last twenty years,
although without taking distances from the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO)” and that in Middle Eastern
9
affairs Italy would not be ideologically pro-Arab.
Nevertheless, he had to make a considerable effort to
convince the Israeli diplomacy of the democratic conversion
of the post-fascist party Alleanza Nazionale (National
Alliance). Moreover, he was the first European minister
visiting Gaza after the establishment of the Palestinian
10
National Authority.
This general attitude is reflected by the active role of
Italian governments and nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) cooperating in the economic development of
Palestinian territories. Some Israeli perception
notwithstanding, Italian public opinion is not hostile to the
Jewish state. According to a poll published by the journal
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Limes, for the majority of Italians (81.7 percent) the
condition for the existence of a Palestinian state is provided
by its full acknowledgment of the state of Israel. On the
other side, the majority (58.8 percent) of Italians refuse to
take a partisan position, declaring to prefer both Israelis
12
and Palestinians. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that
the Italian delegation at the United Nations (U.N. ) was
instrumental in the cancellation of the (in)famous Zionism
equals to racism resolution of the General Assembly.
According to the Italian columnist Arrigo Levi, this poll
reflected the fact that in Italy the roots of anti-semitism are
not deep, and that the connection between Israel and the
13
Jews plays a positive role.
Just because of its ties to Middle Eastern countries
and/or personalities, sometimes Italy acted as a forerunner
to European and even Western policies, as happened in
March 1997 when Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs
Lamberto Dini went to Teheran few days after Rafsanjani’s
visit to ar-Riadh, during a phase of mutual opening in
foreign policies between Iran and western countries. One
year later, Italy was the first Western country to be visited
by an Iranian president, Khatami, after the Islamic
revolution.
Another factor making a difference in Italian foreign
political and economic relations has been Libya. Italian
companies of different dimensions have an interest in
cooperation with Libya, and this country is a traditional
important supplier of oil for Italy. Economic interests mix
with a traditional propension to dialogue, confirmed , for
example , in the last years by former Prime Minister
14
Romano Prodi.
France. France is the only European state which has an
ambition to play openly the role of a global medium -sized
power. This is especially true as far as Arab, and generally
speaking Mediterranean, countries are concerned. Since
Algeria’s independence, de Gaulle declared and pursued a
French Arab policy. After the years marked by the end of
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bipolar confrontation and the Second Gulf War, there was a
transformation from an Arab policy to a Mediterranean
15
policy. This is reflected in an interview the French foreign
minister released to the French quarterly journal, Politique
internationale, where he declared:
I think that the expression “Arab Policy” can give rise to
confusion. If the matter is on one side to have active relations
with “Arab countries” and, on the other, to take into
consideration the Arab dimension of global problems, then this
policy is pertinent for France. But if you mean that France
should have one Arab policy, global and undifferentiated, and
support all Arab points of view, the expression is neither
16
justified nor convenient.

In the Mediterranean area , this role is played in
different theaters: the Maghreb, the Levant, the Balkans,
and the Gulf, if you take into consideration the enlarged
Mediterranean. In each of these theaters , France can claim
both contemporary interests and a historical tradition. For
example, Algeria represents a special interest for France,
and the special relationship has been characterized by
17
bilateral relations since the independence . It is
unthinkable that any French president or government
would give up a national policy with respect to Algeria. At
the same time, French politicians cannot pursue an
interventionist course in Algerian politics, since that could
be charged with “colonial attitudes.” Moreover, other
difficulties have been provoked by diverging, or simply
different, views within the French leadership. A first
dividing issue was provided by the Sant’Egidio initiative,
when the external leadership of the Front Islamique de
Salut, (FIS, Islamic Front of Salvation) met with the Front
of National Liberation, the Front of Socialist Forces, and
other minor groups in Rome, at the Sant’Egidio community.
At that time there was a difference between Prime Minister
Balladour, very cautious with respect to any interference
into Algerian affairs and support to the Sant’Egidio
initiative, and Defence Minister Leotard, who openly
supported a political arrangement between the Algerian
426

government and the Islamic armed opposition. A similar
difference surfaced later, in the socialist government: at the
beginning of 1998, where Prime Minister Jospin expressed
his opinion that the Algerian government bore some
responsibility for the violence occurring in the country,
Foreign Minister Vedrine declared he had no doubt about
the official version. These differences do not conceal a
substantial support of the Algerian government, but the y do
not make it easier for the EU to articulate its own position
on this issue.
In the Gulf, French policy has (or had) been marked by
good relations with Iraq. The former French defense
minister Chévenement went so far as to declare, in
February 1990, that the development of the Hussein missile
was a factor enhancing stability in the region of the Gulf.
This position has not been officially repudiated: Védrine
remarked that there is a difference between Iraq in the
1970s and the 1980s, and the same country in the 1990s,
and that the change in French foreign policy was caused by
the occupation of Kuwait in August 1990.
As far as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is
concerned, it was apparent during Chirac’s visit to the
Palestinian Territories in the Fall of 1996 that he wanted
his country to play a more visible role in the diplomatic
process in the Middle East. When Chirac took the floor in
front of the Palestinian Legislative Council and Yasir
Arafat, he spoke as though he were speaking to the
representatives of a fully sovereign and democratic
18
country. In his speech he accepted most of the Palestinian
positions, and underlined the importance of the
development of Palestinian institutions and of the creation
of a Palestinian state. These outspoken statements were
certainly not contradictory with the declaratory policy of the
EU, but the decision to take such a clear stand was in
contrast with the low profile adopted at that moment by the
EU.
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Spain. In the Euro-Mediterranean context , the role of
Spain has been conditioned by its interest in the Maghreb,
both political and economic. Spanish-Moroccan relations
have been always shadowed by the question of the enclaves
of Ceuta and Melilla, and by the objective concurrence
between Spanish and Moroccan agricultural products.
Nevertheless “Spain’s long-term interest did not
necessarily coincide with the short-term interest of the
producers. In short, one could not reduce Hispano-Moroccan
”19
relations simply to a discussion about tomatoes .
The importance for Spain of a Mediterranean policy has
always been reflected, since Franco’s death and her access
into the EC, by Spanish activism to implement a European
framework for the Mediterranean.
Britain. British foreign policy has been oscillating in the
last few years. The problem of the identity of British foreign
policy in this area is as old as the decision to retreat east of
Suez. This decision implied giving up a direct independent
role in the Near East and the Gulf. Often in this area
influence was exerted by means or in cooperation with
American power, and sometimes by means of international
organizations. However, conservative prime ministers
always appraised the preferential relationship with
Washington more valuable than any kind of independent
initiative in the area or European cooperation. This has
changed, at least in declarations, with the Blair government
and the appointment of Cook as foreign minister. This is
particularly clear if you compare the reaction of Jeremy
Rifkin, foreign minister in the Major cabinet, to the visit to
Israel and the Palestinian Territories of the French
President Chirac, and the initiatives of Robin Cook in the
spring of 1998. It is well-known that Rifkin evaluated
Chirac’s initiative during his visit as “romantic,” and added
20
that “it endangers the American role in the peace process.”
In this connection it must be noted that he considered a
Palestinian state as a viable option, and this could be
considered as an evolution in British foreign policy, which
was perhaps brought about by a kind of “European drag.”
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The Labor foreign minister Robin Cook took a much tougher
stance, especially with respect to the issue of settlements,
and in particular the settlement of Jebel Abu Ghneim/Har
21
Homa. During his visit, he confirmed that his concern over
Israeli settlement policy was shared by the EU members.
Robin Cook’s attitude was obviously a consequence of the
European role he was performing, but also apparently
reflected a break with respect to his predecessor Rifkin’s
positions.
Nevertheless, as far as the Gulf is concerned, British
governments have so far been very close to U.S. statements
and actions. The question is whether this can be considered
contradictory with a British nouvelle vague aimed at
creating an increasing European integration in the area of
security and foreign policy.
22

Germany. The German approach to the Middle East
and to the relation with Arab countries has been determined
since the foundation of the republic by different and
23
sometimes conflicting factors. On one side the historical
guilt with respect to the Jewish people has made
German-Israeli relations distinctive. They were marked at
the beginning by the question of reparations due to Israel as
the representative of the Jewish people. This made the
traditionally good relations with Arab countries tense, and
Arab countries played a peripheral role in German foreign
policy, even though they grew more important as energy
raw materials suppliers.
Nevertheless, after the substantial failure of German
Middle East policy and the change in government in the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in the 1960s, the
Palestinian question played a more relevant role. The new
policy was defined as characterized by Ausgewogenheit
(balance).
From this point of view, self-determination, which was
requested for the Germans, could not be denied to the
Palestinians. The expression “right of the Palestinian
people for self-determination” was for the first time
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endorsed by the FRG in 1974, at a General Assembly of the
U.N. (vote for a declaration). It is interesting that the
German position was charged with unilaterality —before
1969 in favor of Israel, and in the 1970s and later in favor of
the Palestinians.
Things did not change much with the end of the Cold
24
War, the Gulf War, and the beginning of the peace process .
Germany follows a two-track policy, German and European.
Whereas there can be reasonable doubts about the
European character of the foreign policy of Bonn in some
areas, like the Balkans, it is undoubtable that in the Middle
East a fairly integrated approach is taken. In many respects
there is both a domestic and a foreign policy focus, both in
subregional and functional issues.
Another serious issue contributing to the determination
of German policies is the presence of relevant Turkish and
Kurdish communities of immigrants in Germany. The
German government must always keep a delicate and
sometimes precarious balance. This was clear during the
crisis triggered by the arrival of the Kurdish leader
Abdallah Ocalan in Italy and his arrest. The German
government did not ask for extradition, even though the
German magistracy had called for his arrest. The trial of
Ocalan in Germany would have implied a confrontation
between the Kurdish and Turkish communities in
Germany, with relevant consequences on domestic policy,
from the point of view of order and security, and foreign
policy (German-Turkish relations). This combination of
domestic and foreign policy is the primary reason for the
German approach to the issues of Islam, fundamentalism
and a relevant permanent Muslim community in Germany.
The EC and the Middle East.
At the beginning of this chapter it is important to note
how European positions with respect to the conflict evolved,
until the Venice Declaration and its further specifications.
The start of change can be located in the oil crisis after the
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October (Kippur/Ramadan) War in 1973, and the increasing
differentiation of European and American interests.
In a declaration released just after the war (November 6,
1973), EC states agreed that a just peace had to take into
account the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, that it was
not admissible that territories are taken by force, and that
Israel should terminate the military occupation of the
territories taken during the Six-Day War. Together with
these statements, EC states always stressed the necessity of
a global approach to peace in the Middle East, and
consequently they expressed doubts with respect to the
Camp David process. Nevertheless, EC states did not intend
to transform the differences between themselves and the
United States into a full-fledged transatlantic crisis.
The ensuing Euro-Arab dialogue substantially failed,
mainly because Europe was basically interested in oil
supplies, and Arab countries in a dramatic change in the
European attitude with respect to the Palestinian problem.
More precisely, one of the main obstacles was the
acknowledgement of the PLO.
The process of evolution of European positions and of
differentiation of European and American interests and
views led in the following decade to the Venice declaration
that was issued by the European Council after a 2-day
conference in Venice on June 13, 1980:
The time has come to promote the recognition and
implementation of the two principles universally accepted by
the international community: the right to existence and to
security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and
justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian
problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian
people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed
in a condition, by an appropriate process defined in the
framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise
fully its right to self-determination. These principles apply to
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all parties concerned, and thus to the Palestinian people, and to
the PLO, which have to be associated with the negotiations.

Other points which would mark the European attitude
in the following years were the call for the end of the
occupation of Palestinian territories, and a firm stance
against unilateral initiatives in Jerusalem and settlement
policy. The position of the EC and of the European Political
Cooperation did not change in the years following the
Venice declaration, and was possibly strengthened after the
failures of the Israeli attempts to create a leadership
alternative to the PLO and the beginning of the intifada.
In Madrid, Hans van der Broek, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Netherlands and acting President of the
Council of Ministers, confirmed the Community’s views on
the peace process in the Middle East:
. . . The Twelve consider it of the utmost importance that the
parties have committed themselves to the road map of this
conference: direct negotiations on the basis of resolutions 242
and 338 . . . The political negotiations are to be underpinned by
multilateral negotiations on regional cooperation in fields of
mutual interests. We look forward and expect to be working
closely with all the parties to ensure progress along these lines . .
. The Twelve’s guiding principles throughout the negotiating
process are those which have since long governed our position.
They remain unchanged. These principles are Security Council
resolution 242 and 338, the principle of land for peace, the right
of all states in the region, including Israel, to live within secure
and recognized boundaries and the proper expression of the
right to self-determination of the Palestinian people.

In van der Broek’s speech you can find a functionalist
and rationalist attitude that was partially successful in the
process of European integration, and the illusion that a
process modelled on the Conference for Security and
Cooperation in Europe could be started in Madrid. As we see
below, the same functionalist attitude characterized the
approach to multilateral talks. Unfortunately, these
illusions have been so far doomed because of the many
difficulties in the Palestinian and in the Syrian track.
432

Between Madrid, Oslo and Barcelona.
After the peace conference was convened in Madrid at
the end of October 1991, two processes started: the better
25
known bilateral talks, and the multilateral track . As is
well-known, bilateral talks brought about peace between
Israel and Jordan, whereas the present course of the
Israeli-Palestinian process took other paths after the
success of the left-wing coalition in the Israeli election of
May 1992 and secret contacts between PLO and Israel in
Scandinavia just before the elections.
The multilateral track was structured into five working
groups, respectively on arms control and regional security,
water, environment, refugees, and economic development.
Other multilateral processes developed in the area, like the
Middle East and North Africa economic summits, and after
1995 the Barcelona process. It makes sense to ask whether
this multitude of multilateral processes has been an
advantage or a hindrance.
The idea of the multilateral track is grounded in a
functionalist conception of international cooperation, that
is, presumed to start from “technical” issue areas. The
cooperation in those issue areas would induce the states to
put aside or to solve their “high politics” problems. The
dynamics and explication and denomination of the
processes of cooperation is variable according to the various
schools of thought of functionalism and neo-functionalism.
However, the expectation is that the advantages of
cooperation and the mutual learning and understanding in
“lower politics” or technical issue areas would create the
climate for agreements in security.
The multilateral talks had basically two aims. The first
was obviously to try to start cooperation in sensitive, but in
some cases “technical ,” areas such as water resources and to
extend it to more sensitive and “political” ones. This first
objective reflected the above quoted “functionalist”
mentality. The other aim was drawing the international
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community, and particularly the EU, into the process with a
consolation prize, but excluding the EU from the more
relevant—both from the political and m ediatic point of
view—bilateral talks, chausse gardé of the United States.
The EU had to run the Regional Economic Development
(RED) Group. Meetings of this group took place in Brussels
in May 1992, in Paris in October 1992, in Rome in May 1993,
in Copenhagen in October 1993, and in Rabat and in Bonn in
January 1994. After the Declaration of Principles in the
Copenhagen round, every part agreed on the necessity to
intensify the work of the RED Group to ensure it would not
be marginalized. The EU tried to encourage the various
delegations about long-term economic relations and about
possible institutional mechanisms, processes, and
frameworks to support the efforts towards regional
cooperation. After Rabat, a monitoring committee was
established, and after that a secretariat, which had to be
based in Amman. After the 1996 Israeli elections , the
multilateral track (and the RED Group) virtually ceased
their activities, and it is difficult to point out any single
important issue where an achievement can be found. But
that was linked to progress in bilateral talks.
In the diplomatic process following the Madrid
conference, functionalist dynamics have not been able to
work (even approximately) because security problems have
so far been of the existential type (or are perceived to be so)
for all actors, and especially for those at the core of the
problem, i.e., Israelis and Palestinians.
The European Role after the Establishment
of the National Palestinian Authority.
After the establishment of the Palestinian National
Authority (PNA) the activity of the EU and of EU states was
marked by economic aid and (sometimes un-)diplomatic
missions. If you look at the political and diplomatic activity
in this period of time (at least until the appointment of
Moratinos in October 1996), there is not much new: many
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visits of Euro-troikas to the Middle East and statements
confirming the usual position of the EU. Some of them, like
those concerning settlement policy and Jerusalem, were not
particularly agreeable for Israeli governments. However,
condemnation of terrorist acts has always been
uncompromising, Arafat was often requested to fight
terrorism more effectively, and calls for the end of the
boycott to Israel were a must in most European
declarations.
European economic role, on the contrary, has been so far
relevant: 45 percent of the aid to the Palestinian Territories
comes from the EU as such (not from member countries).
For example, in the years 1990-91 , 60 millions of Ecu (mecu)
were supplied by the EU as development aid. In the year
1991, 43 percent of the total aid to the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA ) in the
Middle East was provided by the EU. In 1993 , 15
Palestinian universities and five administration s received
75 mecu. For the years 1994-98, 500 mecu were deliberated
in 1993, and that sum was later increased. In April 1994 the
Council decided to support the establishment of the
Palestinian police with a sum of 10 mecu, though this
decision was characterized by formal problems in the
decisionmaking process between Council, Commission , and
the Parliament. After the Taba/Washington agreement the
European role in Palestinian elections was absolutely
essential, with financial (14 mecu) and political support
given by the presence of 300 observers, 30 of whom were
members of the European Parliament.
The economic support of the EU can be considered as an
effect and a cause—at the same time—of the European
concern for the peace process. On one side there is a wide
agreement that economic development in the Palestinian
territories is an important factor of stabilization. On the
other side, any stalemate in the process puts Palestinian
economy under stress for closures of the Palestinian areas
or any kind of constraint, and this makes European
continuing aid (and financial burden) necessary.
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At the same time (especially with the Rabin/Peres
government) there were bilateral agreements signed by the
EU and Israel, such as the agreement of November 11, 1995,
for a political dialogue on a regular basis, economic
cooperation and the establishment of a free trade area
(according to the Barcelona spirit), and agreement on
telecommunications.
This economic role notwithstanding, the EU has not so
far been able to develop an adequate political role in the
process. The reasons for this diminished role are manifold.
They can be traced back to three main factors: the attitude
decided in Barcelona with respect to existing frameworks,
the U.S. purpose to maintain leadership in the process, and
the Israeli and (to a lesser extent) Arab perceptions of the
European role.
As is well-known, the European approach to existing
frameworks for conflict resolution has been not to interfere
with already existing diplomatic processes. This has caused
the noninterference with the Oslo process, which started in
26
a sense even before Labor success in 1992 elections . This
European attitude was reinforced by the American will not
to share the leadership in areas perceived as absolutely
vital to U.S. interests. Moreover, U.S. administrations have
often perceived European perspectives as different in many
respects, particularly as far as the attitude towards alleged
terrorist organizations or pariah states is concerned. For
example, many European governments and the EC had
relations with the PLO, even when the United States
considered it officially as a terrorist organization, and the
differences with respect to Iran or Libya are well-known.
The problem of Israeli perception is not related only to
the Venice declaration and “Arab policies” of some
27
European countries and the EU. The historical collective
memory of the Jewish people represents Europe as the
continent of anti-semitism, pogroms, and the Shoah.
Moreover, European reactions to the intifada were
perceived by Israelis (and sometimes were really) as
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absolutely disproportioned. In European media the use of
words such as genocide and extermination tended to equate
Israeli behavior with respect to Palestinians with the Nazi
treatment of Jews. The Israeli public opinion, on the other
side, tended to generalize European exaggerations and “bad
taste” (to make use of understatement), and often
attributed to Europeans the will to “normalize” the Jews
and so get rid of any guilt feeling.
These perceptions have been made stronger by a
behavior which is perceived as a double standard, i.e., the
fact that heavier human rights violations in Arab countries
(and later, sometimes, in the Palestinian territories) have
not been criticized with the same eagerness marking
criticisms against Israel. Obviously these perceptions do not
make it easier for the Israelis to overcome the thought that
all this is a modern variety of the old—even though of
different types—European anti-semitism.
As is the case for the behavior of the British
administration during the mandate, Arab and Palestinian
28
perceptions are in a sense the mirror image of Israeli ones .
First, often, especially in the public opinion, there is
little—yet increasing—awareness of differences between
European countries and the United States, and complaints
are made against “the West” as a whole. Moreover, even
those making a difference object to Europeans that there is
no coherence between statements and actions, since
declarations would imply a tougher stance, and possibly
economic sanctions against Israel, which has always been
rejected by European states and the EU. In this respect, the
Arabs charge Western countries with a double standard,
because, for example, Iraq is much more heavily punished
than Israel for not complying with U.N. Security Council
resolutions.
A frequent criticism is the lack of a real common
European foreign policy. This criticism is stronger when
divergent attitudes emerge, as in the case of the
Chirac-Rifkind controversy.
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In order to overcome the political and perceptional
difficulties in the implementation of a European role, the
Council appointed Miguel Angel Moratinos as a “special
envoy” to the Middle East on October 28, 1996. His mandate
is to have contacts with all the interested parties—the
countries of the region, the United States, and the
international organizations—observe the evolution , and
contribute to the implementation of the agreements.
The reactions to Moratinos’ appointment were diverse.
The Americans did not fully agree. The U.S. special envoy
disagreed, stating in a quintessential diplomatic style:
I think that it is important when you are in a delicate stage of a
negotiating process for all those who want to be helpful to find
the best ways to be supportive. Right now, I think that it is
generally agreed, not only by the party, but by others, that the
29
effort that we are making is the one they support.

On the Palestinian side, PLO representative in Brussels
Leyla Shaheed declared:
The U.S. and Europe have different opinions about how to
develop and support the peace process. The European position
concerning the Palestinian issue and other matters in the
region is far more advanced than that of America . . . There are
European countries which . . . call clearly for a Palestinian state
. . . Israel prefers to deal with the Arabs through the Americans
and therefore, does not want a European role, because the
European position toward peace is similar to the Arab and
30
Palestinian one.

The record of Moratinos’ activity is generally positive,
but it has been marked by low profile. Even his interviews
often reflect this; for example, a recent interview to a
Palestinian weekly is a masterpiece of diplomatic low
profile. This does not mean that his activity has been judged
as insignificant. On the contrary, his mediation has in many
situations contributed to keep channels of communications
alive. Israeli attitudes, which were at the beginning
cautious, became later more favorable.
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Nevertheless, the usual problems remain on the table.
For example, in March 1999 the usual question concerning
Jerusalem was raised again by a note of the Israeli foreign
minister Ariel Sharon concerning the Orient House in East
Jerusalem, expressing the Israeli view that European
representatives cannot visit it because PNA institutions are
not allowed in Jerusalem. The European position,
confirmed in the occasion by the German ambassador, is
that the Orient House is a PLO , and not a PNA, institution,
and that East Jerusalem is by no means a part of Israel.
This only makes clear that even sharp differences have not
so far been overcome.
Final Considerations.
At the conclusion of the chapter I must give an
answer—at least tentative—to the questions posed at its
beginning. First, there is no t much difference with respect
to perceived threats to security and objectives of foreign and
security policy. A difference can be made for the Gulf, but
this has more to do with transatlantic relations than with
real perceptions of threat. Second, a consensus is emerging,
at least with respect to some important issues, such as the
Middle East peace process. As far as problems like Algeria,
the divisions between different school s of thought seem to be
rather transnational than national in character.
The obstructions are provided more by nationally
located bureaucratic interests than by clear and wellfounded national interests: diplomacies do not want to
share their decisionmaking processes, military personnel
do not want to be reduced or submitted to different chains of
command, and so on. Moreover, the coordination of different
national traditions is not easy, especially when some actors
want always to stand in the first rows.
Whereas, as written above, a consensus is emerging in
the area of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and,
generally speaking, of Israeli-Arab relations, things are
more difficult with respect to the Gulf and Algeria.
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In the first case, the U.S. policy of double containment is
not shared by all Europeans. Differences within the EU
became apparent during the Anglo-American attack of Iraq
in December 1998, when Blair was almost totally isolated
from the Continent (with the exception of the Spanish
leader, Aznar). In this case the problem is related to three
main factors. First, Britain’s attempt to maintain both its
traditional relation with the United States and its effort to
foster a more coordinated European foreign policy. This
double track is probably perceived by Blair and his foreign
minister Cook as not contradictory. Maybe it is not in the
short run, at least formally, but it cannot be sustained in the
long run. Second, the fact that the Gulf is outside the
geographical scope of any common enterprise of the EU; it is
in the Middle East, but outside the range of Barcelona.
Third, the most important factor is probably the stagnation
of CFSP, which will be the subject of the concluding
remarks.
As far as Algeria is concerned, the difficulties French
governments have so far met in dealing with this conflict are
31
magnified in the European case . Obviously all EU states
are torn between the possible charge of neo-colonialist
interference on one side, and, on the other, the humanitarian horror of slaughters, and the more political and
security related concern for the possible spread of unrest
and terrorism to Europe. Troikas and delegations of the
Parliament carried out missions in Algeria, and met the
President and members of the government and of the
Parliament. Nevertheless all the institutional instances of
the EU have so far refrained from any role of mediation
between the parties. This is the picture emerging, for
example, from the meeting of the EU foreign ministers in
32
Luxembourg in November 1997, or from the visit of the
delegation of the European Parliament to Algeria (February
33
8-12, 1998).
In this context, it is not possible even to outline the
possible causes of what has been called “Europaralis," i.e.,
34
the stagnating process of a CFSP. Certainly one problem
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of the EU is that it had to cope just after the Maastricht
summit with its worst nightmare, i.e., the war in former
Yugoslavia. However, the lack of unity with respect to the
Gulf and the pretense of national bureaucracies or
individual personalities to play their own role, or to go their
own way in single issues or conflicts, are all elements that
make European policies less credible. Moreover, the
perspective reduction of the Barcelona process to
agreements for economic openings does not generate the
momentum necessary for a strengthened role in the
Mediterranean and the Middle East.
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CHAPTER 17
THE SPIRIT OF ETERNAL NEGATION:
RUSSIA’S HOUR IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Stephen J. Blank

After the Cold War many believed that the United States
could act more unilaterally and more deeply in the Middle
East to resolve existing conflicts without running the great
1
risks stemming from superpower competition. Today that
hope is in danger of frustration. One reason is that super or
great power competition has returned to the area. Since
1994, Russia has shown increasing determination to regain
something like its traditional regional role. Certainly the
Middle East’s inherent proclivities for conflict have
facilitated Russia’s return to the area and frustrated U.S.
policy. But Russia’s overall international situation and
perception of it, as well as the structure of Russian domestic
politics, present even more compelling motives for Moscow’s
revived policy. Russian Middle East policy results from the
intersection of global, regional, and domestic forces, an
interaction that must be analyzed to make sense of
Moscow’s policies.
Historically the non-European region most penetrated
by foreign intervention, the Middle East’s internal
cleavages still lead foreign governments into repeated
involvement in its affairs and rivalries, for two main
reasons. First, this foreign intervention certifies the
interveners’ international role, status, and power. That
certification is as much a weapon in those governments’
domestic policies as it is in their foreign policy. By
enhancing their foreign standing, governments obtain
greater leverage with which to maneuver amid shifting
domestic coalitions as well as abroad. Often those coalitions
add a strong foreign policy component to their basic
2
domestic orientation.
445

The second reason has often been to use the status
gained by being seen as a credible regional player to
overturn the local and “global” status quos and realize
thereby a government’s local, regional, and global strategic
interests. The Middle East remains an area where a state,
aspiring to a higher status because it is blocked elsewhere,
can act with reasonable impunity to upset the status quo
when a crisis emerges and force its way into the counsels of
the mighty. The Middle East now enjoys the role the
Balkans played in world politics before 1914 and remains
the true seat of today’s “Eastern Question” in international
politics.
But today’s Middle East is not that of the Cold War.
Many analysts now accept that the linkages between the
former Soviet republics of the Transcaucasus and Central
Asia with the classical Middle East are reshaping the
Middle East’s definition. Today, Middle Eastern players,
notably Israel, Turkey, and Iran, act resolutely throughout
Central Asia and Transcaucasia, thereby erasing the
3
former dividing lines between them.
Consequently, Russia’s Middle Eastern policy emerges
out of numerous opportunities and dangers, if not threats,
emanating from the region, from world politics in general,
and from domestic sources. Even as Russia’s regional policy
and its new diplomatic offensives realize these two purposes
of foreign intervention, they are also responses to this
combination of threat and opportunity. Undoubtedly
Moscow will continue to seek to enlarge its role in the area,
especially under the new government led by Yevgeny
Primakov. Earlier, as Foreign Minister, Primakov pulled off
notable diplomatic victories with regard to Iraq, mainly due
to U.S. incompetence and ineptitude rather than Russian
power. The U.S. fiasco in the crises over U.N. inspections of
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities to
prevent their reappearance in 1997-98 seemingly
highlighted Moscow’s role as a potential equal or aspirant to
that role vis-à-vis Washington in the Middle East. As a
result, the sanctions regime will come under constant
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pressure and might even collapse after 1999, even though
U.S. intelligence maintains that Iraq could restore a
credible WMD and missile capability in the region within
4
1-3 years after that. While Russia surely won great
temporary victories in 1997-98, the lasting strategic
benefits are harder to discern.
The Forces Behind Russian Policy .
Moscow’s regional policies constitute part of a broader
quest to enlarge its domestic room for maneuver and
international status. Primakov has often proclaimed that
Russia must have a global role and policy. As President
Boris Yeltsin’s 1996 action policy stated, Russia should
conduct a global, i.e., “multivector,” foreign policy, leading
to a situation where its word would be decisive in world
affairs, and no major decision in international affairs could
be reached without Russia. Primakov even asserts that
Russia’s return to global prominence is “as a natural desire
5
in the multipolar world.” In pursuit of these objectives,
Russia has intervened diplomatically and shipped military
systems in Cyprus, in the Arab-Israeli peace process, in the
sanctions regime against Iraq, and in support of Iran’s
political ambitions. It has asserted itself regionally and
globally to force Washington and skeptical local
governments, e.g., Israel, to take it seriously as an equal to
the United States. In the Gulf it also seeks to fracture the
U.S.-built alliance system and leverage the congruence
between its and France’s Middle Eastern policies to affect
the European and global chessboard. As Le Nouvel
Observateur reported, one of French President Jacques
Chirac’s confidants stated that if France wants to play an
international role, it benefits from the existence of a strong
Russia which helps it reaffirm itself as a major power “free
from any complex and ready to play the card of stability.”
Translated into clear English (or French in the original) this
means that:
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In the Middle East both countries want to reactivate old
friendships and offer Arab and Israeli leaders a chance to talk to
someone else than Washington. France can only do this by
acting as the EU’s political driving force, and Russia has been
helping it to gain this status. As for Russia, it can only achieve
this goal by making sure it does not appear to be scheming
against Western interests, a risk it can avoid through
6
consultation with France.

The implicit, and sometimes explicit, threat is always
that Moscow might then exploit its formidable capabilities
for disrupting the Middle Eastern and even European
status quo to make life uncomfortable for its opposite
numbers.
Moscow must invoke the specter of its trouble-making
capabilities and even on occasion actually deploy them
because it operates in a highly unfavorable climate in the
Middle East and more generally on the world stage. The
most profound, overarching, and inescapable threat, and
one that grips Moscow on a daily basis, is that Russia is and
for some time has been a failing state. As of August 1998,
one may even say it became a failed state. This failure would
include the total breakdown of the center’s ability to raise
taxes, disburse funds, enforce laws, govern the outlying
provinces, and maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of
7
force throughout the state. By whatever standard of state
failure one measures, Russia is uncomfortably close to a
8
perfect correspondence with those standards. The specter
of state disintegration due to those factors constantly
weighs upon the calculations of Russia’s policymakers and
9
political community. Thus while we in the United States
might argue that the post-Soviet picture was the most
benign threat environment in recorded Russian history,
prominent Russian analysts concluded by 1993 that threats
abounded everywhere and the situation was steadily
10
worsening. Hence the security issue or dilemma that
drives policy towards the new Middle East is now as much
inside Russia’s borders as it is an external threat.
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Concurrently, Russia also discerns multiple external
risks that shape its policy. The primary foreign threat that
Yeltsin and Primakov, not to mention others, invoke is to
11
Russia’s integrity. One reason why Russia’s integrity is at
risk is because Russia’s deimperialization and democratization remain incomplete. Prominent politicians still
argue that the former Soviet republics will return to some
form of complete integration with Moscow on Moscow’s
12
terms. Therefore Moscow still cannot fully accept either
the new borders of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) or of the Baltic states, as well as the notion that
the “successor states” have or should have the same
sovereignty as other states. A Brezhnev doctrine for the
former Soviet Union still haunts the Kremlin’s imagination.
One major reason for continuing to pursue the goal of
integration—the priority in foreign policy—is precisely to
13
prevent any further internal separatism within Russia.
This is a classic attribute of an imperial policy to divert
attention from internal weakness. Yet it takes place where
Russia’s military and economic policy instruments are
relatively useless.
Therefore, Russian policy or strategy towards the
Middle East is essentially negative. It is haunted by the
prospect of any foreign power getting a lasting foothold
there, and from there into the CIS. Like Goethe’s
Mephistopheles, it incarnates the spirit of eternal negation.
Russia until now has been able occasionally to obstruct or
frustrate foreign policies of other governments, but it has
failed spectacularly to create anything of a positive lasting
nature abroad. For Moscow, the CIS and the adjacent
Middle East cannot be allowed to come under foreign
influence. We can characterize the Kremlin’s policy as
strategic denial across the board, in economics, diplomacy,
and military policy. Moscow discerns threats of varying
intensity, but always of substance from any consolidated
Western presence in the CIS or in the Middle East which
would open the way to that presence in the CIS. Sergei
Arutinov, a renowned ethnologist in Moscow argues that,
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A Turco-Israeli close cooperation is a positive fact from the
world-wide point of view. But generally it would worsen
Russian-Turkish and Russian-Israeli relations. It may also
provoke the reemerging of anti-Semitism in Russia. It will
evoke much anxiety in Armenia too. First, a mutually
acceptable solution about Karabakh must be found and only
then a Turkish-Israeli cooperation may start to be realized in
the Near East and the former USSR states. Otherwise, it may
trigger Russian-Iraqi, Russian Iranian, Armenian-Iranian
rapprochements, push Armenian extremists in the world to a
14
cooperation with Palestinian extremists.

Moscow often employed a similar argument against
NATO enlargement. However, the assertion that any
foreign advance will undo Russia’s friendship towards and
identification with the West only reflects how shallow that
friendship and identification are. Likewise, in the Middle
East, Moscow’s policy presents a similar negativity. For
example, Primakov has repeatedly complained about
Russia being marginalized in the peace process between
Israel and the Arabs. Instead, he argues that the U.S.
monopoly should give way to greater participation by
Russia and the European Union (EU). Yet, at the same time,
Moscow makes wholly unrealistic demands that the peace
process be a comprehensive and simultaneous affair, with
peace being made with all the remaining belligerents at
once and is busy arming all of Israel’s enemies, Iran, Syria,
and even covertly Iraq. Naturally, Israel rejects Russia’s
participation on this basis. Meanwhile Primakov went so
far as to boast, when the peace process appeared to be dead,
15
that he was content not to share the U.S. failure. This
attitude of simultaneous complaint, yet refusal to
participate constructively and offer useful ideas, typifies
Moscow’s overall policy.
This program of strategic denial becomes particularly
clear when Moscow confronts not just Israel’s or Turkey’s
presence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, but also
Washington’s and NATO’s appearance there. The presence
of huge deposits of oil and gas in Kazakstan, Turkmenistan,
and Azerbaijan has lured American and Western investors,
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and now their governments, into the Transcaucasus and
Central Asia in such a way as to make these areas
increasing hotbeds of competition with Russia and to pose
what Moscow sees as a mortal threat to its vital interests in
16
integration and internal stability.
Would-be
geopoliticians like Zbigniew Brzezinski argue that it is a
vital U.S. interest to so firmly implant itself in these states
17
as to exclude Russian influence there. Whether or not this
is the proper U.S. objective, Washington is following
through on this policy, thus arousing Moscow’s deepest
18
fears.
Yet precisely because Moscow views these areas’ full
sovereignty and its consolidation as a threat to its survival
as a state, this Western presence, whether American,
Turkish, or Israeli, is unsettling at best and a major threat
at worst. This only shows the continuing hold of zero-sum
thinking over Russian policy. If Russia’s neighbors are fully
secure and cannot be threatened by Russia, due to other
states’ strong interest in them and their own internal
stability, then Russia itself is threatened. As U.S. analyst
Alvin Rubinstein observed,
Clearly, any strategic vision worthy of critical examination
must be rooted in historical context. With respect to Central
Asia, this means a view of the region as a vast borderland
between Russia and the Middle East. Any policy that
contributes to the viability of the new republics and ensures
their non-threatening character to Russia must, by virtue of
consolidating this strategic buffer zone, redound to the
long-term security of Turkey, Iran, and the Arab states of the
19
Persian Gulf region.

The U.S. regional policies are closely tied to NATO’s
enlargement and the dual containment of Iran and Iraq.
U.S. writers increasingly call the CIS part of the “greater
Middle East” and the “strategic fulcrum of the future” or the
20
“strategic high ground,” due to its energy resources.
Robert Blackwill and Michael Stuermer claim that ”no
Western power has been safe without some measure of
influence or control over the southern and eastern shores of
451

21

the Mediterranean.”
This area now includes the
Transcaspian, since Washington and Ankara want the
terminus of Transcaspian oil and gas to be Ceyhan on the
Southeastern Mediterranean. Nor do U.S. officials shrink
from spelling out their grander visions of the future.
Ambassador Matthew Nimetz postulates the growing
importance of the Mediterranean region as a whole.
Therefore, a clear U.S. commitment to remaining a military
power here will markedly enhance regional security. This is
true for the major NATO powers as well: France, Germany,
22
Italy, Great Britain, Spain, Greece, and Turkey.
To
maintain regional security, NATO must not only integrate
the entire region into the Western economy and foster the
development of “pluralistic institutions,” NATO must also
grasp the military nettle.
The Pax NATO is the only logical regime to maintain security in
the traditional sense. As NATO maintains its dominant role in
the Mediterranean, it must recognize a need for the expansion of
its stabilizing influence in adjacent areas, particularly in
Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea region (in concert, of
course, with the regional powers, primarily Russia, Ukraine,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) and in the Arabian/Persian
Gulf. The United States must continue to play the major role in
this security system. The Sixth Fleet will be the vehicle to
implement this commitment for years to come, although this is
23
something that might be reviewed some time down the road.

Supposedly, Russia’s views either do not count or Russia
will blithely accept this outcome.
Given the centrality of energy to Russia’s economy and to
the West, what conclusion about NATO’s future activities in
the CIS and Middle East should a Russian planner or
policymaker adopt when analyzing Nimetz’ words or the
following statement by former Secretary of State Warren
Christopher and former Secretary of Defense William
Perry?
The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today’s
reality: the danger to the security of its members is not
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primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, but
threats to their collective interests beyond their territory.
Shifting the alliance’s emphasis from defense of members’
territory to defense of common interests is the strategic
imperative. These threats include the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of oil, terrorism,
genocidal violence, and wars of aggression in other regions
that threaten to cause great disruption. To deal with such
threats alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form
military coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NATO
24
territory.

Thus Russian elites, and not Primakov alone, constantly
profess that they face linked challenges in Europe, the CIS,
and the Middle East due to the American hegemonic drive.
And from the point of view of Realpolitik, they have much
justification for seeing things in this way. The problem for
Primakov and his colleagues is that they apparently see the
world exclusively in terms of a zero-sum game, often with
25
the open threat of force. U.S. leaders, on the other hand,
see things in an entirely different and Wilsonian, or what
Walter MacDougall calls a global meliorist light, so while
we do not have a clash of ideologies in the old sense,
fundamental approaches to international relations and
politics are embroiled here in the Russo-American
26
confrontation in the Middle East.
Nor are these the only threats that Moscow faces.
Russian analysts and officials habitually worry that Russia
may be excluded from European and Middle Eastern
decisionmaking as Washington and NATO move closer to
its border. Russia may also be consigned to an economic role
as a provider of raw materials and deprived of the
opportunity to partake of the contemporary technological
and post-industrial revolution. This would leave it as a
27
perpetually inferior power. They also worry about any
form of Muslim self-assertion, whether national or
religious, as a threat and often associate either of these
phenomena under the terms, Wahhabism, Pan-Turkism, or
Pan-Islamism, without regard for the scholarly distinctions
28
among these phenomena.
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As the Afghan crisis sparked by the Taliban’s victories
indicates, Russia fears any spillover of any of these
phenomena into Central Asia, the advent of massive
refugee problems, and the involvement of its troops in
containing these threats from Afghanistan. Furthermore,
there is the persistent danger that some analogous kind of
movement might commence in Russia itself, detach the
affected area from Russian control, and spread throughout
Russia, reviving fears of the state’s disintegration. More
dangerous, yet, is the possibility that outside sponsors like
Turkey or Iran may actively encourage and support such
29
movements.
Precisely because Iran could easily
undertake such a policy, Russia, already in February 1992,
indicated its continuing willingness to supply Iran with
30
conventional and dual-use arms and technology sales.
However, aiding Iran thusly brings Russia face to face
with the prospect of such an internal threat being combined
with an external threat from a Muslim regime. This could
range from upheaval caused by some form of Muslim
self-assertion, either religious or national, to conventional
support from abroad for that group in rebellion. Or the level
of threat could escalate further. If proliferation to Russia’s
south is allowed to go unchecked, then weapons of mass
destruction could figure either as deterrents of one or both
31
sides or as active weapons in the conflict.
The following analysis captures the diversity of many of
the regional threats as seen from Moscow (and not only from
there).
Geopolitically, the black hole of Central Asia now constitutes an
expanded part of the new Middle East. Geoculturally, few other
regions entail a nation-state border system of such potential
transparency, where common and cross-border religious,
ethnic, linguistic, and collective memories could act individually
or jointly as destabilizing or integrating factors. From
Kazakhstan to Egypt (and one could substitute Tajikistan to
Algeria and Sudan-SB) dynamics of anticolonial feeling [old or
new], economic underdevelopment, uneven development,

454

religious revivalism, arms proliferation, artificial borders, and
32
ethnoterritorially driven conflicts are characteristic.

These regional threats are complicated by the role
played by the United States in its own right and as leader of
several global alliances, e.g., its alliance with NATO, Israel
and Turkey, all of whom are seen as encroaching on Russia’s
vital interests. Russian analysts take for granted that the
United States wants to oust Russia from its traditional vital
33
interests and destroy it as a great power. Naturally that
threat is intolerable. It is all the more intolerable because
Russia harbors dreams of equality with the United States, a
34
dream voiced by Yeltsin many times.
Sergei Rogov,
director of the USA Institute and an advisor to the
government and Foreign Ministry, has written that,
First of all, Moscow should seek to preserve the special
character of Russian-American relations. Washington should
recognize the exceptional status of the Russian Federation in
the formation of a new system of international relations, a role
different from that which Germany, Japan, or China or any
35
other center of power plays in the global arena.

As Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment observes,
Russian analysts argue that current difficulties are
transient but Russia is entitled to this “presidium seat” in
36
Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and on global issues. Yet
any realistic analysis knows this aspiration is a dangerous
illusion given Russia’s weaknesses. Thus Moscow’s
negative policies must be calibrated so as to prevent
Washington from slamming the door on Russia even as it
works to frustrate U.S. policies.
However, Moscow also discerns opportunities which are
seen as offsetting or that allow it to keep those threats at a
distance. Within the Middle East itself, the internal ethnic
rivalries within states, e.g., Kurds vs. Turkey, Palestinians
vs. Israel, offer both neighbors of those states and interested
outside players opportunities to interfere with and offset
the host states’ policies. Thus Moscow has aided the Kurds
on numerous occasions, just as it has consistently supported
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minorities in the Transcaucasus against Baku and Tbilisi.
Moscow has also tried to broker a truce between rival
Kurdish factions in Iraq, to bolster Saddam Hussein’s
regime in Baghdad, and to discomfit Ankara which regards
any unified Kurdish political stance, even one across the
38
border in Iraq, with unfeigned alarm and suspicion.

A second cleavage in the Middle East is the linked series
of inter-state rivalries. Iran vs. Arabs, Israel vs. Arabs, Iran
vs. Israel, inter-Arab strife, now most notably in the Gulf,
but also in Lebanon, for example. These regional
“contradictions,” to use the Soviet term, show little sign of
disappearing. Few, if any, regional governments have
adopted the thinking of U.S. professors with regard to
international politics nor do they accept the new liberal
dispensation. Security is still conceived largely in military
terms. Strategic territory is still vital, zero-sum thinking
and proliferation of WMD are pervasive. Uncooperative
39
behavior is rampant and so on. Naturally such behavior
not only obstructs the search for resolution of regional
conflicts, it also impedes U.S. efforts in its search for peace
and raises the constant specter of American military
engagement, as in Iraq. These contradictions facilitate the
entry of a power who seeks to exploit them, through arms
sales, diplomatic support, covert support for breakaway
movements, and the like, for grander strategic objectives.
Further contradictions derive from the fact that
Washington very much wants Russia to join with U.S.
global initiatives and has shown an exceptional forbearance
to Russia in the face of a lot of provocation and bad temper.
Unfortunately, this forbearance, whatever else it has
gained, also has reaped more “tantrums” and protests at
U.S. policy. While they only further poison the bilateral
well; they offer many Russian elites the consoling illusion of
standing up to Washington even as Russia falls apart.
Other contradictions apply as well to America’s allies,
especially France. Russia and France both view each other
as states which must be cultivated in order to enhance their
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respective standing vis-à-vis Washington, so that
Washington will offer them more benefits in order to keep
them on its side and pay more attention to their interests in
40
pursuing its own goals. Thus the cultivation of France and
support for its opposition to American policies in the Gulf
and the Israel-Palestine conflict translates into a search for
global leverage vis-à-vis the United States, especially in
41
Europe. France, too, seeks to enhance its standing
vis-à-vis Moscow and Washington as well as in the Middle
East by its calculated display of distance from American
42
policy.
Therefore Primakov’s diplomacy and policy seek
leverage by trying to create regional and/or strategic
partnerships with states who are willing to some degree to
align their goals with Moscow’s in different areas of the
43
globe. Primakov’s approach very much follows the
tradition of Alexander II’s Foreign Minister Prince
Gorchakov who, after the defeat in the Crimean War,
sought to minimize threats to Russia and enhance her
status by precisely the same search for regional
partnerships and the exploitation of contradictions in areas
where Russia could advance. Primakov has explicitly
invoked this aspect of his predecessor’s policies and is
44
clearly inspired by it. As an article in the Foreign
Ministry’s journal, International Affairs, stated,
For Russia, the transition to a multi-polar world will create
the possibility of diversifying the directions of foreign policy
and of developing constructive strategic relations immediately
with some influential partners. This increases the possibility
of a maneuver necessary for ensuring the country’s security
under the conditions of a resource deficit and of the transition
period in the development of our country which is attended by
45
difficulties.

Primakov’s successor as Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov,
echoed this sentiment when he noted that Russian foreign
policy now demanded the skill of seeking compromises
considering different states’ interests, and of seeking allies,
46
“not for life but for a specific given instance.”
457

Russia’s Approach to the Middle East.
Moscow’s Middle Eastern policies have fully crystallized
under Primakov’s intellectual and political leadership. As
Primakov has become Prime Minister, they are likely to
continue along those same lines. This approach also quite
clearly enjoys the support of President Boris Yeltsin and
Russian elite opinion. It comprises a doctrine that is called
multipolarity but which stems from traditional geopolitics,
47
a doctrine having dangerous implications for Russia.
The emphasis on geopolitics implies that Russia’s claim
to be a great, even global, power is guaranteed by virtue of
its size and location irrespective of its internal state of
affairs and the qualities of its domestic, economic, and
48
military performance. Primakov and Yeltsin have argued
that Russia has global interests and its potential, not its
49
reality, is what counts. The doctrine of multipolarity
postulates that Russia increasingly lives in a multipolar
world where any one power or bloc, i.e., the United States,
cannot be allowed to dominate in a hegemonic fashion
anywhere, e.g., the Middle East. Russia, as a great power
due to its potential, if not yet its reality, must play a global
role, not just a regional one, and be seated at the “presidium
50
table” of all international affairs. Or as Leonid Brezhnev
and his Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko stated, no
international issue can be decided without Russian
participation. A consensus exists that Russia, in Yeltsin’s
words, “deserves to be a great power.” Unfortunately
employing this formulation means that Russia is not a great
power. Russia claims a status beyond its real capacities, but
one that encourages any other party who is dissatisfied with
the status quo. Primakov, in the face of much earlier
reformist doctrine to the fact that Russia is now only a
regional power, has said Russia is a global actor and
conducts an avowedly global policy and has adopted the
51
Brezhnev line. And that globalism, despite rhetoric to the
contrary, often directly challenges U.S. policies, not just
rhetorically, but through tangible political actions.

458

As expressed by Russian analysts, this globalism derives
from two axioms which are held with almost religious
certainty across the Russian political spectrum. As General
Makhmut A. Gareev, one of Russia’s most respected
military theorists, writes,
The main idea of contemporary Russia is that it can, must, and
will be reborn and develop as a great power. This is not
determined by someone’s wishes, but by fundamental
objective factors: historical traditions, geopolitical situation in
the world, real economic, political, and spiritual needs, which
would always manifest themselves and are impossible to
52
‘cancel.’ We must be ready to defend this idea.

Key security figures, like former Deputy Defense Minister
and Security Council Secretary Andrei Kokoshin, have
espoused comparable views. 53 Logically, therefore, Russia’s
future status, if not present weakness, should entail its seat
at the “presidium table” of world politics.
This outlook resonates across Russia’s political
spectrum and is expressed in the term Derzhavnost’, an
inherent, objectively given great power status. This legacy
goes back to the Tsars and is perhaps one of the greatest
fetters upon Russia’s ability to maneuver in contemporary
international affairs. Because Russia’s elite instinctively
believes that Russia’s potential and size makes it
automatically a great power, these elites have sacrificed
Russia’s economic welfare to the paraphernalia of securing
great power status. Hence Russia lacks a solid foundation
for maintaining that status. Moscow has consistently
striven to attain an international and now global position,
based mainly on military factors that its economy and
society could not sustain. This striving has also consistently
precluded or inhibited efforts at democratic reform and
arouses international suspicion about Russia’s ultimate
aims.
Today’s globalism is also based on the second axiom that
Russian national interest dictates a policy of countering the
United States in all the key regions, Europe, the Middle
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East, CIS, and Far East in order to safeguard Russian
national interest and great power status as Washington’s
54
equal. One advocate of “limited globalism,” Oleg V.
Davydov, describes it as a policy of accepting that Russia is
fated to be a global power and one of the key centers of
multipolarity as it develops. But it must also pursue a
pragmatic line of engagement where and when its vital
interests are joined. Other comparable analyses argue
55
along similar lines. The logical corollary of this belief,
dating back beyond the Bolsheviks to the Tsars, is that any
Western influence near Russia’s “sphere of influence”
automatically is hostile and a threat that must be
56
countered.
First and foremost, this policy line aims to appease
Russian domestic policy, and it has allowed Primakov to use
the doctrine of Derzhavnost’ to increase domestic support for
foreign policy and remove it as an issue in the domestic
struggle for power. Instead, as Ivanov stressed, there is now
a basic consensus with the Duma and across the elite on
foreign policy deriving from the mystique of
57
“Derzhavnost.” Second, by acting along the line of national
interest apart from and against the United States,
Primakov has followed a policy that commanded Yeltsin’s
support, without which he could not function. Third,
Primakov has also wrested control of foreign policy away
from many of the rivals that his predecessor, Andrei
Kozyrev, faced unsuccessfully. Fourth, Primakov has also
benefited from the tough negotiations and agreement he
won on NATO enlargement that is universally regarded as
the best deal Russia could get, and his brilliant exploitation
of the inept U.S. policy toward Iraq during 1997-98. These
successes have allowed Primakov to conduct a policy of
cultivating allies or partners with whom to prevent
American hegemony in each regional domain. In the Middle
East these partners are Iran, Iraq, Syria, Cyprus, Libya,
and Sudan. Moscow cultivates them using all the tools of the
trade, diplomatic support through the U.N. and inter-state
relations, commercial trade, shared interests in energy
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issues, sales of weapons and nuclear technology, and
perhaps most importantly, the cultivation of a common
approach to the Middle East and its security issues.
Primakov has long argued that it is essential for Russia
and the Middle East that the United States not play the sole
58
role of regional hegemon. Russia must constitute an equal
and opposing presence. In 1991, on a mission to the area to
save the Soviet Union’s regional position, he said that
Middle Eastern leaders, “consider it necessary that a united
economic and military-strategic area of the USSR be
preserved.”
They wanted a USSR presence in the Middle East because this
would preserve the balance of power. Nobody wants some
power to maintain a monopoly position there. These states
understand that our country creates an area of stability in this
region with its new policy of non-confrontation with anyone, a
policy oriented toward searching for ways of making interests
59
coincide with those of other countries.

There is no reason to believe that he has changed his views
which clearly constitute the foundation of Moscow’s
regional policy.
And indeed, there is much truth to this perception.
Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and Yasser Arafat,
among others, have publicly urged Moscow to return to an
active role in the Middle East. Syria announced in March
1998 that, while it had not previously exerted much effort to
develop ties with Russia, it was now doing so at the highest
level. Iraq and Iran also welcome Russia’s greater regional
60
presence. Consequently, Primakov’s policies enjoy
regional and domestic support.
Indeed, from the start of his tenure as Foreign Minister,
Primakov and Yeltsin insisted that Russia would demand
an increasing role in the Middle East to counter America’s
61
monopoly of the peace process. Primakov also then
observed that the previous policies were misguided.
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We explain our inadequate activity in the Near East by the fact
that our efforts were aimed at evening our relations with the
former cold war adversaries. But this was done without an
understanding of the fact that, by not surrendering our
positions in the region and even strengthening them, we would
have paved the way to the normalization of relations a shorter
62
and more direct way.

Unquestionably this policy has discomfited the United
States. It surprised Secretary Christopher in 1996 when he
first encountered it, and it certainly has helped undermine
the foundations of our erratic policy in the Gulf. 63 But more
tellingly, it also has struck at the U.S. increasingly visible
regional unilateralism.
This became clear very soon after Primakov came to
power in 1996. Another Lebanese crisis broke out, and he
attempted to mediate between Israel, the Lebanese
guerrillas, and Syria. He offered his good offices based on his
contacts with Syria, Iran, and these guerrillas, but at the
same time blamed the Peres government in Jerusalem for
the crisis. Not surprisingly, Israel and the United States
rejected his overtures and criticism and his mission failed.
But he used it to begin cementing Russian relations with
France as well as with the broader Arab world in order to
obtain his larger goals. Indeed, Primakov apparently
viewed Peres’ electoral defeat by Benyamin Netanyahu
shortly afterwards with considerable satisfaction. On the
one hand, Russia felt that Shimon Peres’ Israeli
government had been insufficiently warm to it, while
Netanyahu had called for improved relations with Moscow.
On the other hand, he correctly believed that Netanyahu
would slow implementation of the Oslo peace plan and
process to the point where serious strains would arise
between Israel and the Arabs, and between Washington and
the Arabs, and this slowdown of the peace process would
offer Moscow numerous opportunities for improving its
regional position. Moscow’s former ambassador to Israel,
Aleksandr’ Bovin, actually observed that Primakov was not
particularly friendly to Israel. Certainly Primakov publicly
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stated his happiness to saddle the United States with
failure to achieve progress between Israel and the
64
Palestinians in 1998.
And this constitutes the danger in Russian policy. The
problem is not just its confrontational posture toward
Washington, Jerusalem, and Ankara. Rather, the problem
is that Russia fuels regional tensions that Moscow can
neither control nor avoid and which may rebound against
Russia’s own strategic interests. The great powers in the
Middle East are as often as not unable to control their
clients and instead have to follow up their play, leading
65
them into dangerous, if not failed, policies. Also, there has
been no public sign of Russian ideas to advance the peace
process. In view of the fact that a slowdown of the peace
process and the implicit corollary of renewed Israeli-Arab
tension are believed to be in Russia’s national interests, one
cannot credibly envision Russia as a valuable interlocutor
or equal player in the peace process. So its demand for an
equal seat at the table appears to be based ultimately on
nothing more than a policy of eternal negation of American
initiatives and Israeli policy. Yet this stance risks
perpetuating and solidifying the high degree of regional
tension that already exists. And arms supplies to one side or
another do even more to poison that well and frustrate
American policies in the peace process and in the Gulf.
Certainly Russia’s perceptions appear to be at least to some
degree behind Syria’s, Iraq’s, and perhaps even Arafat’s
calculations. They fear that without Moscow they lack a
credible source of counter-pressure to Washington and
Jerusalem and want to force Israel to retreat to Oslo or
perhaps 1967. Unfortunately, Russia’s policies render it
incapable of gaining Israel’s trust as a guarantor of its
security or of inspiring the trust needed to bring all sides
closer to peace. Moreover, because Russia is Iraq’s main
support against sanctions and Iran’s nuclear sponsor,
Moscow’s policies have injured possibilities for regional
peace.
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This is hardly surprising in one sense, given Russia’s
utter economic prostration. After all, a state that boasts
that it did not spend one Kopek on the peace process hardly
66
deserves a seat at the peace process table. But the actual
policy being conducted seems to have more to do with
pacifying domestic elites and evoking memories of a status
that Russia cannot maintain than with progress towards
true domestic reform, reconstruction, and a true
enhancement of Russia’s foreign standing. This is because
the insistence on empire and Derzhavnost have always been
the rock upon which reform efforts have foundered. These
aspects of Russian policy are evident in the four cases of
policy towards Iraq, Iran, Cyprus, and the peace process.
And they clearly involve playing to the domestic galleries,
especially insofar as the issues of energy and proliferation
are concerned.
Indeed, the domestic galleries are crucial because the
failure to create a viable state and coherent national
security policy process or mechanisms has given those
galleries a disproportionate role in the formulation and
conduct of policy. As Nikolai Sokov observes,
The ability of the government to develop and implement policy
will be strongly limited by the influence of politically relevant
domestic actors, each of whom will hold a virtual right of veto
over specific aspects of policy. Unlike in pluralist systems, [the
government] will have only a limited ability to manipulate
domestic coalitions for the simple reason that the coalition will
67
be nearly all-encompassing and very stable.

Furthermore, because these coalitions are so stable, only
if some shock to the system (perhaps Primakov’s accession
to power and subsequent new economic policies) occurs will
the dominant coalitions be unseated and new departures in
68
policy take place. And in such a system, government will
try to incorporate all interests into foreign policy because
69
their influence is so pervasive and stable. The fact that not
a single defense industry has been closed for bankruptcy
until now, despite the utterly useless nature of much of their
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production, indicates the force of this lobby that can defend
anti-national interests and value-subtracting firms and its
70
ability to bend the state to its will. Therefore it is easier
and cheaper politically to incorporate these lobbies into the
policy process early in the game and legitimate their
presence through all of its stages. Therefore, as Sokov again
notes, policy does not correspond to anything like the
rational-actor model. Sectoral or partial interests are
exalted and pursued at the expense of any coherent national
interest. The failure of the state leads to the privatization of
71
the state and the policy process. In Russia’s Middle
Eastern policy, the energy and defense industry lobbies
provide particularly telling examples of how this process
occurs in actual policymaking.
Russia and the Gulf: Energy and Weapons.
Since 1991, the Gulf has become the main focus of
Russia’s Middle Eastern policy. This attests both to Russia’s
shrunken reach, the rise of the peace process after 1991, and
Iran’s enhanced strategic importance vis-à-vis the CIS and
Russia. But it also reflects the rising importance of the
struggle for energy shares in the CIS, a struggle that will
probably determine the geopolitical fate of the
72
Transcaspian states. Russian support for Iraq and Iran is
almost overdetermined, since these two states’ support for
Russia not only anchors its position in the Gulf, but also
materially helps it in the struggle for energy.
The turn to Iran reinforces the existing partnership
between the two states. It makes sense, given the U.S.
blockade or embargo on Iran that drives Tehran to find
other partners and both sides’ need to establish an
arrangement or regime, to sort out Central Asian and
Caucasian conflicts and energy issues. Not surprisingly, the
two states conducting policies that have isolated them to
some degree from the international community came
together. At a 1995 Irano-Russian roundtable,
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The speakers alluded to the quest by Iran and Russia for an
identity and to Russia’s political determination to prevent any
country from dominating the region [Central Asia and the
Caucasus]. It was stressed that Iran and Russia are natural
allies with distinctive natural resources and the predominance
of any third power should be prevented. This is related to the
manner in which the two sides define their strategic objectives.
It was also stated that Russia’s influence in Central Asia and
the Caucasus should be treated with respect and if domination
73
is not the objective, cooperation is possible.

This was hardly the first time this conclusion was stated.
It had already achieved the force of policy well before 1995.
In 1992 Russian authorities already understood that they
needed to continue providing Iran with conventional
weapons (if not more dangerous dual-use technology) lest
Iran make trouble for Moscow in Central Asia and the
74
Caucasus, a perception that continues until now. At the
same time, this strategic partnership also belies or at least
neutralizes Iran as the avatar of the Islamic threat used in
the Russian media and by Russian elites to justify
everything from Chechnya to Tajikistan. Iran is simply not
regarded as a threat in actuality, no matter what might be
said about fundamentalism in general. Perhaps this is due
to the U.S. isolation of Iran that pushes it against
Washington and towards Moscow, or it comes from Iran’s
highly circumspect policy in the CIS, or from the Russian
weapon and technology transfers. Or perhaps all three of
these factors help limit Iran’s interests in the CIS. In fact,
many policymakers recommend dealing with Muslim
societies, specifically Iran, in order to engage this
phenomenon and turn it away from threatening Russia, a
75
solution that Primakov has espoused in the past. Yeltsin’s
advisor, Andranik Migranyan, who calls for Russian
hegemony in the CIS, stated that,
In many areas Iran can be a good and strategic ally of Russia at
[the] global level to check the hegemony of third parties and
keep the balance of power. . . . Russia will try to further
cooperate with Iran as a big regional power. We will not let the
West dictate to Russia how far it can go in its relations. Of
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course, we will try at the same time not to damage our
76
relations with the West.

Russia also clearly wants to “internationalize” the issue
of Gulf security, obtain a role as a recognized guarantor of
the area, either through the U.N. or through a regional
alignment, and displace the U.S. primacy there, even as it
77
recognizes the latter’s strong regional interests.
Accordingly, Primakov supports the removal of foreign U.S.
troops from the Gulf. Hence one goal of Russia’s support for
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Iraq may be to achieve just this objective. Iranian officials’
statements also indicated an overt desire to arrive at a
“division of responsibilities with Russia in regard to
79
regional conflicts and energy issues.”
Therefore they are openly very critical of any Russian
80
backsliding on energy issues in the Caspian.
That
backsliding, as in Russia’s recent deal with Kazakstan on
the nature of the Caspian Sea that reflected Russia’s
waning ability to dictate to Kazakstan, led to sharp Iranian
criticism and to a hurried visit by Deputy Foreign Minister
81
Boris Pastukhov to reassure everyone that all was well.
Accordingly, until and unless Washington relaxes its efforts
to isolate Iran from oil deals in Central Asia and the
Caucasus, trade abroad and nuclear power deals, coupled
with Russian resentment at U.S. policies, will provide
excellent grounds for a durable marriage of convenience.
Energy issues dictate much of these grounds for this
marriage. The struggle for energy has made the entire
Transcaspian area an arena for geopolitical conflict.
Unfortunately, the logic of the evolution of the U.S.
policy of a full-scale, coordinated economic-militarypolitical program to integrate the entire area firmly into the
82
West has much to answer for in this connection. While
there are solid reasons for so acting and certainly this
prospect offers the region much more than being tied to
Moscow’s corpse, it nonetheless extends U.S. power into
what formerly was a Russian preserve.
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As long as the Transcaspian basin is alleged to be larger
than the Ghawar field in Saudi Arabia, the largest oil field
in the world, a stake of this magnitude justifies
83
Washington’s compelling interest in the Transcaspian.
However, Russia, too, has compelling strategic interests in
solidifying its position with Iraq and Iran due to the local
energy situation. Energy revenues are crucial to every state
in the region, including Russia, for reasons connected to
their own internal political economy. All these states are
rentier states whose main revenue comes from oil and gas
sales, an external royalty or rent, the production of which is
largely unrelated to the rest of the domestic economy. The
concept of the rentier state originated with regard to Iran
under Shah Mohammad Pahlavi (1941-79) but has grown to
include other oil producing Arab states, e.g., Kuwait or
Qatar. Some analysts substitute the term allocative state,
84
but both refer to the same phenomenon.
The establishment of rentier states in the CIS means
that their stability depends on a continuing flow of energy
revenues. To the degree that those revenues are interrupted
or interdicted, these states’ internal and external stability
comes into question. It is not enough for these states to
obtain foreign investment and diplomatic-military support,
they must use those newly acquired advantages wisely over
a long time to develop and stabilize.
Because they are rentier states, the Transcaspian states
and Russia compete for the same export markets for energy.
Russia’s energy interests are vital to the survival of the
government and state in their present form. The struggle
between the particular interest of the energy companies,
who seek more and more profits, from participating in the
regional energy bonanza, and the Foreign Ministry that
seeks to uphold a national state interest and close the
region’s prospects down altogether, has bedeviled Russian
foreign policy and confirms Sokov’s observations about the
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nature of the policy process. This does not mean that
Russia’s survival as such is necessarily endangered by a
failure to attain those interests and close the door on future
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energy competition. But Yeltsin’s system is jeopardized by
such a failure because of its incoherent national security
policy process and weakness vis-à-vis the world economy.
Russia’s energy interests are more extensive than those
of its neighbors. Therefore Russian policy, as determined by
the energy companies, and/or by the Foreign Ministry,
fights to retain control over the CIS energy network. Oil and
natural gas, which constitute the very foundations of the
Russian economy and account for more than half the
country’s entire export earnings, are at stake. One might
also contend that since the allocation of the oil rent is the
key relationship between the ruler and the ruled, it is the
basis of the government’s legitimacy, something that was
confirmed when the oilmen and bankers forced the collapse
of the Kiriyenko government in 1998 when it tried to raise
their taxes. And since foreign policy in such states consists
largely of creating an environment conducive to the
expansion and allocation of those rents, and the stability of
the ruler’s position, a hegemonic aspect is likewise intrinsic
86
to their foreign policy. Certainly this is the case for Russia,
although we may see prolonged struggles between
Primakov’s government and the energy lobby on domestic
issues in the months ahead.
As one of the world’s leading producers and exporters of
hydrocarbons, Russia cannot ignore Central Asia and
Azerbaijan’s intention to increase the extraction and export
of oil and natural gas. The emergence of major new
producers could reconfigure the global energy markets and
profoundly affect price dynamics with immediate and
severe consequences for Russia’s economy. Coordinating
Moscow’s energy strategy with plans to increase the
production and export of oil and gas in the CIS constitutes a
primary national interest for Russia. Therefore Russia
reacts negatively toward any external “meddling” in CIS
87
energy affairs.
Russia’s efforts to take over the Caspian energy economy
became visible in 1994, but its most recent formal policy was
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outlined in 1996 when the Security Council and the
Ministry of Fuel and Energy proclaimed energy a major
factor in safeguarding Russia’s security. The fuel economy
faces internal threats from the low level of energy efficiency
in Russia, the non-payments crisis where debtors do not pay
their bills for goods and services, and the lack of foreign
investments. The solution to the internal economic failure is
economic imperialism, i.e., “access to internal markets of
neighboring countries,” preserving and expanding “reliable
external marketing outlets, and thus ensuring the transit
88
through Russia energy carriers.”
Russia’s “fuel diplomacy” should focus on establishing a
common CIS system of energy security, including shared
property, common development, integrated production
companies, and free access to markets and resources. CIS
states should view Russia as their major partner and
collaborations with other countries as “economically
inexpedient.” Moscow would encourage Russia’s oil giants,
Gazprom, Lukoil (the premier gas and oil companies), and
Transneft (the main pipeline company) to reach out into
Kazakstan and Turkmenistan to preserve Russia’s
dominance over those states’ economies and perpetuate a
89
closed, exclusive sphere of influence there.
As the largest exporter and refiner of oil and gas who
controls the shipment of all petroleum products through its
“steel umbilical cord” across the CIS, Russia has compelling
reasons for this policy. On economic grounds alone, it has
every reason to oppose any expansion of its rivals’ market
share should they be able to sell freely abroad. Therefore, it
wages unceasing economic warfare against them and
demands a cut from all of their projects, to explore or ship oil
and gas. Russia has repeatedly blackmailed Kazakstan,
Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan into admitting Russia, often
90
on concessionary terms, to their energy projects.
Meanwhile Russia’s own productive capacity in both oil
and gas has steadily declined, and its energy industries are
entangled in numerous dysfunctional economic and
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political relationships for all their apparent riches and
profitability. Serious competition for Russia’s current
markets, especially from modernized producers using
foreign capital, technology, and infrastructure, and
enjoying Western political support, would undo Russia’s
domestic and foreign economic position. Moreover, the
economic collapse ignited by the Asian crisis in late 1997
has already forced Russia to export more oil to obtain scarce
foreign capital and squeeze domestic producers who will be
under more domestic pressure to pay taxes. So energy
producers face strong internal pressures to export more and
restrict competition.
Since Russia’s main source of foreign exchange derives
from its energy exports, if those exports declined
substantially, Russia’s ability to earn foreign exchange and
meet its large and growing international debts and its
ability to sustain itself at home through access to foreign
capital markets and international economic agencies would
fall, too. Indeed, many Russian observers worry greatly that
Russia might remain consigned for years to come to a
semi-peripheral state in the world economy as an exporter
of raw materials like oil and gas, and be unable to attain
modern levels and forms of economic, industrial, and
technological development. They fear a lasting
economic-technological, and hence military, backwardness,
leaving Russia at the mercy of the United States or other
91
foreign coalitions. Unhappily for them, there seems no
way out unless Russia can convert its foreign earnings into
development and internal investment capital. Until then,
Russia must rely mainly on its energy economy for foreign
exchange and seek to drive out competition as befits a true
aspirant to monopoly status. But Russia’s political economy
promotes rent-seeking, not investment, and recycles
economic-political pathologies throughout the system.
Complicating matters for Russia is its declining capacity
to produce energy products. Its infrastructure is dilapidated
and worsening, and its new sources of energy face
formidable costs to explore and ship because of their
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location in the inhospitable Siberian north and east, and
because there has been precious little investment from
abroad or internally for over a decade. Furthermore, the
present Russian economic climate does not favor external or
even internal energy investment, and foreign firms are
leaving in frustration and disgust. If anything, this
situation will worsen, given the continuing inhospitable
climate for foreign investment, one that may even worsen
before it improves.
Meanwhile, Russia and the CIS states remain extremely
wasteful consumers of energy, dependent on subsidized
consumption at below market prices and on the big oil and
gas firms’ subsidization of housing, social welfare functions,
etc. Without foreign income, because CIS and Russian
purchases are way down since 1991, this whole rickety
structure could come apart. Indeed, when the government
started pressing Gazprom to pay more taxes in mid-1998 as
a major financial crisis hit it, Gazprom predictably began
demanding more payment from its foreign customers in the
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CIS.
Gazprom’s situation exemplifies the precariousness of
this house of cards. Gazprom receives only 5-15 percent of
its receipts for its goods and services in cash. Its exports,
therefore, must subsidize its domestic operations which are
in any case endangered as the infrastructure declines. It
exploits this situation to justify its monopoly position and
enormous tax arrears by citing its willingness to continue
subsidizing customers who do not pay in cash—a category
that includes most of Russia’s city governments. Gazprom
effectively has replaced the failing state and taken its
payment for services rendered in the taxes that it does not
pay. Yet its profits and those of other energy companies from
exports do not return to the economy either as taxes or
93
investments or even to cover current costs.
Thus, if Gazprom’s exports decline while other states
provide cheaper gas and more of it through better pipelines
and with foreign backing, its ability to subsidize the
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collapsing domestic economy and to avoid taxes declines
with it. But worse, much of the municipal sector’s economy
declines with Gazprom for lack of gas and with that sector
banks, housing, and others are all severely endangered. The
dependence of key sectors of Russia’s economy on Gazprom,
the firm that was former Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin’s former employer, exemplifies the
pathology of the rentier state. And the skewed dependence
upon state protection, tax breaks, and non-cash payments
underscores the extent to which Russia has failed to make
94
the economic transition to a genuine market economy.
Certainly such dangers and the benefits of state protection
that accrue to firms like Gazprom can explain the purely
economic motives of Russia’s energy barons and
government when facing the prospect of enhanced rivalry
from former satrapies whose independence Moscow still
cannot accept.
The foregoing analysis explains why Gazprom has
obstructed any Turkmen penetration of the Russian
market, pipelines or access to customers outside Russia. It
also explains the economic motives behind Russia’s efforts
to curtail the emergence of the Transcaspian states’ energy
economies. At the same time, Russia has consistently
advanced a geopolitical rationale for reintegrating the
whole area around itself as the main task of all state
95
agencies. However, the interests of the energy companies
do not necessarily comport either with this geopolitical
rationale or with Russia’s own best interests. Gazprom’s
energy war against Turkmenistan, abetted by Moscow,
drove Ashkhabad to Iran, Turkey, Germany, and the United
States for financial, economic, and political support and
weakened Moscow’s future ability to leverage the situation
in Turkmenistan. Neither Russian consumers, nor the
economy, nor Russian national interests benefit from such
policies, but Gazprom does. And its unassailable
connections display how the privatization of Russian
foreign policy undermines regional stability and
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development. But it also explains the economic-strategic
motivation for Russia’s policies towards Iraq and Iran.
Foreign observers like the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London (IISS) deride the U.S. claim
concerning the size of regional oil and gas deposits which
would make the entire region’s holding larger than Prudhoe
Bay, the East Texas fields, and the Ghawar field combined.
Other energy industry figures and the calculations of
specialists like Robert Ebel of the Washington-based Center
for Strategic and International Studies argue that official
U.S. estimates are far too high and claim that Caspian
holdings will amount to no more than about 3-4 percent of
96
global energy reserves. Furthermore, the IISS argues that
the cost of moving equipment into the area, the expense of
construction and the transit fees that must be paid make
Caspian investment of marginal utility at the low end of
current oil prices. As oil prices have fallen further to their
lowest point in a decade since the IISS went to press,
investment will probably be affected and could become
unviable. Oil and gas companies would probably then
return to the Middle East because of the preexisting
97
infrastructure and business arrangements.
But that outcome would undermine the whole thrust of
U.S. policy that seeks to minimize the need for Gulf oil and
gas and to look elsewhere. As the IISS remarked, due to the
cheaper cost involved in transporting Iraqi oil and gas,
opening those products up to international markets and
repealing the sanctions regime—an increasingly likely
denouement—represents a major challenge to further
98
development of Caspian energy holdings. This is one
major explanation of why Russia pushes so hard to end the
sanctions on Iraq, an outcome that can only be seen as a
major U.S. defeat and an equal setback to the Transcaspian
99
states.
And that consideration underlines the strategic linkages
tying this region to the Middle East. To the extent that the
Caspian region can be stabilized, the United States can
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afford to further diminish its need for Middle Eastern gas
and oil and reduce Iran’s, Iraq’s, and Russia’s potential to
play decisive roles in the Western and American energy
100
economy.
The diversification of supplies to avoid
excessive reliance on unstable and volatile areas constitutes
a major U.S. objective. But, at the macro or geostrategic
level, U.S. policy strikes at Russia’s main regional
objectives as well as Iran and Iraq’s hopes for a way out of
their current strategic and economic impasses.
Local U.S. diplomats and the administration now regard
the Transcaspian area as a “backup” to or substitute for
dependence upon the Middle East if that region’s oil
101
supplies become problematic.
Russia’s Iraq policy also
combines many of the same motives, especially the desire
for markets and an economic foot in the door and the desire
for political leverage. There are undoubtedly, as well, many
Russian political figures who loudly advocate breaking the
U.N. sanctions on Iraq or overturning them so that Iraq and
Russia could establish friendship, pay off Baghdad’s $7
billion debt to Russia through oil sales and become a market
for Russian business, especially in energy sectors. To the
degree that Iraq breaks out of the sanctions regime, it can
then not only pay off its debts to Russia, it can bring in
Russian technology and capital to major investment deals
and bypass the Transcaspian states, keeping them from
becoming independent market rivals of Russia. It also will
staunchly stand against any return of U.S. power to the
Gulf. Likewise, Russian officials reiterate their desire to
sustain the large Soviet economic investment in Iraq and
develop it further.
Russia’s political motives are equally important vis-à-vis
Iraq. When Russia mediated the crisis in November 1994
that looked like a resumption of the war with Kuwait, it won
much credit in Baghdad because it showed the erosion of the
united front in the Security Council. The U.S.-led forces
appeared to be in disarray. Russia’s actions were rightly
seen as a declaration of Russia’s independence in the Gulf
and assertion of the equal importance of its interests to
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Washington’s.
As Vladimir Tytarenko, then Deputy
Chief of Mission in Baghdad observed, Russia’s policy will
be based on reinforcing strategic interests, and Russian
interests in Iraq and the Middle East are no less important
than America’s interests. Stressing that local events have
great repercussions in Russia, he played up trade rivalry
103
with Washington, not ideological rivalry.
Viktor
Posvalyuk, the Foreign Ministry’s roving ambassador to the
region, used that crisis to reiterate Russia’s demand for an
all-inclusive Gulf security system that it would help bring
104
into being. Primakov’s tremendous diplomatic victory in
1997-98, when he twice brokered deals that forced America
to back away from enforcing inspections of Iraq’s WMD
program, dramatically enhanced the perception of Russian
return and American disarray in the area. But it built on
previous achievements.
It now appears that the sanctions regime will come
under continuing pressure and contention as Iraq struggles
to escape from “the box” that U.S. officials foolishly
105
maintained they put Saddam Hussein in.
In fact past
U.S. policy toward Iraq, as revealed in mid-summer 1998,
106
looked both duplicitous and weak, a deadly combination.
While the most recent crisis of November 1998 ended in
Iraq’s retreat and reacceptance of United Nations Special
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspections, it will not be
the last crisis triggered by Iraq’s determination to
overthrow the sanctions regime. Accordingly, we can expect
that the other main reason for Russian domestic lobbies’
support for Iraq—the desire of the oil, gas, and defense
industry and the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) to
sell their wares in Iraq—will come even more to the fore in
the Gulf and throughout the Middle East than before.
Proliferation Policy.
As in energy, Russia’s proliferation policy in the Middle
East and elsewhere links domestic policy groups and factors
with foreign policy interests. Russia’s proliferation policy is
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a decidedly complicated affair. Formally speaking, Russia
has a very sophisticated set of rules, laws, and decrees that
have taken shape since 1992. These enactments have
established a detailed and heavily bureaucratic regime
governing customs controls, exports of dual-use, and
military technology to the point where many Russian
commentators flatly assert that no weapons or dual-use
technologies can be sold or exported without the
107
government knowing about it or against its wishes. Those
rules also attest to Russia’s continuing desire to be taken
seriously as a Western “liberal” state that supports
108
non-proliferation. Hence Russian writers maintain that,
even if Russia is not a formal member of various
international export control bodies, its regulations and laws
are written with an eye towards conformity with
109
international procedures.
Although there have been many statements claiming
that Russia opposes nuclear or other WMD proliferation,
official reports consistently deny that Russia is now
threatened by proliferation. The Duma, too, does not
consider proliferation of WMD to be a threat to Russian
110
security even if neighbors get these weapons.
And, in any
case, it is the U.N.’s job to identify states who are
contemplating proliferation. Russia opposes any export
controls other than those imposed by the U.N. and IAEA,
and insists that Iran and Iraq are nowhere near the
achievement of a nuclear capability. Therefore the Iraqi
“nuclear file” should be closed, and inspections ceased.
Likewise, Russia refuses to participate in U.S. sanctions or
blacklists against Iran, claiming that the IAEA reports Iran
to be in full compliance with international standards and
111
procedures.
And Primakov has repeatedly denied that
Russia sells dual-use or nuclear weapons’ capabilities to
Iran. Therefore, attempts by outside actors like the United
States to target states who otherwise are listed as
complying with the IAEA, e.g., Iran, are unwarranted and
merely an effort to undermine Iran’s and Russia’s presence
in the marketplace for weapons where the competition is
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intense. Russian reports and statements also constantly
shun terms like rogue states. Instead, Russia espouses a
policy of engagement with these states to deal with
potential issues of proliferation while pursuing its own
113
interests. In fact,
Rules to exclude “violator-participants” are not envisioned in
the context of multilateral agreements. The nations take the
recommended lists and guiding principles [of international
conventions and agreements] as a foundation when considering
the possibility of making specific foreign and economic deals,
but these principles are interpreted by each country proceeding
from its own national interests. The imposition of sanctions also
depends on national legislation. The regimes under analysis are
in fact an aggregate of parallel and coordinated systems of export
controls of all nations that adhere to the basic rules of export
114
control. (italics author)

Furthermore, Russia’s political establishment views
American policy as hypocritical in that it seeks to bar
Russian exports of the same kind of reactor to Iran that
Washington has exported to North Korea. Russian analysts
argue that,
It is highly likely that a flexible policy in relation to North Korea
could prove to be more sensible for strengthening the
international non-proliferation regime under certain
circumstances. But the opinion prevails among the Russian
leadership that an uncompromising policy towards a number of
other nations is not effective either. Whether Russia, in
entering into agreements on technical collaboration, will be able
to have a positive influence on the policy of such partners as Iran
115
is another matter.

The official rationale for proliferation policy emerged in
Primakov’s 1995 report as head of Russian Foreign
Intelligence, the SVR. This report stated that Russian
authorities strongly oppose nuclear proliferation precisely
because Russia is especially vulnerable to the threats posed
by proliferation, as a state close to many of the regions
where would-be proliferators, who are already at odds with
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their neighbors, including potentially Russia, are active.
The report stated that:
For Russia the specific fate of the NPT (Non-Proliferation
Treaty) will not only inevitably affect its strategic course for
enduring security, but will also have a major impact on
national security interests. The appearance of new nuclear
countries on RF (Russian Federation) borders would create a
real threat, destabilize the situation in the “near abroad” zone,
and force it to revise the guidelines of Russian defense policy,
116
including in terms of its nuclear component.

Hence the main threat to the nonproliferation regime is
countries like Israel, Pakistan, and India who are de facto
nuclear powers but remain outside the treaty. Their
capability is dangerous in itself and can spread, e.g.,
Pakistan’s transfer of know-how to Iran and North Korea’s
export of missile technology to Pakistan. Since these states
stand outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they cannot
rely on the international community to provide “real levers”
to stop their potential enemies from going nuclear.
Accordingly, their exclusion from the NPT regime is a
regionally destabilizing factor. That exclusion stimulates
their enemies to follow suit. Surely Iran fulfills this
designation. That fact alone logically should lead Moscow to
117
resist any further nuclearization of the Middle East.
And
Moscow still claims it follows this logic and this policy.
Furthermore, the SVR report categorically stated that
Russia cannot support states pursuing a double standard
toward “unofficial” nuclear countries or states, like Iran,
who are on the nuclear threshold or seeking to acquire
weapons. Because such tactics allow these threshold states
to nuclearize further and triggers arms races among them
and their enemies, supporting them is a highly dangerous
118
policy.
At the same time, this policy comports with
Russia’s broader and oft-stated justification for exporting
conventional weapons abroad.
Russian authorities state that national interest is the
main factor determining foreign military-technical
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cooperation. This cooperation occurs within the frameworks
of Russia’s treaty and political obligations to the world
community regarding the arms trade and of expanded
transparency in such weapons transfers. These obligations
include treaties like the NPT and other agreements to
prevent the proliferation of WMD and missile technologies.
Moscow further adjusts the volume of its sales to the
capabilities of foreign states to provide them with a
reasonable degree of training and proficiency that suffices
for defense. But those trade balances preclude support for
the excessive militarization of the recipient’s economy and
the ensuing aggravation of internal socio-economic and
external regional tensions that undermine peace and
development. Russia limits “to a maximum degree” the
export of weapons to countries who violate international
agreements with Russia or who are engaged in conflicts.
Sometimes Russia forbids exports of certain systems, and it
will not export weapons and combat equipment to states
who may use them against Russian citizens, property,
119
interests, and installations.
Many Russian writers on
arms sales also now contend, as noted above, that the state
has very strong controls over arms sales. And due to these
extensive bureaucratic controls, it is unthinkable that any
producer along with myriad sub-contractors could get away
120
with secret, covert arms sales abroad.
Moreover, with respect to Iran, Moscow has argued that
there is absolutely no state policy of transferring WMD
technology or know-how to Iran and that, in any case, Iran
121
does comply with IAEA requirements and inspections.
Likewise, Primakov and others assert that Iran is not close
to having a nuclear weapon and hence does not represent a
122
threat to Russia.
Obviously, if this is the policy, it is a highly responsible
one even as it advances Russian economic, military, and
political interests. But if this be the case, then Russian
authorities and analysts cannot simultaneously claim, as
they and their sympathizers within the administration
regularly do, that they cannot control the export of
480

conventional or WMD systems, technologies, and
123
weapons. Indeed, some Russian writers, notably Andrei
Kortunov and Andrei Shumikhin, deny the whole claim of
rigorous controls. They observed that Russian policy is
distinguished by the absence of coherence and consistency
due to the struggle among the “multipolar” interests and
opinions at the policymaking level and the government’s
124
utter disorganization. In this struggle, powerful factions
in and around Russia’s government strive to monopolize as
much as possible of the policy processes that concern them.
In highly technical issues like arms sales, it is easier for
125
these interests to gain their goals.
Thus,
In the area of WMD (and especially BM-ballistic missiles)
proliferation, it is the narrow interest groups representing
producers of some types of exportable hardware and materials
that are especially eager to obtain “absolute” authority in
laying out and implementing policies benefiting primarily
their own positions. As traditionally was done in the former
Soviet Union, additional practical means of achieving such a
monopoly position are setting up a heavy veil of secrecy and
acting under the guise of “overriding national security
126
expediency.”

Since arms sales are so profitable, they have been
repeatedly acknowledged to be a source of endless
corruption and one in which powerful political figures get
involved to enrich themselves or to provide funds for their
127
political war chests. In fact, the former head of Russia’s
domestic intelligence service, the Federal Security Service
(FSB), General Nikolai Kovalev conceded, however
opaquely, that many businessmen have little regard for
Russia’s proliferation interests and sell weapons or
128
technology illegally or covertly.
Many analysts believe
that such criminality is indeed possible, and even pervasive,
for at least some classes of weapons. Therefore, these claims
of strict controls point at two opposing but compatible
129
conclusions.
If those claims of strict control are
mendacious and Russia cannot control arms sales, then
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Russia has lost state control of policies in support of a vital
national interest.
If, on the other hand, the claims of strict control are true,
the reports of corruption mean that it takes place with the
active knowledge and participation of the Russian
authorities. Inasmuch as we have repeated evidence of
corruption admitted by those selfsame authorities or
Russian journalists, this loss of control over policy seems
obvious, but Russia cannot and will not admit it. But, at the
same time, since this corruption is pervasive up to the very
top of the government ladder, it is also clear that much of the
corruption and mendacity is state sponsored. In other
words, the fine words of the SVR report and other official
statements of rectitude regarding proliferation are just
that, words. The reality blends pervasive corruption,
private aggrandizement, active official participation in and
connivance with that corruption, and strict paper controls.
Claims that Moscow cannot stop this trade or that its
regulations preclude it strain credulity. The rhetoric of
nonproliferation conceals a policy that abets proliferation.
The Reality of Russian Proliferation.
That reality, as revealed over the last several years, is
then quite alarming. Russian and Western press reports
indicate that Russia has become a conscious, willing, and
major proliferator of WMD, including biological warfare
capabilities. Iran’s difficulties have forced it to let Russia
take over its Bushehr reactor project as a turnkey operation.
But even before that, U.S. and Israeli intelligence reported
that Iran is now within 1 year of a nuclear missile
130
capability, even if Russia now desists from helping it.
Since Russian authorities have acknowledged that Israel
has presented a more comprehensive view of
Iranian-Russian collaboration than did the United States,
and Israeli intelligence throughout has been on the mark
regarding Iran, there seems no reason to dispute this
131
assessment. These and other sources also cite Iran’s great
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strides in ballistic missiles with Chinese, DPRK, and
132
potentially Russian help.
Recent Russian reports detail
the conscious participation and coordination of Russia’s
FSB, the high-level state commissions on non-proliferation,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and probably the Ministry of
Defense in projects to send Russian scientists to Iran to
transfer nuclear know-how as Iran aims at intermediate
range and then intercontinental ballistic missile capability
(IRBMs and ICBMs, respectively). Furthermore, in 1996,
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of External Economic
Relations Oleg Davydov revealed that Russia would sell
Iran over $4 billion of machinery and equipment, including
military equipment over the next 10 years, and that
military hardware and complete sets of equipment for
Iranian enterprises now constitute 85 percent of the total
volume of deliveries to Tehran and could grow. In late 1995,
the Iranian government also expressed an interest in
raising the level of purchases of hardware, machinery, and
equipment to $1 billion a year for the next 2 years, 1996-97.
Should Iran pay off its debts to Russia by 2005, Russia could
133
be exporting $4.5-5 billion annually.
The known technology transfers of WMD to Iran involve
SS-4 technology and the reactor at Bushehr as well as
exchange of scientific know-how with Iranian scientists and
training in Russia for them. The Bushehr reactor comprises
four reactors plus turbines that Russia is now expected to
provide, along with more military technology and weapons
since Ukraine dropped out under American pressure. And
all this assistance occurs even though Russian officials
know full well and publicly profess that Iran intends to build
134
nuclear weapons with this assistance!
Russia is also helping Iran develop a national
communications satellite that will have an earth
monitoring capability. The firm doing this work, the Spurt
Science and Production Center, is known for its work on
classified space programs. The space apparatus itself is
being developed by the Reutov Mashinostroyenie Science
and Production Association, which used to develop ballistic
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and cruise missiles and most important military space
systems. The Izhevsk Radio Plant and the Aksion Joint
Stock Company also regularly participated in Soviet space
programs. Russia clearly knows this is a dual-use system,
that Iran will have exclusive control over once it is designed,
and that it will take 2-3 years from signing the contracts to
135
finish the satellite.
More recently, it was reported that
Russia is about to demonstrate gas centrifuges that are vital
to the construction of atomic bombs to Iran, and sell it
136
tritium (heavy water) as well. These demonstrations and
sales clearly violate President Yeltsin’s 1995 agreement
with President Clinton to terminate nuclear sales to Iran.
The transfer of missile technology openly violates the
membership rules for the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) where Russia is a member and also
automatically makes it subject to sanctions. And none of
this includes the sizable and ongoing conventional weapons
sales program to Iran which also flouts past promises that it
would stop.
Yet Iran is a state whose nuclearization was listed in
1995 as a clear potential threat to Russia. Selling your
potential enemies the atomic rope with which to hang you
should not make good policy. Yet Russia persists and has
ready answers to those who question the logic of its policy.
Already in 1992 officials argued that Russia must sell arms
to prevent Iranian support for Islam in the southern CIS
and Russia, and that it is best to influence Iranian progress
137
by these sales to limit the threat.
That rationale still
operates today.
Other political considerations also are present. The SVR
report says:
Russian-Iranian cooperation could be a unique testing ground
where the possibility and need for a member state of the
“nuclear club” to fulfill its obligations under Article IV of the
NPT whereby the participants in the Treaty must promote
equitable, nondiscriminatory cooperation in the field of peaceful
atomic power engineering but must, in doing so, prevent
conditions for the proliferation of nuclear weapons [and this]
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would be meaningfully examined. Cooperation in the cause of
replacing the North Korean gas-graphite reactors with light
138
water ones can also be the same kind of example.

Russia seems to feel it must provide these technologies
in order to prove its bona fides to Tehran. Clearly the issue
here is an Irano-Russian security partnership on issues of
common concern: Azerbaijan’s westward turn, control of
Caspian Sea oil and gas flows, stabilizing Central Asia,
especially Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and Transcaucasia.
Russia’s search for Iranian cooperation and entry into the
Gulf parallels its search for a point of entry into the Korean
peace process by seeking access to the consortium to provide
North Korea with reactors, gaining leverage in Korea and
Asia. Thus nuclear sales are a large part of the entry price
into the Gulf, Central Asian, and Korean political
sweepstakes. North Korea’s recurrent blackmail of the
United States, Japan, and South Korea through threats to
go nuclear if it does not receive sufficient funding indicates
how that regional game is played.
Therefore in the Middle East, Russia also supports the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Gulf, and aims to create a
bloc of pro-Russian forces against U.S. and Israeli interests
to compel Washington to admit Russia as an equal player
139
with a veto into the peace process and Gulf security.
That
ambition resurrects much of the previous Soviet policy of a
bloc or entente among the former “rejectionist front” of the
late 1970s to support Moscow’s efforts to jeopardize the
peace process against Israel and the U.S. monopoly of it.
This is also the geostrategic factor driving support for
Iran’s, Iraq’s, Libya’s, Sudan’s, and Syria’s conventional
and WMD rearmament. Iraqi buyers have toured Russian
factories, bought gyroscopes from discarded SLBMs, and
had these gyroscopes certified by the Russians. When
Jordan intercepted the shipment, a rare table used to test
guidance instruments was found. Although the Russians
claim the gyroscopes were scrap metal, the table clearly was
not, and its sale constitutes another violation of the Missile
Technology Control Regime that Russia has apparently
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frequently violated with impunity.
Since the CIA now
believes that once Iraq escapes sanctions, as seems
increasingly likely, it will rapidly redevelop its capability for
using WMD, it seems quite possible that Russian firms will
141
help Iraq achieve this goal. Nor are these the only cases of
arms transfers to the Middle East. Syria has been receiving
Russian conventional weapons, yet there are constant
reports of Syrian interest in Russian collaboration in
upgrading Syria’s chemical and biological weapons
capabilities and missile technologies. And apparently new
conventional arms deals are in the offing with Syria, Egypt,
142
and even possibly Iraq. Yemen is also coming to Russia to
buy SU-27 fighters and trainers, and S-300 surface-to-air
missiles. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also
exported freely to Yemen who for years was engaged in a
civil war and conflicts with its neighbors. While that
stopped for a while when the Cold War ended, Yemen has
returned to negotiate these sales, apparently to counter a
143
threat it perceives either from Saudi Arabia or Ethiopia.
And there are growing signs of a Libyan-Russian
rapprochement that could lead to atomic technology
144
transfers and arms sales.
Nor can Moscow pretend any longer that Iran is not
seeking to go nuclear. When Iran tested its Shihab-3 missile
in 1998, it became clear that Iran had adapted a North
Korean Nodong missile to a mobile launcher, making it
virtually invulnerable to antimissile systems. This missile’s
range comprises virtually the entire Middle East and parts
of Russia. And “Not a single expert has any doubts that this
145
vehicle is capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”
Analyzing Russia’s Motives.
However, diplomatic objectives are arguably not the
only, or perhaps not even the dominating consideration for
Russia’s support for international proliferation. Certainly
Russia, like the Soviet Union, talked one way and acted
another. In the late Soviet period, Moscow also supported
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proliferators despite its opposition to proliferation. A dual
146
policy is nothing new. And indeed, the conditions leading
Moscow to favor it are, if anything, more desperate today
than before.
Apart from influence over friendly states’ military and
foreign policies, another critical motive for military and
civilian transfers of conventional as well as nuclear
weapons and technologies of mass destruction is to save
Russian civilian and defense industry. Primakov recently
listed that goal as one of the foundations and main goals of
147
Russian foreign policy.
That announcement represented
a major departure from previous policy. Until now, in
Russia, as elsewhere, conventional arms sales were
regarded as an essential and legitimate policy instrument
with which to uphold national defense industries which face
great pressure from cutbacks in the post-Cold War
environment. Now Russia has apparently given up on
getting capital for its civilian reconstruction from other
civilian sources and will aggressively sell weapons
anywhere to restore civilian and defense industry.
This tallies with the report given by Duma member and
military expert Alexei Arbatov to a conference in California
last year. Arbatov revealed that the Defense Ministry told
producers it cannot buy their weapons until 2005 when it
hopes the situation will be stabilized so that Russia can
reenter the next round of conventional procurement. Until
then, they are free to sell any and all conventional systems
without government export controls. And indeed, they must
do so to obtain the income needed for research and
148
development (R&D) for 2005.
Since arms sales are now
supposed to fund military reform as well as defense
industry and political operations like election campaigns,
the pressure to sell anything abroad, even state-of-the-art
systems, will surely intensify. Russian arms sellers proudly
point out that they do not attach political criteria to deals or
149
refrain from selling their state-of-the-art production. The
implications are clear. A fight for markets and likely arms
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race will occur throughout all the regions where Russia is
pushing weapons.
This rationale also conforms to statements by Minatom
about its sales of centrifuges and other nuclear technology
to Iran. These sales prevent the layoff of thousands of
workers in Minatom’s far-flung empire, gain scarce foreign
capital, and demonstrate and extend the level of Russian
150
production technologies and know-how.
Fear of Iranian
nuclear weapons was dismissed as a cover for economic
rivalry as America’s main objective. And as a final example
of the utter cynicism with which this proliferation policy is
conducted, Moscow and Iran jointly issued a joint call for a
151
non-nuclear Middle East.
Since Russia is engaged in a global quest for markets, we
can expect a bruising competition with Western and other
producers. Especially in troubled areas like the Middle
East, this competition can only help further militarize all
security relationships for Iran, its neighbors (including Iraq
and the other Gulf states), Syria, Turkey, and Israel. Arms
and technology sales which are also a major domestic
political money tree, have duly become now a major state
priority and a factor in destabilizing critical areas. Apart
from offering Syria weapons, Russia is selling SAMs
(SA-10s) to Cyprus and Iran, and offering nuclear
technology, weapons technology, and reactors to India,
China, Pakistan, Cuba, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. There is talk
of $5 billion in atomic reactor deals and even of 50-70
152
transfers of reactors for cash to China.
The foregoing goes beyond arguing that arms sales are
undertaken to rescue Russian defense industry or even
civilian industry, and the atomic industry located in
Minatom. Arguably we see the takeover of a key domain of
foreign, defense, and economic policy by an interest group or
groups, defense industry, and the atomic industry. They are
intent on rescuing themselves at the expense of Russia’s
civilian reconstruction or its vital strategic long-range
security interests. Moreover, because the arms and nuclear
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sales industry is a gold mine in terms of access to foreign
currencies and markets, it has become a cash cow for
politicians to milk for purposes of building their private war
chests. This helps explain why the arms sales program has
undergone constant reorganization and changes in its
leadership almost from the start, and has always been the
subject of a continuing struggle for control over its revenues
among the highest levels of the Russian government.
Essentially in arms sales, including nuclear and other
WMD sales, the lust for private gain has overtaken the
effort to devise and execute a coherent national interest and
strategy.
This privatization of the state does not mean that
weapons and technologies are solely sold abroad for private
gains. But it does suggest that the leaders of the state
cannot disentangle their private interests from those of
Russia or of international security more broadly, and are
engaged in wholesale subversion of their own laws and
treaties they have signed. In the past, and perhaps even
now, there have been many cases of covert arms and
technology transfer abroad. Foreign pressure has
repeatedly led to the promulgation of new decrees and
programs of export controls of sensitive and dual-use
systems, all seemingly to no avail. The Iranian and other
cases described below show us repeatedly that the claims
about strict bureaucratic controls are mocked by high-level
officials like Primakov who loudly deny Russia’s
involvement in proliferation even as they are deeply
engaged in subverting their own laws. This confluence of
private with public interests and high officials’ continuous
subversion of the state’s laws and interests graphically
testify to Russia’s raging crisis of statehood, and the
absence of a coherent national interest. Indeed, at the same
moment as Russia sells weapons that are most likely to be
used against Israel, its defense industry pushes joint
153
Israeli-Russian deals for sales abroad, e.g., to China!
Minatom exemplifies this fusion of private and national
interests. Its responsibilities include not just its employees’
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jobs, but a ramified social welfare network that served them
and their families as well as all of Russia’s reactors and
civilian nuclear installations. Its two ministers, Viktor
Mikhailov and his successor, Yevgeny Adamov, believe they
must mount an aggressive international marketing
campaign to provide for its well-being and that of its
employees. Therefore Minatom strongly pushes nuclear
exports to China, Iran, India, and more recently Syria and
154
Cuba, all ostensibly for civilian use.
Minatom claims it
must market its reactors aggressively to survive and other
arguments do not move it for good reason. More recently,
Minatom stated the aim of becoming a global competitor, a
155
second Gazprom.
There is every reason to expect this state of affairs to
continue, if not entrench itself further. Primakov’s views
are already known, but the factors cited above accurately
reflect the ongoing strength of the defense industry lobby.
Since 1992 the myth has grown that arms sales are the way
to recovery. And today’s desperation, plus the assiduity of
Russia’s arms sellers, has encouraged this fantasy and
created important constituencies for supporting a policy of
making defense exports the priority of industrial policy. The
emphasis on defense production as the expected locomotive
of recovery was first voiced in 1992 by Mikhail Malei,
Yeltsin’s advisor on these issues, and was no more realistic
156
then than it is now. But the fantasy retains great appeal
and is strongly entrenched among members of the arms
sales community, like Yevgeny Anan’ev, the director of
Rosvooruzhenie—the state’s official agency for arms sales
abroad. Arms sales command popular support among the
regional governors, as they fund factories and keep people
working while bringing in some desperately needed foreign
revenue. Indeed, whole factories are working only for export
now and would otherwise shut down, despite the risks of
157
selling abroad.
And as central power collapses, the regional governors
are becoming increasingly influential players who wish to
preserve the current regime at Rosvooruzhenie and deplore
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the agency’s previous condition as a political football.
Apparently they have been able to prevail and help retain
Anan’ev in power, because he is quite solicitous of their
158
interests and remits monies to them.
Thus key economic
and political lobbies made up of governors, defense
industry, and its numerous patrons or dependents help
sustain defense industry as yet another unproductive
rent-seeking sector of the economy. Whenever any effort has
been made to shut down defense plants, among the most
unproductive in the entire economy, a vociferous lobbying
campaign has arisen to prevent this. Therefore, of
approximately 1700 factories producing defense goods, only
500 produce anything worthwhile, and the rest cannot even
be sold off at bankruptcy auctions. Yet they continue on the
books and remain value-subtracting industries and a major
159
component of Russia’s “virtual economy.”
Politicians have also bought into this mythology. At the
same time, Primakov’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri
Maslyukov has made no secret of his desire to take control
over the entire defense industry and foreign arms sales in
order to reconstitute something like the Soviet defense
industrial structure. So clearly the arms trade in its entirety
160
will remain a political football.
Primakov’s support for
expanded arms sales in order to revitalize not just defense
industry but civilian industry as well reveals a desire to use
state policy consciously to reverse the global trend whereby
civilian discoveries generate advances in military
161
production. The current crisis can only intensify the drive
to sell dual-use technologies and weapons abroad even
though Russia well understands that the global market for
weapons is currently shrinking and that it often requires
foreign financing to produce products that are saleable
abroad.
Russian arms sales leaders have long since renounced
any efforts to sell on the grounds of ideological conviction.
Rather, arms are sold for economic and political
considerations—a fact that has not precluded frequent
162
barter deals which make no sense.
They have also
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proclaimed their willingness to sell systems that the
Russian armed forces do not yet have since they cannot
afford to buy them, and it costs more to produce for the
domestic than the foreign market! Anan’ev now maintains
that,
In essence, weapons are now the most high-tech Russian
exports meeting world standards today. Weapons represent
around 80 percent of all Russian industrial exports. This alone
justifies the creation of all of the necessary conditions for
successful export expansion in the defense sector of our
163
economy.

Anan’ev clearly is calling for continued efforts to recover
all of Moscow’s previous markets and implicitly for
remilitarizing the economy to promote arms sales that bring
so much to Russia. He claims that increased arms sales are
also linked with the recovery of Moscow’s voice on the
international stage. Arms sales have followed Russia’s
reassertion of its national interests and contribute to the
successful promotion of those interests abroad. As he
concludes,
Military-technical cooperation with foreign countries is still one
of the highest priorities of state activity in Russia. It is the
source of a high percentage of state budget receipts in hard
currency, represents an important means of paying the state
debt, secures the employment of a large segment of the adult
population, and guarantees the continued existence of the
Russian military-industrial complex, which now produces
products in high demand in the international market,
surpassed only by energy resources in their competitive
potential. Russian military have good prospects, but progress in
this field will require the utmost consolidation of the efforts of
all the structures and agencies participating in
military-technical cooperation and legislative bodies on all
164
levels.

Cyprus.
Many of Russia’s ambitions and the risks it runs thereby
emerge in its arms deals with Cyprus to provide it with
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S-300 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles which could
easily be reconfigured to attack Turkey proper. Both Cyprus
and Greece intended these weapons to be bargaining chips
to compel Ankara and perhaps Washington to pay attention
to the situation on Cyprus and negotiate a settlement to the
165
issue of Turkish forces there.
Moscow saw things otherwise. Not only did it gain a new
client for its defense industries and further extend its
influence into Cyprus, a known haven for Russian
money-laundering, Moscow also saw a golden opportunity
to drive a deep division into NATO by aggravating
Greco-Turkish competition. One of the hallmarks of
Russian policy has been a renewed emphasis on fostering
ties with Greece to check Turkish ambitions and NATO’s
presence in the Balkans. This is based on Serbia’s and
Greece’s interest in keeping Albania and Macedonia quiet,
and not allowing Kossovo to secede. The pursuit of the
rapprochement with Athens has even led to regular
Greco-Russian security discussions and more recently to
166
arms deals.
Naturally, Russia was more than happy to
comply with Cyprus’ request and train the Cypriots in the
use of the system.
But for Ankara, this was and is a major threat, and it
announced that it would shoot down the missiles or board
the ships carrying them through the Straits. Russian
spokesmen retorted that Russia might react to such actions
as if they were an act of war. Russia’s opportunism now bid
fair to embroil it in a European war against Turkey and
implicitly NATO. While this sat well with the many
members of the elite who regard Turkey as a threat due to
its unconcealed ambitions to build a Trans-Caucasian
barrier against Russian influence and wrest energy
pipelines and terminals away from Russia, this would also
strike at one of Russia’s major trading partners and at some
of the most flourishing trade relationships that Moscow
currently enjoys. Furthermore, Turkey let it be known that
it might bar Russia from its huge defense contracts. And
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Russian arms manufacturers actually expect such an
167
outcome and see little prospect for that market.
In short, Russian opportunism and its strictly
short-term horizon—raising ready cash from defense
sales—threatened some of its most vital interests and
security. As a sign of what Russia stood to lose from the deal,
originally announced in late 1996, Pavel Felgengauer,
Russia’s leading defense correspondent, wrote that in
December 1996 Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller
offered to prevent NATO enlargement from becoming a new
168
dividing line in Europe or a threat against Russia.
But the Russian arms traders and the all-powerful banks that
finance and control arms trade were not interested. They had
something more important than enlargement on their
minds—profits. The Cyprus deal is strictly a commercial one
which will bring huge returns to middle-men. Arms shipments
to Turkey, on the other hand, only cover previous Russian
government debt. And such deals do not bring any substantial
profits to traders. The Russian arms trade lobby wanted the
Cyprus contract as soon as possible in order to secure
government-guaranteed commercial credit to the arms
industry.Lending rates are falling in Russia and the earlier a
169
good loan can be clinched, the better.

Although there is clearly a disposition to see Turkey as
the enemy, as an expansionist power, and as a leader in the
attempt to penetrate Transcaucasia and the Black Sea,
Russia cannot directly confront it yet. But the Black Sea
Fleet clearly views Turkey as a threat and seeks parity with
170
it.
Furthermore, the crisis became internationalized.
Turkey and Israel became close military partners, and
Israel trained Turkish pilots in attacks against these
missiles. Britain and the United States became alarmed at
the military and intelligence issues involved if Cyprus got
Russian technicians to run its air defenses. Moscow also
warned Israel to desist from involvement. Finally,
Washington has now directly brought its pressure to bear in

494

attempting to negotiate a settlement with Greece and
Turkey. The pursuit of short-term and crass opportunism
on Russia’s part frightened Cyprus and Greece, neither of
whom wants a conflict. Thus they decided to take delivery in
November 1998 rather than July, ostensibly because they
171
did not want to disrupt the tourist season.
Since then, Russia has reiterated its intention to fulfill
every part of the contract as far as training, installing, and
operating those weapons until the Cypriots learn how to use
them. Moreover, there are reports of a long-term defense
accord, presumably entailing further sales to Cyprus and/or
172
Greece. At the time of this writing, the situation remains
unclear. Russia may get its money, but it is not certain the
weapons will be delivered or that there will be further
contracts. On the other hand, the arms might indeed go to
Cyprus with unforeseeable consequences. But what is
already certain is that an arms race has begun in the
Eastern Mediterranean with Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus
all racing to modernize and reequip their armed forces. And
this arms race takes place in an atmosphere of growing
Turkish fears of being surrounded on all sides by Russian
missiles in the hands of Moscow’s partners and its
173
enemies. We abetted this by cascading surplus weapons
in Europe to Greece and Turkey after the CFE treaty went
into effect, and these new Russian sales add more fuel to the
fire. In either case, one may ask what lasting long-term
benefits will accrue to Russia from this adventure compared
to the costs involved.
Russia and the Peace Process.
Although Moscow certainly does not want a new war in
the area since another Arab-Israeli war will only intensify
Washington’s dominance in the area, its policies towards
the peace process are hardly helpful. This does not mean
Moscow is the main author of the reasons for its present
crisis, but its policies are now inimical to the cause of peace.
Israel does not trust it, hopes of a rapprochement with
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Jerusalem have been dashed, and Moscow has no ideas to
offer any of the parties.
It did not have to be this way. There were forces in the
Russian government, namely the military, led in this case
by former Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev and
more recently by Security Council chairman Andrei
Kokoshin, who sought a lasting strategic dialogue, if not
partnership with Israel. They very much sought this
dialogue on behalf of Russian defense industry which saw a
big opportunity to work with Israel’s highly regarded
defense and high-tech industries to gain access to those
systems, Western technology and know-how, and new
markets. Israel is making a fortune on revamping old Soviet
arms, and the Russian defense industry clearly wanted
access to this process. Accordingly, Grachev signed an
174
agreement with Israel in 1995. Kokoshin, too, wanted to
continue this partnership and strategic dialogue with Israel
175
to benefit the Russian defense industry.
However, Russian proliferation towards Iran and
support for Iraq and Syria’s rearmament has made it
difficult, if not impossible, to continue this partnership, and
176
Israel has suspended economic cooperation with Russia.
Kokoshin was fired from the Security Council when
Primakov became Prime Minister, although this was
apparently done for internal reasons connected with the
struggle for power in Russia. Still, Primakov’s policies have
made it quite impossible for Jerusalem and Russia to effect
a rapprochement, and this seems to have been Primakov’s
goal. For example, when Israel advanced a new proposal for
leaving Southern Lebanon through direct bilateral
negotiations with Beirut, he supported Syria’s policy of
quashing this attempt and retaining Damascus’
protectorate over Lebanon; in other words, preserving a
177
source of tension in the area. Primakov also gratuitously
stated that, once the Palestinian Authority proclaims
statehood, Russia would recognize it. Furthermore, Russia
quite clearly is trying to associate itself with the EU as
leaders in the peace process. This gambit won no plaudits in
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Israel which regards both Russia and the EU as prejudiced,
178
and not impartial, bystanders.
These actions, coupled
with the mendacious policy towards proliferation and Iran,
led Israel to lobby the U.S. Congress to impose sanctions on
Russia, a prospect that clearly antagonized Moscow and did
not help it or Washington in their mutual relations. This
became especially true when Iran tested its Shihab-3
missile made with Russian help and demonstrated its
growing missile capabilities.
Here again Primakov sacrificed economic advantage
since Israel is Moscow’s largest trading partner in the area,
and the possibility of aiding the defense establishment by
this strategic partnership, in favor of a policy whose roots
date back to Brezhnev of orchestrating an anti-American
and anti-Israeli bloc among Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The
evident purpose of this policy seems only to force
Washington to let Russia back into the Middle East by
raising the high degree of tension that already exists there.
Bereft of constructive ideas about the peace process and
unwilling to invest in confidence-building measures or
policies, Russia seems intent on playing a spoiler’s role in
the area’s potentially most dangerous conflict. Yet there is
little chance of it successfully persuading Washington to
admit it to the peace process in any meaningful way.
In October 1998 its weak position was exposed when
Yasser Arafat called for Russia to participate in the October
15, 1998, negotiations with Israel and the United States at
the Wye Plantation. Arafat, appealing to Russia as co-chair
of the Madrid conference of 1991, the formal genesis of the
peace process, clearly wanted Moscow’s full support for his
goals of increased autonomy and eventual statehood. But
Moscow can only support him to a limited degree. Although
there is clearly much sympathy for his position and the
Palestinian cause in the Duma and the government, other
179
considerations also apply.
Moscow’s utter prostration and need for foreign support
limits the degree to which it can directly confront the United
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States on a vital issue. Thus Ivanov was quoted as saying
that the creation of an independent Palestinian state,
“cannot contradict Israel’s national interests, especially in
180
the sphere of security.”
Presumably this is not exactly
what Arafat wanted to hear from Moscow. While Moscow
stated a request to participate in the Wye Plantation
negotiations, at the same time it clearly had no new ideas to
181
offer to either side.
But while this stance may not cause
problems with Washington over an issue where Moscow
cannot really exercise much leverage, it does not seem
calculated to win over the suspicious Israelis or to convince
the Palestinians that Moscow can be relied upon. As in
much of Russian foreign policy, we see here a defensive
demand to be taken seriously, a plea which in itself betrays
the fact that here, as in Kosovo for example, Moscow is
“irrelevant” to vital U.S. decisions and policy-making
mechanisms.
Conclusions.
Unquestionably Primakov and his policies have been
lionized at home. But it is unclear to what degree they have
made Russia more secure, although some elites now feel
better about Russia. However, tangible economic and
political gains have been sacrificed, and it is not clear that
Primakov’s victories have achieved more than to annoy the
United States and Israel. He certainly owes much to what
could be the most inept U.S. policy in the Gulf in several
years. While he has maneuvered most ably on the Russian
and world stage, he oversees a still ruined estate whose
management did nothing in the time he gave it to improve
conditions or exploit the gains he made.
Moreover, his policies have abetted some of the most
dangerous trends in world politics, specifically the diffusion
of nuclear and other military technologies. From a U.S.
point of view, these policies threaten our allies and our
strategy which places a premium on foreign presence.
Conventional, not to say nuclear, or chemical, or biological,
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warheads in the hands of an enemy in the region immensely
complicates any hope of using Middle Eastern lodgements
as forward bases. And as missile capabilities spread, they
will embrace Europe and North Africa, with similar results
for us. But this not a reason for Moscow to rejoice either.
Those capabilities also put more and more of Russia’s land
mass at risk. Although Primakov and Yeltsin have
repeatedly denied that they would be crazy enough to
permit these capabilities to spread to states like Iran, that is
exactly what they have done. Here, too, ultimately Russian
policy’s strength lies essentially in its capacity for negation
of American and local initiatives that would possibly bring
peace to the region and help calm Russia’s own troubled
southern frontier. As in the past, Russia has chosen power
and prestige over true security and lasting commercial
benefit for itself and its peoples. However, the old game
seems to offer little but future danger to Russia. After all, if
the present trend towards maximizing the state’s status
and reputation abroad grows at the expense of its ability to
provide for domestic security, Russia, too, could then be
burned in the fire that its policies have helped to stoke.
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